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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation: Environmental Change
Economic activity has always altered societies’ physical and biological environment.
These human-induced changes have grown with population density and technical capa-
bility. In recent times humankind’s impact on the natural environment has not only
changed in quality and quantity, but also the time scale on which its actions affect the
physical and biological surroundings has increased significantly. I want to point out this
phenomenon at the example of global climate change. It is probably one of the most
serious human induced alterations of the natural environment discovered so far. The
background for this so called ‘global warming problem’ is that the atmosphere of the
earth naturally traps incoming solar energy. This process results in a higher average
temperature on the planet’s surface. The effect is mainly caused by water vapor and
different atmospheric gases. Due to the resemblance of the radiative forcing effect of
these gases to that of a greenhouse, these gases are typically classified as greenhouse
gases. Without the natural greenhouse effect, today’s average surface temperature of
the planet would be approximately 33◦C colder (Roedl 2000). As a result of human eco-
nomic activity, accumulation of these greenhouse gases in the atmosphere has increased
over the past centuries and, in particular, over the last decades. The most important
factor in this human induced accumulation is the increase in the atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentration, mainly caused by fossil fuel burning and deforestation. Another
example for an even more efficient greenhouse gas, which appears, however, in lower
concentrations in the atmosphere, is methane. Methane is also emitted in fossil fuel
burning but, most importantly, as well in cattle and rice agriculture and from land-
1
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fills.1 Such an increase in greenhouse gas concentration causes an (additional) increase
in global surface temperature, as well as a change in other climatic determinants.
Considering different scenarios for future economic activity, the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) predicts with respect to the baseline of 1990 an increase in av-
erage global surface temperature between 1.4 to 5.8 ◦C by the end of the century, with a
disproportional temperature increase on land areas (IPCC 2001b). While small amounts
of climate change can proof beneficial for some regions and sectors, adverse effects are
predicted to dominate and to increase with the magnitude of change. Adverse effects
include sea level rise, threats to human health, decrease in ecological productivity and in-
creased precipitation variability causing floods and droughts (IPCC 2001e, IPCC 2001a).
Another large scale change of a climate determinant that could be triggered by global
warming, is a shut-down of the northern arm of the Gulf Stream. Such a process would
be irreversible, and bring a significant cooling and change in the precipitation pattern
for Northwestern Europe.2 Other examples of irreversible processes that can be caused
by global warming include an irreversible disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet,
resulting in a permanent rise of the sea level (IPCC 2001e, 77), and an acceleration
of biodiversity loss (IPCC 2001a, 53). The irreversibility involved in these potential
changes highlights the time scale in which current actions, and emissions within a cou-
ple of decades, can alter our natural environment. However, also without invoking
irreversibility, the example of global warming points out that environmental change
and feedback, caused by today’s decisions, affect a long time horizon. For example,
the thermal expansion of the oceans and melting of the ice will continue at least for
several hundred years after a stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations has been
achieved (IPCC 2001b, 17). An additional characteristic of climate change is the high
degree of uncertainty involved in most quantitative estimates concerning the effects of
global warming and the amount of global warming needed to trigger other changes in
the climate system (IPCC 2001b, 30 et seqq.).
While climate change alone would certainly be motivation enough for this study, a
similar reasoning on time scale and uncertainty holds true for many other economy-
environment interactions. Such examples include biodiversity loss, depletion of the
ozone layer, potential impacts of genetically modified organisms, ecosystem impact of
1For an overview of the different causes of global warming compare with increasing detailedness IPCC
(2001d), IPCC (2001e) and IPCC (2001c). A recent study by Keppler, Hamilton, Braß & Ro¨ckmann
(2006) suggests that also the production of methane in intact plants and from detached leaves plays a
more important role in the global methane budget than previously assumed.
2A recent study by Bryden, Longworth & Cunningham (2005) indicates that the volume of water
carried by the Atlantic Conveyor Belt to Northwestern Europe has possibly dropped already by 30%.
2
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invasive species, nuclear waste disposal, watershed protection and climate regulation
functions of tropical rain forests, and soil degradation. There are three stylized facts
that can be derived from these examples. First, there are important settings in which a
careful consideration of the long term is essential for an adequate determination of costs
and benefits going along with economic activities that cause changes to the physical
and biological environment. Second, in the mentioned examples, benefits gained from
most economic activities3 are comparatively short-term as opposed to the long-term
repercussions on welfare through the induced environmental change. This time structure
makes it extremely important, to carefully think about weighing the future as opposed
to the present in order to avoid a systematic bias between (short-term) benefits and
(long-term) costs. And third, the magnitude of contemporary benefits from economic
activity is generally much better known than the highly uncertain magnitude (or even
character) of environmental changes and their repercussion on welfare in the long run.
Therefore, a careful consideration concerning the evaluation of uncertainty associated
with the long-term consequences of environmental change is a challenge of high priority.
Treating either the time structure or the uncertainty structure in the economic framework
of balancing costs against benefits inattentively, is likely to bias policy recommendations
in a systematic way in favor or against environmental interventions.
1.2 Conceptual Background
In economic theory, welfare is usually characterized by a function, or a more general
mathematical relation, that allows to compare different scenarios, and to evaluate which
choice in a given set of possibilities is best. The process of evaluating a particular
scenario or project is called cost benefit analysis. To this end, cost benefit analysis has
to identify different determinants of welfare, and make them comparable at a given point
of time. In such an analysis, the environment serves as a source of human welfare in a
manifold way. First, this happens by immediate appreciation of environmental amenities
such as clean air, scenic views, outdoor activities or appreciation of biodiversity. Second,
our physical and biological surroundings give rise to more indirect service flows, like for
example, the regulation of hydrological cycles or climate regulating functions. Third,
our natural environment provides resources that enter into the economic production
3That is, fossil fuel burning, agriculture, deforestation and landfill storage mentioned above as
some of the major causes for the increase of greenhouse gas concentrations, or the usage of CFC’s
or genetically modified organisms and again deforestation as major causes for the other mentioned
examples.
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process. All of these contributions to human welfare are captured under the concept of
use value.4 In addition to these use-values, one considers as well non-use (or intrinsic)
values that generally arise from ethical, moral or spiritual considerations. Moreover,
cost benefit analysis does not only have to compare different outcomes at a given point
of time, but also has to make comparisons when costs and benefits occur at different
points of time. As it was observed in the preceding section, a project that involves
fossil fuel burning or deforestation might go along with immediate benefits, as well as
an unfavorable alteration of the environment that feeds back into the welfare function
in the long run. Therefore, an important determinant in a cost benefit analysis is the
weight given to future sources of well-being as opposed to the current. These weights,
assigned to different points of time, are usually characterized by means of a (social)
discount rate.
The social discount rate, and thus, the weight given to future consumption and service
streams, is usually composed of two factors. The first is the so called rate of pure time
preference. It characterizes society’s impatience or intrinsic devaluation of the future,
and is typically an exogenous parameter to the economic theory of cost benefit analysis.
While usually positive rates of pure time preference are employed, some share the point
of view prominently expressed by Ramsey (1928, 543) that a pure rate of time prefer-
ence is “ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination”.
The second determinant of the social discount rate is incorporating evaluative effects of
economic growth and decreasing marginal utility. More precisely, it is characterized by
the growth rate which is weighted with a term that depicts society’s desire to smooth
consumption over time. This term is founded on a simple economic consideration relat-
ing the technological possibility of increasing produced consumption over time through
investment, and the willingness to forego consumption in some period in order to have
more in another. Dasgupta (2001, 183 et seqq.) works out that this consideration,
in combination with a decline of long-term economic growth caused by global climate
change, could increase the weight that should be given to future consumption and service
streams. His reasoning implies that the optimal social discount rate would be falling
over time. As constant discount rates go along with an exponential decline of weight
given to the future, falling discount rates, which yield a more moderate decline of future-
weight, are often regarded as favorable. However, applying such declining discount rates
4Another (indirect) use value which is often mentioned in this context is the so called option or quasi
option value. It is introduced to capture the value of an uncertain potential use of natural resources in
the future, when time is not considered explicitly. However, in a dynamic framework, as employed in
this dissertation, these option values fall together with uncertain use values in the future (and possibly
also with future non-use values as stated next).
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in project evaluation can result in a continuous revision of the optimal project, due only
to the passage of time and not to any real changes in the project or its circumstances.5
This phenomenon has been termed time inconsistency. Most approaches that suggest
declining discount rates on the basis of intergenerational justice or observed behavior,
lead to such a time inconsistency. However, more recently, different approaches that ra-
tionalize time consistent declining discount rates under uncertainty have been developed
(Weitzman 1998, Azfar 1999, Dasgupta & Maskin 2005). In relation to climate change,
Nordhaus’ (1993,1994) integrated assessment model for climate change and its critical
discussions and alternative assessments have shown the importance of carefully quanti-
fying the social discount rate for the derivation of an optimal greenhouse gas abatement
path (see e.g. Toth 1995, Plambeck, Hope & Anderson 1997). In particular, Plambeck
et al. (1997, 85) point out that a reduction of the pure rate of time preference from 3%,
as assumed by Nordhaus (1993), to 0%, would result in an optimal abatement path that
cuts emissions by 50% from the baseline to the year 2100, as opposed to 10% in the
assessment of Nordhaus (1993).
The relation between current and future well-being is the central focus of a sustainable
development.6 With respect to the discussion on discount rates in the preceding para-
graph, let me remark that Pezzey (2006) refers to discount rates that fall over time as
‘sustainable discount rates’. Van den Bergh & Hofkes (1998, 11) describe the common
denominator of sustainability theories as the acknowledgment of the “long-run mutual
dependence of environmental quality and resource availability on the one hand, and
economic development on the other hand”. In this context two different notions of sus-
tainability are generally distinguished. On the one hand, there is the weak sustainability
paradigm which is mainly concerned with the preservation of a non-decreasing overall
welfare. To this end, advocates of the notion of weak sustainability allow for a substitu-
tion between environmental and man-made capital. On the other hand, the paradigm of
strong sustainability requires a non-declining value or physical amount of natural capital
and its service flows. The latter demand of non-declining natural capital and service
flows, is based on the viewpoint that substitution possibilities between man-made goods
and natural resources and service flows are either limited or ethically indefensible. While
5This problem does not apply to the mentioned reasoning set forth by Dasgupta (2001, 183 et seqq.),
where the falling discount rates are implied by a change in future economic development.
6The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland report) de-
fines: “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compro-
mising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). Note that a broad
definition of a sustainable development also includes a sociological dimension, which will not be part
of my analysis.
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traditionally the economic analysis of sustainability has a strong focus on capital and
its substitutability in production, the importance of incorporating preferences has been
pointed out as well. Recently, Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2002) mapped the differ-
ence between the two mentioned paradigms of sustainability into an assumption on the
substitutability between the two classes of goods in the welfare function.
Another evaluative concern that is closely related to the concept of sustainability, is
the demand of a precautionary handling of the uncertainty going along with the long-
term environmental changes discussed in section 1.1. In this regard, Hahn & Sunstein
(2005, 1) predict that “over the coming decades, the increasingly popular ‘precautionary
principle’ is likely to have a significant impact on policies all over the world”. A fre-
quently cited definition of the precautionary principle is that “where an activity raises
threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”
(Wingspread declaration, Raffensperger & Tickner 1999, 8). However, a major difficulty
in the interpretation and application of the precautionary principle is the vagueness in
its formulations. This vagueness gives rise to criticisms which are most prominently
expressed by Hahn & Sunstein (2005, 1) who state that “the precautionary principle
does not help individuals or nations make difficult choices in a non-arbitrary way. Taken
seriously, it can be paralyzing, providing no direction at all”. The authors continue that
“In contrast, balancing costs against benefits can offer the foundation of a principled
approach for making difficult decisions”.
Let me finally address some important details of the standard modeling framework
in environmental economics. For models under certainty, the standard approach is to
depict overall welfare as a sum of per period welfare. The underlying assumption, al-
lowing for such a welfare representation, is known as additive separability over time.
In this model, the willingness of the decision-maker to substitute consumption between
one period and another, can be characterized by the (inverse of the) elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution. An additional assumption, that is commonly adopted, is that
the functions describing the welfare derived from different outcomes coincide up to a
discount rate between different periods. For decision makers with an infinite planning
horizon, Koopmans (1960) has shown that this structure is implied by a stationarity
axiom, which assumes that the mere passage of time does not change preferences. Such
an axiomatization depends crucially on the strict positivity of the discount rate.
For models dealing with uncertainty, the standard framework is the expected utility
model. Here, a decision maker weights the different possible outcomes with a proba-
bility distribution, and evaluates a scenario that gives rise to a particular probability
6
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distribution by its expected welfare. For an atemporal setting, such an approach to
evaluate uncertain choices has been axiomatized most prominently by von Neumann &
Morgenstern (1944). In this framework, the decision maker’s willingness to smooth con-
sumption over different risk-states characterizes his degree of risk aversion. In models
where time and uncertainty is represented simultaneously, the standard is to combine
these two frameworks described above by assuming the structure of an intertemporally
additive expected utility model. In this framework, evaluation of certain consumption
streams is obtained, as before, by taking a discounted sum of per period welfare. If
uncertainty prevails, the different possible outcome paths are weighted with probabili-
ties. Then a scenario, giving rise to a particular distribution over possible consumption
paths, is evaluated by its expected welfare.
A limitation of the latter model is that two characteristics of welfare, which are in
principle independent of each other, are confined to a one-to-one relationship. Precisely,
the (Arrow-Pratt) coefficient of relative risk aversion has to be equal to the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This implies that a decision maker’s willingness
to substitute consumption between different periods, has to coincide with his propen-
sity to ‘substitute consumption between different risk states’. Note that the definition
of intertemporal substitutability and risk aversion is straightforward only in the one
commodity setting. Kreps & Porteus (1978) developed a more general model, extending
von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) axiomatic approach to a multiperiod setting (not
assuming additive separability over time). Within this generalized framework, Epstein
& Zin (1989) show for the one commodity case that intertemporal substitutability and
risk aversion can be disentangled. This disentanglement in the Epstein-Zin framework
goes along with an intrinsic7 preference for either early or late resolution of uncertainty.
The latter implies that, in such a model, uncertainty is no longer expressed immediately
over different consumption paths, but has to be stated recursively over periodic outcomes
(temporal lotteries). That is, uncertainty at the beginning of a period is expressed as a
joint probability distribution over the outcomes of that period and over the probability
distribution prevailing at the beginning of the next period. The more standard mod-
eling approach is to depict uncertainty directly as a joint probability distribution over
the outcomes in all periods.
7Intrinsic means not instrumental, i.e. that the information derived from an earlier resolution of
uncertainty cannot be used to improve (expected) outcomes in the future.
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1.3 Key Issues
In this dissertation, I develop insights and tools concerning the evaluation of long-term
trade-offs between economic activity and its environmental repercussions. My study
concentrates on theoretical aspects of the evaluation functional characterizing preference
and welfare. I focus in particular on the weight given to the short versus the long run,
and the incorporation of uncertainty. The results render contributions to the fields of
environmental economics and decision theory, as well as to the more specific research
areas of sustainability and cost benefit analysis. This section gives a brief overview over
the key issues addressed in my dissertation.
The first contribution relates the strength of the notion of sustainability to the sub-
stitutability in welfare between environmental service flows and produced consumption
streams. I analyze how the different notions of sustainability change the weight that
is given to consumption and services in the long run. To this end, I study a stylized
growth scenario, where the growth rate of produced consumption streams dominates
that of environmental service flows. I show that if the strength of sustainability is only
translated into the substitutability between environmental service streams and produced
consumption, a strong notion of sustainability will generally result in lower weights given
to long-run service and consumption streams than a weak notion of sustainability.
The second contribution is derived for the same stylized growth model. I find that in
such a multi-commodity setting the optimal social discount rates reflect the difference
in growth, as well as the degree of substitutability between the two classes of goods.
These determinants are mirrored not only in the magnitudes of the social discount rates,
but also in their time development. I point out that some degrees of substitutability can
cause social discount rates to decline over time, while others can cause social discount
rates to grow, both within a time consistent framework.
The third contribution formalizes an important aspect of the precautionary principle.
It concerns the willingness to undergo precautionary measures in order to prevent a
threat of harm. I argue that the concern of the advocates of the precautionary principle
is not captured by the standard model of risk aversion, based on an intertemporally
additive expected utility framework. Taking time structure more seriously, I introduce
a concept called intertemporal risk aversion, and show its immediate relation to the
concerns of the precautionary principle. This notion of uncertainty attitude is carried
by standard axioms of decision theory, including those of von Neumann & Morgenstern
(1944). Moreover, in contrast to the notion of standard risk aversion, the definition of
intertemporal risk aversion immediately holds for the multi-commodity setting.
The fourth contribution of my dissertation is to work out the general time consistent
8
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model, which falls back to additively separable welfare over time for certain consumption
paths, and to the von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) setting in the atemporal case.
These are the most prominent specifications for the respective framing scenarios, and
I show how a careful unification allows to disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal
substitutability. Moreover, I show how a stationary aggregation of welfare over time
can be axiomatized in a finite planning horizon, without the assumption of a positive
discount rate.
The fifth contribution analyzes the reasons for an intrinsic preference for the timing
of uncertainty resolution in recursive utility models. I relate such a preference to the
functions characterizing risk attitude and intertemporal substitutability. Moreover, I
work out that a disentanglement of a decision maker’s attitude with respect to risk and
his propensity to substitute consumption between different periods is possible, without
assuming an intrinsic preference for an early or late resolution of uncertainty. This result
implies that it is possible to disentangle (standard) risk aversion and intertemporal
substitutability also in a model, where uncertainty is expressed non-recursively over
consumption paths.
The sixth contribution relates to the choice of the pure rate of time preference. I offer
axioms under which an intertemporally risk averse decision maker chooses the pure
rate of time preference as zero. These axioms concern the decision maker’s stationarity
of risk attitude and his attitude with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution.
While, under these axioms, a decision maker is not free to devalue the future due to pure
impatience, he gives reduced weight to welfare that is uncertain. When uncertainty is
increasing over time, this fact has some resemblance to discounting. However, the more
a decision-maker can know about the future, the more weight it will carry.
1.4 Methodology
Part I of this dissertation employs a stylized growth model, which takes as given a
functional representation of welfare that is additive over continuous time. The assump-
tion of continuous time allows to adopt differential calculus to analyze the behavior of
discount rates over time. I introduce the concept of good-specific discount rates as gen-
erators of marginal utility propagation. The latter concept, taken from physics, proves
useful to interpret and compare different integral representations of cost benefit function-
als, corresponding to different views on discounting. Having introduced the conceptual
background, I reduce the general welfare function to a parametric form depicting the
difference between a preference for weak and strong sustainability in an as simple as
9
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possible form that still allows to derive the main insights. In this model, the (certain)
consumption levels of the two classes of goods are represented by real numbers.
In contrast, parts II and III are axiomatic approaches to long-term evaluation, deriv-
ing functional representations only from underlying assumptions on preferences. Again,
part II derives the simplest model that is general enough to introduce and relate the rel-
evant concepts. Then, part III starts out by extending the concepts to the most general
setting in this study. Subsequently, I work out desirable restrictions that cut back on the
model’s complexity. In part II, objects of choice are pairs of certain present outcomes
and uncertain future outcomes. Certain outcomes are depicted as elements of a compact
metric space, and uncertain outcomes are represented by (Borel) probability measures
on the latter. Part III makes use of a recursive extension of this ‘certain×uncertain’
setting to a multiperiod framework, as developed by Kreps & Porteus (1978) (temporal
lotteries). It also analyzes the simpler approach where probabilities are defined directly
on consumption paths. Part II and III adopt a discrete time framework. The simpler
structure is considered preferable to introduce the new concept of intertemporal risk
aversion, without the rather technical aspects of continuous time analysis in recursive
utility models. As in the first part, I introduce a concept borrowed from physics, a so
called gauge. It describes a degree of freedom in a system, here my preference represen-
tations, that can be exploited in different ways. Instead of eliminating, i.e. normalizing,
this degree of freedom right at the outset of the model, the idea is to explicitly analyze
this freedom. This approach proves helpful to derive a deeper understanding of the
theory.
1.5 Outline
Part I of my dissertation analyzes the relation between a preference for strong versus
weak sustainability and the optimal social discount rate. Anticipating the resulting
non-constancy of the social discount rate, chapter 2 briefly reviews related literature
on declining discount rates. Offering an interpretation as generators of marginal utility
propagation, the concept of social discount rates is extended to the multi-commodity
setting. For the one commodity setting, I briefly work out the well known dependence
of the social discount rate on growth and intertemporal substitutability. Chapter 3
discusses the concepts of weak and strong sustainability, and relates it to the degree
of substitutability in the welfare function between man-made goods and environmental
service and consumption streams. Taking a closer look at the situation where consump-
tion of produced goods grows at a faster rate than the consumption of environmental
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services and amenities, I work out how the limitedness in substitutability translates
into modifications of the optimal social discount rates for the respective goods. Finally,
chapter 4 elaborates how the good-specific social discount rates have to be employed
in the cost-benefit evaluation of a (small) project. It relates the perspective of good-
specific discount rates to an evaluation with a universal discount rate. Moreover, the
cost-benefit evaluation is related to an evaluation by means of (imaginary) complete
future markets.
Part II of my dissertation introduces the concept of intertemporal risk aversion and
relates it to an important concern of the precautionary principle. In chapter 5, I intro-
duce the precautionary principle, discuss related literature on choice under uncertainty,
and motivate my approach to formalize the willingness to undergo preventive action.
Chapter 6 develops the axiomatic background for the preference representation under-
lying the subsequent study. A particular feature of my representation is that it allows
for different choices of the representing Bernoulli utility function8 (for the same un-
derlying preferences). I show how different normalizations (gauges) of Bernoulli utility
correspond to different representations found in the literature. Chapter 7 introduces
the concept of intertemporal risk aversion, and relates it to the attempt of disentangling
intertemporal risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability. I show that in a multi-
commodity setting the latter coefficients depend on the particular commodity under
observation, and how this corresponds to a dependence on the choice of the Bernoulli
utility function (gauge). Intertemporal risk aversion, on the contrary, is shown to be
gauge independent. I relate the concept of intertemporal risk aversion to precaution
and the concern of preventive action, and give a reinterpretation in terms of risk aver-
sion with respect to welfare gains and losses. Finally, I introduce quantitative measures
of intertemporal risk aversion and elaborate conditions for uniqueness. To focus the
discussion, the axiomatizations and representations in chapters 5 to 7 use a simplified
framework featuring only two periods and stationary preferences. Moreover, a zero rate
of pure time preference is assumed.
Part III of my dissertation extends and refines the model of intertemporal risk aver-
sion. First, chapter 8 axiomatizes the general representation for an arbitrary finite time
horizon and non-stationary preferences, and adapts the axiomatic characterization of
intertemporal risk aversion. Starting from this general perspective, chapters 9 and 10
analyze axioms that simplify the representation. In chapter 9, I examine different sta-
8Bernoulli utility describes a cardinal function that, by itself, represents choice over certain, one
period outcomes. In combination with uncertainty and intertemporal aggregation rules, it serves as the
bases for more general evaluation.
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tionarity assumptions. In my finite time horizon setup, there is no canonical way to
impose stationarity. While stationarity with respect to the evaluation of certain out-
comes is straightforward, an axiom yielding stationarity with respect to risk attitude is
more involved. Two alternative axioms are introduced. The first yields a constancy of
the functionals that evaluate uncertainty in every period. The second axiom is a more
natural extension of the stationarity axiom for certain outcome paths and the intuition
that the mere passage of time should not change preferences. Chapter 10 analyzes a
decision maker’s preference with respect to the resolution of uncertainty. I relate the lat-
ter to the functions characterizing intertemporal substitutability and risk attitude, and
elaborate the reasons underlying such a timing preference. I critically discuss the mo-
tivations for a non-trivial timing preference found in the related literature. I show how
indifference with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution allows to simplify the
representation. I point out that the derived model allows to disentangle standard risk
aversion from intertemporal substitutability in a non-recursive intertemporal expected
utility framework. Finally, I combine assumptions on timing preference with assump-
tions on stationarity and elaborate implications for discounting. Chapter 11 concludes
by summarizing the conceptual contributions, pointing out further implications and
different applications, and, finally, suggesting various extensions of the study.
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Chapter 2
Social Discounting
2.1 Introduction
In the first part of my dissertation I analyze how limited substitutability in consumption
between environmental services and produced goods affects the social discount rates, and
the weights given to future consumption streams. The study is intimately linked with
two important aspects of sustainability. First, the weight given to future consumption is
the fundamental concern linking economic modeling to the definition of a sustainable de-
velopment as a “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). And second,
the substitutability between environmental services and produced consumption is the
most important distinction between the concepts of weak and strong sustainability.
My study considers a stylized growth model where the growth rate of produced con-
sumption dominates that of environmental service streams. I generalize the concept of
social discount rates to the multi-commodity setting and elaborate how social discount
rates are affected by such an uneven growth. I find that the social discount rate of
the environmental good, which becomes relatively more scarce over time, gets a mark
down, while the rate of the produced consumption stream receives a mark up. The
more challenging findings concern the behavior of the social discount rates over time.
It turns out that, if the two classes of goods are of moderately limited substitutability
in consumption,1 both discount rates decline over time. The corresponding specification
1By moderately limited substitutability I denote the region where welfare can be derived from
consuming only one of the two classes of goods, but mixtures are generally preferred to extremes. On
the other hand I denote the region where ‘positive welfare’ cannot be gained by consuming only one of
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of welfare closely relates to the concept of weak sustainability and the result seems to
substantiate a demand for falling discount rates by environmentalists. In this respect,
Pezzey (2006) even defines sustainable discount rates as falling discount rates. How-
ever, a surprise comes from analyzing the situation where the elasticity of substitution
between the two classes of goods is smaller than one, and substitutability is strongly
limited. This is a welfare specification that is closely related to the notion of strong
sustainability. I find that in such a setting both social discount rates grow over time.
Moreover, this growth is strong enough to imply that the weight given to consumption
and environmental services in the long run becomes smaller than under moderate lim-
itedness in substitutability, even when the environmental service stream decreases in
absolute and relative turns.
I explain that the described time behavior of the social discount rates connects to a
finding by Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2002), who analyze the value share of man-made
consumption in a comparable growth scenario. Furthermore, my study closely relates
to a paper by Weitzman (1994) on an ‘environmental discount rate’ and its criticism by
Arrow et al. (1995, 140). Weitzman (1994) presents a reasoning how the consideration of
environmental amenities being degraded by production or being luxury goods, can lead
to reduced and falling discounting rates. However, he does not model the environmental
good or its value development explicitly. In particular, the interpretation of the derived
quantity as a proper discount rate is criticized by Arrow et al. (1995, 140), for its lack
of an explicit conversion of the environmental benefits into equivalents of produced
consumption. My study can be seen as a different approach to model the relation
between the development of environmental service streams and produced consumption.
Unlike Weitzman, I explicitly model preferences and both classes of goods. This allows
to take up the concern of Arrow et al. (1995, 140) with respect to Weitzman’s (1994)
work. My model does not substantiate Weitzman’s (1994) result. But opposed to Arrow
et al.’s (1995, 140) comment, it shows that, also when approaching the evaluation the
way requested by the authors, a similar environmental reasoning can affect the time
behavior of the discount rate.
More generally my model relates to a broad field of literature that motivates and works
with declining (hyperbolic) discount rates for different reasons. An excellent review on
declining social discount rates is found in Groom, Hepburn, Koundouri & Pearce (2005,
7 et seqq.) who summarize and critically review the literature on effects that can cause
optimal social discount rates to decline over time. A survey on experiments indicating
that observed behavior is better described by the use of falling discount rates is found
the consumption streams as the region of strongly limited in substitutability.
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in Frederick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002, 378). From a different perspective,
Chichilnisky (1996) and Li & Lo¨fgren (2000) develop models of hyperbolic discounting
that are based on considerations of intergenerational justice. A problem with the use of
hyperbolic discount rates is that these can lead to a continuous revision of the (formerly)
optimal plan, a phenomenon called time inconsistency. One way to ‘solve’ this problem
is to look at the planning process as a non–cooperative game against one’s future selves
or future generations (Phelps & Pollak 1968, Arrow 1999). Another access to this
problem is set forth by Weitzman (1998), Azfar (1999) and Dasgupta & Maskin (2005)
who rationalize hyperbolic discounting in the case of uncertainty. In a context closer to
my own Gollier (2002) developed sufficient conditions for hyperbolic discounting in an
uncertain world of economic growth. From the perspective of this literature, my study
provides an explanation for time consistent evaluation with non-constant social discount
rates under certainty. Let me finally remark that in 2003 hyperbolic discount rates also
made their way into applied policy, when the British Green Book started to prescribe
hyperbolic discount rates for the evaluation of long-term projects (HM Treasury 2003,
97 et sqq.).
Part one of my dissertation is structured as follows. Subsequent to this introduction,
section 2.2 introduces good-specific social discount rates and factors, and offers an in-
terpretation of social discount rates as generators of marginal utility development over
time, a concept borrowed from physics. I briefly discuss the expression for social discount
rates in the standard one commodity setting. Chapter 3 analyzes how limited substi-
tutability in welfare between environmental service streams and produced consumption
affects the social discount rates in a stylized growth scenario. First, chapter 3.1 intro-
duces the reader to the concepts of weak and strong sustainability. I relate these two
concepts to different substitutability assumptions in welfare. Then, chapter 3.2 derives
a reduced form for welfare that parametrizes substitutability in a simple manner and
eliminates the effect of uniform growth on the social discount rates, which has been
discussed extensively in the literature. Chapter 3.3 derives the results concerning mag-
nitude and time behavior of social discount rates and the weight on future consumption
streams that have been mentioned earlier in this introduction. Chapter 4 explains the
cost benefit evaluation of a small project from different perspectives on discounting. In
chapter 4.1 I work out how good-specific discount rates have to be treated in the process
of evaluation and how the choice of numeraire affects the discount rate. The critique of
Arrow et al. (1995, 140) on Weitzman’s (1994) ‘environmental discount rate’ is taken
up and reviewed. Chapter 4.2 relates the social cost benefit analysis to a market based
evaluation. Finally, chapter 4.3 gives a brief summary of the results and the discussion
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in part I.
2.2 Social Discount Rates and Factors
This section derives social discount rates from the development of marginal utility over
time. It proves beneficial for later sections to do this by simultaneously introducing
social discount factors. I study the case of two (aggregate classes of) consumption goods,
however, the model is easily extended to N ∈ IN goods. The consumption quantities
of the two goods at time t are characterized by positive real numbers, denoted x1(t)
and x2(t). To simplify notation, the time argument will generally be omitted. With
xi : [0,∞) → IR I denote the consumption path for good i from the present t = 0 to
the infinite time horizon. x comprises the consumption paths of the two goods in vector
notation. Welfare is assumed to be representable in the form
U =
∞∫
0
U(x1(t), x2(t), t) dt . (2.1)
I call the function U(x1(t), x2(t), t) the (instantaneous) utility function and require it to
be twice differentiable. For a given consumption path x I write Ux(t) ≡ U(x1(t), x2(t), t).
The analogous notation applies to the derivatives of U . For notational convenience the x
will usually be dropped. I define the good specific social discount factor between time t0
and time t as the time propagator of marginal utility Dxi (t, t0) for a given consumption
path x:
Dxi (t, t0) ≡
∂U(x1,x2,t)
∂xi
|t
∂U(x1,x2,t)
∂xi
|t0
(2.2)
⇔
∂U(x1, x2, t)
∂xi
∣∣∣
t
≡ Dxi (t, t0)
∂U(x1, x2, t)
∂xi
∣∣∣
t0
, i ∈ {1, 2} .
It captures the value development over time by relating the value of an additional unit
of consumption good xi at time t to the value of an additional unit at time t0. Note that
in a discrete time setting such discount factors Dxi (t, t0) are used by Malinvaud (1974,
234).2
2In his general equilibrium setting Malinvaud calls them subjective discount factors as he consid-
ers heterogeneous agents. Looking at a social welfare framework, I call the Dxi (t, t0) social discount
factors. Further below, I show that this wording is also appropriate in the sense that, for the one
commodity standard setting, the social discount factors give rise to rates that are known as social dis-
count rates. Obviously, the discount factors Dxi (t, t0) are not the same as functions of time multiplied
to a time-independent instantaneous utility function (representing only pure time preference). Note
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To yield the discount rates that correspond to the social discount factors one can
immediately work out the relation
δi(t) = −
d
dt
Dxi (t, t0)
Dxi (t, t0)
= −
d
dt
∂U(x1,x2,t)
∂xi
∂U(x1,x2,t)
∂xi
= −
∂2U
∂t∂xi
(t) + ∂
2U
∂x2i
(t)x˙i +
∂2U
∂xj∂xi
(t)x˙j
∂U
∂xi
(t)
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. However, I also want to offer a slightly more indirect
derivation, giving rise to an interesting perspective on the relationship between discount
rates and factors. For this purpose, I have a closer look at the infinitesimal discount
factor corresponding to the infinitesimal propagator of marginal utility:
Dxi (t+ dt, t) =
∂U
∂xi
(t+ dt)
∂U
∂xi
(t)
= 1 +
∂U
∂xi
(t+ dt)− ∂U
∂xi
(t)
∂U
∂xi
(t)
= 1 +
∂2U
∂t∂xi
(t) + ∂
2U
∂x2i
(t)x˙i +
∂2U
∂xj∂xi
(t)x˙j
∂U
∂xi
(t)
dt
≡ 1− δi(x(t), x˙(t), t) dt ≡ 1− δi(t) dt
for i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j. The instantaneous change of Dxi is completely characterized
by the term δi(t) ≡ δi(x(t), x˙(t), t), which is the discount rate corresponding to D
x
i . In
physics (the negative of) δi(t) is called the generator of D
x
i as it describes – or from an
active point of view generates – the change of Dxi .
3 In the context of this study, δi(t) can
be understood as the (good-specific) generator of time development of marginal utility.
Therewith, δi(t) is the generator of value development for an additional unit of good xi
in the future.4 The finite time propagator follows from the infinitesimal one as derived
in Appendix A.1 yielding:
Dxi (t, t0) = exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
δi(x(t
′), x˙(t′), t′) dt′
)
(2.3)
= exp
∫ t
t0
∂2U
∂t′∂xi
(t′) + ∂
2U
∂x2i
(t′)x˙i +
∂2U
∂xj∂xi
(t′)x˙j
∂U
∂xi
(t′)
dt′
 .
that the Dxi (t, t0) can also be calculated if the pure time dependence of instantaneous utility is not
multiplicatively separable.
3Compare Sakurai (1985, 46 et sqq.,71 et sq.) or Goldstein (1980, chapter 9) for this view on
classical and quantum mechanics (e.g. momentum being the generator of translation). The minus
sign is introduced to meet the economic perspective of positively discounting instead of negatively
“upcounting”.
4Note that from a technical perspective the characterization of δi(t) as the generator of marginal
utility propagation is much less ambiguous than simply calling it “social” or “subjective” discount
factor (compare footnote 2).
19
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL DISCOUNTING
In models with a single (aggregate) consumption good, δi(t) is known as the (instan-
taneous) social rate of time preference or social discount rate. This stands out more
clearly if instantaneous utility is specified to the form usually applied in discount util-
ity models: U(x1, x2, t) = u(x1, x2)e
−ρt. For the moment, let me neglect the second
commodity by setting it constant.5 Then, the discount rate δ ≡ δ1 becomes
δ(t) = ρ−
∂2u
∂x21
∂u
∂x1
x˙1 = ρ−
∂ ∂u
∂x1
∂x1
x1
∂u
∂x1
x˙1
x1
= ρ+ θ(x(t)) xˆ1(x1(t),x˙1(t)) . (2.4)
This expression for the social discount rate is well known in the literature, see for example
Arrow et al. (1995, 136) or Groom et al. (2005). The constant ρ is called the pure rate of
time preference. The term θ depicts the (absolute6 of the) elasticity of marginal utility of
consumption, which is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Finally
xˆ1 denotes the growth rate of the consumption commodity. Equation (2.4) states that
the value development of an additional unit of good xi is generated by the pure rate of
time preference as well as a term proportional to the growth rate of consumption and
the elasticity of marginal utility. To work out the intuition of the second term, assume
that consumption is growing over time. Then, an individual with a decreasing marginal
valuation of consumption will evaluate an additional unit of consumption in the future
less than in the present. Therefore, he discounts consumption at a higher rate than just
pure time preference. This effect is proportional to the growth rate and the measure
θ for the relative decrease in marginal valuation as overall consumption increases. In
most macroeconomic models the function u is assumed to exhibit constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (CIES). This assumption implies that in a steady state
the term θ xˆ1 and, thus, the social discount rate δ¯ = ρ + θxˆ1 is constant. A constant
rate of discount goes along with exponential discounting of future consumption, i.e. the
discount factor in equation (2.3) becomes Dx(t, t0) = e
−δ¯t.
In general, the terms in equation (2.4) must not necessarily be constant. In fact, the
term θ xˆ1 is also used to argue for hyperbolic discounting. A discount function is said to
be hyperbolic if it is characterized by a falling instantaneous discount rate (Laibson 1997,
450). Dasgupta (2001, 183 et sqq.) works out that in the face of global climate change, a
decline in consumption growth xˆ1 would imply that social discount rates should fall over
time. It is immediate from equation (2.4) that this effect is proportional to the absolute
of the elasticity of marginal utility θ. In other words, a lower intertemporal elasticity of
5That is, x2 can be regarded as a fixed parameter of the utility function.
6As in the standard DU models diminishing but positive marginal utility in consumption is assumed,
the term −∂
2u
∂x2
1
x1/
∂u
∂x1
= θ turns out to be positive.
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substitution (θ−1) intensifies the effect that a decline in growth induces decreasing social
discount rates and thus a relatively higher weight given to the future. I will come back
to this point at the end of the next chapter. Finally, Gollier (2002) works out conditions
under which a translation of equation (2.4) into a framework with uncertainty can lead
to a falling discount rate by the term θ xˆ1. In the next chapter, I will analyze how
the explicit modeling of two commodity classes, which are limited in substitutability,
changes equation (2.4) and the weight given to future consumption. Such a weighing of
future consumption is an important concern of a sustainable development. Moreover,
when identifying the commodity classes x1 and x2 with environmental service streams
and produced consumption, the limitedness in substitution directly relates to the two
opposing concepts of weak and strong sustainability.
21
CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL DISCOUNTING
22
Chapter 3
Sustainability and Limited
Substitutability
3.1 A Preference for Weak versus Strong
Sustainability
Concerning the environment-economy interaction there are two different paradigms of
sustainability. Both of them are carried by the broad definition of a sustainable de-
velopment as formulated in the report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development (Brundtland report) which defines that “sustainable development is de-
velopment that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987). The paradigm of weak sus-
tainability translates this requirement into the demand that overall welfare should not
decline over time. To this end, advocates of the weak sustainability paradigm allow for
a substitution between man-made and environmental capital. The paradigm of strong
sustainability requires that the value (or the physical amount) of natural capital (or its
service flows) should be non-declining itself. The reason for the latter demand is that
the advocates of the strong sustainability paradigm do not believe in substitutability
between the different types of capital. Therefore, they translate the requirement of
not compromising future generations into the demand to individually maintain natural,
economic and social capital. While these three types of capital correspond to the differ-
ent dimensions of sustainability, natural capital is frequently broken down further into
different classes of capital corresponding to different service flows. Then, each of these
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classes is required to be non-declining by itself (either in physical terms or in value).
For an overview over the more detailed differences between weak and strong sustain-
ability as well as further differentiations of sustainability demands compare for example
Neumayer (1999) and van den Bergh & Hofkes (1998).
Traditionally the economic analysis of sustainability is mostly focused on capital and
its substitutability in production. However, as soon as one acknowledges that a per-
fect replication of natural capital and its service flows by man-made capital is not
possible, the evaluative aspect of weighing natural service flows against man-made ser-
vice flows gains in importance. Examples for non-substitutable environmental assets
pointed out by Pearce, Markandya & Barbier (1997, 37) include the ozone layer and its
UV-protection function, the climate-regulating functions of ocean phytoplankton, the
nutrient trap and pollution cleaning functions of wetlands and the watershed protection
functions of tropical rain-forests. Given such a non-substitutability, one either has to
adhere to an extreme notion of strong sustainability and leave the mentioned assets
untouched, or one has to allow for a trade-off and make the respective service flows
comparable to other service flows. For this purpose the substitutability of the different
service flows in welfare has to be specified. Note, that few people would claim that, for
example, the ozone layer as a whole can be replaced by man-made goods or services.
However, it can be argued for a substitutability at the (current) margin. For example,
sunscreen lotion or shelter under glass can protect from ultraviolet radiation and, thus,
‘replace’ a little of the stratospheric ozone. But, observe that such an argument already
involves the welfare judgment that taking a sun bath with or without sunscreen are
complete substitutes in consumption, or that a glass roof is a substitute to the open air.
While some might agree to such a statement, others will usually contradict. In particu-
lar, this disagreement over the substitutability between natural consumption and service
streams and its potential technical substitutes represents a difference in the preferences
between the advocates of the strong and the advocates of the weak sustainability con-
cept.
The importance of explicitly incorporating preferences concerning environmental ser-
vice flows and environmental quality into the analysis of a sustainable development is,
for example, pointed out by Pearce et al. (1997, 33). From a fairly comprehensive point
of view van den Bergh & Hofkes (1998, 14) summarize the motivation for the standpoint
of strong sustainability as “the recognition that natural resources are essential inputs in
economic production, consumption or welfare that cannot be substituted for by physical
or human capital, or the acknowledgement of environmental integrity rights in nature”.
Note that the latter ‘environmental integrity rights’ are often referred to as intrinsic
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values of nature. These values are generally regarded to be non-anthropocentric con-
cepts, based on moral, ethical or religious considerations.1 I will absorb them to the
degree possible into the neoclassical preference framework as a generalized (existence)
value of natural capital and its service flows. Explicitly, my model only considers ser-
vice and consumption flows (compare equation 2.1). An existence value attributed to a
particular capital at a certain point of time has to be captured as an ‘existence service
flow’ proportional to the amount of existing capital. Moreover, the words service flow,
consumption good and amenity stream will be used interchangeably.
Taking a non-perfect technical substitutability between natural and man-made capi-
tal as given, my analysis focuses on the limitedness in substitution between the corre-
sponding service flows in social welfare. Social welfare will be depicted by a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function which allows a straight forward analysis of dif-
ferent degrees of substitutability between the two aggregate classes of produced goods
and environmental services. I call the region in which welfare can be derived from con-
suming only either of the two commodity classes, the region of moderate limitedness in
substitutability and identify it with a weak sustainability preference. With these prefer-
ences, a mixture between the two classes of consumption and service flows is generally
preferred. However, it is possible that a decision maker agrees to a trade-off that de-
prives him completely of his natural capital and the according service flows. I refer to
the region in which it is not possible to derive welfare only from produced consumption
streams, as the region of strongly limited substitutability and identify it with the notion
of strong sustainability, calling it a strong sustainability preference.2 The extreme case
of a strong sustainability preference would correspond to a preference relation that does
not allow for any trade-off between the two classes of consumption. The extreme of
weak sustainability preference would limit to perfect substitutability in consumption
between produced and natural service flows. In between these two extremes there is a
wide range of parameters that correspond to more moderate standpoints.
A comparable translation of the two notions of sustainability into a preference or
welfare framework has been set out by Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2002). Their analysis
focuses on the (infinitely) long run in a growth scenario where produced consumption
1I will not delve into the philosophical discussion about the meaning of a non-anthropocentric value
system. For a further discussion of a potential foundation and the difficulties going along with the
concept of intrinsic value and the construction of non-anthropocentric environmental ethics compare for
(different perspectives) Buchdahl & Raper (1998), Grey (1993) and most critical to the meaningfulness
of a non-anthropocentric ethics Lynch & Wells (1998).
2In the language of Dasgupta & Heal (1974, 4) for substitutability in production, such a functional
specification corresponds to, here a preference, where both inputs are essential.
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grows to infinity, while the flow of environmental goods is bounded. Against this back-
ground the authors distinguish between poor and perfect long-run substitutability by
a characteristic of the welfare function for an infinitely grown produced consumption
stream. It turns out that in the CES welfare characterization used in my setup, Gerlagh
& van der Zwaan’s (2002) distinction between poor and perfect long-run substitutability
and my distinction between the regions of strongly and of moderately limited substi-
tutability coincide (Gerlagh & van der Zwaan 2002, 335). Therefore, Gerlagh & van der
Zwaan’s (2002) mapping of the notions of weak versus strong sustainability into the
welfare specification matches my notions of weak and strong sustainability preference.
The next section analyzes how these notions of weak versus strong sustainability prefer-
ence are reflected in the social discount rates, in a scenario where produced consumption
grows at a faster rate than the consumption of environmental service streams. Particular
attention is paid to the question of weighing the long versus the short run.
3.2 Limited Substitutability in Consumption and
Social Discount Rates
Returning to the model set out in equations (2.1-2.3) the ‘commodity’ x1 is now inter-
preted as a flow of environmental goods and services while x2 is representing an aggre-
gate of produced consumption. Moreover, I assume an exponential time dependence of
instantaneous utility yielding U(x1, x2, t) = u(x1, x2)e
−ρt. This functional form corre-
sponds to a constant rate of pure time preference ρ and implies time consistency of the
planning functional (2.1). In such a multicommodity setting equation (2.4) generalizes,
and the discount rate corresponding to the social discount factor Dx1 (t, t0) becomes
δ1(t) = ρ−
∂2u
∂x21
∂u
∂x1
x˙1 −
∂2u
∂x1∂x2
∂u
∂x1
x˙2 . (3.1)
It comprises an additional term that depends on the substitutability3 ∂
2u
∂x1∂x2
between
the two classes of goods.4 To work out the influence of substitutability in welfare on
the social discount rate and its evolvement over time, I take instantaneous utility to
be of the functional form u(x1, x2) = [a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s]1/s with s ∈ IR, a1, a2 ∈
3See Coto-Milla´n (1999, 21) for different ways of defining substitutability of consumption goods.
Hereafter I will go over to a functional form that directly parametrizes substitutability.
4Note that equation (3.1) has independently been derived by Weikard & Zhu (2005) who also com-
ment on the magnitude effects (see below) but do not analyze time behavior of the discount rates.
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IR++, a1 + a2 = 1 and u1, u2 ≥ 0.
5 This step furthers understanding as it separates
good-specific utility ui(xi) from substitutability effects parameterized in a simple form
by s. As derived in appendix A.1, for such a welfare specification the social discount
rate for the environmental service stream becomes
δ1(t) = ρ−
∂2u1
∂x21
∂u1
∂x1
x˙1 − (1−s)
a2u2(x2)
s
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
(
∂u2
∂x2
(x2)
u2(x2)
x˙2 −
∂u1
∂x1
(x1)
u1(x1)
x˙1
)
. (3.2)
The first and the second term in equation (3.2) resemble the widely used equation
(2.4). In the following I want to examine the additional third term that depends on
the substitutability parameter s. With this objective in mind, I simplify the utility
function by setting u1(x1) = x1 and u2(x2) = x2, which leads to the standard CES
utility function u(x1, x2) = [a1x
s
1 + a2x
s
2]
1/s.6 Thereby, I eliminate in equation (3.2) the
well studied second term and simplify the third without changing its dependence on the
substitutability parameter s. This step leads to the discount rate:
δ1(t) = ρ− (1− s)
a2x
s
2
a1xs1 + a2x
s
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Vsp s(x1, x2)
(xˆ2 − xˆ1) . (3.3)
The first determinant in the social discount rate for the environmental service stream in
equation (3.3) is the pure rate of time preference ρ. It is reduced by a second term which
comprises three different components. The first component (1− s) is a measure for the
limitedness in substitutability between the two classes of goods. The second component
depicts the value share of the produced consumption stream:
Vsp s(x1, x2) =
∂u
∂x2
x2
∂u
∂x1
x1 +
∂u
∂x2
x2
=
a2x
s
2
a1xs1 + a2x
s
2
. (3.4)
It depends on the ratio x1
x2
between the environmental services and the produced goods
consumed,7 the utility weights a1 and a2 and the substitutability parameter s. The last
component in equation (3.3) characterizes the relative growth overweight of the produced
5IR++ denotes the strictly positive real numbers. For s = 0 the function is defined by the limit s→ 0
yielding u(x1, x2) = u1(x1)
a1u2(x2)
a2 . For s→ −∞,∞ the limit functions are min{u1(x1), u2(x2)} and
max{u1(x1), u2(x2)} respectively. ui ≥ 0 stands for ui(xi) ≥ 0 for all xi ∈ IR+.
6CES functions exhibit a constant elasticity of substitution σ that relates to s by the formula
σ = 11−s . For its derivation see Arrow, Chenery, Minhas & Solow (1961). Observe that CES functions
are homogeneous of degree one. Thus, proportional overall growth does not change marginal utility as
it follows that the latter is homogeneous of degree zero in consumption. This explains why the chosen
functional form is so well suited to focus on the new effect due to relative difference in growth, filtering
out the overall growth effect extensively discussed in the literature in connection with equation (2.4).
7This is easily observed by multiplying the nominator and denominator on the right hand side of
equation (3.4) with x−s2 .
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consumption stream with respect to the environmental service stream. Altogether the
second term on the right hand side of equation (3.3) can be summarized as follows. The
relative growth overweight in produced consumption is weighted with the value share
of produced consumption. This expression is then weighted with the limitedness in
substitutability between produced and environmental amenity streams and subtracted
from the pure rate of time preference. A closer analysis of the expression for different
degrees of substitutability will be the object of investigation of the next section.
Before, however, let me derive the analogous social discount rate for produced con-
sumption and service streams. It is easily arrived at by switching the indices in equa-
tion (3.3):
δ2(t) = ρ− (1− s)
a1x
s
1
a2xs2 + a1x
s
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ Vse s(x1, x2)
(xˆ1 − xˆ2) . (3.5)
The interpretation is analogous to that of equation (3.3). This time the growth over-
weight of the environmental service stream is weighted with the value share of the
environmental services
Vse s(x1, x2) =
∂u1
∂x1
x1
∂u1
∂x1
x1 +
∂u2
∂x2
x2
=
a1x
s
1
a1xs1 + a2x
s
2
.
The resulting expression is again weighted with the limitedness in substitutability be-
tween produced and environmental consumption and then subtracted from the pure rate
of time preference. In the next section I analyze a scenario where the environmental
amenity and service streams grow at a slower rate than produced consumption. Antici-
pating such a growth overweight on the part of produced consumption, let me rearrange
equation (3.5) to the form
δ2(t) = ρ+ (1− s) Vse
s(x1, x2) (xˆ2 − xˆ1) . (3.6)
3.3 Social Discount Rates in a Stylized Growth
Scenario
In the following, I want to analyze how the weights for future consumption evolve in a
scenario where produced consumption grows at a faster rate than consumption of envi-
ronmental services. The underlying assumption is that technological progress increases
the availability of produced consumption at a faster rate than the availability of environ-
mental service and amenity streams can be increased. In fact, when thinking about the
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essential life-support services that most advocates of a notion of strong sustainability are
concerned about, like for example climate regulation functions (compare section 3.1), it
is hard to think about a long-term positive growth rate of environmental services at all.
When thinking about simpler environmental consumption goods like defined in Fisher
& Krutilla (1975, 360) as goods that are “generally consumed on site, with little or no
transformation by ordinary productive processes”, like for example scenic views, then
by definition these goods are not or little affected be technological progress in produc-
tion.8 The appreciation of biodiversity and its existence value is another example where
the growth rate of the corresponding existence service flow is negative and a serious
growth within a human planning horizon is hard to imagine. Against this background
I introduce the following
Assumption 1: The growth rate of produced consumption and services is higher than
the growth rate of environmental amenity streams and services, that is xˆ2(t) >
xˆ1(t) ∀ t.
The assumption allows of course for a decline in environmental goods and services. It
also allows for a scenario, which is sometimes put forth in relation to climate change,
where production and environment decline together, as long as environmental service
flows decline at a higher rate.
Under this stylized growth assumption, I want to analyze how different specifications
of the limitedness in substitutability in welfare, between the two classes of goods and
services, affects the weights given to future consumption. Hereby I want to focus on the
effect that stems from the interplay of the difference in growth rates and the limitedness
in substitutability. As I have worked out in section 3.2, a simple welfare function serving
this purpose is the following.
Assumption 2: Welfare is representable in the functional form
U =
∞∫
0
[a1x
s
1 + a2x
s
2]
1/se−ρt dt with a1, a2 ∈ IR++, a1 + a2 = 1 and s ∈ IR, s ≤ 1.
9
As elaborated in the preceding section this specification of welfare disregards the in-
fluence of an even overall growth (or decline) on the social discount rates and focuses
on the substitutability effect. I added the assumption that the substitutability param-
eter s should be smaller or equal to one. The range s ∈ (1,∞) corresponds to the
8One can think of several cases, where technological progress helps accessing or enjoying environmen-
tal goods. However, such a complementarity between produced and environmental goods and services
is captured in the welfare function, i.e. in the parameter s.
9For s = 0 the integrand is defined by limit, yielding the well known Cobb-Douglas specification:
lims→0[a1x
s
1 + a2x
s
2]
1/s = xa11 x
a2
2 (Arrow et al. 1961, 231).
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assumption that environmental and produced services are ‘more than perfect substi-
tutes’ in the sense that extreme choices tending towards the consumption of only one of
the two consumption streams are generally preferred to mixtures. Such an assumption
would neither seem reasonable when analyzing environmental and produced consump-
tion and service streams, nor would it correspond to any notion of sustainability. In
the following, I analyze one after another the scenarios corresponding to s = 1 (perfect
substitutability), s = 0 (Cobb-Douglas preferences), s ∈ (0, 1) (moderate limitedness in
substitutability) and s < 0 (strong limitedness in substitutability).
The interpretation of the social discount rates derived for these different welfare spec-
ifications is the following. I take as given an underlying growth scenario that satisfies
assumption 1. A decision-maker or social planner is asked to evaluate a small project
that affects environmental service streams and produced consumption streams over some
period of time. Then, the social discount rates and factors specify the weight that a
planner, subscribing to a particular welfare specification, gives to the corresponding fu-
ture consumption streams. In particular, I will be interested in the time development
of these weights and the differentiation between the scenarios of moderate and strong
limitedness in substitutability that I identified with the notions of weak versus strong
sustainability in section 3.1. A formal setup of such a small project evaluation is given
in chapter 4.10
The case of perfect substitutability in consumption between environmental service
flows and produced consumption corresponds to the substitutability parameter s = 1. It
implies additivity in welfare between the different classes of goods u(x1, x2) = a1x1+a2x2
and an elasticity of substitution σ = 1
1−s
that is infinite. As there is no limitedness in
substitutability (1−s = 0), equations (3.3) and (3.6) show that the social discount rates
for both classes of goods coincide with the pure rate of time preference: δ1 = δ2 = ρ.
Note that this result holds by construction (and reduction) of the welfare function
carried out in section 3.2 to focus on the substitutability effect and disregard other
growth effects.
The next preference specification that I want to analyze corresponds to the widely
used Cobb-Douglas welfare function u(x1, x2) = x
a1
1 x
a2
2 which is implied by s = 0
(Arrow et al. 1961, 231). This welfare specification lies at the border between the
regions identified with the notion of weak and strong sustainability. For such a welfare
specification the elasticity of substitution σ = 1
1−s
equals unity. The value share of the
environmental service stream Vse s=0 corresponds to its utility weight a1 and the value
10Smallness of the project means that the changes brought about by the project do not affect the
overall growth scenario.
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share of the produced consumption stream corresponds to Vsp s=0 = a2. Therefore, the
social discount rates corresponding to equations (3.3) and (3.6) become
δ1(t) = ρ− a2 (xˆ2 − xˆ1) and (3.7)
δ2(t) = ρ+ a1 (xˆ2 − xˆ1) . (3.8)
The social discount rate for the environmental service flow is reduced by a term propor-
tional to the difference in the growth rates and to the (relative11) utility-weight given to
produced consumption. In a steady state the terms in equation (3.7) are constant and
therefore discounting of the environmental good stays exponential with a lower discount
rate. The social discount rate for produced consumption is also constant in a steady
state. However, it is augmented by a term proportional to the difference in growth rate
and to the (relative) utility-weight given to environmental amenities and services. These
results are summarized in
Proposition 1: Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold with s = 0.
Then the social discount rates are given by equations (3.7) and (3.8).
The social discount rate for the environmental service stream receives a mark down
proportional to the difference in growth rates and the utility weight given to the
produced consumption stream. The social discount rate for the produced consump-
tion stream receives a mark up proportional to the difference in growth rates and
the utility weight given to the environmental consumption stream. In a steady
state both social discount rates are constant.
The intuition is straight forward. The slower growing environmental consumption good
becomes relatively more scarce as time evolves. Therefore, the social discount rate,
expressing its value development over time, gets a mark down corresponding to a higher
weight given to future environmental service streams. On the other hand, the produced
good becomes more abundant in relative terms and, therefore, its social discount rate
receives a mark up. The fact that the mark up/down of the goods is proportional to the
value share corresponding to the utility weight given to the other consumption good,
is best understood by considering the situation where the other good receives a (close
to) zero utility weight. Then the evaluation of the first good should not (or very little)
depend on the evolvement of the second consumption stream. Therefore, as the utility
weight given to a good goes to zero, it should be the social discount rate of the other
good that is not affected anymore by limitedness in substitutability.
After these two rather specific parameter constellations where s ∈ {0, 1}, I turn to
11Note that a2 =
a2
a1+a2
as a1 + a2 = 1.
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the range where the substitutability parameter lies anywhere in between, i.e. 0 < s < 1.
This case goes along with substitution elasticities between one and infinity. As mo-
tivated in section 3.1 I call this parameter range a region of moderate limitedness
in substitutability because utility can be gained by consuming only one class of ser-
vice streams, but mixtures are preferred. Connecting to the sustainability debate, I
have identified these preferences with the notion of weak sustainability, as - with
such a welfare specification - there is no a priory limit for substituting nature by an
increase in production. Analyzing the social discount rate for the environmental good,
equation (3.3) shows that again a positive term is deducted from the pure rate of time
preference. However, as I show in the proof of proposition 2, the term Vsp s in the mark
down is monotonously increasing over time. On the other hand, the social discount rate
for the produced consumption stream still gets a mark up (equation 3.6). However, the
term Vse s in the mark up is strictly decreasing over time.
Proposition 2: Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold with s ∈ (0, 1). Then the social discount
rates are given by equations (3.3) and (3.6).
The social discount rate for the environmental service stream receives a mark down
proportional to the difference in growth rates, the value share of the produced con-
sumption stream and the limitedness in substitutability expressed by (1− s).
The social discount rate for the produced consumption stream receives a mark up
proportional to the difference in growth rates, the value share given to the envi-
ronmental consumption stream and the limitedness in substitutability expressed
by (1− s).
In a steady state, both social discount rates fall over time to lim
t→∞
δ1 = ρ −
(1− s)(xˆ2 − xˆ1) and lim
t→∞
δ2 = ρ and discounting is hyperbolic.
I show more generally in the proof of proposition 1 that the existence of ǫ > 0 and
t∗ ∈ [0,∞) with xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t)− ǫ for all t ≥ t
∗ is enough to ensure that in the long run
the discount rates approach the form δ1(t) = ρ − (1 − s) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t)) and δ2(t) = ρ.
However, outside of a steady state a strong fluctuation in the difference in growth rates
can bring about a time period in which either of the discount rates is constant or
increasing. Observe furthermore that the discount rate for the environmental service
stream x1 will eventually grow negative if there exists t
∗ such that (1−s)(xˆ2(t)−xˆ1(t)) >
ρ ∀ t > t∗. That is, if the difference in the growth rates between the two classes of
services, weighted with the limitedness in substitutability, dominates the rate of pure
time preference ρ.12
12Observe that this relation determines only the instantaneous discount rate. In addition it is also
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To interpret the result let me first compare it to the result of proposition 1. The two
social discount rates still receive a comparable mark up/down which is proportional to
the difference in growth rates. I first have a closer look at the social discount rate for the
environmental service stream. In proposition 2, the effect on δ1, triggered by the growth
overweight of the produced consumption stream, is no longer simply proportional to
the utility weight given to the produced consumption stream. It is weighted with the
value share of the produced consumption stream and the limitedness in substitutability.
The limitedness in substitutability happened to be one in proposition 1. Moreover, the
Cobb-Douglas specification of welfare in proposition 1 has the unique feature that the
value share of a commodity xi corresponds to its utility weight ai independent of the
consumption levels. In general however, the value share Vsp s, which is weighing the
importance of the growth overweight of produced consumption for the evaluation of the
environmental service stream, depends on the consumption levels. Due to the relative
increase of produced consumption this value share grows over time. The higher it gets,
the more attention is paid in δ1 to an increasing relative scarcity with respect to the
produced consumption stream. This increasing attention to the relative scarcity causes
the social discount rate to decline and the weight given to future environmental services
to increase over time (as compared to a scenario with perfect substitutability or no
change in relative scarcity). Moreover, such a relative scarcity is only important to the
degree that the two classes of goods are limited in substitutability. A similar reasoning
holds true for the social discount rate of the produced consumption stream. Here the
growth ‘overweight’ of the other commodity is negative resulting in a mark up of the
discount rate. As the value share of the environmental good Vse s declines, the attention
payed to such a mark up in the social discount rate for the produced consumption stream
falls over time. Therefore, the discount rate of the produced consumption stream is
declining as well.
Finally, let me turn to the welfare evaluation that goes along with a substitutability
parameter s < 0. This parameter range corresponds to an elasticity of substitution
smaller than unity. As I have motivated in section 3.1, I call such a parameter range a
region of strong limitedness in substitutability, because welfare cannot be gained
by consuming only one of the two classes of service streams. In connection with the
sustainability discussion, I identified these preferences with the notion of strong sus-
tainability as they impose a limit on substituting nature by an increase in production.
Analyzing the social discount rate for the environmental service stream, equation (3.3)
shows that, like in the other examined scenarios, a positive term is deducted from the
possible that the social discount factor Dxi (t, t0) grows bigger than 1.
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pure rate of time preference. However, as I show in the proof of proposition 3, the term
Vsp s is now declining over time. On the other hand, the social discount rate for the
produced consumption stream still gets a mark up (equation 3.6). However, the term
Vse s in the mark up now is strictly increasing over time.
Proposition 3: Let assumptions 1 and 2 hold with s < 0. Then the social discount
rates are given by equations (3.3) and (3.6).
The social discount rate for the environmental service stream receives a mark down
proportional to the difference in growth rates, the value share of the produced con-
sumption stream and the limitedness in substitutability expressed by (1− s).
The social discount rate for the produced consumption stream receives a mark up
proportional to the difference in growth rates, the value share given to the envi-
ronmental consumption stream and the limitedness in substitutability expressed
by (1− s).
In a steady state, both social discount rates grow over time to lim
t→∞
δ1 = ρ and
lim
t→∞
δ2 = ρ+ (1− s)(xˆ2 − xˆ1).
The first part of the proposition is equivalent to that of proposition 2. The interesting
difference is, however, the evolvement of the optimal social discount rates over time.
Recall that the the two scenarios analyzed in propositions 2 and 3 only differ in the
assumption about the substitutability between environmental service streams and man-
made service and consumption streams. Proposition 2 considers the case where there is
moderate limitedness in substitutability, corresponding to a notion of weak sustainabil-
ity, and yields that optimal social discount rates should be falling over time. Proposition
3 considers the case where there is strong limitedness in substitutability, correspond-
ing to the notion of strong sustainability, and yields that optimal social discount rates
should be growing over time. This result is rather surprising as the usual intuition as
expressed for example in Groom et al.’s (2005, 2) survey on declining discount rates
is that “It is immediately obvious that using a declining discount rate would make
an important contribution towards meeting the goal of sustainable development” and
Pezzey (2006) even defines sustainable discount rates as falling discount rates. Now the
preferences underlying proposition 3 relate to a stronger concept of sustainability than
those of proposition 2. Nevertheless, it is proposition 3 that brings about optimal social
discount rates that increase over time. Even more surprisingly might be the following
result which is an immediate consequence of the steady state results of propositions 2
and 3.
Proposition 4: Evaluating the social discount rates for a given growth scenario under
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the assumptions 1 and 2 the following assertion holds.
In a steady state, the long-term social discount rates corresponding to a strong
sustainability preference (s < 0) are higher than those implied by a weak sustain-
ability preference (0 < s < 1). That is, lim
t→∞
δs<0i (t) > lim
t→∞
δ0<s<1i (t) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
For a similar statement without a steady state, assume the existence of ǫ > 0 and
t∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t)− ǫ for all t ≥ t
∗. Then, there exists t¯ ∈ [0,∞)
such that δs<0i (t) > δ
0<s<1
i (t) for all t > t¯ and i ∈ {1, 2}.
A numerical example for the time evolvement of the social discount rates for the two
different scenarios is drawn in figure 3.1. In the left diagram the substitutability param-
eter is chosen to be s = .5 corresponding to moderate limitedness in substitutability and
a weak sustainability preference. In the right diagram the substitutability parameter is
chosen to be s = −.5 corresponding to strong limitedness in substitutability and a strong
sustainability preference. The other parameters are chosen equally for both scenarios
as ρ = 3%, xˆ2 − xˆ1 = 2.5% and a1 = a2 = .5.
13 As the model is constructed to only
depend on the relative growth difference, this scenario depicts equally well a situation
where both growth rates of consumption are positive (e.g. xˆ2 = 3% and xˆ1 = .5%),
a scenario where produced consumption grows and environmental services decline (e.g.
xˆ2 = 1.5% and xˆ2 = −1%), or one where both forms of cosumptions are subject to
a decrease over time. The mark up/down as well as the time behavior pointed out in
propositions 2 and 3 is clearly observable. Moreover, after t = 88 years, the (instanta-
neous) discount rate for the environmental service stream grows bigger for the strong
sustainability scenario than for the weak sustainability scenario. Note that this does not
immediately imply that the weight given to the environmental service stream is lower
with a strong sustainability preference. As derived in chapter 2.2, the evaluation of an
extra unit of environmental services is captured by the corresponding discount factor
(the propagator of marginal utility). For the same scenario specifications as in figure 3.1
I have depicted the corresponding discount factors in figure 3.2. This picture seems to
go along better with the intuition that under a stronger sustainability preference future
environmental service streams should receive a higher weight. The reason is found in
equation (2.3). A discount factor relates to the rate by Dxi (t, t0) = e
−
R t
t0
δi(x(t
′),x˙(t′),t′)dt′
.
Hence, a small discount rate at the beginning is ‘memorized’ in the discount factor for
all times and, therefore, raises the weight given to the future not only at early times,
but also in the long run. However, if the dominance of the discount rate in the strong
sustainability scenario keeps up long enough (which is guaranteed by propositions 2
and 3) the discount factors in the strong sustainability scenario will fall below that of
13The initial values in the example are x1(0) = x2(0) = 1.
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Figure 3.1 : Numerical example for the time development of social discount rates over
time in years. The upper line represents the social discount rate for the produced
consumption stream, the lower line represents the discount rate for the environmental
service stream. The dashed line reflects the pure rate of time preference, corresponding
to the common discount rate if perfect substitutability in consumption is assumed. In
the left diagram the substitutability parameter is chosen to be s = .5, on the right it is
s = −.5. The other parameters coincide for both scenarios and are ρ = 3%, xˆ2 − xˆ1 =
2.5% and a1 = a2 = .5.
the weak sustainability scenario and, thus, give a lower weight to future environmental
service streams. In the depicted scenario this would be observed after t = 195 years
and, sooner or later, it will happen under all parameter specifications as is assured by
the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Evaluating the social discount rates for a given growth scenario under
the assumptions 1 and 2 the following assertion holds.
Assume the existence of ǫ > 0 and t∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t) − ǫ
for all t ≥ t∗. Then for any t0 ∈ [0,∞) there exists t¯ ∈ [0,∞) such that
Dxi
s<0
(t, t0) < D
x
i
0<s<1
(t, t0) for all t > t¯ and i ∈ {1, 2}.
This result clearly counteracts the intuition that environmental goods, which in relative
terms become increasingly scarce over time, should be valued higher in the long term,
in a setting with strong sustainability preferences and strongly limited substitutability,
than in a setting with weak sustainability preference and only moderate limitedness in
substitutability.
As discussed in connection with proposition 2 the reason for the time development
of the social discount rates is found in the development of the value share. Therefore,
the latter should also be the key to understand the supposed puzzle that a strong sus-
tainability decision-maker gives less weight on a long-run environmental service stream
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Figure 3.2 : Numerical example continued (same specifications as for figure 3.1). Drawn
are the social discount factors for the environmental (upper line) and the produced
(lower line) good. The dashed line reflects exponential discounting corresponding to the
pure rate of time preference.
than does a weak-sustainability decision-maker.14 The answer to the puzzle turns out to
be closely related to an observation by Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2002). The authors
find in a similar stylized growth scenario that under strong limitedness in substitutabil-
ity between the two classes of commodities, the value share of man-made consumption
goes to zero in the long run. While Gerlagh & van der Zwaan (2002) assume that pro-
duced consumption grows over all bounds whereas environmental service streams are
bounded, I can show in my setup that this proposition holds true also if consumption
in both goods grows without bounds but the produced consumption stream grows at a
faster rate (compare proof of proposition 3). The same reasoning holds if both growth
rates decline, but the environmental service stream declines at a faster rate. Figure 3.3
depicts how the value share of the produced consumption stream evolves in the sce-
nario underlying figures 3.1 and 3.2. One can clearly observe how the value share of
produced consumption grows for a weak sustainability scenario and falls for a strong
sustainability scenario. Only for the specification at the border between the two differ-
ent regions where s = 0 the value share stays constant over time (corresponding to the
Cobb-Douglas evaluation of proposition 1).
By definition, the value share is a combination of the amount consumed of a con-
sumption stream and its evaluation. In the stylized growth scenario analyzed in this
section, the environmental service stream grows relatively scarce over time while pro-
duced consumption becomes relatively more abundant. At the same time the limited-
14This holds as long as the only difference between their preference specifications is the degree of
substitutability between the man-made and environmental goods and service flows.
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Figure 3.3 : Numerical example continued (same specifications as for figure 3.1). Drawn
is the value share of the produced consumption stream. The thick lines correspond to
the substitutability parameters used for the weak and strong sustainability preference
scenario drawn in figures 3.1 and 3.2.
ness in substitutability causes a unit of environmental services to be increasingly more
valuable than a unit of produced consumption. In the weak sustainability preference
scenario (moderate limitedness in substitutability), the (relative) physical scarcity of
the environmental service stream dominates, and the value share of the environmen-
tal service stream declines, while the value share of the produced consumption stream
grows. Limited substitutability and relative scarcity with respect to a consumption
stream that increasingly dominates the value share of welfare, causes the discount rate
for the environmental service stream to decline.
However, with a strong sustainability preference, corresponding to strong limitedness
in substitutability, the increase in unit value dominates the (relative) physical scarcity
in determining the value share of the environmental service stream. Therefore not
only a unit of environmental service grows more valuable over time, but also the total
amount of environmental services consumed grows more valuable than the total amount
of produced goods consumed. In consequence, as the value share of the produced con-
sumption stream declines to zero, less and less attention is paid in the social discount
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rate for the environmental service stream to the limited substitutability with respect
to a consumption stream that grows increasingly unimportant for welfare. This effect
is best understood when considering the extreme of a strong sustainability preference.
For s → −∞ the evaluation functional converges to U =
∫∞
0
min{x1, x2}e
−ρt dt. Once
the economy is scarcer in environmental service flows than in produced consumption,
a decision-maker with these preferences will only pay attention to the environmental
service streams. Therefore the time development of his evaluation of an extra unit of
environmental services is solely generated by the pure rate of time preference (δ1 = ρ).
For such a decision maker an increase in relative scarcity of the environmental amenity
stream with respect to produced consumption is of no importance (as soon as the critical
level x1 = x2 has been exceeded). With a growing relative scarcity of the environmental
services and a declining value share of the produced services, the other preference spec-
ifications in the strong sustainability domain converge towards a similar evaluation. It
implies that less attention is paid to the increase in relative scarcity and lim
t→∞
δ1 = ρ.
The focus of my analysis has been the time development of the weight given to future
consumption streams. Let me point out that social discount rates for the different sce-
narios at a given point of time reflect well the different concepts of sustainability. At any
given point of time, the difference in evaluation between an extra unit of environmental
services and an extra unit of produced consumption increases in the relative scarcity of
the environmental service as well as in the limitedness in substitutability. This fact is
easily observed by taking the difference between equations (3.6) and (3.3) yielding
δ2(t)− δ1(t) = (1− s) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t)) . (3.9)
This difference in social discount rates in equation (3.9) generates a relative difference
in weights given to the consumption streams corresponding to
Dx1 (t, t0)
Dx2 (t, t0)
= exp
(
−
∫ t
t0
δ1(t
′)− δ2(t
′) dt′
)
= exp
(∫ t
t0
(1− s) (xˆ2(t
′)− xˆ1(t
′)) dt′
)
. (3.10)
A stronger notion of sustainability corresponds to a higher limitedness in substitutability
(1− s) in the welfare function. As equations (3.9) and (3.10) show, such an increase in
(1−s) implies also an increase in the weight given to environmental services as opposed
to produced consumption. Moreover, this difference is monotonously growing over time
as relative scarcity of the environmental service stream increases. Such a relation reflects
well the intuition behind associating the strength of the notion of sustainability with
the limitedness of substitutability in the corresponding welfare function.
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However, what I have shown in this section, is that a differentiation between a weak
and a strong notion of sustainability through an according parametrization of the substi-
tutability between environmental services and produced consumption streams in the wel-
fare function, implies at the same time that a stronger notion of sustainability results in a
reduction of the weight given to the future as opposed to the present. Whenever environ-
mental services or both consumption streams are declining over time (xˆ1 < min{xˆ2, 0}),
such a reduced attention paid to future service and consumption streams seems to oppose
the fundamental objective of a sustainable development as expressed in the Brundtland
report (compare section 3.1). I want to offer two different perspectives on the derived
relationship between the limitedness in substitutability and the accounting weights for
the future in the face of the different notions of sustainability.
The first perspective is that, in the analyzed growth scenario, any parameter constel-
lation corresponding to s < 1 gives more weight to future environmental services than
a welfare function assuming perfect substitutability (which does not pay attention at
all to an increase in relative scarcity). Giving a relatively higher weight to the scarcer
environmental goods comes at the cost of shifting weight from the future environmen-
tal services to the present environmental services.15 The notions of strong versus weak
sustainability only relate to the substitutability between the different classes of goods
and services. When concerned with intertemporal comparisons in a growth scenario as
analyzed in this section, applying a weak sustainability preference for project evalua-
tion corresponds to a stronger sustainability demand in the sense that a higher weight
is given to long-run future consumption and service streams. The second perspective
is that a difference between a weak and a strong notion of sustainability should not
only be mapped into a different degree of substitutability between the two classes of
goods. It can simultaneously be required that a stronger notion of sustainability should
go along with a decrease in intertemporal substitutability. As discussed in connection
to equation (2.4) on page 20, a decrease in intertemporal substitutability goes along
with an increase in weight given to future consumption streams, whenever growth is
declining, and can counteract the effect analyzed above.
15Note that this is despite the fact that absolute scarcity and relative scarcity of the environmental
service stream increases over time for xˆ1 < min{xˆ2, 0}.
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Chapter 4
Discounting and Project Evaluation
4.1 Social Discounting in a Cost Benefit Analysis
of a Small Project
In this chapter, I elaborate how the social discount rates and factors derived in the
previous chapters have to be applied in the evaluation of a small project. This section
presents and relates different views on the social discounting and pricing of costs and
benefits. In section 4.2, I relate such a social cost benefit analysis to an evaluation in
an (imaginary) market system. The project analyzed in this chapter is characterized
as a small change ∆x of a consumption plan x0. Exercising the project yields a new
consumption and service stream x=x0 + ∆x with xi = x
0
i (t) + ∆xi(t), i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈
[0, T ]. At each point of time ∆xi(t) should be small as compared to xi(t) so that I
can expand U(x1(t) + ∆x1(t), x2(t) + ∆x2(t), t) first order in the ∆xi(t) (small project
assumption). Then, the welfare of the new consumption path can be written as
U =
T∫
0
U(x01(t) + ∆x1(t), x
0
2(t) + ∆x2(t), t) dt
=
T∫
0
U(x01(t), x
0
2(t), t) +
∂U
∂x1
(t)∆x1(t) +
∂U
∂x2
(t)∆x2(t) +O(∆x(t)
2) dt
= U 0 +
T∫
0
∂U
∂x1
(t)∆x1(t) +
∂U
∂x2
(t)∆x2(t) +O(∆x(t)
2) dt , (4.1)
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where the marginal utilities are evaluated along x0. Equation (4.1) states that neglecting
terms of second order in ∆x, the project raises welfare, if and only if,
T∫
0
∂U
∂x1
(t)∆x1(t) +
∂U
∂x2
(t)∆x2(t) dt > 0 . (4.2)
The integral represents a cost benefit functional in continuous time with valuation de-
rived from the social welfare objective given in equation (2.1). If the path x0 is optimal,
all feasible projects ∆x should yield an evaluation smaller or equal to zero. In the follow-
ing, I derive different perspectives on how to evaluate whether a particular project can
increase welfare, and relate them to the results of the preceding chapter. Before doing
so, let me assume that at a reference time t0 there exist prices p1(t0) and p2(t0) fulfilling
p1(t0)
p2(t0)
=
∂U
∂x1
(t0)
∂U
∂x2
(t0)
. In general t0 will be the present (t0 = 0) and prices p1(t0) = p1(0) and
p2(t0) = p2(0) are either market prices, if present markets exist, or, more likely for the
environmental service streams, they are prices derived from direct and indirect methods
of evaluation, like for example contingent valuation or hedonic price studies (see e.g.
Hanley, Shogren & White 1997, 383 et sqq., or Ma¨ler & Vincent 2005). In equation (4.2)
time specific marginal utilities are used to evaluate the changes in x1 and x2 at every
point of time. By relating the marginal utilities in equation (4.2) for different points of
time with the help of equation (2.2), I arrive at the perspective of social discounting as
it was adopted in the previous chapters. Together with the above relation for prices at
t0 I obtain the form
T∫
0
Dx
0
1 (t, t0)p1(t0)∆x1(t) +D
x0
2 (t, t0)p2(t0)∆x2(t) dt > 0 . (4.3)
Equation (4.3) takes the prices at t0, usually the present, to determine the relative value
of x1 and x2 at t0 and propagates both prices over time by means of the marginal utility
propagators Dx1 (t, t0) and D
x
2 (t, t0) respectively. The prices D
x
i (t, t0) pi(t0) could be
referred to as social accounting prices.1 Another interpretation is to take the factors
Dxi (t, t0) as good–specific social discount factors. This view corresponds to the analysis
of chapters 2 and 3. Applying equation (4.3) to the growth scenario in section 3.3 with
a weak sustainability preference would imply a marked up and falling discount rate for
the produced consumption stream x2 and marked down and falling discount rate for the
environmental service stream. It is important to be aware that either one can argue that
prices of the environmental service stream rise due to its increasing relative scarcity, or
1Note that these prices Dxi (t, t0) pi(t0), in general, do not coincide with the capital measured market
prices that will be studied in section 4.2.
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one can apply the good-specific discount rates discussed earlier. Doing both at the same
time yields a wrong evaluation.
An interesting special case is the evaluation of a project that affects only consumption
of the environmental service streams at different points of time (∆x2 = 0). Then (4.3)
is equivalent to
T∫
0
Dx
0
1 (t, t0)∆x1(t) dt > 0 .
An important consequence of the discussion in chapter 3.3 is the following. Considering
a partial model of the environmental sector, optimal discounting can be hyperbolic and
time consistent with a marked down discount rate. Moreover, for the evaluation of such
a project, the relative weight given to environmental services as opposed to produced
consumption is of no importance. Therefore it appears particularly catchy that an
evaluation based on a strong sustainability preference - in the sense and scenario of
the last section - gives less weight to long-term environmental service flows than an
evaluation based on a weak sustainability preference.
By factoring out Dx
0
1 (t, t0) or D
x0
2 (t, t0) in equation (4.3) the evaluation functional
becomes
T∫
0
[
p1(t0)∆x1(t) +
Dx
0
2 (t, t0)
Dx
0
1 (t, t0)
p2(t0)∆x2(t)
]
Dx
0
1 (t, t0) dt > 0 or (4.4)
T∫
0
[
Dx
0
1 (t, t0)
Dx
0
2 (t, t0)
p1(t0)∆x1(t) + p2(t0)∆x2(t)
]
Dx
0
2 (t, t0) dt > 0 . (4.5)
Equations (4.4) and (4.5) take the more usual view, that there is one common discount
rate applicable to all goods (the discount rate). Equation (4.4) can be interpreted the
following way. Let the evaluation start out with the prices in t0 = 0. Then the first
good is taken to be the numeraire (in the sense of keeping its price constant). Hence,
the change of marginal utility of the first good expressed by Dx
0
1 (t, t0) becomes the
discount factor and the (contemporaneous) value of the second good must be propagated
by the relative change of marginal utility of good two relative to good one, i.e. by
Dx
0
2 (t,t0)
Dx
0
1 (t,t0)
. Applied again to the setup of chapter 3.2 with the example of moderately
limited substitutability between environmental and produced consumption streams, the
social discount rate for the environmental service stream would be the discount rate and
discounting would take place with the lower hyperbolic discount rate δ1.
A more common perspective on cost benefit analysis corresponds to equation (4.5)
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which is the analogue taking x2 to be the numeraire. Such a cost benefit evaluation
takes the social discount rate of produced consumption as the discount rate. Time
development of the accounting price for the environmental service stream is characterized
by the expression
Dx
0
1 (t,t0)
Dx
0
2 (t,t0)
. Let me normalize p2(0) to unity and define p
∗
1(0) =
∂U
∂x1
(0)
∂U
∂x2
(0)
as
the value of a unit of environmental services in units of produced goods in the present.
Then, choosing t0 = 0, equation (4.5) together with equation (3.10) imply that for
the scenario analyzed in chapter 3.3 the (relative) pricing of the environmental service
stream in units of produced consumption develops as:
p∗1(t) = p
∗
1(0) exp
(∫ t
0
(1− s) (xˆ2(t
′)− xˆ1(t
′)) dt′
)
. (4.6)
This way of setting up a cost benefit evaluation is also promoted by Arrow et al. (1995).
From this perspective the authors criticize Weitzman’s (1994) derivation of a marked
down hyperbolic ‘environmental discount rate’ as not properly converting environmental
benefits into a flow of (produced2) consumption equivalents. Arrow et al. (1995, 139)
state that the “essence of social discounting is to convert all effects into their consump-
tion equivalents and then to discount the resulting stream of consumption equivalents at
the social rate of time preference. Incorporating environmental effects does not change
the discount rate itself but does require special attention to the proper relative pricing
of environmental goods over time”. Note that Arrow et al. (1995) use the term ‘social
rate of time preference’ for the social discount rate δ in the sense of the one commodity
equation (2.4).
In fact Weitzman (1994) neither models the environmental good explicitly, nor does
he state a functional form for the preferences. Also does he not account separately
for environmental changes and growth of produced consumption. Instead, Weitzman
derives an overall discount rate under the assumption that produced consumption is
growing at the cost of degrading the environment.3 The assumed functional form for
this relationship renders an overall discount rate that is smaller than in the absence
of environmental externalities and falling over time. As this so called ‘environmental
discount rate’ does not explicitly distinguish between the value development of environ-
2Arrow et al. (1995) use the one commodity equation (2.4) as point of departure for their discussion
on discounting. In the section on ‘the environmental and discounting’ the authors make the point that
environmental benefits have to be converted into consumption equivalents. In the view of my explicit
two commodity setup, I identify environmental benefits as environmental service and consumption
streams x1 and their (obviously non-environmental) consumption equivalents as corresponding to my
produced consumption stream x2.
3An alternative interpretation offered by Weitzman is that the environment is a luxury good whose
demand grows over time.
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mental service streams and that of produced consumption it could at most be applied to
a project where the assumed fixed relationship between production growth and environ-
mental decline holds. More generally Groom et al. (2005, 458) criticize that “in many
ways Weitzman’s environmental discount rate is difficult to interpret in light of the re-
duced form set up and, in particular, the absence of an explicit modeling of preferences,
environmental goods and externalities.”
Arrow et al. (1995, 140) continue that when properly converting into consumption
equivalents, the environmental considerations do “not change the discount rate to apply
to the consumption stream”. Now equation (4.5) gives a cost benefit analysis in the
perspective of Arrow et al. (1995) and equation (4.6) works out how for the scenario
in chapter 3.3 a ‘proper relative pricing of environmental goods over time’ converts the
environmental service and amenity stream into (produced) consumption equivalents.
However, in the same scenario it was also observed that under limited substitutability
in consumption the increasing relative scarcity of the environmental service stream also
changes the discount rate δ2 that has to be applied to the (produced) consumption stream
x2. In particular under the assumption of a moderate limitedness in substitutability
such an environmental consideration still can give rise to hyperbolic discount rates for
the produced consumption stream. However, the produced consumption stream gets
a mark up and not a mark down. Moreover, under the assumption of strong limited-
ness in substitutability, a growing relative scarcity in the environmental service stream
can result in a growing value share of the environmental goods and go along with an
increasing discount rate.
4.2 Relation to a Complete Market Evaluation
After having worked out the evaluative structure for the setting of incomplete future
markets, I want to point out how it relates to a scenario where markets are complete
and evaluation is reflected in the corresponding market prices. The prices are derived by
setting up the budget constraint of a representative consumer. Welfare is again assumed
to be of the general form of equation (2.1) though restricted by the assumptions that
follow below. For this section I will assume that the social optimum can be decentralized
by an appropriate price system. Prices are measured in units of capital which can be
regarded either as money or as real capital. These current value prices are denoted by
p1(t) and p2(t). The interest rate on capital is r(t). Remuneration for a fixed offer of
one unit of labor w(t) is only introduced for ‘completeness’ of the budget constraint.
All these variables are exogenous to the representative consumer. His choice is between
45
CHAPTER 4. DISCOUNTING AND PROJECT EVALUATION
saving k˙(t) units of the capital good k and consuming the amounts x1(t) and x2(t). For
x1 being essential life support services provided by the environment, such an immediate
choice of a representative agent is of course fictitious. For environmental goods like a
hiking trip or a scenic view one might get closer to existing future markets. However,
the setting is only meant to relate discounting in markets, or with respect to market
based prices, to a social cost benefit setup. With the above assumptions the budget
constraint of the representative agent is given by the equation
k˙(t) = r(t)k(t) + w(t)− p1(t)x1(t)− p2(t)x2(t) .
Together with equation (2.1) it follows that the Hamiltonian describing the optimization
problem of the representative agent is
H = U (x1(t), x2(t), t) + λ(t) [r(t)k(t) + w(t)− p1(t)x1(t)− p2(t)x2(t)] .
In the following, I assume that a sufficiency condition for the optimization problem is
met.4 Moreover, I assume a continuous control (consumption) path and an interior
solution. The solution for the consumption path is denoted by x. Along this path the
following necessary conditions for an optimum must be satisfied:
∂H
∂x1
=
∂U
∂x1
− λ(t) p1(t)
!
= 0 , (4.7)
∂H
∂x2
=
∂U
∂x2
− λ(t) p2(t)
!
= 0 , (4.8)
∂H
∂k
= λ(t) r(t)
!
= −λ˙(t) . (4.9)
From equations (4.7) and (4.8) I obtain the relations:
∂U
∂x1
(t)
∂U
∂x2
(t)
=
p1(t)
p2(t)
and
∂U
∂xi
(t)
∂U
∂xi
(t0)
=
λ(t)
λ(t0)
pi(t)
pi(t0)
i ∈ {1, 2} . (4.10)
Integration of equation (4.9) yields the shadow price of capital
λ(t) = ce−
R t
0 r(t
′)dt′ with the integration constant λ(0) = c ∈ IR+ . (4.11)
Analogous to the social discount factors describing marginal utility propagation on the
preference side, let me define the time propagator of capital as
R(t0, t) = e
R t
t0
r(t′)dt′
.
4See Takayama (1994, 660 sqq.), Chiang (1992, 214 et sqq.) and Seierstad & Sydsaeter (1977) for
different sufficiency conditions.
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It describes how much capital in t can be derived from an extra unit of capital in t0. Note
that analogously to the reasoning in chapter 2.2 on the relation between δi and D
x
i , the
productivity of capital r(t) can be interpreted as the generator of capital propagation.
I have defined R(t0, t) in a way that again R(t, t0) =
1
R(t0,t)
= e
−
R t
t0
r(t′)dt′
is the factor
which is discounting with capital productivity. I refer to R(t, t0) =
1
R(t0,t)
as the inverse
capital propagator. Equation (4.11) shows that the shadow value of capital at time t
is inversely proportional to the productivity of capital between the present and time t,
i.e. λ(t) ∝ R(t, t0).
5 This relation is straight forward as a unit of capital today can be
turned into R(t0, t) units of capital in period t. Therefore a unit of capital in time t is
worth 1
R(t0,t)
= R(t, t0) units of capital today.
Inserting R(t0, t) into equation (4.10) the following relation between the time prop-
agator of marginal utility Dxi (t, t0) of good i, the capital propagator and the price of
good i is obtained:
pi(t) = D
x
i (t, t0) pi(t0)R(t0, t) . (4.12)
Equation (4.12) shows that time development of (capital measured) prices depends on
two influencing factors. One is the effect discussed in the previous chapters depending
on the change of marginal utility expressed by Dxi (t, t0). In addition, the current value
prices pi(t0) and pi(t) corresponding to different periods have to be related. As prices
of the goods are measured in units of the capital good, this is achieved by the capital
propagator R(t0, t).
For the one commodity setting it is often assumed that capital is measured in units
of consumption (e.g. Barro & Sala-i-Martin 1995, 62). Similarly, I could assume in the
two commodity setting that capital is measured in units of produced consumption. This
assumption makes the current value price of produced consumption constant over time.6
Therefore equation (4.12) implies for i = 2 that the inverse capital propagator R(t, t0)
and the propagator of marginal utility Dx2 (t, t0) coincide. This is because capital mea-
sured in units of produced consumption now reflects the value development of produced
consumption over time. With regard to the non-constancy of the social discount rates
in the scenario of chapter 3.3, note that such a measurement of capital implies that r(t)
exhibits the same non-constant form as derived for δ2.
With this background, let me finally analyze how the evaluation of the small project
5The shadow value reflects the value of an extra unit of capital in units of welfare along the optimal
path. For a closer discussion and the derivation of this interpretation of a shadow price (costate variable)
compare e.g. Kamien & Schwartz (2000, 136 et sqq.). Note that λ is the present value shadow price.
6Then the current value price of produced consumption is measured in units proportional to itself.
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from the preceding section would be evaluated if complete markets existed for all times.7
Applying equation (4.12) to equation (4.3), the following evaluation functional for the
project is obtained:
T∫
0
[p1(t)∆x1(t) + p2(t)∆x2(t)]R(t, t0) dt > 0 .
(4.13)
This time the social discount factors Dxi (t, t0) are not needed for evaluation. The price
development accounts already for the change in welfare. But as prices are measured
in capital, and, if capital is productive, the present value of a unit of capital in the
future is less than the value of a unit of capital in the present, the future prices have
to be discounted with capital productivity. Therefore capital productivity can be re-
garded as the common discount rate for both goods. If capital is measured in terms
of produced consumption, and thus R(t, t0) = D
x
2 (t, t0), equation (4.13) coincides with
equation (4.5).
4.3 Summary
To evaluate long–term projects, an expression for the development of valuation over time
is needed. Social discount rates represent such an expression. They allow the economist
to think in rates and elasticities, and lay out different contributions in a nice additive
form. The study in part I of this dissertation has worked out one such contribution to
value development over time, which emerges in a multi-commodity world with limited
substitutability between different forms of consumption. I have analyzed a scenario, in
which produced consumption is assumed to grow at a faster rate than environmental
services. In this setting, I identified moderate and strong limitedness in substitutability
in the welfare function with the notions of weak and strong sustainability on sides of
the decision maker. I have derived that, under the assumption of moderate limitedness
in substitutability, the social discount rates for (both) future consumption streams fall
over time. On the other hand, the assumption of strong limitedness in substitutability
goes along with rising social discount rates. This result was related to Gerlagh & van der
Zwaan’s (2002) finding that under strong limitedness in substitutability the value share
of produced consumption falls to zero, even when its physical share grows to one. Such
7Having assumed that the social optimum can be decentralized in a complete market system, such
an evaluation is only of theoretical interest to compare the resulting cost benefit functional to that of
section 4.1.
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a development goes along with a reduced attention paid to the increase in relative
scarcity of the environmental service flow over time. In consequence, less weight is given
to environmental services in the long run than under the assumption of only moderate
limitedness in substitutability.
In such a scenario, the identification of the strength of the notion of sustainability, with
the substitutability between the two classes of service and consumption streams, seems
puzzling when environmental services also decline in absolute terms. Then, a notion
of stronger sustainability delivers a weaker commitment to a sustainable development
in the sense of valuing future resources. If such a relationship is unwanted, it has
been suggested that a stronger notion of sustainability can be translated simultaneously
into a higher limitedness of substitutability between environmental service streams and
produced consumption, and into a reduction of intertemporal substitutability. I have
elaborated how the derived discount rates and factors have to be applied in project
evaluation. Either, they can be used to directly propagate individual prices over time,
or a numeraire has to be chosen. In the latter case, the discount rate of the numeraire
becomes the discount rate, and other consumption streams have to be converted into
contemporaneous equivalents of the numeraire. However, not only magnitude, but also
the form of discounting depend on the choice of the numeraire and its substitutability
to other goods.
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Intertemporal Risk Aversion and
the Precautionary Principle
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Chapter 5
Preliminaries
5.1 Introduction
Recently Hahn & Sunstein (2005, 1) predicted in the Economists’ Voice that “Over the
coming decades, the increasingly popular ‘precautionary principle’ is likely to have a
significant impact on policies all over the world.” However, there is an ongoing debate
between and among economists, environmental scientists and policy makers about the
merit and meaning of the precautionary principle. The usual formulations of the prin-
ciple are generally vague, as discussed for example in Turner & Hartzell (2004) and
Sandin (2004). In part II of my dissertation I suggest an axiomatic formalization of
decision-making under uncertainty that takes up an important concern of the precau-
tionary principle, related to the willingness to undergo preventive action in order to
avoid a threat of harm. For doing so, I introduce a new notion of risk aversion in the
multi-commodity case and connect it to the idea of precaution.
A second point of view, motivating the line of thought of this study, is the following.
I derive the general time consistent model, satisfying the von Neumann & Morgenstern
(1944) axioms for an individual period, and additive separability over time when re-
stricted to certain outcomes. I consider this question particularly interesting as these
are the two predominantly used specifications in the respective framing scenarios of
atemporal choice under uncertainty and intertemporal choice under certainty. Merging
the assumptions underlying the respective representations into a common, time consis-
tent framework, does not result in intertemporally additive expected utility, but a more
general class of representations that also accommodate precautionary decision rules. In
this framework, I analyze how Epstein & Zin’s (1989) disentanglement between risk
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aversion and intertemporal substitutability extends to a multi-commodity setting. I
show that in a world with many commodities absolute values of risk aversion and in-
tertemporal substitutability are good-dependent, while a particular relation between the
two is invariant. This invariant gives rise to the concept of intertemporal risk aversion.
In opposite to the extension of standard risk aversion to a multi-commodity setting as
developed by Kihlstrom & Mirman (1974), the concept of intertemporal risk aversion is
not confined to comparisons of ordinally equivalent preferences.1
My setting closely relates to the seminal work of Kreps & Porteus (1978), who ex-
tend the atemporal von Neumann-Morgenstern setting for choice under uncertainty to
a temporal structure. Under the assumption of intertemporal consistency, the authors
obtain a recursive representation that uses expected utility evaluation within each pe-
riod, and a generally nonlinear time aggregation from one period to the next. Kreps and
Porteus show that an agent behaving in accordance with their axioms generally exhibits
a preference for the timing of risk resolution. The representation brought forward by
the authors can be understood as an extension of Koopmans’s (1960) recursive utility
model under certainty to a recursive model for risky settings. My study shows that
even when starting from a time-additive model for certain outcomes, the general time
consistent model for the evaluation of risky outcomes will exhibit recursivity and pref-
erence for the timing of risk resolution. While Kreps & Porteus’ (1978) representation
is more general, my model gives rise to an attractive structure that enhances the eco-
nomic interpretation. This is achieved not only by introducing and relating measures of
atemporal risk aversion, intertemporal substitutability and intertemporal risk aversion,
but also by the following reasoning. Contributing to the intricacy of interpreting Kreps
& Porteus’ (1978) representation is the fact that it crucially depends on a nonlinear
aggregation of utility over time. In my view, working with a utility (or welfare) function
that is additive over time on certain outcomes greatly simplifies the interpretation and,
thus, the move from mathematical representation to economic intuition.2
1In this respect it stands closer to the application of the theory of risk aversion to the indirect utility
function as brought forward by Stiglitz (1969). For fixed prices, Stiglitz applies the standard Arrow-
Pratt approach of risk aversion for one commodity to income. However this approach is constraint to
compare lotteries along an individual’s Engel curves in a market environment.
2In such an intertemporally additive representation, a welfare gain of one unit today and a welfare
gain of another unit in the next period is just as good as a welfare gain of two units in a third period.
Such a reasoning generally is wrong in the representation of Kreps & Porteus (1978). Note that in a
setting with stationary preference and a positive rate of time preference, the latter of course has to
be integrated into the interpretation. This fact, however, is not related to the nonlinearity of utility
aggregation over time as found in the representation of Kreps & Porteus (1978).
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Epstein & Zin (1989) analyze Kreps & Porteus’ (1978) representation3 in a one com-
modity setting in order to disentangle information about the attitude towards risk and
towards intertemporal substitutability. Such a distinction between risk aversion and
intertemporal substitutability is not possible within a standard intertemporally addi-
tive expected utility model.4 Using a representation that allows for different choices
of Bernoulli utility5, I analyze to what extend such a specification of risk aversion and
intertemporal substitutability proves useful when studying a multi-commodity world. I
work out that there is no longer a canonical measure of risk aversion or intertemporal
substitutability, as both of these quantities generally vary between different goods. This
variation between different goods can be expressed as a dependence on the choice of the
particular representing Bernoulli utility function (for given preferences). I identify a re-
lation between the characterizations of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability
that is invariant under different choices of Bernoulli utility. It is this invariant quantity
that gives rise to the notion of intertemporal risk aversion. An axiomatic formalization
of the latter concept is developed and quantitative measures are worked out.
Later, in part III of the dissertation I establish a general relation between the measures
of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability and Kreps & Porteus’ (1978) prefer-
ence for the timing of uncertainty resolution. This relation answers a question raised
by Epstein & Zin (1989, 952 et seq.) on the interlacement of (standard) risk aversion,
intertemporal substitutability and the preference for the timing of uncertainty resolu-
tion. My representation suggests that the concept of intertemporal risk aversion is also
at the basis of a preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution. Seeking for reason-
able simplifications of the model structure, I analyze the consequences of indifference to
the timing of uncertainty resolution and of stationarity with respect to risk evaluation.
Indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution yields a representation that captures
intertemporal risk aversion in a single parameter. Moreover, it simplifies the model
structure by allowing for a non-recursive description of lotteries. In particular, such
a representation allows to disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability
3The precise difference of Epstein & Zin’s (1989) setting compared to Kreps & Porteus (1978) is
that the first only analyze a one commodity setting with no history dependence and a time aggregation
that exhibits constant elasticity of substitution. However, they allow for a more general evaluation of
uncertainty than that implied by the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms and, moreover, extend the
framework to allow for an infinite time horizon.
4In the intertemporally additive expected utility model, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is confined to the inverse of the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (Weil 1990).
5Bernoulli utility describes a cardinal function, that, by itself represents choice of certain one period
outcomes. In combination with uncertainty evaluation functionals and time aggregation rules it serves
as the basis for more general evaluation.
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when evaluating lotteries over consumption paths non-recursively. Based on a study by
Chew & Epstein (1990) for homothetic preferences, the latter combination of attributes
has been believed to be unfeasible. Moreover, I work out two different axioms of risk
stationarity. One yields stationarity of the functionals evaluating uncertainty in every
period. The other is a more natural extension of certainty stationarity in a finite time
framework. In combination with indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution, the
latter will have strong implications for the choice of the rate of pure time preference.
Part II of my dissertation is structured as follows. In the upcoming section 5.2, I intro-
duce the precautionary principle and motivate my approach to a formalization. Related
literature on modeling the concept of precaution and choice under uncertainty is briefly
summarized. Section 5.3 formally introduces the concept of general and precautionary
uncertainty aggregation rules, which are closely related to generalized means. Chapter 6
develops an axiomatic representation of preferences, based on these uncertainty aggrega-
tion rules and a closely related intertemporal aggregation rule. Chapter 6.1 revisits the
atemporal von Neumann-Morgenstern setting. Special attention is payed to different
possibilities of fixing (gauging) the Bernoulli utility function over the certain outcomes
and its consequence for the applicable uncertainty aggregation rule. Chapter 6.2 takes a
brief look at the other framing scenario, i.e. additively separable preferences over certain
consumption paths, and introduces the concept of an intertemporal aggregation rule.
The two framing scenarios are united in chapter 6.3 by a representation for the simplest
setting that is sufficiently rich to discuss most of the topics pointed out earlier in this
introduction. It consists of a two period framework, where the first period outcomes
are certain and the second period outcomes are uncertain. The crucial point of this
representation is that it leaves some freedom for the choice of the representing Bernoulli
utility function. Chapter 6.4 points out how fixing (gauging) Bernoulli utility in different
ways leads to different representations found in the literature.
Chapter 7 discusses the economic content of the representation. In chapter 7.1, I ana-
lyze how Epstein & Zin’s (1989) distinction between intertemporal substitutability and
risk aversion in the one-commodity case carries over to a multi-commodity setting. In
particular, I show that in the multi-commodity setting only a particular relation between
the two is invariant over different commodities. Chapter 7.2 axiomatically identifies this
invariant quantity as a notion of risk aversion itself. Due to its crucial dependence on
the intertemporal structure of preference, I call this notion of uncertainty attitude ‘in-
tertemporal risk aversion’. Chapter 7.3 shows, how the concept of precaution as it is
motivated in the next two sections, coincides with the concept of strict intertemporal
risk aversion. In this connection welfare is interpreted as a Bernoulli utility function
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that exhibits additive value aggregation over time. With such a notion of welfare, in-
tertemporal risk aversion and precaution are reconsidered as risk aversion on welfare.
Finally, chapter 7.4 works out quantitative measures of intertemporal risk aversion. Part
III of this dissertation is an extension of the analysis carried out in part II. Chapter
8 extends the preference representation and the notion of intertemporal risk aversion
to a general non-stationary multiperiod setting. In chapter 9, I introduce two different
stationarity conditions for preferences over uncertain outcomes (in the setting with a
finite time horizon). Finally, chapter 10 is dedicated to different aspects of preferences
for the timing of uncertainty resolution in the sense of Kreps & Porteus (1978), including
its relation to standard risk aversion, intertemporal substitutability, intertemporal risk
aversion and the pure rate of time preference.
5.2 The Precautionary Principle
The most frequently cited definition of the precautionary principle was agreed upon
at the Wingspread Conference in 1998 by 32 participants with different academic and
professional backgrounds. The latter state that “it is necessary to implement the Pre-
cautionary Principle: Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or
human health, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect
relationships are not fully established scientifically” (Raffensperger & Tickner 1999, 8)6.
There is some consensus that the precautionary principle emerged as an explicit and
(somewhat) coherent principle in the field of environmental policy in the seventies in
relation with the German ‘waldsterben’ (forest dieback) and its possible causes (see Har-
remoes et al. 2001, 13).7 Its first major international advocacy came with the adoption
of the World Charter for Nature by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1982.8
With the decision on phasing out the production of a number of substances believed to
be responsible for the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer, the precautionary prin-
ciple first entered into an international treaty in the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol in
6Emphasis added, the Wingspread declaration is also found online at http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/
precaution-3.html.
7However, some authors date the precautionary priciple back to earlier times, cf. Sandin (2004, 462).
For example, Martin (1997, 276) writes that “Unambiguous reference to precaution as a management
guideline is found in the millennial old tradition of Indigenous People of Eurasia, Africa, the Americas,
Oceania, and Australia”.
8Section (11b) of the World Charter of Nature states that “where potential adverse effects
are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed”. The Charter is available online at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm .
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1987. Since then, it has been taken up in a series of international treaties and decla-
rations. Most importantly these include the Third North Sea Conference (1990) with
a particularly strong version,9 the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Develop-
ment & the Framework Convention on Climate Change,10 and the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety (2000)11. In the contracts of the European Union, the Precautionary Prin-
ciple entered into the Maastricht Treaty in 1994, was worked out in a Communication
on the Precautionary Principle in 2000 and made it into the European Constitution,
which was signed in 2004, but not ratified yet.12
The different formulations of the precautionary principle account for a wide range of
specifications, reaching from comparatively moderate formulations as in the Rio Decla-
ration on Environment and Development 1992, Principle 15: “Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a rea-
son for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation”13 to
much stronger statements as in the Third North Sea Conference (1990): “apply the
precautionary principle, that is to take action to avoid potentially damaging impacts of
substances that are persistent, toxic, and liable to bioaccumulate even where there is
no scientific evidence to prove a causal link between emissions and effects” (Harremoes
et al. 2001, 14, emphasis added). Most importantly, however, the formulations are
generally vague. A detailed analysis of this problem can be found in Sandin (2004) and
Turner & Hartzell (2004). This vagueness is a major source of criticism with respect to
the precautionary principle, as prominently expressed by Hahn & Sunstein (2005). The
authors argue that “the precautionary principle does not help individuals or nations
make difficult choices in a non-arbitrary way. Taken seriously, it can be paralyzing, pro-
9See next paragraph for the formulation.
10The wording of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Article 3.3 is similar
to that of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development cited in the next paragraph.
The Convention is available online at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf .
11The preamble directly refers to the precautionary principle as formulated in the 1992 Rio Dec-
laration on Environment and Development, and articles 10 and 11 further elaborate the princi-
ple. The Cartagena Protocal on Biosafety is available online at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/
protocol.asp .
12Article III-233 of the draft Treaty establishing a constitution for Europe stipulates: “Union policy
on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations
in the various regions of the Union. It shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles
that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
source and that the polluter should pay.”
13Compare Rao (2000, 11 et seq.) or find the complete declaration online at http://www.unep.org/
Documents.multilingual/ Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163.
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viding no direction at all” (Hahn & Sunstein 2005, 1). They continue that “In contrast,
balancing costs against benefits can offer the foundation of a principled approach for
making difficult decisions” (Hahn & Sunstein 2005, 1). My goal is to work out such a
principled approach for balancing costs and benefits in a non-arbitrary way, which, at
the same time, takes up some of the concern of the precautionary principle.
To motivate my approach, let me come back to the above mentioned Wingspread
definition of the precautionary principle. It requires that “Where an activity raises
threats of harm to the environment or human health, precautionary measures should be
taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically”
(Raffensperger & Tickner 1999, 8). Yet any reasonable economic model depicting un-
certainty will take into consideration a threat of harm to human welfare. In a standard
model such a threat would be represented by a positive probability of yielding low wel-
fare. Such a probability does not have to be objective14 and, thus, does not have to be
based on a complete scientific understanding. A threat of harm in this sense obviously
reduces the expected welfare. A precautionary measure, in the sense of the Wingspread
definition, is an action taken to avoid such a threat of harm. Hence, it has to take place
before the observed impact on welfare. Therefore a formal model, depicting the decision
problem at hand, has to consider at least two periods. In addition, the second period
has to account for uncertainty. Let me lay out my formal intuition of precaution in such
a simple model.
Let me denote outcomes in the first and the second period by x1 and x2 respectively.
For the purpose of this introduction, think of outcomes as a description of consumption,
effort and harm for a particular state of the world that a decision maker envisions
within a period. Effort accounts for the various endeavors which are undergone in the
first period, in order to avoid a threat of harm in the second period. In the following
x1 is assumed to vary in the amount of effort undergone. Of course such an effort
can go along with a reduction in consumption. Increasing effort is assumed to reduce
welfare within the first period. For the second period uncertainty prevails. Assume that
only two outcomes are perceived possible. One is a standard or ‘unharmed’ outcome,
denoted by x¯2, and the other is an outcome, where society suffers serious harm and is
denoted by x2. Furthermore, let each of the two possible second period outcomes be
associated with probabilities p(x¯2) and p(x2) = 1−p(x¯2). I characterize society’s welfare
(or an individual’s utility) by a welfare function u. Obviously welfare is assumed to be
14The empirical definitions of probability by frequency or symmetry are usually referred to as objec-
tive probabilities. In the situation described by the Wingspread declaration an epistemic approach to
probabilities better fits the situation. Here, probabilities are seen as elements of a (non-binary) logic
or as beliefs. See the discussion on page 63.
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higher in the unharmed state than when society is suffering from serious harm, implying
u(x¯2) > u(x2). The standard evaluation of such a scenario would be depicted by the
following equation:
u(x1) + p(x¯2)u(x¯2) + p(x2)u(x2) = u(x1) + Ep u(x2) . (5.1)
For simplicity, I assume a stationary welfare function and set the rate of pure time pref-
erence to zero.15 Equation (5.1) is the evaluation rule corresponding to a maximizer of
intertemporally additive expected utility (or welfare). Note that I identify evaluation
rules with corresponding decision rules by the assumption of welfare (or utility) maxi-
mization on some set of feasible outcomes. Moreover, for the remainder of this chapter,
the terms welfare and utility will be used synonymously.16 The evaluation in equation
(5.1) translated into real terms is also the standard cost benefit analysis answer for a two
period setting with uncertainty, see e.g Brent (1996, 167 et seq.) and Johansson (1993,
142 et seq.). In equation (5.1) the threat of harm p(x2)u(x2) diminishes overall welfare.
In consequence, there will always be some willingness on behalf of the decision maker to
undergo efforts that decrease or prevent the threat of harm p(x2)u(x2). In accordance
with the Wingspread definition, precautionary measures have to be taken in the first
period, in order to reduce or eliminate the threat of harm in the second period. If these
measures would come at no cost, they would obviously be carried out. The interesting
scenario is when such precautionary measures lower the welfare in the first period. A
decision maker using equation (5.1) for his evaluation is willing to accept a reduction of
first period welfare of up to u(x¯2) − E u(x2), in order to eliminate the threat of harm.
In words, the maximum of first period welfare reduction accepted corresponds to the
difference between the welfare derived from the unharmed outcome and the expected
welfare when facing the threat of harm.
Yet, this effort does not seem to suffice the advocates of the precautionary principle.
The authors of the Wingspread declaration state explicitly that “We believe existing
environmental regulations and other decisions, particularly those based on risk assess-
ment, have failed to adequately protect human health and the environment, as well
15As will be discussed later on, neither a positive rate of time preference nor a non-stationary welfare
function change the general insight. Obviously, the cost-benefit approaches mentioned below do apply
a positive rate of discount striving for numerical results.
16While utility rather alludes to an agent making private decisions, the word welfare suits better to
a decision maker in public policy. However, the reasoning carried out in my study is suitable for both
scenarios. Moreover, some of the concepts from decision theory discussed in this and the next sections
are conventionally labeled in terms of utility rather than welfare, like, for example, expected versus
non-expected utility theories. A relabeling to non-expected welfare or to a Bernoulli welfare function
would appear somewhat peculiar.
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as the larger system of which humans are but a part” (Raffensperger & Tickner 1999,
353). However, some sort of assessment for the uncertainty is needed. The minimal
information would be that some harming scenario is deemed possible while others are
not. Such a situation is formalized by Arrow & Hurwicz (1972), who show that deci-
sion rules coping with that little information have to be based only on evaluation of
the extreme outcomes in order to satisfy certain rationality properties. With respect to
a precautionary evaluation, it seems to be more plausible to base the decision on the
evaluation of the worst possible outcome than basing it on the best possible outcome.
This reasoning is supported by Bossert, Pattanaik & Xu (2000), who show that in a
setting only discriminating between what can and what cannot happen, maximizing the
worst possible outcome is the only decision rule conforming with a concept of uncer-
tainty aversion.17 However, an evaluation that only takes into account the worst possible
outcome is usually considered as too extreme. In my example, such a decision criteria
implies a willingness to reduce welfare in the first period - in order to avoid the threat
of harm - by u(x¯2)−minx2 u(x2) = u(x¯2)− u(x2). In a scenario where welfare without
the threat of harm would coincide in both periods (i.e. u(x1) = u(x¯2)), this disposition
would imply that the decision maker is willing to reduce welfare in the first period to
the harm-level u(x2) just to prevent that such welfare level could come up in the second
period. In my opinion, most decision makers would not subscribe to such an extreme
decision rule (including myself). Therefore, I seek for precautionary evaluation rules,
as a subclass of generalized uncertainty aggregation rules, that render an evaluation of
the uncertain second period, which lies somewhere between expected value and the worst
possible outcomes. These precautionary evaluation rules imply that a decision maker’s
willingness to reduce welfare in the first period in order to prevent a threat of harm in
the second period p(x2)u(x2), is bigger than for the intertemporally additive expected
utility maximizer, who uses equation (5.1), i.e. bigger than u(x¯2) − E u(x2). This idea
of precautionary uncertainty evaluation is formalized in the next section.18 To this end,
17For a definition of what it means precisely to be uncertainty averse in such a setting compare
Bossert et al. (2000, Definition 3). The authors also refine the rule of ‘maximizing the worst possible
outcome’ for situations where the extreme outcomes of different scenarios coincide.
18In relation to the violation of the independence axiom in the Ellsberg (1961) paradox, the author
suggests a decision rule that is a convex combination of the expected utility model and the maximization
of the worst possible outcome. This compound decision rule obviously renders an evaluation that
lies between expected utility and the valuation of the worst outcome. The latest axiomatization of
such a decision rule is given by Chateauneuf, Grant & Eichberger (2003) in the language of subjective
Choquet-expected utility by relaxing independence on the extreme outcomes. My axiomatization yields
a decision rule that is not a convex combination of these two extremes, but can continuously vary from
one extreme to the other. Moreover it stays continuous within the topology of weak convergence.
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more information on uncertainty will be needed than the mere specification of what is
perceived possible and what is not.
If one is willing to add a little more structure concerning the evaluation of uncertainty
than in the Arrow-Hurwicz setup, models of ambiguity such as Gilboa & Schmeidler
(1989) or its recent generalization by Ghirardato, Maccheroni & Marinacci (2004) are
applicable. These models work with sets of probability distributions instead of unique
probabilities. In Gilboa & Schmeidler’s (1989) axiomatization, decision makers use
the worst probability distribution deemed possible to assess an uncertain situation.
With respect to the relation between ambiguity and precaution, Gollier (2001, 310 et
seq.) criticizes such an attitude as too extreme. However, the recent generalization by
Ghirardato et al. (2004) gives a more satisfactory axiomatization, which allows for a
much broader and more reasonable class of ambiguity attitudes. In my opinion, their
approach resolves Gollier’s criticism and supports that, when decision makers are not
willing or able to assign a single probability distribution to outcomes, but rather a set
of such distributions, there is evidence that some sort of more precautionary decision
rule can be needed in order to represent general preferences.
However, I show that it is by no means necessary to abandon the uniqueness of
probabilities (or the independence axiom, see below), in order to derive the necessity
in a preference representation to allow for more precautionary evaluation rules than
the one corresponding to equation (5.1). I demonstrate that already the standard von
Neumann-Morgenstern assumptions give rise to more precautionary decision rules, as
soon as time structure is introduced and taken serious. I consider my study as comple-
mentary to other approaches towards extending the notion of uncertainty evaluation, as
for example the mentioned study by Ghirardato et al. (2004), which comprises many of
the earlier extensions of the von Neumann-Morgenstern setup. Merging my conception
of intertemporal risk aversion and these extended treatments of ‘atemporal’ uncertainty,
constitutes a promising research agenda for the future. In the remainder of this section,
I briefly discuss the related literature, both, more broadly on choice under uncertainty
and more specifically on attempts to formalize the precautionary principle.
Let me start with a closer look at the representation of general uncertainty attitude by
Ghirardato et al. (2004). Key to this approach as compared to the standard approach of
von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), and its subjective formulation by Savage (1972), is
the relaxation of the independence axiom. The independence axiom roughly states the
following.19 Let a decision maker be indifferent between a lottery p and another lottery
p′. Now offer him two compound lotteries, which both start out with a coin toss. In both
19A formal statement of the independence axiom is given on page 73.
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lotteries the decision maker enters the same third lottery p′′ if head comes up. However,
if tail comes up, the decision maker faces lottery p in the first compound lottery and
the lottery p′ in the second. Recalling that the decision maker is indifferent between
lotteries p and p′, the independence axiom requires the decision maker to be indifferent
between the two compound lotteries as well. However, in particular decision contexts,
there is ample evidence that observed behavior consistently deviates from the theories
of von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) and Savage (1972), which are built on the inde-
pendence axiom. The most prominent violations are those discovered by Allais (1953)
and Ellsberg (1961). More recent challenges include the equity premium puzzle (see e.g.
Kocherlakota 1996) and Rabin’s (2000) paradoxical relation between risk aversion in the
small and risk aversion in the large for an expected utility maximizer. Note that the
first puzzle can partly be explained by disentangling the coefficients of risk aversion and
intertemporal substitutability without giving up the independence axiom. Such a disen-
tanglement is also an important step in my formalization of precaution (see chapter 7).
Rabin’s (2000) paradox has recently been shown to hold for a wide class of non-expected
utility theories that give up the independence axiom as well (Safra & Segal 2005). For an
overview on other violations of independence compare for example Starmer (2000) and
Luce (2000). Despite these behavioral inadequacies, the independence axiom still has a
strong normative appeal in the sense of agreeing on a principled approach to evaluate
uncertain outcomes as pointed out for example in Hammond (1988a), Hammond (1988b)
and Starmer (2000, 334). For an introduction to approaches for decision-making under
uncertainty that abandon or relax the independence axiom, most importantly Quiggin’s
(1982) Rank-Dependent Utility, Machina’s (1982) Local Expected Utility, Choquet Ex-
pected Utility dating back to Schmeidler (1989) and Kahneman & Tversky’s (1979)
Prospect Theory, compare for example Karni & Schmeidler (1991), Schmidt (1998) and
Starmer (2000). Note that most of the mentioned theories are completely or to some
extent contained in the above mentioned model by Ghirardato et al. (2004).
For the representation of uncertainty by a unique probability distribution, there exist
different conceptions and axiomatizations. The classical treatments are the frequentist
characterization of probability by von Mises (1939) and the measure theoretic axioma-
tization of Kolmogorov (1933). A quite different approach by de Finetti (1937) derives
probabilistic reasoning from assumptions on betting behavior. Savage (1972) recovers
probabilistic beliefs and evaluation of outcomes in a joint framework. His framework
is also the stepping stone for Ghirardato et al.’s (2004) axiomatization of choice under
uncertainty, where relaxing independence goes along with a description of uncertainty
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in terms of sets of probabilities.20 Better suited to the context of my study are the epis-
temic axiomatizations of probability by Koopman (1940) and Cox (1946,1961). Both are
partly inspired by the seminal work of Keynes (1921) and construct a probabilistic logic.
A more recent treatment within this line of thought is Jaynes (2003). For an overview
over the different conceptions of probability compare, for example, Eisenfu¨hr & Weber
(2003). For a more detailed discussion of subjective probabilities see Kyburg & Smokler
(1964) and Fishburn (1986).21 Note that, as a consequence of sticking to unique proba-
bility measures for the description of uncertainty, I will not make a distinction between
the words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’.22
Complementary attempts on formalizing aspects of the precautionary principle have
been carried out by Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000), Gollier (2001), Gollier & Treich
(2003), Immordino (2000), Immordino (2003) and Barrieu & Sinclair-Desgagne´ (2005).
A decade earlier Kimball (1990) analyzed and labeled the concept of precautionary
savings. He defined a precautionary savings motive by the condition that an increase
of uncertainty over future income raises the current savings. Within an intertemporally
additive expected utility model, Kimball (1990) derives conditions on the utility function
for the precautionary savings motive to hold. To this end, he defines measures of relative
and absolute prudence that characterize the curvature of marginal utility. They are
exact analogues to the Arrow-Pratt measures of relative and absolute risk aversion, just
applied to marginal utility instead of the utility function itself. Kimball finds that the
relation between the measures of risk aversion and prudence determine the precautionary
savings motive. Eeckhoudt & Schlesinger (2005) give an axiomatic characterization of
prudence and, moreover, extend the concept and the axiomatic characterization to any
order of derivatives of the utility function.
20Note however that there is some evidence within the Savage framework that dynamic consistency
implies the existence of unique probabilistic beliefs (Epstein & Breton 1993).
21For a definition of objective probability beyond the frequency or symmetry definition compare also
Popper’s (1959) concept of propensity.
22A notion frequently found in the literature discussing different forms of uncertainty and ignorance
is the following. Risk refers to the particular form of uncertainty where probabilities are known, while
general uncertainty also accounts for situations where the probabilities are unknown to the decision
maker. This distinction goes back to Knight (1921). Within the concept of epistemic probabilities or
subjective probabilistic beliefs, however, it is not obvious what is meant by ‘known probabilities’. A
possible answer would be to single out objective probabilities as known probabilities. However, among
the advocates of subjective probability, there is generally no agreement on the existence of objective
probability in the first place. Another distinction possibility is to identify general uncertainty with the
concept of ambiguity (or hard uncertainty). In the literature discussed above, the latter corresponds
to the non-uniqueness of probabilities, or, in the formulation of Choquet expected utility, to the non-
additivity of the (monotonic) set functions (capacities) that replace the concept of probability.
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Gollier et al. (2000), Gollier (2001) and Gollier & Treich (2003) analyze a one-
commodity, two-period model, in which consumption causes potential damage in the
second period. In such a model, they examine the effect of new information that arrives
between the first and the second period. The authors label a decision rule precautionary
if it satisfies the following condition. Whenever better information23 about the future
is expected, the decision rule must imply a reduction of the (potentially harmful) first
period consumption as compared to a situation where no information is expected. They
derive a criterion for their concept of precaution to hold in terms of absolute prudence
dominating (twice absolute) risk aversion. Gollier (2001, 312) points out that for deci-
sion makers exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, this condition is usually regarded
unlikely to hold.24 While the above model considers the reaction of a decision maker in
terms of reducing the amount of potential harm by reducing first period consumption,
Immordino (2000) and Immordino (2003) explore the decision maker’s willingness to
invest into a reduction of the probability that the harmful event takes place. Using
the terminology of Ehrlich & Becker (1972), Immordino calls actions that reduce the
harm level in case it occurs self-insurance and actions that reduce the probability of the
potential harm to take place self-protection. In a similar setup as Gollier et al. (2000),
Immordino analyzes under which circumstances decision rules exhibit precautionarity
in the sense of self-protection. Finally, Barrieu & Sinclair-Desgagne´ (2005) define a
precautionary strategy (within a static setting) as an action that either is self-insuring
or self-protecting. They derive a set of mathematical conditions that a precautionary
decision maker has to satisfy when confronted by a threat of harm.
While all of the above models, which explicitly refer to the precautionary principle,
stay within the intertemporally additive expected utility framework, Kimball & Weil
(2003) extend Kimball’s (1990) analysis of precautionary savings to a the framework of
Kreps & Porteus (1978). They show that in the generalized framework, which allows
to distinguish between risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability, all three quan-
23This is better information in the sense of Epstein (1980) going back to Marschak & Miyasawa
(1968). It can be defined roughly as follows. Let there be two periods and a given expectation for
the outcome of the second period at the beginning of the first. After having decided upon first period
consumption but before choosing consumption in the second period a signal is received. Whenever
an information structure allows to derive (in expectation) a higher welfare gain from such a signal for
all reasonable welfare functions than does another, the information structure is said to carry better
information.
24Note that the model crucially depends on a linearity in the trade-off between second period con-
sumption and second period damage. Moreover, the authors assume an interior solution. However,
due to the assumed linearity, this existence assumption is not always met. For the above mentioned
scenario of constant relative risk aversion, it can be shown that such an interior solution does not exist.
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tities, prudence, risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability, jointly determine the
precautionary savings motive. As I work out in chapter 7, my conception of precaution
crucially depends on the disentanglement between risk aversion and intertemporal sub-
stitutability, but not on prudence. Moreover, it is not tied to a specific model of savings
or emission reduction. Motivated as a simple intertemporal reasoning on a decision
maker’s willingness to undergo preventive action, I present a general characterization in
terms of the underlying preferences.
5.3 Uncertainty Aggregation Rules
This section defines the concept of general and precautionary uncertainty aggregation
rules. Let X be a connected compact metric space. The elements x of X are called
consumption levels or, more general, outcomes. They may contain quantifications in
terms of real numbers as well as more abstract characterizations, for example, of current
climate or the state of an ecosystem before and after an invasive species has been
introduced. The space of all continuous functions from outcomes into the reals is denoted
by C0(X). More generally, the space of all continuous functions from some metric space
Y into the reals is denoted by C0(Y ). An element u ∈ C0(X), u : X → IR, is called a
Bernoulli utility function.25 Define U = minx∈X u(x), U = maxx∈X u(x) and U = [U,U ]
so that the range of u is given by U .26 The set of all Borel probability measures on X
is denoted by P = ∆(X) and equipped with the Prohorov metric which gives rise to
the topology of weak convergence. The elements p ∈ P are called lotteries. Given the
epistemic probability definition I referred to in the preceding section, lotteries do not
only describe draws from an urn, but are general characterizations of uncertainty with
respect to possible outcomes. The degenerate lotteries giving weight 1 to outcome x are
denoted by x ∈ P . A lottery yielding outcome x with probability p(x) = λ and outcome
x′ with probability p(x′) = 1− λ is written as λx+ (1− λ)x′ ∈ P . Note that the ‘plus’
sign between elements of X always characterizes a lottery.27 Again more generally, the
25A more specified definition of Bernoulli utility in relation to the representation of preference rela-
tions is given in the next section (compare page 73).
26Note that compactness of X and continuity of u assure that the minimum and the maximum are
attained.
27As X is only assumed to be a compact metric space there is no immediate addition defined for
its elements. In case it is additionally equipped with some vector space or field structure, the vector
addition will not coincide with the “+” used here. The “+” sign used here alludes to the additivity of
probabilities.
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set of Borel probability measures on any compact metric space Y is denoted by ∆(Y ).
Finally, I denote with IR+ = {z ∈ IR : z ≥ 0} and IR++ = {z ∈ IR : z > 0} the set of all
positive, respectively strictly positive, real numbers.
An uncertainty aggregation rule is defined as a functional M : P × C0(X) → IR. It
takes as input the decision maker’s perception of uncertainty, expressed by the probabil-
ity measure p, and his evaluation of certain outcomes, expressed by his Bernoulli utility
function u. For certain outcomes uncertainty aggregation rules are imposed to return
the value of the Bernoulli utility itself, i.e.M(x, u) = u(x). The uncertainty aggregation
rule generated by the axiomatization in the subsequent chapter is the following. For a
strictly monotonic and continuous function f : IR→ IR defineMf : P ×C0(X)→ IR by
Mf (p, u) = f−1
[∫
X
f ◦ u dp
]
, (5.2)
where f ◦u denotes the usual composition of two functions.28 The composition sign will
often be omitted. This shall not create confusion, as usual multiplication of two functions
does not appear within this model. If the probability measure would be defined directly
on the range of u, the expression in equation (5.2) would be known as the generalized
or f -mean. It aggregates the utility values weighted by some function f and applies the
inverse of f to normalize the resulting expression. The only difference between the mean
and the uncertainty aggregation rule is that the latter takes the Bernoulli utility function
as an explicit argument. If such a correspondence between a mean and an uncertainty
aggregation rule holds, I say that the uncertainty aggregation rule (hereMf ) is induced
by the mean (here generalized or f -mean).29 The reason for taking up the function u as
an explicit argument in the uncertainty aggregation rule, is to explore the freedom in the
choice of Bernoulli utility and to stress the similarity between uncertainty aggregation
and intertemporal aggregation, which will be introduced in chapter 6.2.
To illustrate the uncertainty aggregation ruleMf with some examples, let me consider
the subset of lotteries having finite support, i.e. the set of all simple probability measures
P s ⊂ P on X. Then, equation (5.2) can be written as
Mf (p, u) = f−1
[∑
x
p(x)f ◦ u(x)
]
.
28Note that by continuity of f ◦u and compactness of X Lesbeque’s dominated convergence theorem
(e.g. Billingsley 1995, 209) ensures integrability.
29Precisely this relation can be defined as follows. Let pu ∈ ∆(U) denote the probability measure
induced by p defined on X through the Bernoulli utility function u ∈ C0(X) on its (compact) range U .
Then an uncertainty aggregation ruleM is said to be induced by a meanM : ∆(U) → IR whenever
M(p, u) =M(pu) ∀p ∈ P. Mean inducedness implies that only the probability of x is used to weigh
u(x).
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The simplest uncertainty aggregation rule corresponds to the expected value operator,
and is obtained for f = id:
E(p, u) ≡ Ep u(x) =
∑
x
p(x)u(x) .
It is induced by the arithmetic mean. For Bernoulli utility functions with a range re-
stricted to U ⊆ IR+ another example of an uncertainty aggregation rule is induced by
the geometric mean and corresponds to f = ln:
G(p, u) =
∏
x
u(x)p(x) .
Both of the above uncertainty aggregation rules are, again assuming U ⊆ IR+, contained
as special cases in the following uncertainty aggregation rule achieved by f(z) = zα:
Mα(p, u) ≡Mid
α
(p, u) =
[∑
x
p(x)u(x)α
] 1
α
defined for α ∈ IR with M0(p, u) ≡ limα→0M
α(p, u) = G(p, u) and M1(p, u) =
E(p, u).30 The corresponding mean is known as power mean. In the limit, where α goes
to infinity respectively minus infinity, the uncertainty aggregation rule Mα only con-
siders the extreme outcomes (abandoning continuity in the probabilities): M∞(p, u) ≡
limα→∞M
α(p, u) = maxx u(x) and M
−∞(p, u) ≡ limα→−∞M
α(p, u) = minx u(x).
Let me take Mα as an example to illustrate the intuition of uncertainty aggregation
rules. Assume that an exogenously given u specifies some cardinally measurable welfare
information for the outcomes x ∈ X.31 Now consider a lottery yielding u¯ = u(x¯) =
100 with probability p¯ = 0.9 and u = u(x) = 10 with probability p = 0.1. Then an
expected value maximizer will evaluate the lottery by the certainty equivalent ucE =
ucα=1 = 91. Another person, who is extremely precautious, might value the lottery
only as high as the worst of its outcomes, that is ucmin = u
c
α=−∞ = 10. However, as
discussed in the preceding section, the latter is considered as too extreme an assessment.
As motivated in the respective setup, a general precautionary decision rule should go
along with an uncertainty aggregation rule that renders an evaluation lying somewhere
between expected welfare and the welfare of the worst possible outcome. Rewriting the
scenario evaluation of equation (5.1) with a general uncertainty aggregation rule yields
30The easiest way to recognize the limit for α → 0 is to note that for any α > 0 the function
fα(z) =
zα−1
α is an affine transformation of f(z) = z
α. As shown in a ‘Note’ on page 195 in the
appendix, affine transformations leave the uncertainty aggregation rule unchanged. Then the fact that
limα→0
zα−1
α = ln(z) gives the result.
31Note that it will be a major task of the subsequent chapters to render a sound basis to this
cardinality.
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the evaluation rule
u(x1) +M(p, u) . (5.3)
The evaluation rule is considered precautionary if it yields a higher willingness to reduce
first period welfare in order to avoid a threat of harm than does equation (5.1). Denote
by P thu = {p ∈ P
s : p(x¯2), p(x2) > 0, p(x¯2) + p(x2) = 1 with x¯2, x2 ∈ X, u(x¯2) > u(x2)}
the set of potential threat of harm lotteries. Then, with an intertemporal evaluation
rule of the form (5.3), the definition of a precautionary uncertainty evaluation in the
sense of the preceding section can be formalized.
Definition: Given an evaluation of the certain outcomes by a function u ∈ C0(X), an
uncertainty aggregation rule is called precautionary if the following relation holds:
u(x2) <M(p, u) < E(p, u) ∀ p ∈ P
th
u . (5.4)
For the uncertainty aggregation rule Mα it can be shown that the smaller is α, the
lower is the certainty equivalent that the respective uncertainty aggregation rule, corre-
sponding to the power mean, brings about (e.g. Hardy, Littlewood & Polya 1964, 26).
Hence, within this setup, a precautionary decision maker would be expected to choose
a parameter α < 1. More generally, in the case of the uncertainty aggregation ruleMf ,
which is parameterized by the function f , precautionarity of the uncertainty aggregation
rule is characterized by the concavity of f as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6: An uncertainty aggregation rule of the form Mf is precautionary in
the sense of equation (5.4), if and only if, f is either strictly increasing and concave
on U or strictly decreasing and convex on U . An uncertainty aggregation rule of
the formMα is precautionary in the sense of equation (5.4), if and only if, α < 1.
The next chapter develops representations of preferences that make use of uncertainty
evaluation by means ofMf . Therefore, I will use the wording precautionary evaluation
or uncertainty aggregation rule as a reference to evaluation that goes along with an
uncertainty aggregation rule of typeMf and that satisfies the concavity condition stated
in the proposition. Other precautionary uncertainty aggregation rules (like e.g. the one
in footnote 18) will be ruled out by the axioms.
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Chapter 6
The Representation
6.1 Atemporal Uncertainty
Chapter 6 develops the representational background for the subsequent discussion on
intertemporal risk aversion and precaution in chapter 7. This section 6.1 revisits the
atemporal von Neumann-Morgenstern setting. Special attention is payed to different
possibilities of fixing (gauging) the originally ordinal utility function over the certain
outcomes. Section 6.2 takes a brief look at the other framing scenario of additively
separable preferences over certain consumption paths, and introduces the concept of
an intertemporal aggregation rule. The two framing scenarios are united in section
6.3, where a representation for the simplest setting sufficiently rich to discuss most
of the topics pointed out in the introduction is given. The distinctive feature of the
representation is that it leaves open the choice of the representing Bernoulli utility
function. Section 6.4 points out how fixing (gauging) Bernoulli utility in different ways
leads to different representations found in the literature. The idea of keeping some
freedom in the choice of Bernoulli utility is already introduced below in the atemporal
framework. While it might appear a little artificial at this point, it will prove helpful in
later sections and chapters.
A useful perspective on the study in this section is the following. Choice in a cer-
tain, atemporal (or one period) setting determines the utility or evaluation function on
the certain outcomes only up to strictly increasing transformations. Introducing un-
certainty, von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) single out a particular utility function
evaluating the outcomes, by prescribing that expected value maximization should de-
scribe choice over lotteries. In other words, they use the originally ordinal character of
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utility on certain outcomes in order to render a desired uncertainty aggregation rule. If,
however, a cardinal evaluation of certain outcomes is given and the freedom of Bernoulli
utility no longer prevails, additive representations no longer suffice to represent all de-
cision rules conforming with the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. Such a situation
can arise, when there is additional information on welfare, for example stemming from
intertemporal considerations carried out in the later sections.
For a slightly different perspective on this reasoning, let me introduce a notion bor-
rowed from physics. I call a degree of freedom in a theory, that has no observable effect,
a gauge. Fixing this freedom in order to yield a particular representation is called
gauging. A more familiar wording for gauging is obviously choosing a normalization.
However, there is a small but important semantic difference between the two concepts.
A normalization is usually carried out at the very beginning of an analysis in order to
simplify the subsequent algebra. On the other hand, identifying a particular gauge goes
along with the reasoning that exploring the freedom of the gauge, instead of eliminat-
ing it right away, can render a deeper understanding of a theory. Chapter 7.1 applies
this technique to identify the quantity that describes intertemporal risk aversion and
precaution. Moreover, carrying along the gauge freedom of Bernoulli utility for a little
while, allows to develop different representations which are useful for different questions
and interpretations later on in sections 6.4, 7.1 and 7.3.
I represent preferences over lotteries in the usual way by a binary relation on P
denoted . For two lotteries p, p′ ∈ P the interpretation of p  p′ is that lottery p
is weakly preferred with respect to lottery p′. The relation  will be required to be
reflexive.1 The asymmetric part of the relation  is denoted by ≻ and interpreted as a
strict preference. The symmetric part of the relation  is denoted by ∼ and interpreted
as indifference. An uncertainty aggregation rule is said to represent the preference
relation  over lotteries if
p  p′ ⇔M(p, u) ≥M(p′, u) for all p, p′ ∈ P (6.1)
and some u ∈ C0(X). It is said to represent  for u∗ ∈ C0(X) if equation (6.1) holds
with u = u∗. The theorem by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944), in a version close
to Grandmont (1972, 49), states the following.
Theorem 1 (von Neumann-Morgenstern): The axioms
A1 (weak order)  is transitive and complete, i.e.:
1Note that reflexivity is implied by completeness in axiom A1.
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− transitive: ∀ p, p′, p′′ ∈ P : p  p′ and p′  p′′ ⇒ p  p′′
− complete: ∀ p, p′ ∈ P : p  p′ or p′  p
A2 (independence) ∀ p, p′, p′′ ∈ P :
p ∼ p′ ⇒ λ p+ (1− λ) p′′ ∼ λ p′ + (1− λ) p′′ ∀ λ ∈ [0, 1]
A3 (continuity) ∀p∈P : {p′∈P : p′  p} and {p′∈P : p  p′} are closed in P
hold, if and only if, there exists a continuous function u: X → IR such that
∀ p, p′ ∈ P : p  p′ ⇔ Ep u(x) ≥ Ep′ u(x).
The theorem states that, accepting axioms A1-A3, there exists a Bernoulli utility
function u on the outcomes such that the uncertainty aggregation rule is of the expected
utility form. A1 assumes that the decision maker can rank all lotteries (completeness).
Moreover, if one is preferred to a second and the second is preferred to a third, then the
first should also be preferred to the third (transitivity). Note that, within the context of
deriving a principled approach to choice under uncertainty, A1 should be interpreted as
“if a decision maker had the capacities to rank all possible outcomes, then his ranking
should satisfy transitivity” rather than as an assumption that the decision maker has
actually worked out a ranking of all possible outcomes. The independence axiom A2
has already been discussed in chapter 5.2 on page 62. Continuity A3 assures that
infinitesimally small changes in the probabilities do not result in finitely large changes
in the evaluation.
Now, consider what happens in a situation, where a decision maker has a given
evaluation u for the certain outcomes.2 To answer this question, I adapt my earlier
definition of Bernoulli utility to the duty of preference representation. The minimal
requirement for a utility function to express evaluation of certain outcomes is that
a certain outcome x is preferred over a certain outcome x′, if and only if, the value
assigned to x is higher than that assigned to x′. I call the set of all utility functions,
which satisfy this ordinal requirement, the set of Bernoulli utility functions B = {u ∈
C0(X) : x  x′ ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(x′)∀x, x′ ∈ X} for a given preference relation . Note that
for convenience of presentation, the definition of Bernoulli utility functions assumes
continuity (which is also implied by axiom A3). It is a trivial consequence of theorem 1
that, if the preference relation  satisfies axioms A1-A3, the set of Bernoulli utility
functions is nonempty. Moreover, with any Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B, also a
strictly increasing and continuous transformation of u is inB. With regard to my earlier
2Wherefrom such a cardinal evaluation may stem will be subject of the subsequent sections. The
key to the answer rests within the intertemporal structure.
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introduction of a Bernoulli utility function in chapter 5.3 without reference to preference
relations, note that any u ∈ C0(X) is a Bernoulli utility function in the sense above for
some preference relation . Now, let me specify the uncertainty aggregation rules that
represent the decision makers preference over lotteries in the sense of equation (6.1) with
a given Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B for a preference relation , satisfying the von
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms.
Proposition 7: Given a binary relation  on P and a Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B
with range U , the relation  satisfies axioms A1-A3, if and only if, there exists a
strictly monotonic and continuous function f : U → IR such that for all p, p′ ∈ P
p  p′ ⇔Mf (p, u) ≥Mf (p′, u).
Moreover, if f represents  in the above sense, then f ′: U → IR represents  in
this sense, if and only if, there exist a, b ∈ IR, a 6= 0 such that f ′ = a f + b.3
Note that the indeterminacy of f up to affine transformations does not translate into
an indeterminacy of the functional M. A function f ′ = a f + b with a, b ∈ IR, a 6= 0
renders the same uncertainty aggregation rule as f , that is Mf (·, ·) = Mf
′
(·, ·). This
holds, as the inverse f ′−1 cancels out the affine displacement of f ′ with respect to f .
In what follows, the group of nondegenerate affine transformations will be denoted by
A = {a : IR→ IR : a(z) = a z+ b , a, b ∈ IR, a 6= 0} with elements a ∈ A, and the group
of positive affine transformations will be denoted by A+ = {a+ : IR → IR : a+(z) =
a z + b , a, b ∈ IR, a > 0}. Then, the uniqueness result of proposition 7 can be written
as ‘...if and only if, there exists a ∈ A such that f ′ = af .’ In later propositions, this
notation yields a significant simplification in the formulation of the uniqueness results.
In all of the upcoming propositions, corollaries and theorems, the uniqueness result will
be stated in a similar form at the end of the proposition (corollary, theorem). Therefore,
I will often refer to the uniqueness result as the ‘moreover part’ of the corresponding
proposition.4
Let me come back to the perspective given at the beginning of this section. Choice
under certainty only renders ordinal information on the Bernoulli utility function u and,
thus, can be represented by all members of B. Proposition 7 states that this gauge
freedom for Bernoulli utility u translates into the representing uncertainty aggregation
3The theorem can also be stated using only increasing versions of f . In this case Mα would be
included inMf in a less obvious way than by f(z) = zα. Strictly decreasing functions are allowed in
the proposition, because the inverse in (5.2) cancels out any nondegenerate affine transformation.
4Similarly, the proof of the uniqueness results is given in a ‘moreover part’ subsequent to the proof
of the main assertion of the propositions, corollaries and theorems.
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rule through the form of the parameterizing function f . Taking this correspondence the
other way round one obtains
Corollary 1: For any strictly monotonic, continuous function f : IR→ IR the following
assertion holds:
A binary relation  on P satisfies axioms A1-A3, if and only if, Mf represents
. The latter is: there exists a continuous function u : X → IR such that
∀p, p′ ∈ P : p  p′ ⇔Mf (p, u) ≥Mf (p′, u). (6.2)
Moreover, if u represents  in the sense of equation (6.2) then u′: X → IR repre-
sents  in this sense if and only if there exists a+ ∈ A+ such that u = f−1a+ f u′ .5
The evaluation function u will obviously be a member of B, as for any f it holds that
Mf (x, u) = u(x). Hence, u represents choice on the certain outcomes in the sense of the
definition of a Bernoulli utility function. The uniqueness of u is, in general, no longer
up to affine transformations as in theorem 1. Indeterminacy of the Bernoulli utility
function u corresponds to those transformations of u, which result in affine transforma-
tions of f , and, thus, leave the uncertainty aggregation rule unchanged. For example, in
the representation where uncertainty aggregation corresponds to the geometric mean,
the remaining gauge freedom of u, after fixing f = ln, is expressed by the group of
transformations u→ c ud , c, d ∈ IR++.
6
Corollary 1 points out, how Bernoulli utility functions and uncertainty aggregation
rules always come in pairs. For f increasing and strictly concave (or in particularMα<1),
corollary 1 reproduces von Neumann-Morgenstern’s theorem with expected value re-
placed by a precautionary uncertainty aggregation rule (compare proposition 6). An
immediate consequence of corollary 1 is that
In the atemporal framework a dispute on whether to apply a pre-
cautionary uncertainty aggregation rule or expected value cannot
be distinguished from (or can be stated as) a disagreement on the
evaluation function over the certain outcomes.
5Recall that f−1a+ f u′ describes the composed function f−1 ◦a+ ◦ f ◦ u′ and not a multiplication
of values. Note that equation (6.2) uses f only on the restricted domain U . Alternatively one can
define f : U → IR on a nondegenerate interval U and require u : X → U to be surjective. Then the
representing u in equation (6.2) is unique. Compare to the analysis in chapter 7.4.
6Setting f = ln corresponds to the remaining freedom u = f−1a+ f u′ = ea ln(u
′)+b = u′
a
eb with
a > 0.
75
CHAPTER 6. THE REPRESENTATION
However, the definition of a precautionary uncertainty aggregation rule in chapter 5.3
appealed to an intertemporal setup, where the evaluation of uncertainty in the second
period determined the willingness to undergo prevention effort in the first period. Such
a time structure proves to be essential to define the concept of precaution in terms of
preferences. As a consequence, temporality is introduced in the next section.
6.2 Intertemporal Certainty
This short section treats the other framing scenario of the general framework, i.e. addi-
tively separable preference over certain outcome paths. Time is discrete with planning
horizon T ∈ IN. Individual periods are usually denoted with time indices t, τ ∈ {1, ..., T}.
The set of all certain consumption paths from period t to period T is denoted by
Xt = XT−t+1, where XT−t+1 denotes the T− t+1– fold Cartesian product of X with
itself.7 A consumption path is generally written with a calligraphic x and its period τ
entry is denoted by xτ . When explicit reference is made to the fact that x is an ele-
ment of Xt I give the consumption path an upper case time index t. Then xt denotes a
consumption path from period t to period T , and xtτ denotes the period τ entry of the
respective consumption path. For example, a (planned) consumption path x ∈ X1 in pe-
riod one writes as x = (x1, x2, ..., xT ). Whenever such a notation is unambiguous, I also
label the entry xt by xt, yielding the notation x = (x1, x2, ..., xT ) for the consumption
path. Furthermore, let x0 ∈ X be some benchmark consumption. It is arbitrarily fixed
and serves to define the shorthand notation [x]t ≡ (x, x
0, ..., x0) for the consumption
path [x]t ∈ X
t that yields the specified consumption x in period t and the benchmark
consumption in all subsequent periods. The benchmark consumption is a common out-
come when comparing two different paths of type [x]t and [x
′]t. Thus, the relation
[x]t t [x
′]t expresses a preference of x over x
′ in period t.8 The final piece of notation
concerns the introduction of an intertemporal aggregation rule. Like the uncertainty
aggregation rules in the preceding sections have been parameterized by a function f ,
the intertemporal aggregation rules will be parameterized by a function g. For a given
function u ∈ C0(X) with range U , I define G = g(U), G = g(U) and G = [G,G]. In
addition, I define Γ = (G,G).
7There are T − t + 1 periods from t to T for which consumption has to be specified. I do not
distinguish different sets of outcomes for different periods. X can be thought of as the union of all
possible outcomes perceivable in any period.
8The intertemporal separability implied by axiom A4 will make this expression of preference inde-
pendent of the choice of the benchmark consumption x0.
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In this section, the binary relation  depicts preferences on the set X1 of certain
consumption paths starting in the first period. As mentioned before, I want the model to
be additively separable over time with respect to certain outcomes. The reason is that it
is the predominant framework for intertemporal modeling, in particular in environmental
economics, and eases the economic interpretation (compare the discussion in chapter
7.3). Moreover, despite its simplicity, the additively separable structure on certain
outcomes over time proves to be sufficiently rich to analyze the concept of precaution
and intertemporal risk aversion. Examples for axiomatizations of additive separability
include Koopmans (1960) and Radner (1982). However, these axiomatizations are not
within the focus of my analysis. In consequence, I take additive separability as a direct
assumption expressed in the following axiom.
A4 (certainty additivity) There exists u ∈ C0(X) such that for all x, x′ ∈ X1
x  x′ ⇔
T∑
τ=1
u(xτ ) ≥
T∑
τ=1
u(x′τ ). (6.3)
Note that this axiom also includes the assumptions of stationarity and a zero rate of time
preference. Stationarity implies that the mere passage of time does not have an (antic-
ipated) effect on preferences. For example, if stationarity holds, I will not (anticipate
in my plans to) prefer Beck’s beer over Budweiser in 2010 and Budweiser over Beck’s
beer in 2011. The assumption that the pure rate of time preference is zero implies that
future well-being is given the same weight as present well-being. Both assumptions will
be relaxed in chapter 8. However, for the time being, these assumptions are helpful, as
they do not affect qualitatively the concepts of precaution and intertemporal risk aver-
sion, and allow to focus on the essential. In chapters 9 and 10 I derive axiomatizations
that imply stationarity and a zero rate of time preference, taking general non-stationary
preference as a starting point. Another assumption that is implied by axiom A4, is his-
tory independence, which excludes (anticipated) habit formation. An extension of the
concept of intertemporal risk aversion to a framework allowing for history dependence
of preferences, is not pursued in this study, but constitutes an interesting challenge for
future research.
Like in the preceding section, the evaluation functions representing preferred choice
on certain one-period outcomes are called Bernoulli utility functions. The respective
set B characterizing the Bernoulli utility functions is defined by the straight-forward
extension B = {u ∈ C
0(X) : [x]1  [x
′]1 ⇔ u(x) ≥ u(x
′)∀ x, x′ ∈ X}, which coincides
with the definition given in section 6.1 for T = 1. Note that axiom A4 ensures that
the definition of B does not depend on the choice of the benchmark consumption x
0.9
9Nor does it depend on the fact that the defining paths [·] have constant future consumption streams.
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It is important to realize that axiom A4 does not imply that equation (6.3) holds for
every Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B. It only implies that there exists a particular
Bernoulli utility function such that comparisons between different consumption paths
can be expressed as comparisons of the sum over per period utility.10 For an arbitrary
given Bernoulli utility function u the following analogy to proposition 7 holds.
Proposition 8: Given a preference relation  on X1 and a Bernoulli utility function
u ∈ B with range U , the relation  satisfies axiom A4 if and only if there exists
a strictly monotonic, continuous function g : U → IR such that for all x, x′ ∈ X1
x  x′ ⇔ g−1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(xt)
]
≥ g−1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(x′t)
]
. (6.4)
Moreover, if T ≥ 2 and g represents  in the sense of equation (6.4), then g′:
U → IR represents  in this sense, if and only if, there exists a ∈ A such that
g′ = ag.
For the case of two periods let me abbreviate the representational form by introduc-
ing the notion of an intertemporal aggregation rule N g : U × U → IR, N g(·, ·) =
g−1
[
1
2
g(·) + 1
2
g(·)
]
. Such an intertemporal aggregation rule resembles closely the func-
tional form of the uncertainty aggregation rule Mf . Here, the probability weights
entering Mf (p, u) correspond to the period weights 1
2
and assure that the expression is
well defined.11 The fact that the period weights are fixed, allows to define the intertem-
poral aggregation rule directly on the range U of the Bernoulli utility function. For the
particular Bernoulli utility function corresponding to u in equation (6.3) of axiom A4,
the function g is the identity and intertemporal aggregation becomes linear.
10Referring to axiom A4 at more length as ‘additive separability over certain consumption paths’
might be more helpful in making this point. Naming the axiom simply ‘certainty additivity’ follows
Chew & Epstein (1990, 61).
11That is that the range of 12 g(·) +
1
2 g(·) coincides with the domain of g
−1. For a stationary setting
with positive discounting, these weights change to the form given in chapter 9.
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6.3 Certain × Uncertain
Combining the thoughts of sections 6.1 and 6.2, I now combine time structure and uncer-
tainty. For this end I consider the simplest nontrivial setting: a two period framework,
where consumption in the first period is certain and consumption in the second period
is uncertain. It is the simplest framework that allows to shed light on the idea of pre-
caution, as it has been motivated in chapter 5.2. I consider such a simplified framework
useful to familiarize with the structure of the representation, the idea of gauging and for
introducing the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. As I work out in chapter 8, all
the essential insights gained in this simplified framework extend in a straight forward
way to any finite time horizon. For such a multiperiod extension, I apply the frame-
work of Kreps & Porteus (1978). In their terminology, the time frame discussed here
only spans one and a half periods. Anticipating the more general setup and avoiding
notational confusion I denote the first period in this section by t = F and the second
and last period by t = T .12 Let me finally remark that this short section only presents
the mathematical structure. Its economic content will be discussed in chapter 7.
Elements xF ∈ X denote certain consumption in the first period. Degenerate lotteries
yielding certain consumption in the second period are denoted by xT ∈ X. If the period,
in which outcome x takes place is obvious, the time index is omitted. General objects of
choice in the second period are the lotteries p ∈ P , just as in section 6.1. The preference
relation over these objects is denoted by T . Objects of choice in the first period are
combinations of certain consumption in the first period and lotteries faced in the next:
(x, p) ∈ X × P . Preferences over these objects are given by the relation F . The set of
preferences in both periods will be denoted by = (F ,T ).
I demand that preferences restricted to certain consumption paths satisfy certainty
additivity A4, and that lotteries are evaluated on basis of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
axioms A1-A3. In addition, the preferences in period one and two shall be connected
by the following consistency axiom:
A5 (time consistency) For all x ∈ X and p, p′ ∈ P : (x, p) F (x, p
′)⇔ p T p
′ .
This is time consistency in the sense of Kreps & Porteus (1978).13 It is a requirement for
choosing between two consumption plans that coincide in their first period outcome. For
12Due to backward recursion in the derivation of the general representation, the structure of the
second period in this representation corresponds to the last period in the multiperiod setting. A full
time-step back would also introduce uncertainty for the preceding (i.e. first) period.
13Adapted to the one and a half period setting of this section.
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these choice situations, axiom A5 demands that in the first period the decision maker
shall prefer the plan that gives rise to the lottery that is preferred in the second period.
Again, I am interested in finding a representation for , for a given evaluation u ∈
B ≡ BF on the certain one-period outcomes. The definition of the set of Bernoulli
functions given in the preceding section still applies. Setting u ∈ B ≡ BF is justified
by the fact that certainty additivity A4 and time consistency A5 imply that BF =
BT .
14 Denote by F |X×X the restriction of F to the set of certain consumption paths
(or pairs). The following representation theorem holds.
Theorem 2: Given a set of binary relations = (F ,T ) on (X×P, P ) and a Bernoulli
utility function u ∈ B with range U , the set of relations  satisfies
i) A1-A3 for T (vNM setting)
ii) A4 for F |X×X (certainty additivity)
iii) A5 (time consistency)
if and only if, there exist strictly monotonic and continuous functions f : U → IR
and g : U → IR such that
v) (x, p) F (x
′, p′) ⇔ N g
[
u(x) , Mf (p, u)
]
≥ N g
[
u(x′) , Mf (p′, u)
]
vi) p T p
′ ⇔ Mf (p, u) ≥ Mf (p′, u) .
Moreover, g and f are unique up to nondegenerate affine transformations.
In this representation, period T lotteries are evaluated the same way as in proposition 7
by means of the uncertainty aggregation ruleMf . In the first period, these second period
lottery-evaluations are aggregated with the evaluation of the certain outcomes xF by
means of the intertemporal aggregation rule N g the same way as in proposition 8. With
respect to the roman numbering in the above and later theorems, I adopt the convention
that numbers i − iv are related to assumptions on preferences, while numbers starting
from v are concerned with the functional representation.15 Now, it will be interesting
to look again at the gauge-freedom within the representation.
14This is shown in the proof of theorem 2. Observe that in the definition of BF it is [x] = (x, x
0)
where x0 is identified with the degenerate lottery yielding the benchmark outcome x0 in the second
period.
15The only exception to this rule will be the very last theorem in this dissertation.
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6.4 Gauging
Like in section 6.1, there is some gauge freedom rendered to the model by the freedom
to choose the Bernoulli utility function in theorem 2. Given some u ∈ B, any other
Bernoulli utility function is a strictly increasing continuous transformation of u and any
strictly increasing continuous transformation of u yields an element of B. Moreover
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1: If the triple (u, f, g) represents the set of preferences  in the sense of
theorem 2, then so does the triple (s◦u, f ◦s−1, g ◦s−1) for any s : U → IR strictly
increasing and continuous.
Now, like in section 6.1, I can gauge the uncertainty aggregation rule in the representa-
tion of theorem 2 to any desired form which is parameterized by a strictly monotonic
and continuous f ∗. This is achieved by choosing s = f ∗−1 ◦ f in lemma 1, and yields
the following corollary of theorem 2.
Corollary 2 (f-gauge) :
For any strictly monotonic and continuous function f : IR → IR, the following
equivalence holds:
A set of binary relations  satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 2,
if and only if, there exists a continuous function u : X → IR with range U and a
strictly monotonic and continuous function g : U → IR such that
v − vi) of theorem 2 hold.
Moreover, the pairs (u, g) and (u′, g′) both represent  in the above sense, if
and only if, there exist a ∈ A and a+ ∈ A+ such that the relation (u, g) =
(f−1a+f u′,a g′ f−1a+
−1
f) holds.
The gauge used implicitly by Kreps & Porteus (1978) is obtained for f = id. The
latter implies that the uncertainty aggregation rule becomes additive, i.e. expected util-
ity. Then equations v) and vi), characterizing the representation (compare theorem 2),
become:
Kreps Porteus gauge (f = id−gauge) :
v) (x, p) F (x
′, p′) ⇔ N g [u(x) , Ep u] ≥ N
g [u(x′) , Ep′ u]
vi) p T p
′ ⇔ Ep u ≥ Ep′ u .
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While uncertainty aggregation is linear in this gauge, aggregating Bernoulli utility of
the first periods with expected Bernoulli utility of the second period is, in general,
nonlinear. The interpretation of the linearity of uncertainty aggregation at the cost of
nonlinearity over time will be discussed in the next chapter. Let me remark that Kreps
& Porteus (1978) get a slightly more general intertemporal aggregation rule, for they
do not demand certainty additivity in the sense of axiom A4. In the notion of Johnsen
& Donaldson (1985), my axiom implies unconditional strong independence over time
for certain outcomes while the analogue in their setting would be conditional strong
independence, which is slightly weaker. However, axiom A4 allows for a special gauge
that will prove most helpful for discussing the meaning of welfare and precaution in
chapter 7.3. This gauge is a special case of the following
Corollary 3 (g-gauge) :
For any strictly monotonic and continuous function g : IR → IR, the following
equivalence holds:
A set of binary relations  satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 2,
if and only if, there exists a continuous function u : X → IR with range U and a
strictly monotonic and continuous function f : U → IR such that
v − vi) of theorem 2 hold.
Moreover, the pairs (u, f) and (u′, f ′) both represent  in the above sense, if
and only if, there exist a ∈ A and a+ ∈ A+ such that the relation (u, f) =
(g−1a+g u′,a f ′ g−1a+
−1
g) holds.
It renders the above mentioned certainty additive gauge for g = id. Setting the function
g to identity implies that intertemporal aggregation of Bernoulli utility becomes linear.
Then the representation mimics the setting discussed in chapter 5.
Certainty additive gauge (g = id−gauge) :
v) (x, p) F (x
′, p′) ⇔ u(x) +Mf (p, u) ≥ u(x′) +Mf (p′, u),
vi) p T p
′ ⇔ Mf (p, u) ≥ Mf (p′, u).
In this gauge, uncertainty aggregation will generally be nonlinear and, thus, differ from
taking the expected value. Let me point out that in the general multiperiod framework as
introduced in chapter 8.1, the intertemporal aggregation rule N g is applied recursively.
Due to the nonlinearity in the uncertainty aggregation rules and the recursive evaluation
82
6.4. GAUGING
of lotteries, complete additive separability in the sense of an immediate summation over
periods is obtained only for certain consumption paths.16
Another special gauge is possible, if the outcome space is one-dimensional, i.e.X ⊂ IR,
and Bernoulli utility is strictly increasing in the consumption level x ∈ X. Then, the
representing Bernoulli utility function u in theorem 2 can be chosen as the identity,
rendering immediately the
Epstein Zin gauge (u = id−gauge, one commodity) :
v) (x, p) F (x
′, p′) ⇔ N g
[
x , Mfp
]
≥ N g
[
x′ , Mfp′
]
vi) p T p
′ ⇔ Mfp ≥ Mfp′
with Mfp ≡Mf (p, id) = f−1
[∫
X
f(x) dp
]
.
In this representation, Bernoulli utility is not explicit anymore. Such a representation
is used by Epstein & Zin (1989) to distinguish between risk aversion and intertemporal
substitutability, as will be discussed in chapter 7.1. The representation assumed by these
authors slightly differs from the one supported by my axiomatization. With respect to
the intertemporal aggregation rule, Epstein & Zin (1989) assume the special case where
g(z) = zρ, which renders an intertemporal aggregation with a constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. On the other hand, they assume a more general uncertainty
aggregation rule, which does not comply with von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944)
independence axiom. For the one and a half period model discussed here, already Selden
(1978) introduced the representation corresponding to the u = id-gauge. However, only
Epstein & Zin (1989) give a time consistent multiperiod extension that has been taken up
by many authors in order to disentangle risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability.
Such a disentanglement is the topic of the next section.
16For the evaluation of the uncertain future, only intertemporal aggregation in each recursive step is
additive in the certainty additive gauge.
83
CHAPTER 6. THE REPRESENTATION
84
Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Risk Aversion and Intertemporal
Substitutability
This chapter elaborates the economic interpretation of the representation developed in
the preceding chapter and introduces the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. First,
this section takes a close look at the disentanglement of intertemporal substitutability
and (standard) risk aversion in the one and in the multi-commodity setting. While
the latter quantities are seen to be good-dependent, an invariant quantity is identified.
Section 7.2 develops an interpretation of this quantity by axiomatically introducing the
concept of intertemporal risk aversion. Section 7.3 relates the concept to the discussion
on precaution in chapter 5. Section 7.4 elaborates quantitative measures of intertemporal
risk aversion and identifies the conditions for uniqueness. Finally, section 7.5 gives a
brief summary of the analysis in part II.
It is well known that risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability cannot be dis-
tinguished within the standard framework of intertemporally additive expected utility
(Weil 1990). For the latter preference specification the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution is confined to the inverse of the coefficient of relative risk aversion. However,
Epstein & Zin (1989) work out how these two characteristics of preference can be dis-
entangled in the more general setting of Kreps & Porteus (1978). To this end they use
a one commodity setting and the Epstein Zin gauge of chapter 6.4:
F representation in Epstein Zin gauge (u = id−gauge):
N g
[
x , Mfp
]
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with Mfp =Mf (p, id) = f−1
[∫
X
f(x) dp
]
.
With respect to the intertemporal aggregation rule, Epstein & Zin (1989) assume the
special case where g(z) = zρ, rendering a CES function for intertemporal aggregation.
Then, σ = 1
1−ρ
characterizes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution on certain con-
sumption paths, and the authors identify ρ as the parameter reflecting intertemporal
substitutability (Epstein & Zin 1989, 949). The easiest way to recognize that the un-
certainty aggregation rule characterizes risk attitude,1 is by comparing two risky second
period choices going along with the same first period consumption:
(x, p) F (x, p
′)
⇔ N g
[
x , Mfp
]
≥ N g
[
x , Mfp′
]
⇔ Mfp ≥ Mfp′
⇔
∫
f(x) dp ≥
∫
f(x) dp′ (7.1)
It is well known from the atemporal theory of risk aversion that, for a decision maker
whose evaluation of lotteries relies on equation (7.1), the concavity of f plays the es-
sential role in characterizing his risk aversion.2 For a twice differentiable function f ,
equation (7.1) reveals the Arrow-Pratt-measure of relative risk aversion as RRA(x) =
−f
′′(x)
f ′(x)
x. The advantage of the Arrow-Pratt-measure of relative risk aversion as op-
posed to f itself, is that it eliminates the affine indeterminacy of f that prevails by
the moreover part of theorem 2. In particular, for f(z) = zα the coefficient of relative
risk aversion becomes RRA = −f
′′(x)
f ′(x)
x = 1 − α (constant relative risk aversion). I
adopt the wording that f in the general setting, and α in the particular case of constant
relative risk aversion, parametrize uncertainty aggregation and risk attitude. More pre-
cisely, they characterize ‘a-temporal’ risk attitude, which means that in equation (7.1)
time plays no role whatsoever. The emphasis of ‘a-temporal’ is borrowed from Nor-
mandin & St-Amour (1998, 268), who use it to point out the difference between the
‘inter-temporal’ information contained in the parametrization of intertemporal substi-
tutability, and the ‘a-temporal’ nature of the risk attitude captured by RRA. I come
1Note that Epstein & Zin (1989) assume a more general uncertainty aggregation rule, which, in
general, does not comply with von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) independence axiom.
2In the atemporal theory developed by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) and stated in theorem 1,
f is usually denoted as u and given the interpretation of Bernoulli utility itself. To understand the
relation to Bernoulli utility in the intertemporal setting, note first that in the atemporal setting g can
be neglected. Then, by lemma 1, the preference representation over the second period lotteries (id, f)
corresponding to equation (7.1), is equivalent to the representation (f ◦ id, f ◦f−1) = (f, id). The latter
is a representation in the sense of theorem 1. In words, f in the Epstein Zin (u = id-)gauge corresponds
to Bernoulli utility u in the classical von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) theorem.
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back to this idea in the next section, when introducing the concept of intertemporal
risk aversion. The special case, exhibiting constant elasticity of substitution (g(z) = zρ)
and constant relative risk aversion (f(z) = zα), is also known as generalized isoelastic
preference (Weil 1990). Independently of Epstein & Zin (1989, 1991), it has also been
developed by Weil (1990). Currently, it represents the predominantly employed model
for disentangling risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability. For this special case,
the preference representation in the first period writes as follows.
F representation in Epstein Zin gauge (u = id−gauge), isoelastic case:{
1
2
xρ + 1
2
[Mαp]ρ
} 1
ρ
with Mαp =Mα(p, id) =
[∫
X
xα dp
] 1
α .
This form has been used in many applications ranging from asset pricing (Attanasio
& Weber 1989, Svensson 1989, Epstein & Zin 1991, Normandin & St-Amour 1998,
Epaulard & Pommeret 2001) over measuring the welfare cost of volatility (Obstfeld 1994,
Epaulard & Pommeret 2003b) to resource management3 (Knapp & Olson 1996, Epaulard
& Pommeret 2003a, Howitt et al. 2005) and evaluation of global warming scenarios (Ha-
Duong & Treich 2004). An overview over the empirical findings for the parameters α
and ρ can be found in Giuliano & Turnovsky (2003). Note that the papers mentioned
above employ the multiperiod extension of the model with a generally positive discount
rate, as introduced in chapters 8 and 9.4
The analysis in chapter 6.4 shows that the Epstein Zin gauge is a particular represen-
tation for a one commodity setting. By choosing the Bernoulli utility function as the
identity, it uses the natural scale of the single consumption commodity to measure risk
aversion and intertemporal substitutability. The representing triple in the sense of the-
orem 2 can be written as (idX , f, g), where idX denotes the identity on X ⊂ IR. In this
paragraph I work out, how a change in the measure-scale of the commodity generally
alters the parameterizations of risk attitude and intertemporal substitutability. In the
case of one commodity, the analysis highlights an aspect of gauge-dependence that be-
comes crucial in the multi-commodity setting. Let x ∈ [X,X] ⊂ IR+ denote the quantity
3While Knapp & Olson (1996) and Epaulard & Pommeret (2003a) solve theoretical models in order
to obtain optimal rules for resource use, Howitt, Msangi, Reynaud & Knapp (2005) try to rationalize
observed reservoir management in California, which cannot be explained by means of intertemporally
additive expected utility.
4I say generally positive, because some estimates, when disentangling α and ρ, actually find a
negative discount rate (e.g. Epstein & Zin 1991). For positive discounting the above representation
on certain × uncertain outcomes becomes
{
1
1+β u(x)
ρ + β1+β
[
Mαp
]ρ} 1ρ
(see chapter 9). Moreover
Svensson (1989) translates the isoelastic model to continuous time, which is also used in Epaulard &
Pommeret (2003b) and Epaulard & Pommeret (2003a).
87
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION
of the (single) consumption commodity in the original measure-scale. For some increas-
ing continuous transformation s ∈ C0([X,X]), let x˜ = s(x) ∈ X˜ = [s(X), s(X)] ⊂ IR
denote the quantity of the consumption commodity in the new measure-scale. For ex-
ample, a change in measurement from kg to g would correspond to s(x) = 1000x.
As u is the identity in the Epstein Zin gauge, such a change of measure-scale can
be identified with u = idX ⇒ u˜ = s ◦ idX corresponding to idX˜ in the new mea-
sure scale. By lemma 1 it is known that with the triple (idX , f, g) also the triple
(s ◦ idX , f ◦ s
−1, g ◦ s−1) represents F . But in terms of the new measure scale, the
latter writes as (idX˜ , f ◦ s
−1, g ◦ s−1) = (idX˜ , f˜ , g˜) with f˜ = f ◦ s
−1 and g˜ = g ◦ s−1
defined on X˜. These functions f˜ and g˜ are the new parameterizations of risk aversion
and intertemporal substitutability for the changed measure-scale. A twice differentiable
f˜ is associated with the new coefficient of relative risk aversion
˜RRA(x˜) = −
f˜ ′′(x˜)
f˜ ′(x˜)
x˜ = −
1
s′(x)
[
f ′′ (s−1(x˜))
f ′ (s−1(x˜))
−
s′′ (s−1(x˜))
s′ (s−1(x˜))
]
x˜ .
Comparing relative risk aversion at the same physical consumption level x˜ = s(x) yields
the index
˜RRA(x˜)
∣∣∣
x˜=s(x)
= −
f˜ ′′(x˜)
f˜ ′(x˜)
x˜
∣∣∣∣∣
x˜=s(x)
= −
s(x)
s′(x)
[
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
−
s′′ (x)
s′ (x)
]
for the new measure-scale as compared to
RRA(x) = −
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
x
for the old measure-scale. Hence, in general, a change of the measure-scale of the
consumption commodity changes the coefficient of relative risk aversion.5 However, it
is interesting to note that a multiplicative rescaling of the consumption unit leaves the
coefficient of relative risk aversion unchanged.6 Let s(x) = a x as in the example of
changing the measure from kg to g (a = 1000). Then it is
˜RRA(x˜)
∣∣∣
x˜=ax
= −
f˜ ′′(x˜)
f˜ ′(x˜)
x˜
∣∣∣∣∣
x˜=ax
= −
ax
a
[
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
−
0
a
]
= −
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
x = RRA(x) .
5Note that this is despite the fact that the coefficient of relative risk aversion is defined in a way to
cancel out the unit of the x measurement.
6This fact is particularly interesting because indeterminacy up to a multiplicative constant is a
frequently encountered form of indeterminacy when defining a measure scale, e.g. for the quantity of
an arbitrarily divisible good. In such a situation, the meaning of a zero consumption level is naturally
given, and the concept of “double as much” as well. However, the unit has to be fixed by convention,
e.g. in the mentioned example to grams. A different fixing of the unit (e.g. to kg or pound) corresponds
to a multiplicative rescaling of the measure-scale.
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This finding implies that the coefficients α and ρ in the isoelastic setting do not depend on
a scaling factor of the measure units. Note, however, that a general affine transformation
a ∈ A+ does change the coefficient of relative risk aversion:
˜RRA(x˜)
∣∣∣
x˜=ax+b
= −
f˜ ′′(x˜)
f˜ ′(x˜)
x˜
∣∣∣∣∣
x˜=ax+b
= −
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
ax+ b
a
6= RRA(x) .
The preceding reasoning on the change of risk measure under a change of measure-
scale is intimately linked to the question on how to extend the notion of risk aversion
and the disentanglement of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability to a multi-
commodity setting. Let me first explore an example, where a decision maker has pref-
erences over two different types of consumption, x1 and x2, quantified on some closed
subsets of IR+. Let me assume that his preferences are representable by a Cobb-Douglas
utility function u(x1, x2) = x
γ1
1 x
γ2
2 with γ1, γ2 > 0, and furthermore that f(z) = z
α and
g(z) = zρ as in the isoelastic setting. Denote period τ consumption of good i by xiτ .
I want to ask for the risk aversion of the decision maker with respect to the first com-
modity, assuming that the second commodity is fixed to some level x¯2 = x21 = x22. In
that case, the representation can be transformed as follows:{
1
2
(xγ111x¯
γ2
2 )
ρ +
1
2
[∫
dp2 (x
γ1
12x¯
γ2
2 )
α
] ρ
α
} 1
ρ
= x¯γ22
{
1
2
xγ1ρ11 +
1
2
[∫
dp2 x
γ1α
12
] ρ
α
} 1
ρ
which is ordinally equivalent to{
1
2
xγ1ρ11 +
1
2
[∫
dp2 x
γ1α
12
] γ1ρ
γ1α
} 1
γ1ρ
.7 (7.2)
The representation in the last line characterizes preferences over the first commodity,
given an arbitrary but fixed consumption level of the second good. Considering only
choice over the first good, I can identify the coefficient of relative risk aversion with
RRA1 = 1 − γ1α and the parameter of intertemporal substitutability with γ1ρ, imply-
ing an elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ1 =
1
1−γ1ρ
. On the other hand, fixing
the consumption level of the first good, yields, by the same reasoning, a coefficient of
intertemporal risk aversion RRA2 = 1 − γ2α and an intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution of σ2 =
1
1−γ2ρ
. This simple example shows that the definition of risk aversion and
7In the case of positive discounting and a discount factor β (compare chapter 9), equation (7.2)
would write as
{
1
1+β x
γ1ρ
11 +
β
1+β
[∫
dp2 x
γ1α
12
] γ1ρ
γ1α
} 1
γ1ρ
.
89
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION
intertemporal substitutability carried out above is good-specific. In the setting with two
consumption commodities, there is an intertemporal substitutability for good one that,
in general, differs from the intertemporal substitutability of good two, and a coefficient
of relative risk aversion for good one that, in general, also differs from the coefficient of
relative risk aversion for the second good. In general, the definitions of risk aversion
and intertemporal substitutability introduced in this section depend on the good under
observation and its measure-scale.8 In such a framework (or rather with such a word-
ing), it can even happen that the decision maker is risk averse with respect to lotteries
over the first good, but risk loving with respect to lotteries over the second good. In
the scenario above, the parametrization γ1 =
1
4
, γ2 =
3
4
and α = 2, yields such a result
with RRA1 = 1 − γ1α =
1
2
and RRA2 = 1 − γ2α = −
1
2
. Note that in the extension of
atemporal risk aversion to multiple commodities, as developed by Kihlstrom & Mirman
(1974), this finding corresponds to a decision maker, who has a positive risk premium
for lotteries of one good, but a negative risk premium for lotteries over another good.
Personally, I consider such a diverge of risk attitude between different commodities as
unsatisfactory. My semantic understanding of risk aversion (or attitude towards uncer-
tainty) asks for a measure that is not coupled to a particular consumption commodity,
but rather to preference in general. In the following, such a measure is identified. To
this end, I exploit the gauge freedom of the representation.
In the formalism worked out in chapter 6, both transformations carried out in the two
preceding paragraphs can be interpreted as a change of the underlying Bernoulli utility
function. In the first case, where I have analyzed a change of measure-scale, this has
been used explicitly. In the situation of two consumption commodities, the underlying
reasoning is as follows. Instead of u(x1, x2) = x
γ1
1 x
γ2
2 , I also can choose the strictly
monotonic transformation u˜(x1, x2) = x1x
γ2/γ1
2 as the Bernoulli utility function for the
representation, which is linear in the first consumption commodity. In order to depict the
same preferences  by means of u˜, I have to change f and g according to lemma 1. The
strictly monotonic transformation that satisfies u˜ = s◦u is s(z) = z1/γ1 ⇔ s−1(z) = zγ1 .
Therefore, the new parametrization of risk aversion is f ◦ s−1(z) = (zγ1)α = zγ1α which
renders the coefficient of relative risk aversion RRA1 = 1 − γ1α. The same reasoning
applies to intertemporal aggregation rendering the intertemporal substitutability σ1 =
1
1−γ1ρ
. Similarly, choosing Bernoulli utility linear in the consumption quantity of the
second good renders the coefficients of relative risk aversion RRA2 = 1 − γ2α and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σ2 =
1
1−γ2ρ
. Let me conclude that commodity and
8Note that for more general preference settings RRA1 will not only depend on the consumption level
of the first commodity, but also on the consumption level of the fixed second good.
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scale dependence of the parameters of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability
correspond to a dependence of these parameters on the choice of Bernoulli utility.
The connection between commodity and scaling dependence of the risk aversion pa-
rameter and the choice of Bernoulli utility, suggests that a notion of risk aversion which
is to be independent of a specific consumption commodity, should not depend on the
choice of the Bernoulli utility function. In this spirit, the following lemma identifies a
natural candidate for such a measure. Denote for any f ∈ C0(U) by fˆ = {af : a ∈ A}
the class of all members of C0(U) that coincide with f up to nondegenerate affine trans-
formations. Inverting each member of fˆ yields the set fˆ−1 = {f−1a : a ∈ A}.9 For
f, g ∈ C0(U), define the composition of fˆ and gˆ−1 as the class of all compositions of
elements from fˆ with elements of gˆ−1, i.e. fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 = {af ◦ g−1a′ : a,a′ ∈ A}. Note
that fˆ ◦ fˆ−1 = iˆd. Obviously, the ‘quantity’ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 denotes the class of all compositions
f ◦ g−1 that go along with the same representation of  for a given Bernoulli utility
function in the sense of theorem 2. However, there is more to it.
Lemma 2: In the representation of theorem 2, the ‘quantity’ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 is gauge in-
variant, i.e. it is independent of the choice of the Bernoulli utility function and
uniquely determined by .
In the light of the preceding discussion of atemporal risk aversion and intertemporal sub-
stitutability, lemma 2 states that the ‘difference’ between the attitude with respect to
risk and with respect to intertemporal substitutability is independent of the particular
good under observation and its measurement. In the isoelastic two commodity exam-
ple with f(z) = zα and g(z) = zρ discussed above, this ‘difference’ f ◦ g−1 becomes
f ◦ g−1(z) = (zα)
1
ρ = z
α
ρ where α
ρ
= 1−RRA
1− 1
σ
. The lemma implies that the same
result for f ◦ g−1 should be obtained, when extracting the information on risk aver-
sion and intertemporal substitution from equation (7.2). The latter was considering
changes (only) in the first consumption commodity. It found a respective parametriza-
tion of risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability corresponding to f(x) = xγ1α
and g(x) = xγ1ρ. As desired, this brings about f ◦ g−1(z) = (zγ1α)
1
γ1ρ = z
α
ρ . Similarly
the result holds, when only looking at changes of the second consumption commodity
rendering f ◦ g−1(z) = (zγ2α)
1
γ2ρ = z
α
ρ . The implications of the fact that f ◦ g−1 is
uniquely determined only up to affine transformations will be discussed in section 7.4.
In the following, section 7.2 works out the interpretation of the ‘quantity’ f ◦ g−1.
9Be aware that, in general, fˆ−1 = {f−1a : a ∈ A} is not the same as ˆf−1 = {af−1 : a ∈ A}.
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7.2 Intertemporal Risk Aversion
This section characterizes the invariant quantity found in Lemma 2 axiomatically. Aim-
ing at the representation of theorem 2, the axiomatic characterization below is for a
decision maker, who has stationary preferences and a zero rate of time preference. Chap-
ter 8 presents the general non-stationary setting. I consider a non-discounting decision
maker to exhibit weak intertemporal risk aversion, if and only if, the following axiom is
satisfied:
A6wnd (weak intertemporal risk aversion, no discounting) For all x¯, x1, x2 ∈ X holds
(x¯, x¯) ∼F (x1, x2) ⇒ x¯ T
1
2
x1 +
1
2
x2. (7.3)
The superscript ‘w’ at the axiom’s label abbreviates ‘weak’ as opposed to ‘s’ for ‘strict’,
while the subscript ‘nd’ denotes the absence of discounting. Similarly, I define the non-
discounting decision maker to exhibit strict intertemporal risk aversion, if and only if:
A6 snd (strict intertemporal risk aversion, no discounting) For all x¯, x1, x2 ∈ X holds
(x¯, x¯) ∼F (x1, x2) ∧ x1 6∼T x2 ⇒ x¯ ≻T
1
2
x1 +
1
2
x2. (7.4)
I start with the interpretation of the strict axiom. The first part of the premise in
equation (7.4) states that a decision maker is indifferent between a certain constant
consumption path delivering the same outcome x¯ in both periods and another certain
consumption path which delivers outcome x1 in the first and outcome x2 in the second
period. The second part of the premise requires the consumption path (x1, x2) to exhibit
variation in the sense that either x1 is preferred to x2 or vice versa.
10 Note that this
relation implies11 that either x1 ≻T x¯ and x¯ ≻T x2 or that x¯ ≻T x1 and x2 ≻T x¯. I
want to stress that, in the decision problem expressed on the left hand side of equation
(7.4), the individual knows that in either case he gets all of the chosen outcomes with
certainty (each at its time). Coming to the right hand side of equation (7.4), axiom
A6 snd demands that, for consumption satisfying the above conditions, the decision maker
should prefer the consumption of x¯ with certainty over a lottery yielding either x1 or
x2, each with probability a half. The intuition is that he values x1 and x2 differently.
10Note that the axiom compares the first period outcome x1 directly with x2, by taking it as a second
period outcome. This switching of the periods does not pose any problems, as the decision maker has
stationary preferences and a discount rate of zero. See also footnote 12. The axiomatic formulation of
intertemporal risk aversion for the general case avoids this switch of period. See chapter 8, pages 117
and 120, for the general formulation and chapter 127, page 139, for the particular case of stationary
preferences and positive discounting.
11In combination with the other axioms given in the representation theorem 2.
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Therefore, the lottery might make him better off, but with the same probability it can
make him worse off. In the latter case, and in contrast to the decision problem in the
premise, he will never receive the higher outcome. Let me point out that the comparison
of the intertemporal consumption paths in the premise is used to calibrate the ‘worse
off’ and the ‘better off’ outcomes in the lottery with respect to each other.12
Calling preferences satisfying axiom A6 snd intertemporally risk averse is motivated by
the following (interrelated) reasons. First, without acknowledging a trade-off over time,
the concept could not be defined. Second, the naming responds to the fact discussed in
the previous section that the conventional definition of attitude towards risk describes
what Normandin & St-Amour (1998, 268) call atemporal risk aversion. In comparison
the concept of intertemporal substitutability describes the attitude of the decision maker
to trade consumption over time. In this sense the theorem below delivers the third
motivation for the naming. It will reveal that intertemporal risk aversion is characterized
simultaneously by the functions f and g and, thus, combines information on atemporal
risk attitude with the intertemporal characteristics of preference.
The interpretation of the weaker axiom A6wnd is analogous to that of axiom A6
s
nd,
except that the consumption path (x1, x2) is allowed to coincide with (x¯, x¯), and the
implication only requires that the lottery is not strictly preferred to the certain con-
sumption path. If axiom A6 snd (A6
w
nd) is satisfied with ≻F (F ) replaced by ≺F (F ),
I call the decision maker a strong (weak) intertemporal risk seeker. If his preferences
satisfy weak intertemporal risk aversion as well as weak intertemporal risk seeking, the
decision maker is called intertemporally risk neutral. The following theorem relates the
concept of intertemporal risk aversion to the invariant found in lemma 2 of the preceding
section.13
Theorem 3: Let the triple (u, f, g) represent the set of preferences  in the sense of
theorem 2. Then the following assertions hold:
a) A decision maker is strictly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in the sense of
axiom A6 snd, if and only if, f ◦ g
−1(z) is strictly concave [convex] in z ∈ Γ for an
increasing version of f .14
b) A decision maker is weakly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in the sense of
12Note that the interpretation of axiom A6 snd depends crucially on the fact that the decision maker
is not discounting future consumption. Otherwise the constellation in equation (7.3) could be entirely
due to x2 being a very bad outcome that had been highly discounted in the premise. While axiom
A6 snd at this point is a simplified version to focus on the essential idea, it will gain its own standing in
chapter 10.4, where I give an axiomatization that implies a zero discount rate.
13Recall the definition Γ =
(
G,G
)
.
14Which is equivalent to strict convexity [concavity] for a decreasing choice of f .
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axiom A6wnd, if and only if, f ◦g
−1(z) is concave [convex] in z ∈ Γ for an increasing
version of f .
c) A decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral, if and only if, fˆ = gˆ. In that
case the decision maker maximizes intertemporally additive expected utility.
To interpret the result, note that f ◦g−1 concave can be paraphrased as f being concave
with respect to g (Hardy et al. 1964). Assume for example that f ◦ g−1 = s and s is
some concave function. Then the relation is equivalent to f = s◦g so that f is a concave
transformation of g, or expressed intuitively f is ‘more concave’ than g. Reconsidering
the discussion of section 7.1, the interpretation in terms of the Epstein Zin gauge would
be as follows. Concavity of f characterizes the decision maker’s degree of (atemporal)
risk aversion, while concavity of g characterizes his desire to smooth out consumption
over time. Hence, in light of the above, f ◦ g−1 concave receives the interpretation of
the decision maker being more averse to substitute consumption into a risky state than
to substitute it into a certain future. To express this statement slightly different, think
of a situation, where a decision maker has the chance to either smooth out consumption
over time or over risk. Then, whenever the intertemporally risk neutral decision maker
is indifferent between the two options, the intertemporally risk averse decision maker
prefers to smooth out consumption over the risky states, while the intertemporally risk
seeking decision maker prefers to keep the risk but smooth out consumption over time.
In section 7.1 it has been shown that the ‘quantity’ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 does not depend on the
gauge and, thus, on a particular commodity and its measure scale. Hence, the reasoning
in terms of the difference between uncertainty aggregation characteristics and attitude
towards intertemporal substitution is more general than the individual interpretation of
the terms f and g in the Epstein Zin gauge, which is tied to a particular commodity and
its measure scale. I think that the best economic interpretation of f ◦g−1 is the one laid
out in axioms A6wnd and A6
s
nd. The subsequent section interprets the axioms and the
expression f ◦ g−1 in terms of risk aversion with respect to welfare gains and losses, and
relates it to the idea of precaution as developed in sections 5.2 and 5.3. Before doing
so, I end this section with a remark on the determinacy of the concavity of f ◦ g−1.
The observant reader might have noticed that the characterization of intertemporal
risk aversion in theorem 3 relies on f◦g−1, while only the ‘quantity’ fˆ◦gˆ−1 is independent
of the choice of Bernoulli utility. Therefore, concavity of f ◦ g−1 should not depend
on affine transformations of the function or its argument. This fact is verified in the
following proposition.
Proposition 9: If some function h ∈ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 is (strictly) concave, then all functions in
fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 are (strictly) concave. If some function h ∈ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 is (strictly) convex,
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then all functions in fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 are (strictly) convex.
Proposition 9 shows that the fact of being intertemporally risk averse or risk seeking
does not depend on the affine freedom of f ◦ g−1. To succeed in defining a quantitative
measure of intertemporal risk aversion, however, the affine freedom in f ◦ g−1 requires
a little more thought.15 Section 7.4 will be dedicated to that question.
7.3 Welfare and Precaution
Technically, relating intertemporal risk aversion and precaution is merely a task of mov-
ing into the certainty additive gauge (g = id). Then the representation given in corol-
lary 3 corresponds to the setup of sections 5.2 and 5.3.16 Moreover, in the certainty
additive gauge it is f ◦ g−1 = f . Therefore, assertion a) of theorem 3 states that, for
an increasing choice of f , strict intertemporal risk aversion is equivalent to a strictly
concave function f . But proposition 6 on page 69 identified the same condition as a
characterization of precaution. This simple reasoning is the technical content of this
section. However, a closer look at the g = id representation yields an interesting in-
terpretation of the concept of intertemporal risk aversion developed in the preceding
section.
Let me start out by recalling that the cardinality of the welfare function in sections 5.2
and 5.3 relied entirely on some ‘exogenous intuition’ of welfare being something cardinal.
Technically, it dropped from heaven. With the background developed in chapter 6, the
cardinality of u is implicit to the formal setup. Evaluation of the threat of harm scenario
with equation (5.3) corresponds to the g = id-gauge. In this gauge, choice over certain
consumption paths is immediately characterized by the sum over per period utility u.
If the sum of per period utility is the same, then the overall welfare is the same, in
the sense that indifference between the corresponding consumption paths prevails. In
other words, an amount ∆u less in one period can be compensated by the same amount
∆u more in another period. The same reasoning and, thus, interpretation of Bernoulli
utility generally fails for other gauges. Therefore, I think that the Bernoulli utility in
the certainty additive gauge most closely relates to the semantics of the word welfare.
At the end of this section, I will come back to this idea and attempt to further motivate,
why I think that the g = id-gauge, and the interpretation of the corresponding Bernoulli
utility as welfare, is a particularly helpful representation of a decision problem. For now,
15It is the affine transformation a˜ in fg−1 → afg−1a˜ that requires some special attention.
16Compare in particular equation (5.3) on page 69.
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let me use the interpretation of welfare as certainty additive Bernoulli utility to revisit
the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. For this purpose, I denote the particular
Bernoulli utility function that corresponds to the g = id-gauge as welfare uwelf . It is the
notion of welfare that has been applied implicitly already in the discussion of sections 5.2
and 5.3.
Now, I give a reinterpretation of axioms A6wnd and A6
s
nd. Applying the notion of
welfare introduced in the preceding paragraph, the first part of the premise in axiom
A6 snd corresponds to the requirement that welfare of the two consumption paths adds
up to the same overall welfare, i.e. uwelf(x1)+u
welf(x2) = u
welf(x¯)+uwelf(x¯). The second
part of the premise in axiom A6 snd adds the demand that the welfare evaluation of
outcome x1 and x2 should not coincide. Without loss of generality (wlog), assume that
uwelf(x1) > u
welf(x2). Then, the potential welfare gain in the lottery giving with equal
probability either x1 or x2 instead of the certain alternative x¯, is just as big as the
potential welfare loss, i.e. uwelf(x1)− u
welf(x¯) = uwelf(x¯)− uwelf(x2) = ∆u
welf . Hence, in
this notion, intertemporal risk aversion demands that a certain welfare level should be
preferred to a welfare lottery that renders a welfare gain of ∆uwelf , with probability a
half, and a welfare loss of ∆uwelf , also with probability a half. With this interpretation,
intertemporal risk aversion can be understood as risk aversion with respect to welfare
gains and losses or just as risk aversion on welfare.
In this notion, precautionary behavior in the sense of sections 5.2 and 5.3 corresponds
to strict risk aversion with respect to welfare gains and losses. A straight forward intu-
ition that was appealed to already in the introductory discussion, and that is excluded
in the preference framework represented by intertemporally additive expected utility.
In the setup of chapters 5.2 and 5.3 a decision maker, who exhibits risk aversion with
respect to welfare gains and losses as described above, will have a higher willingness to
reduce first period welfare in order to avoid a future threat of harm than does a decision
maker evaluating by intertemporal expected utility, as characterized in equation (5.1).
Note that if the precautionary decision maker has the chance to reduce the risk in the
second period by giving up some of his welfare in the first, his ex-post welfare evaluated
on the ex-post certain consumption paths will, on average, be lower than that of an in-
tertemporally risk neutral decision maker with the same welfare evaluation over certain
consumption paths. However, it is the very nature of risk aversion that evaluation of
the future is not simply based on the average outcome, but also on the ‘certainty’ with
which the average outcome (or an outcome close to the average) actually takes place in
the individual occasion. This characteristic of risk aversion corresponds to a cost (on av-
erage) that comes along with precautionary behavior. Therefore, the trade-off between
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precautionary action and intertemporally risk neutral action is that of avoiding risk at
the price of being worse off on average.17 Recall from the discussion in chapter 5.2 that
the arbitrariness with respect to its application, was a major criticism directed against
the precautionary principle. The formulation of precaution as strict intertemporal risk
aversion eliminates this arbitrariness by translating it into the question of specifying a
degree of intertemporal risk aversion. Once such a degree of risk aversion is specified,
the rule when to undergo precautionary action does not depend on the particular class
of outcomes (or field of policy) the decision maker is facing. This procedure offers a
principled approach to balance costs against benefits and, at the same time, allows for
precautionary behavior that is excluded in a cost-benefit analysis based on a preference
framework corresponding to intertemporally additive expected utility. In the next section,
I will set up such a quantitative measure for the degree of intertemporal risk aversion.
Again, the representation in the g = id-gauge and the corresponding interpretation as
risk aversion on welfare will prove useful for understanding the indeterminacy of the
expression f ◦ g−1 ∈ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 and its implications for such a measurement. Before pre-
senting the corresponding analysis, let me close the section with suggesting a reasoning,
why the g = id-gauge might be a particularly convenient representation to think about
intertemporal decision problems.
From a mathematical point of view both, the certainty additive gauge (where g = id),
and the Kreps Porteus gauge (where f = id), have a special appeal as either of them
makes one of the two aggregators N g or M f additive.18 Contemplating why either of
the two gauges might be preferable and in what sense, let me go back to the work of von
Neumann & Morgenstern (1944). Before the authors introduce their famous represen-
tation theorem, they discuss the usefulness of yielding an additive representation. They
explain that calling two natural operations addition “is not intended as a claim that
the two operations with the same name are identical, [...] it only expresses the opinion
that they possess similar traits, and the hope that some correspondence between them
will ultimately be established.” (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1944, 21). As analogies
17Note that, here, the notion of an average appeals to the frequency definition of probability. As dis-
cussed in chapter 5.2, probabilistic reasoning applies to a much wider area of uncertainty. In particular
with respect to climate change and corresponding events like a shut down of the northern arm of the
Atlantic Conveyor Belt or a disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet, a frequency definition seems
a little far-fetched. However, in these situations it appears to me at least as reasonable not to base the
individual decision on the purely mathematical notion of an average outcome.
18In the general multi-commodity setting, u cannot be chosen linear in (all) consumption, as in the
Epstein Zin gauge for one-commodity. At most, one good and its perfect substitutes could be picked
under the assumption that nonsatiation in the interior of X holds for this commodity class. See section
7.1.
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for additive quantities and similarity of traits, they discuss the concepts of mass and
energy.19
In the preference framework described here, I have to conduct two aggregation oper-
ations, one over time and another over uncertainty. It was shown that, in general, only
one of them can be rendered additive. Now let me look at the analogies mentioned by
von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944, section 3.4), namely mass and energy and their
similarity in trait. When thinking about mass as an additive operation, I have in mind
the property that gaining one pound next week, another pound in the second and loosing
two pounds in the third will bring me back to my original weight. Energy might even
prove a better example for making this point, as it is an abstract quantity, introduced
by physicists, to describe some regularity that cannot be observed directly - just as
utility. Furthermore, energy is defined in order to bring this regularity into a form that
makes it possible to think about it in a similar way as about the physically observable
mass, that is, in terms of adding and subtracting energy at different points of time.20
Motivated by the discussion above, I suggest to introduce the quantity named welfare
as the special Bernoulli utility that shares the similarity with the above quantities of
making welfare comparisons additive over time. Then, in the certainty additive gauge,
a unit of welfare ∆uwelf more in period one can compensate a unit ∆uwelf of welfare less
in the second period. In a general gauge, this characterisitc of additivity over time on
certain consumption paths is not satisfied by Bernoulli utility itself, but by the com-
posed function g ◦u which equals uwelf up to an affine transformation.21 More precisely,
uwelf itself is only unique up to affine transformations (see corollary 3). A possibility to
render welfare measurement in the sense of a certainty additive Bernoulli utility function
uwelf unique, is by fixing exogeneously two welfare levels, e.g. the welfare of the worst
and the best outcome(s). This step is equivalent to fixing the range of uwelf or g ◦ u to
a given nondegenerate closed interval W ∗.
19Let me add that additivity is a concept that emerged from the calculus of natural numbers. Math-
ematically, it is therefore based on the Peano axioms. From a more ‘physical’ perspective, it is based
on the observation of similar rules for different classes of materialistic objects, describing what happens
when putting (adding) and taking away objects of the same type. This structure is inherent also in von
Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) examples of mass and energy.
20While stressing the similarity in trait between additivity of mass, energy and welfare be aware that
the analogy, like any analogy, also has its limits.
21From the first part of the proof of representation theorem 2 it is obvious that by construction it
is ĝ◦u = ̂id ◦ uwelf = ûwelf , where uwelf corresponds to the particular Bernoulli utility function which
appears in equation (6.3) of axiom A4.
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7.4 Measures of Intertemporal Risk Aversion
In this section, I establish a measure that quantifies a degree of intertemporal risk
aversion. The natural candidate is the construction of an analogue to the coefficient
of relative risk aversion in the atemporal setting. For a twice differentiable function
f ◦ g−1 : Γ → IR with Γ ⊂ IR, I define such a measure of relative intertemporal risk
aversion as the function:
RIRA : Γ→ IR
RIRA(z) = −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(z)
(f ◦ g−1)′ (z)
z . (7.5)
In the light of section 7.1, and lemma 2 I have to check whether the definition of
RIRA is invariant under affine transformations of f and g. Unpleasantly, this is not
the case. In other words, the coefficient22 of relative intertemporal risk aversion is not
uniquely determined by the underlying preference relation. While the above definition
of RIRA eliminates the indeterminacy corresponding to the affine freedom of f , it still
depends on the particular affine specification of g.23 In detail, define for some a, a˜ ∈ A
the functions f˜ = af and g˜ = a˜g and let a˜(z) = a˜z + b˜. Then, for the new choice
f˜ ◦ g˜−1 = af ◦ g−1a˜−1 ∈ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1, defined on z˜ ∈ Γ˜ = a˜Γ, the coefficient of relative
intertemporal risk aversion calculates as
˜RIRA(z˜) = −
(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′′
(z˜)(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′
(z˜)
z˜ = −
(
af ◦ g−1a˜−1
)′′
(z˜)(
af ◦ g−1a˜−1
)′
(z˜)
z˜ = −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(a˜−1z˜) 1
a˜2
(f ◦ g−1)′ (a˜−1z˜) 1
a˜
z˜
= −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(a˜−1z˜)
(f ◦ g−1)′ (a˜−1z˜)
1
a˜
z˜ .
Evaluating the new coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion ˜RIRA at the same
consumption level as the old coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion RIRA,
22I adopt the word coefficient also for the case where the function is non-constant and, thus, ‘the’
coefficient is a function of z.
23More precisely, it eliminates the affine freedom corresponding the transformation a ∈ A in the
expression af ◦ g−1a˜
−1
while it depends on the transformation a˜ ∈ A. Only in the representation of
theorem 2, the freedom corresponding to the transformation a corresponds to the indeterminacy of f
and the the freedom corresponding to the transformation a˜ corresponds to the indeterminacy of g. For
the g-gauge both indeterminacies are due to the freedom of f , as can be observed from the moreover
part of corollary 3. Similarly for the f -gauge both indeterminacies are due to the freedom of g, as can
be observed from the moreover part of corollary 2.
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which corresponds to z˜ = a˜z,24 the following result is found
˜RIRA(z˜)
∣∣∣
z˜=a˜z+b˜
= −
(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′′
(z˜)(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′
(z˜)
z˜
∣∣∣∣∣
z˜=a˜z+b˜
= −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(z)
(f ◦ g−1)′ (z)
a˜ z + b˜
a˜
. (7.6)
As claimed above, the affine indeterminacy corresponding to the transformation f ◦
g−1 → af ◦ g−1 leaves the coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion unchanged.
However, an affine change corresponding to b˜ in f ◦ g−1 → f ◦ g−1a˜−1 changes the
coefficient.
An analogous result holds, when defining the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk
aversion as the function:
AIRA : Γ→ IR
AIRA(z) = −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(z)
(f ◦ g−1)′ (z)
. (7.7)
Then, changing f◦g−1 → f˜◦g˜−1 like above and evaluating the new coefficient of absolute
intertemporal risk aversion for the same consumption level, yields
˜AIRA(z˜)
∣∣∣
z˜=a˜z+b˜
= −
(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′′
(z˜)(
f˜ ◦ g˜−1
)′
(z˜)
∣∣∣∣∣
z˜=a˜z+b˜
= −
(f ◦ g−1)
′′
(z)
(f ◦ g−1)′ (z)
1
a˜
. (7.8)
Again, the affine indeterminacy corresponding to the transformation f ◦ g−1 → af ◦ g−1
leaves the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion unchanged. However, a
linear change corresponding to a˜ in f ◦ g−1 → f ◦ g−1a˜−1 changes the coefficient.
I want to present an intuition for the indeterminacy of the above coefficients of in-
tertemporal risk aversion. For this purpose, note that a specification of f ◦ g−1 together
with g ◦ u, completely determines the underlying preference relation.25 However, this
is no longer true for a specification of g ◦ u and f ◦ gˆ−1 (or fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 ). The reason is as
follows. The function g itself is only determined up to affine transformations and the
particular specification entering the representation does not matter. Yet, it has to be
the same function g that enters the expression of intertemporal risk aversion f ◦ g−1
and the expression that determines choice on certain consumption paths g ◦ u. As long
as both are changed simultaneously corresponding to the same affine transformation
a ∈ A, i.e. f ◦ g−1 → f ◦ g−1a˜−1 and g ◦ u→ a˜g ◦ u, the represented underlying set of
preference relations  stays the same. But setting up the evaluation functional, when
24The argument z of the function f ◦ g−1 in the representation is a weighted arithmetic mean of two
entries scaling with g.
25To see that f ◦ g−1 together with g ◦ u completely specifies , just note that f ◦ u = (f ◦ g−1) ◦
(g ◦ u) and, hence, all terms in the following strictly monotonic transformation of the representation
N g
[
u(x) ,Mf (p, u)
]
are specified: f ◦ g−1
[
1
2 g ◦ u(x) +
1
2 g ◦ f
−1
[∫
dpx2 f ◦ u(x2)
]]
.
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given only the information f ◦ gˆ−1 and g ◦ u, it is unknown which element of the class
f ◦ gˆ−1 corresponds to the same g as in g ◦u. Combining g ◦u with an arbitrary element
f ◦ g˜ ∈ f ◦ gˆ, however, yields in general an evaluation different from that implied by g ◦u
in combination with f ◦ g−1. In other words, the affine freedom of g does not translate
into a freedom of the measure for intertemporal risk aversion that is independent of the
specification of the evaluation over certain consumption paths. A particular specification
of the expression g ◦ u, evaluating certain outcomes, has to go a along with a particular
choice of the risk measure.
An example might help to understand the preceding reasoning and relate it to the
discussion on measure-scale in section 7.1. Imagine an employee in a small enterprise
who experiences an unusual situation. His boss steps into his office and offers to play
the following lottery. He flips a coin and, if head comes up, the employee gets three
weeks of summer vacation instead of the usual two weeks. However, if tail comes up, the
boss wants him to cut down his summer vacations to one week. The employee declines
the offer. Observing the situation, I would like to find out the underlying motive of the
employee to reject the offer. I have two possible theories about him, which I would like to
tell apart. On the one hand, the employee might love to have a vacation of three weeks.
He even thinks that the third week of vacation would be more valuable to him than
the second, for example because three weeks of vacation would allow him to undertake
the big travel he had been waiting for. But, at the same time he is risk averse, or, in
less sophisticated words, he fears to loose in the lottery, and therefore declines it.26 On
the other hand, the employee might be risk neutral or even keen on gambling, but he
values a third week of vacation so little as compared to the second that he refuses the
lottery of his boss. In an atemporal world, I had a hard time to distinguish these two
possibilities. However, in the intertemporal setting, a differentiation of the two motives
is possible. At least, if the boss allows me to offer the following deal to the perfectly
patient (i.e. non-discounting) employee.27 I walk into the employee’s office with the offer
to trade in one week of this year’s vacation for an extra week of vacation in the next
year. If he accepts, I know that his declining of the lottery was due to risk aversion.
Under certainty, he has a positive willingness to trade his second week of vacation for a
third (a reasoning obviously impossible without time). As he nevertheless declined the
26I encourage the reader to first go over the example relying entirely on a semantic intuition of ‘risk
aversion’ (as it prevailed before the study of von Neumann & Morgenstern’s (1944) theory). Formalizing
the intuitive argument corresponds to the concept of intertemporal risk aversion as introduced in
section 7.2.
27To see how the question has to be asked for a discounting employee or someone with non-stationary
preferences compare page 118 in chapter 8.
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lottery offered by his boss, he must be risk averse. If the employee declines my offer, I
know that he values a second week of vacation higher than the third. Of course, without
further inquiries, I cannot tell whether he might in addition be risk averse. However,
given that one of the two theories about the employee laid out above is true, it would
be the second.
Now, think about measuring the employee’s degree of risk aversion. The easiest per-
spective is the one discussed in section 7.3, corresponding to the certainty additive gauge,
where intertemporal risk aversion can be understood as risk aversion on welfare. Here the
intertemporal trade-off, i.e. the employee’s willingness to trade days of vacation between
one period and the next, determines the Bernoulli utility function, which I associated
with the agents welfare in section 7.3. However, observing the employee’s preferences
over certain consumption paths only renders a welfare function that is determined up
to affine transformations. This is, it does not render a natural level of ‘zero welfare’,
nor does it deliver a natural unit to measure welfare. Now intertemporal risk aversion
describes his attitude towards lotteries over welfare. But for determining a coefficient
of relative risk aversion over welfare lotteries, I have to know the ‘zero welfare’ level.
Similarly, to identify the coefficient of absolute risk aversion on welfare, I have to know
the unit of welfare. Not knowing the ‘zero welfare’ level corresponds, in equation (7.6),
to the undetermined constant b˜ in the coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion.
Not knowing the ‘unit of welfare’ corresponds, in equation (7.8), to the undetermined
constant a˜ in the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion. Fixing a unique
numerical coefficient of intertemporal risk aversion is, therefore, a question of fixing a
measure-scale, just as for atemporal risk aversion in section 7.1. However, this time
the measure-scale is not in terms of physical characteristics of a consumption good, but
in terms of the implicitly derived concept of welfare. Analogously to most arbitrarily
divisible goods, a natural unit is not given and must be fixed by convention (see also
footnote 6). More difficult is probably the interpretation of fixing a zero welfare level, in
order to render a meaning to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Again, it must be
a convention. Note that chapter 10 develops a reasoning based on the decision maker’s
attitude with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution that implies constant ab-
solute intertemporal risk aversion and, thus, a representation that does not depend on
b˜ or the ‘zero welfare’ level.
In general, the corollaries below solve the problem of quantifying intertemporal risk
aversion formally, by incorporating the information that has to come from convention.
As the discussion above was mainly led within the certainty additive gauge (g = id),
let me start out with the case where g is imposed. At first sight, it might be surprising
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that the affine freedom corresponding to a˜ in fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 still prevails in a gauge where
g is exogenously fixed. However, chapter 6.4 worked out that fixing g instead of u
does not abolish any of the indeterminacy. The freedom that corresponds to g in the
representation of theorem 2, translates into an additional freedom of f in the g = id-
gauge, as worked out in the moreover part of corollary 3. For the latter representation,
the pair (u, f) was only determined up to simultaneous transformations of type (u, f)→
(u˜, f˜) = (g−1a+
−1
g u,a f g−1a+g) with a ∈ A and a+ ∈ A+. Hence, the expression
for intertemporal risk aversion in the standard g-gauge still is only determined up to
transformations of type f ◦ g−1 → f˜ ◦ g−1 = a (f g−1a+g) ◦ g−1 = a f ◦ g−1a+. Let me
point out that, in the g = id-gauge, a closer look at the allowed a+ transformations of
the pair (u, f) is another way to see the relation between measuring intertemporal risk
aversion and fixing some freedom in the welfare measure. In this gauge, f represents
intertemporal risk aversion and u was given an interpretation of welfare. Then, the
transformation (u, f) → (u˜, f˜) = (a+−1 u, f a+) corresponds to a shift of a+ between
welfare and intertemporal risk aversion. Only when fixing two points of u by some
convention, f is uniquely determined.
Corollary 4 (g+-gauge) :
Let there be given a set of binary relations = (F ,T ) and a strictly mono-
tonic and continuous function g : IR→ IR. Choose a nondegenerate closed interval
U∗ ⊂ IR. The following equivalence holds:
The set of binary relations  satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 2,
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → U∗ as well
as a strictly monotonic and continuous function f : U∗ → IR such that
v − vi) of theorem 2 hold.
Moreover, u is determined uniquely and f is determined up to nondegenerate affine
transformations. The measures of intertemporal risk aversion RIRA and AIRA as
defined in equations (7.5) and (7.7) are determined uniquely.
I call the representation of corollary 4 a g+-gauge, because it is a g-gauge with the
additional fixing of Bernoulli utility at two points. Corollary 4 is a trivial consequence
of corollary 3, where the fixing of u for any two outcomes abolishes its indeterminacy.
Here, I have fixed the Bernoulli utility for the worst and the best outcome by requiring
that u is onto a given codomain U∗. In the g = id-gauge, the latter fixes immediately
the scale of evaluation for the certain outcome paths, and U∗ can be interpreted as the
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welfare range in the sense of W ∗ in section 7.3. If g is not chosen as the identity, then
g ◦ u gives the evaluation of certain consumption paths and W ∗ = g(U∗), also uniquely
fixed, would correspond to the welfare range in the sense laid out in section 7.3. Instead
of fixing evaluation of the best and the worst outcome, I could as well fix a ‘zero welfare’
level28 and a ‘welfare unit’, or Bernoulli utility for any two points that differ in their
evaluation.
The same approach copes with the indeterminacy of intertemporal risk aversion in
the representation of theorem 2. I call the representation a u+-gauge as a particular
choice of u ∈ B is imposed and, in addition, the range of g is fixed. The latter fixing
determines again the scale, on which the evaluation over certain consumption paths
(corresponding to g ◦ u) is based.
Corollary 5 (u+-gauge) :
Let there be given a set of binary relations = (F ,T ) and a Bernoulli utility
function u ∈ B with range U . Choose a nondegenerate closed interval W
∗ ⊂ IR.
The following equivalence holds:
The set of binary relations  satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 2,
if and only if, there exists a strictly monotonic and continuous function f : U → IR
as well as a strictly monotonic, continuous and surjective function g : U → W ∗
such that
v − vi) of theorem 2 hold.
Moreover, g is determined uniquely and f is unique up to nondegenerate affine
transformations. The measures of intertemporal risk aversion RIRA and AIRA as
defined in equations (7.5) and (7.7) are determined uniquely.
Instead of fixing the welfare range corresponding to G = W ∗, I could again fix as well a
‘zero welfare’ level and a ‘welfare unit’, or the function g on any two points that differ in
their evaluation. In both corollaries above, the risk measures depend on the choice of the
imposed range of g. While in corollary 5 it is fixed directly, in corollary 4 it is determined
by imposing g : IR → IR together with the domain U so that G = g(U) = W ∗ is fixed.
The following lemma states more generally that all what is needed for the uniqueness
of the risk measures RIRA and AIRA, is the set of preference relations and the range
of the function g in any of the representations.
28At least, as long as it should correspond to some outcome within the choice set X. See chapters
8.2 and 9.4 for a formalization of fixing the ‘zero welfare level’ level or the ‘welfare unit’.
104
7.5. SUMMARY
Lemma 3: Let there be given a set of preference relations = (F ,T ) satisfying
axioms A1-A5 as well as a closed nondegenerate interval W ∗ ⊂ IR. For any
representation in the sense of theorem 2 where g is onto G = W ∗, the risk mea-
sures RIRA and AIRA are determined uniquely and independent of the choice of
Bernoulli utility.
Lemma 3 states that, once the scale for welfare in the sense of section 7.3 is fixed by
imposing its range, the measures of intertemporal risk aversion RIRA and AIRA are
uniquely specified by the preference relations.29 Then, the choice of Bernoulli utility in
the representation, corresponding to different good-specific measures of atemporal risk
aversion, does not affect the measures of intertemporal risk aversion.
7.5 Summary
I have introduced a notion of general and precautionary uncertainty aggregation rules.
In this notion, the expected value operator corresponds to the particular uncertainty
aggregation rule that is linear in the evaluation of outcomes. I have elaborated that in
an atemporal setting, the use of different uncertainty aggregation rules is equivalent to a
change in the Bernoulli utility function evaluating (certain) outcomes. In an intertempo-
ral framework, however, aggregation of value over time adds an additional dimension to
the evaluation problem. I have shown that choosing Bernoulli utility in a way yielding a
linear uncertainty aggregation implies, in general, a nonlinear aggregation of value over
time. Considering additivity of welfare over time as a useful attribute for an economic
interpretation of a preference representation, I have offered an alternative representation
which keeps linearity in welfare over time, and uses more general uncertainty aggrega-
tion rules for the evaluation of uncertainty. In such a setting, the class of precautionary
uncertainty aggregation rules has been shown to capture an important concern of the
precautionary principle. These rules imply a higher willingness to undergo preventive
measures in order to avoid a threat of harm, than does an evaluation based on the
standard model of intertemporally additive expected utility.
I have worked out the general time consistent model supported by the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms for choice under uncertainty, and additive separability over time
for certain consumption paths. In this framework, I have introduced a new notion of
risk aversion. Due to its crucial dependence on the intertemporal structure of pref-
29Only in the certainty additive gauge the intertemporal trade-off measure that I interpreted as
welfare coincides with Bernoulli utility, in general it corresponds to range(g) = G.
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erences, I labeled it intertemporal risk aversion. I have provided an axiomatic foun-
dation and worked out measures of absolute and relative intertemporal risk aversion.
These measures were seen to depend only on the underlying preference relation and a
welfare normalization for the best and the worst outcome. In the certainty additive
representation, intertemporal risk aversion can be interpreted as a risk aversion with
respect to welfare gains and losses. I have elaborated a close connection between the
concept of intertemporal risk aversion and the disentanglement of atemporal risk aver-
sion from intertemporal substitutability in the one-commodity setting. While the latter
characterizations of preference become good-dependent in a multi-commodity setting,
intertemporal risk aversion has been shown to specify a relation between the two, which
is independent of the particular commodity under observation. Part II of my disser-
tation assumed a simplified two period setup with stationary preferences and a zero
discount rate. The next chapter extends the concept of intertemporal risk aversion to
the general multiperiod setting.
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Multiperiod Extension
8.1 Multiperiod Extension of the Representation
Part III of my dissertation further analyzes the concept of intertemporal risk aversion
and its representation in a multiperiod framework. This chapter derives the most general
framework. First section 8.1 works out the multiperiod representation of non-stationary
preferences that comply in every period with the von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
for choice under uncertainty, and allow for additive separability over time on certain
consumption paths. To this end I employ a recursive formulation of uncertainty devel-
oped and termed ‘temporal lotteries’ by Kreps & Porteus (1978). Subsequently, section
8.2 adapts the axiomatic characterization of intertemporal risk aversion to the derived
representational framework. It defines the (period-specific) measures of relative and ab-
solute intertemporal risk aversion and gives a respective condition for uniqueness. Later
in part III, chapter 9 examines the representational consequence of different assump-
tions on stationarity. As there is no canonical way of imposing stationarity in a finite
time framework, I offer two different axioms for stationarity of risk attitude. The first
yields stationarity of the uncertainty aggregation rules, while the second is motivated
mainly by the assumption that the mere passage of time should not change preferences.
Finally chapter 10 analyzes the attitude of a decision maker with respect to the timing
of uncertainty resolution. The latter is closely related to the measures of intertemporal
risk aversion. In particular, I derive a representation for an intertemporally risk averse
decision maker who is indifferent with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution.
This setting allows to reduce the temporal lottery setup, where uncertainty is expressed
recursively over periods, to ‘standard’ lotteries, where uncertainty is expressed as a
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probability distribution over consumption paths. For a one commodity setting, this
representation allows to disentangle atemporal risk aversion from intertemporal substi-
tutability within an intertemporal expected utility model.
The first part of this chapter extends the representation of theorem 2 to an arbitrary
finite planning horizon. Hereby I allow for general non-stationary preferences. The
section is mainly technical. Instead of the more widespread framework of atemporal
lotteries corresponding to probability measures over consumption paths, it involves the
richer framework of temporal lotteries introduced by Kreps & Porteus (1978). The latter
is, as Kreps & Porteus (1978) have shown, a natural extension of the classical von Neu-
mann & Morgenstern (1944) setup to an intertemporal setting. It is also the standard
framework in the literature disentangling atemporal risk aversion from intertemporal
substitutability and thus a natural setting for a general definition of intertemporal risk
aversion. When I introduced the time structure for the preceding chapters, I pointed
out that within the general framework it only accounts for one and a half periods. Now,
at the beginning of every period the decision maker faces uncertainty, not only over the
future, but also over the outcome in the respective period. I identify period T with
the last period. As before in T the decision maker has preferences over all lotteries
on the space of outcomes X˜T ≡ X, which are modeled as elements of PT ≡ ∆(X).
In the preceding chapters, choices in F corresponded to pairs of certain outcomes in
period F and lotteries in period T , i.e. elements of the space X˜T−1 ≡ X × ∆(X). In
the general multiperiod framework, however, the second-last period T − 1 starts before
uncertainty over the respective period has resolved. Then, preferences in period T − 1
are expressed by a relation T−1 on the space of lotteries over X˜T−1, which I denote
by PT−1 ≡ ∆(X˜T−1) = ∆(X × PT ). Note the recursive structure of the definition. The
uncertainty at the beginning of period T − 1 is not modeled as a probability distribu-
tion over the Cartesian product of outcomes in T − 1 and T . Rather, it is defined as
uncertainty over the outcome in T − 1 and the lottery faced in period T . For a de-
tailed introduction to recursive lotteries see also Kreps & Porteus (1978). Chapter 10.2
works out the relation between these recursive lotteries and probability measures that
are defined directly on consumption paths.
In general, define X˜T = X and recursively X˜t−1 = X × ∆(X˜t) for all t ∈ {2, ..., T}.
Equip the set of Borel probability measures on X˜t, denoted by Pt ≡ ∆(X˜t), with the
Prohorov metric as to render X˜t−1 compact in the product topology. The elements pt
of Pt are called (period t) lotteries. Preferences in period t are defined on the set Pt
and denoted by t (⊂ Pt × Pt). The set of degenerate lotteries in Pt is identified with
the set X˜t in the usual way. An uncertainty aggregation rule in period t is defined as a
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functionalMft : Pt×C
0(X˜t)→ IR withM
ft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
∫
X˜t
dpt ft◦u˜t(x˜t) . To allow for
general non-stationary preference I weaken the axiom of certainty additivity as follows:
A4’ (certainty additivity) There exist functions ut ∈ C
0(X), t ∈ {1, ..., T}, such that
for all x, x′ ∈ X1:
x  x′ ⇔
T∑
t=1
ut(xt) ≥
T∑
t=1
ut(x
′
t). (8.1)
Axiom 4’ requires additive separability on certain consumption paths. However as op-
posed to axiom 4 the functions ut are allowed to vary arbitrarily over time. In particular,
tastes that are represented by a sequence (ut)t∈{1,...,T} can even reverse between two peri-
ods. To define the set of Bernoulli utility functions for t, the definition on page 77 just
gains a time index, i.e. Bt = {ut ∈ C
0(X) : [x]t t [x
′]t ⇔ ut(x) ≥ ut(x
′)∀ x, x′ ∈ X}.
Recall that axiom 4’ only implies the existence of a certainty additive Bernoulli utility
function. For other Bernoulli utility functions equation (8.1) generally does not hold.
The time consistency requirement is adapted to the set of preference relations ≡
(1, ...,T ) in the multiperiod framework as follows:
A5’ (time consistency) For all t ∈ {1, ..., T}:
(xt, pt+1) t (xt, p
′
t+1) ⇔ pt+1 t+1 p
′
t+1 ∀ xt ∈ X, pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1 .
The interpretation is equivalent to axiom A5. It is a requirement for choosing between
two consumption plans in period t that yield a degenerate lottery with a coinciding entry
in the respective period. For these choice situations, axiom 5’ demands that in period
t the decision maker shall prefer the plan that gives rise to the lottery that is preferred
in period t + 1.1 The notation regarding the codomains of the functions u and g is
adapted to the multiperiod setting by defining U t = minx∈X ut(x), U t = maxx∈X ut(x)
and Ut = [U t, U t], as well as Gt = gt(U t), Gt = gt(U t), Gt = [Gt, Gt] and ∆Gt = Gt−Gt
for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Moreover let Γt = (Gt, Gt). I assume for all following assertions
that the decision maker faces at least two periods (T ≥ 2) and that he is not indifferent
between at least two outcomes in each period, i.e. for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist
xt, x
′
t ∈ X such that [x]t ≻t [x
′]t. Then, the following representation holds.
Theorem 4: Let there be given a sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a sequence of Bernoulli utility functions (ut)t∈{1,...,T} with ut ∈
1This is time consistency in the sense of Kreps & Porteus (1978). The only difference to axiom 5 is
that (xt, pt+1) now has the interpretation of a degenerate lottery.
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Bt . The sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|X1 (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist strictly increasing2 and continuous
functions ft : Ut → IR and gt : Ut → IR such that with defining
v) the normalization constants θT = 1, ϑT = 0 and for t < T
θt =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
and ϑt =
Gt+1Gt−Gt+1Gt
∆Gt
and
vi) recursively the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR by u˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
−1
t−1
[
θt−1 gt−1 ◦ ut−1(xt−1) +
θt−1
θt
gt ◦M
ft(pt, u˜t) +
θt−1
θt
ϑt−1
]
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ft(pt, u˜t) ≥M
ft(p′t, u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt . (8.2)
Moreover, (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (ut, f
′
t , g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in
the above sense, if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist constants aft ∈ IR++
and bft ∈ IR such that ft = a
f
t f
′
t + b
f
t , as well as constants a
g ∈ IR++ and b
g
t ∈ IR
such that gt = a
gg′t + b
g
t .
A sequence of triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} as above is called a representation in the sense
of theorem 4 for the set of preference relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T}. The representation
theorem recursively constructs an aggregate utility u˜t that depends on the utility in the
respective period ut(xt), as well as the aggregate utility derived from a particular lottery
pt+1 over the future. The construction of aggregate utility features for t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}
the intertemporal aggregation rule
N gt,gt+1 : Ut × Ut+1 → IR
N gt,gt+1(·, ·) = g−1t
[
θtgt(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= g−1t
[
θt gt(·) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1(·) + ϑt
)]
.
The reformulation in the last line is an immediate consequence of the relation θtθ
−1
t+1 =
(1 − θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
.3 The normalization constants ensure that the domain of g−1t in the in-
2Alternatively the theorem can be stated replacing increasing by monotonic for (ft)t∈{1,...,T} and
demanding that either all (gt)t∈{1,...,T} are strictly increasing or that all are strictly decreasing.
3See equation C.2 in the appendix on page 209.
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tertemporal aggregation rule N gt,gt+1 coincides with Gt in order to make the inverse well
defined. For stationary preferences chapter 9 will show that gt = gt′ and ϑt = 0 for
all t, t′ ∈ {1, ..., T}, giving rise to the formulation employed in part II. As opposed to
the respective representation in theorem 2, however, in the general stationary setting
the normalization constants θt give rise to discounting. Whenever the outcome in the
respective period or the lottery faced in the future are not known with certainty, the
uncertainty aggregation rule Mft is applied in order to return the certainty equivalent
overall welfare. As formulated in equation (8.2), the resulting expression Mft(pt, u˜t)
evaluates period t lotteries in a way representing choice between general uncertain con-
sumption or outcome plans faced in t. In this recursive evaluation, the representation
of theorem 4 not only features period-specific intertemporal aggregation rules, but also
period-specific uncertainty aggregation rules. Chapter 9 analyzes two different assump-
tions on risk stationarity that relate uncertainty aggregation in different periods.
With respect to the moreover part, observe that the functions (ft)t∈{1,...,T} are deter-
mined only up to individual affine transformations, while for the functions (gt)t∈{1,...,T}
the same multiplicative constant has to apply for all periods. In order to condense the
statement of the moreover part in a way that proves particularly useful in the gauge
corollaries, I introduce the following notation. For a ∈ IR++ define the set of affine trans-
formations Aa with elements aa by Aa = {aa : IR → IR : aa(z) = az + b, b ∈ IR}. In
this notation the moreover part of theorem 4 writes as: Moreover, (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and
(ut, f
′
t , g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the above sense, if and only if, there ex-
ists a ∈ IR++ such that for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist a
+
t ∈ A
+ and aat ∈ A
a such that
(g′t, f
′
t) = (a
+
t ft,a
a
t gt). Let me point out that the functions (gt)t∈{1,...,T}, characterizing
intertemporal aggregation, are determined already by the preferences over certain con-
sumption paths, i.e. by 1 |X1 . Moreover, comparing only certain consumption paths,
the normalization parameter ϑt serves exclusively to allow for the renormalization g
−1
t .
It has no representational function in the sense that the representation
g−1t
[
θtgt ◦ u(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1 ◦M
ft+1 (pt+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
is a strictly increasing transformation of the expression
θtgt ◦ u(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1 ◦M
ft+1 (pt+1, u˜t+1) ,
which does not depend on ϑt. However, as soon as uncertainty is introduced, the repre-
sentation becomes
f−1t
{∫
dp
xt,pt+1
t ft ◦ g
−1
t
[
θtgt ◦ u(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1 ◦M
ft+1 (pt+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]}
. (8.3)
In equation (8.3) no strictly increasing transformation can eliminate ϑt for nondegen-
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erate lotteries. Thus, the normalization constant gains representational responsibility.
However, it is possible to eliminate ϑt from the representation by adding an additional
requirement for the representing functions gt. The moreover part of theorem 4 admits
individual affine translations for the representing sequence (gt)t∈{1,...,T}. This individual
freedom can be used to yield the following modification of theorem 4.
Theorem 5: Let there be given a sequence of preference relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T}
on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a sequence of Bernoulli utility functions (ut)t∈{1,...,T} with
ut ∈ Bt . The sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|X1 (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist strictly increasing and continuous
functions ft : Ut → IR and gt : Ut → IR, the latter satisfying
Gt+1
Gt+1
= Gt
Gt
, such that
with defining
v) the normalization constants
θt =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
for t ∈ {1, .., T} and
vi) recursively the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR by u˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
−1
t−1
[
θt−1 gt−1 ◦ ut−1(xt−1) + θt−1θ
−1
t gt ◦M
ft(pt, u˜t)
]
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ft(pt, u˜t) ≥M
ft(p′t, u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt .
Moreover, (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (ut, f
′
t , g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in
the above sense, if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist constants at ∈ IR++
and bt ∈ IR such that ft = atf
′
t + bt, as well as constants a ∈ IR++ and b ∈ IR such
that gt = ag
′
t + b∆Gt.
The only difference between the two representations is that the additional requirement
Gt+1
Gt+1
= Gt
Gt
picks a particular sequence of representations (gt)t∈{1,...,T} such that the
intertemporal aggregation rule in theorem 5,
N gt,gt+1∗ : Ut × Ut+1 → IR
N gt,gt+1∗ (·, ·) = g
−1
t
[
θtgt(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1(·)
]
,
spares the normalization constants ϑt. A consequence of the additional requirement for
the functions gt is that they are no longer free up to individual translation parameters bt.
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Observe that this additional determinateness of the sequence (gt)t∈{1,...,T} is no longer due
to information that is conveyed already by preference over certain consumption paths.
The information stems from absorbing the normalization constant ϑt, which was seen
to gain representational relevance only for the choice between nondegenerate lotteries.
As theorem 5 breaks the symmetry in the freedom to choose gt, ft and ut ∈ Bt , the
gauge corollaries are stated in terms of representation theorem 4, allowing for arbitrary
choices of gt. Gauging works out as in chapter 6.4. The only difference is that in the
more general framework developed above, I can choose the Bernoulli utility functions
independently for every period and, therefore, gauge the functions gt or ft differently
for different periods. The gauge corollaries build on the following analogon to lemma 1
in chapter 6.
Lemma 4: Let the triple (uτ , fτ , gτ ) be part of a representation (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,τ,...,T}
for (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 4. Moreover, let sτ : Uτ → IR be a strictly
increasing and continuous transformation and define the triple (u′τ , f
′
τ , g
′
τ ) =
(sτ ◦ uτ , fτ ◦ s
−1
τ , gτ ◦ s
−1
τ ). Then, letting (u
′
t, f
′
t , g
′
t) = (ut, ft, gt)∀ t 6= τ , the
sequence (u′t, f
′
t , g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} is a representation of (t)t∈{1,...,T}.
Using lemma 4 I can always choose the Bernoulli utility functions in a way to render
any desired form of the uncertainty aggregation rule. This is stated in
Corollary 6 (f-gauge) :
For any sequence of strictly increasing and continuous functions f t : IR → IR,
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, the following equivalence holds:
The sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 4,
if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist continuous functions
u t : X → IR as well as strictly increasing and continuous functions g t : Ut → IR
such that with defining
v − vi) of theorem 4,
the representation (8.2) of theorem 4 holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Moreover, (ut, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (u
′
t, g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the
above sense, if and only if, there exists a ∈ IR++ such that for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}
there are affine transformations a+t ∈ A
+ and aat ∈ A
a such that (u′t, g
′
t) =
(f−1t a
+
t ft ut , a
a
t gt f
−1
t a
+
t
−1
ft).
In particular, choosing all functions ft as the identity, corollary 6 yields the Kreps Por-
teus gauge. In that case, uncertainty aggregation is always described by the expected
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value operator. In general, however, this choice comes at the cost of a non-linear aggre-
gation of Bernoulli utility over time. But as discussed in chapter 7.3, a linear aggregation
of Bernoulli utility over time can be desirable, e.g. for an interpretation of Bernoulli util-
ity in terms of welfare. The following lemma serves as the basis for such a certainty
additive gauge.
Corollary 7 (g-gauge) :
For any sequence of strictly increasing and continuous functions g t : IR → IR,
t ∈ {1, ..., T}, the following equivalence holds:
The sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i− iii) of theorem 4,
if and only if, for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist continuous functions
u t : X → IR as well as strictly increasing and continuous functions f t : Ut → IR
such that with defining
v − vi) of theorem 4,
the representation (8.2) of theorem 4 holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Moreover, (ut, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (u
′
t, g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the
above sense, if and only if, there exists a ∈ IR++ such that for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}
there are affine transformations a+t ∈ A
+ and aat ∈ A
a such that (u′t, f
′
t) =
(g−1t a
a
t gt ut , a
+
t ft g
−1
t a
a
t
−1 gt).
In particular, choosing the functions gt as the identity for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} yields the
certainty additive gauge.4 Here, Bernoulli utility is time-additive over certain consump-
tion paths. For a stationary setting without discounting, chapter 7.3 has explained how
in such a representation the concept of intertemporal risk aversion can be interpreted
as risk aversion on welfare. The next section extends the concept of intertemporal risk
aversion into the general framework derived above.
8.2 Intertemporal Risk Aversion
In this section I introduce the general, axiomatic characterization of intertemporal risk
aversion. In the special case of a decision maker with stationary preference and a
zero rate of pure time preference, the definition is equivalent to the form introduced in
4Note that, for the definition of the normalization constants θt, this is a special case where
∆Gt = ∆Ut.
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chapter 7.2. To tie up with the discussion in part II, I first state the characterization
for a two period setting. Subsequently, two alternative extensions of the axiom to an
arbitrary number of periods are offered, both of which yield the same characterization in
terms of the representation derived in the preceding section. The main difference in the
formulation with regard to chapter 7.2 is the following. Relaxing the requirements of a
zero rate of time preference and stationarity imply that the definition has to consider
lotteries over general consumption paths, rather then over individual outcomes in a
single period.5
In the two period setting, a decision maker is said to exhibit weak intertemporal risk
aversion (in period 1), if and only if, the following axiom is satisfied:
A6wtp (weak intertemporal risk aversion) For all x1, x
′
1, x2, x
′
2 ∈ X holds
(x1, x2) ∼1 (x
′
1, x
′
2) ⇒ (x1, x2) 1
1
2
(x1, x
′
2) +
1
2
(x′1, x2). (8.4)
The index ‘w’ at the axiom’s label abbreviates again ‘weak’ as opposed to ‘s’ for ‘strict’,
while ‘tp’ denotes the particular two period setting. A decision maker is said to exhibit
strict intertemporal risk aversion (in period 1), if and only if, the following axiom is
satisfied:
A6 stp (strict intertemporal risk aversion) For all x1, x
′
1, x2, x
′
2 ∈ X holds
(x1, x2) ∼1 (x
′
1, x
′
2) ∧ x2 6∼2 x
′
2 ⇒ (x1, x2) ≻1
1
2
(x1, x
′
2) +
1
2
(x′1, x2). (8.5)
I start with the interpretation of the strict axiom. The first part of the premise in
axiom A6 stp states that a decision maker is indifferent between a certain consumption
path delivering outcome x1 in the first period and outcome x2 in the second period,
and another certain consumption path delivering outcomes x′1 and x
′
2 respectively. The
second part of the premise requires that the decision maker values either x2 higher than
x′2 or vice versa. Let me assume he prefers outcome x
′
2 over outcome x2 in the second
period. In combination with the first part of the premise, this preference implies that
the decision maker values x1 higher than x
′
1 in the first period.
6 Moreover, the indiffer-
5Precisely, admitting a non-zero rate of time preference implies the necessity to consider lotteries
over paths rather than over single period outcomes. Allowing for non-stationary preference results
in the additional need to include non-constant certain consumption paths in the axiom’s comparisons.
Chapter 9.4 gives a simplified version of the axiom for the case of general stationary preference, keeping
consumption paths on the left hand side of the comparisons in equation (8.4) constant over time.
6Again, the interpretation assumes that the axioms of choice of the last section, as gathered in
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ence with respect to the intertemporal trade-off in the first part of the premise implies
that there is some equivalence between the superiority of x1 over x
′
1 and the inferiority
of x2 with respect to x
′
2. To arrive at the right hand side of equation (8.5), reassemble
the outcomes to the new consumption paths (x1, x
′
2) and (x
′
1, x2). As opposed to the
consumption path (x1, x2), the consumption path (x1, x
′
2) features a higher consumption
in the second period, while first period consumption coincides. On the other hand, the
consumption path (x′1, x2) delivers an inferior outcome in the first period, but consump-
tion in the second is the same as in (x1, x2). Moreover, in the sense of indifference in the
intertemporal trade-off, there is an evaluative equivalence between the superiority of the
consumption path (x1, x
′
2) with respect to (x1, x2), and the inferiority of the consump-
tion path (x′1, x2) with respect to (x1, x2). Now, the right hand side of equation (8.5)
offers the choice between the consumption path (x1, x2) with certainty and a lottery
that yields, with equal probability, either the superior consumption path (x′1, x2) or the
inferior consumption path (x1, x
′
2). Then, the axiom requires an intertemporally risk
averse decision maker to prefer the certain consumption path over the lottery. Again,
the intuition is that he might be better off in the lottery than with the certain consump-
tion path (x1, x2), but he might as well be worse off with equal probability. This differs
from the decision problem in the premise, where the decision maker can be certain to
get the higher outcome in the second period, if he decides for the inferior outcome in
the first.
The interpretation for the weaker axiom A6wtp is analogous. The only difference is that
the implication of axiom A6wtp just requires the lottery not to be strictly preferred to the
certain outcome path. Therefore, the premise can allow that both consumption paths,
(x1, x2) and (x
′
1, x
′
2), are evaluated identical with respect to their individual outcomes.
If axiom A6 stp (A6
w
tp) is satisfied with ≻1 (1) replaced by ≺1 (1), the decision maker
is called a strong (weak) intertemporal risk seeker. If his preferences satisfy weak in-
tertemporal risk aversion as well as weak intertemporal risk seeking, the decision maker
is called intertemporally risk neutral.
Before I extend the axioms to an arbitrary planning horizon, let me revisit the example
studied in chapter 7.4. An employee was offered a vacation lottery by his boss. The
corresponding coin flip would have either extended his summer vacation from two to
three weeks, or would have cut the vacation short by one week. As the employee declined
the lottery, I wondered whether this rejection was due to risk aversion or whether it
theorem 5, are satisfied. Preferring x1 over x
′
1 in the first period corresponds formally to [x1] ≻1 [x
′
1].
In terms of representation theorem 5, this relation implies that any Bernoulli utility function renders a
higher value for outcome x1 than for outcome x
′
1.
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was caused by a higher valuation for a second week of vacation than for a third week
of vacation. Therefore, I asked the employee, whether he was willing to trade in a
week of this year’s summer vacation for an extra week of next year’s summer vacation.
Acknowledging that I observed a rather particular employee, who featured a stationary
preference relation and a zero rate of time preference, this combined information was
enough to decide whether he declined due to (intertemporal) risk aversion or due to
judging a third week of vacation inferior to a second week of vacation. Now let me
extend the example to those employees, who have general non-stationary preferences,
by applying axiom A6 stp to the above setting. Hence, in order to find out whether such
an employee is intertemporally risk averse, I have to offer him a different lottery than in
chapter 7.4. Now, the coin flip should promise him either two weeks of vacation this year
and three in the next, or, if the other side comes up, one week of vacation this year and
two in the next. If he declines such an offer, but prefers to trade in one week of vacation
this year for an extra week next year, the employee is known to be intertemporally risk
averse.7 If he accepts the lottery, but declines the certain trade, the employee is known
to be an intertemporal risk seeker. If he declines both, the lottery and the certain trade,
I only know that he is not, at the same time, intertemporally risk seeking and values
the third week higher than the second. If he accepts both, I only know that he is not
intertemporally risk averse and, at the same time, judges the third week inferior to
the second. In these cases, I have to change the vacation payoffs, corresponding to a
variation of the outcome paths x = (x1, x2) and x
′ = (x′1, x
′
2) in axiom A6
s
tp, in order to
derive further information on the employees preference and risk attitude.
To state the axiom for an arbitrary finite planning horizon T , I need to introduce
some notation. Given two consumption paths x = (xt, xt+1, ..., xT ) ∈ X
t and x′ =
(x′t, x
′
t+1, ..., x
′
T ) ∈ X
t, I define the reassembled consumption path (x−i, x
′
i) =
(xt, ..., xi−1, x
′
i, xi+1, ..., xT ) ∈ X
t, as the consumption path that coincides with x in all
but the ith period, and in period i it coincides with the period i outcome of path x′.
Note that for i ∈ {t, ..., T} there are T − t+1 different consumption paths (x−i, x
′
i), each
of length T − t+ 1. Then,
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x−i, x
′
i) denotes a lottery that yields with equal
probability any of these consumption paths (x−i, x
′
i). This lottery can also be described
as follows. Think about constructing a new consumption path out of the consumption
path x, by keeping all but one of its entry. The entry that is changed, replaces the
outcome xi by the outcome x
′
i. Now, the lottery draws with equal probability the period
7More precisely, he is known to be intertemporally risk averse for that particular welfare level. How-
ever, see chapter 10 to find (axiomatic) reasons, why a decision maker might be only either everywhere
intertemporally risk averse or everywhere intertemporally risk seeking.
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in which the consumption is exchanged.
A decision maker is said to exhibit weak intertemporal risk aversion in period t < T ,
if and only if the following axiom is satisfied:
A6w (weak intertemporal risk aversion) For all x, x′ ∈ Xt holds
x ∼t x
′ ⇒ x t
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x−i, x
′
i).
A decision maker is said to exhibit strict intertemporal risk aversion in period t < T , if
and only if the following axiom is satisfied:
A6 s (strict intertemporal risk aversion) For all x, x′ ∈ Xt holds
x ∼t x
′ ∧ ∃ τ ∈ {t, ..., T} s.th. [xτ ]τ 6∼τ [x
′
τ ]τ
⇒ x ≻t
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x−i, x
′
i).
I give an interpretation for the strict version of the axiom, which illustrates also the
interpretation of its weak form. The premise, i.e. the first line of axiom A6 s, is analogous
to that of axiom A6 stp. The first part states that a decision maker is indifferent between
the certain consumption paths x and x′. The second part of the premise requires that
there exists at least one period, in which the decision maker is not indifferent between
the outcome delivered in the respective period by consumption path x and the one
delivered by consumption path x′.8 Without loss of generality assume that there exists
τ ∈ {t, ..., T} such that outcome xτ is strictly preferred to outcome x
′
τ (i.e. [xτ ]τ ≻τ
[x′τ ]τ ). Then
9, by the first part of the premise, there also has to exist a period τ ′, in
which the outcome xτ ′ is judged inferior to the outcome x
′
τ ′ . Therefore, the second part
of the premise implies that there exists a consumption path (x−τ ′ , x
′
τ ′) that is judged
superior to the consumption path x as well as a consumption path (x−τ , x
′
τ ) that is judged
inferior to x. Of course, there can be several consumption paths of type (x−i, x
′
i) with
i ∈ {t, ..., T} that are judged superior or inferior with respect to the consumption path
x. However, the outcomes x′i that make the paths (x−i, x
′
i) superior and those that make
the paths inferior with respect to x, balance each other in the sense of the intertemporal
trade-off given in the first part of the premise. Then, the second line of axiom A6 s
demands that for consumption satisfying the above conditions, an intertemporally risk
averse decision maker should prefer the consumption path x with certainty over the
lottery that yields with equal probability any of the consumption paths (x−i, x
′
i), some
8Recall the definition of [xt]t as the consumption path (xt, x
0, ..., x0) that yields outcome xt in
period t and some arbitrary, but commonly fixed, baseline consumption x0 ∈ X from period t+ 1 on.
9Assuming that the axioms of choice given in the preceding section prevail.
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of which make him better off and some of which make him worse off.
The interpretation for the weaker axiom A6w is analogous, except that the consump-
tion path x is allowed to coincide with x′, and the implication only requires that the
lottery is not strictly preferred to the certain consumption path. If axiom A6 s (A6w) is
satisfied with ≻t (t) replaced by ≺t (t) the decision maker is called a strong (weak)
intertemporal risk seeker. If a decision maker’s preferences satisfy weak intertemporal
risk aversion as well as weak intertemporal risk seeking, the decision maker is called
intertemporally risk neutral.
Before stating the theorem that characterizes intertemporal risk aversion in terms of
the representation of theorem 4, I want to offer an alternative axiomatic characterization
of intertemporal risk aversion in the multiperiod setting, which only involves a lottery
over two consumption paths. These consumption paths are constructed by separating
the relatively better outcomes of x with respect to x′ from the relatively worse outcomes
of x with respect to x′. Precisely, define for x, x′ ∈ Xt the consumption paths xhigh(x, x′)
and xlow(x, x′) in Xt by
(xhigh(x, x′))τ =
{
x′τ if [x
′
τ ]τ ≻τ [xτ ]τ
xτ if [xτ ]τ τ [x
′
τ ]τ
and
(xlow(x, x′))τ =
{
x′τ if [xτ ]τ τ [x
′
τ ]τ
xτ if [x
′
τ ]τ ≻τ [xτ ]τ
for τ ∈ {t, ..., T}. The consumption path xhigh(x, x′) collects the better outcomes of
every period, while xlow(x, x′) collects the inferior outcomes of every period. In this
notation the definition of weak intertemporal risk aversion in period t < T can also be
stated as follows:
A6w* (weak intertemporal risk aversion) For all x, x
′ ∈ Xt holds
x ∼t x
′ ⇒ x t
1
2
xhigh(x, x′) + 1
2
xlow(x, x′).
And strict intertemporal risk aversion in period t < T can be written as:
A6 s* (strict intertemporal risk aversion) For all x, x
′ ∈ Xt holds
x ∼t x
′ ∧ ∃ τ ∈ {t, ..., T} s.th. [xτ ]τ 6∼τ [x
′
τ ]τ
⇒ x ≻t
1
2
xhigh(x, x′) + 1
2
xlow(x, x′).
The interpretations are analogous to those of axioms A6w and A6 s. However, the ‘worse
off’ versus ‘better off’ trade-off in the lottery can be observed more directly. Moreover,
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for long time horizons, the formulation in axioms A6w* and A6
s
* reduces the outcome
paths offered by the lottery significantly. Note that for the case of two periods, both
axioms A6w and A6w* coincide with axiom A6
w
tp, and both axioms A6
s and A6 s* are
identical to axiom A6 stp. Theorem 6 shows the equivalence of the two formulations within
a preference setup as described in the preceding section. Most importantly however, it
translates the axiomatic characterization of intertemporal risk aversion into a functional
characterization for representations in the sense of theorem 4.
Theorem 6: Let the sequence of triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} represent the preferences
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 5. Furthermore let t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}.
The following assertions hold:
a) A decision maker is strictly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in period t in
the sense of axiom A6 s, if and only if, ft ◦ g
−1
t (z) is strictly concave [convex] in
z ∈ Γt.
b) A decision maker is weakly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in period t in
the sense of axiom A6 s, if and only if, ft ◦ g
−1
t (z) is concave [convex] in z ∈ Γt.
c) A decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral in period t, if and only if,
ft ◦ g
−1
t (z) is linear in z ∈ Γt.
d) The above assertions hold as well, if axiom A6 s is replaced by axiom A6 s*, and
if axiom A6w is replaced by axiom A6w* .
In theorem 6 intertemporal risk aversion is characterized by the functions ft ◦ g
−1
t .
Note, that for period T , the term fT ◦ g
−1
T is determined by the underlying preferences
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} to the same degree as the compositions ft ◦ g
−1
t for any other period.
Therefore, theorem 6 can be used to extend the definition of intertemporal risk aver-
sion to the last period of the planning horizon.10 The interpretation of the assertions
is the same as for theorem 3. For a detailed discussion I refer to chapter 7. However,
the above extension to the general multiperiod setting allows the functions characteriz-
ing intertemporal risk aversion to change arbitrarily over time. In the one-commodity
Epstein Zin gauge, theorem 6 shows that intertemporal risk aversion goes along with
standard risk aversion dominating a decision makers aversion to substitute consumption
over time. Considering the certainty additive gauge (g = id), assertion a) states that
intertemporal risk aversion is equivalent to a strictly concave function f . As this gauge
was implicitly applied in the setup of sections 5.2 and 5.3, where a strictly concave
f has been identified to characterize precautionary behavior (compare page 69), strict
10Of course, this is only possible because the sequence of preference relations  is defined over at
least two periods. Otherwise, i.e. in the one-period or atemporal case, gT would not be determined at
all.
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intertemporal risk aversion corresponds again to a precautionary evaluation of a threat
of harm scenario.
As discussed in chapter 7.3, in the g = id-gauge, certainty additive Bernoulli utility
is given the interpretation of welfare uwelf . With such a notion of welfare, intertemporal
risk aversion can be interpreted as risk aversion with respect to welfare gains and losses.
Just as in chapter 7.3, I can also reinterpret the axioms characterizing intertemporal
risk aversion in this section in terms of risk aversion on welfare. For example axiom
A6 s* gains the following interpretation. The first part of the premise requires that for
two consumption paths, x and x′, the per period welfare adds up to the same overall
welfare. The second part of the premise requires that at least in one period, the welfare
gained from consumption path x differs from that gained from consumption path x′. The
consumption path xhigh(x, x′) collects for every period the outcome xt or x
′
t that renders
the comparatively higher welfare, while the consumption path xlow(x, x′) collects the
outcome xt or x
′
t that yields the comparatively lower welfare. Then, the lottery between
these ‘high welfare’ and ‘low welfare’ consumption paths constructed in axiom A6 s*
renders in expectation the same welfare as the certain consumption path x. A decision
maker who is strictly risk averse on welfare, i.e. strictly intertemporally risk averse, is
defined by preferring the certain consumption path x over the welfare lottery that leaves
him with equal probability either worse or better off, and yields the same welfare as the
certain consumption path in expectation.
For a quantitative measurement of risk aversion, the two definitions of chapter 7.4
gain a time index. For a twice differentiable function ft ◦ g
−1
t : Γt → IR define a measure
of relative intertemporal risk aversion in period t as the function:
RIRAt : Γt → IR
RIRAt(z) = −
(
ft ◦ g
−1
t
)′′
(z)(
ft ◦ g
−1
t
)′
(z)
z . (8.6)
Analogously define the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion in period t as
the function:
AIRAt : Γt → IR
AIRAt(z) = −
(
ft ◦ g
−1
t
)′′
(z)(
ft ◦ g
−1
t
)′
(z)
. (8.7)
To make these quantities well defined, the affine freedom in the representation corre-
sponding to the evaluation of certain consumption paths has to be fixed, just as in
chapter 7.4. In a general gauge, this evaluation is characterized by the functions gt ◦ ut.
As worked out in the certainty additive gauge, where the term gt ◦ut = u
welf
t directly co-
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incides with Bernoulli utility, the expression was given an interpretation of welfare (see
chapter 7.3). As explained in chapter 7.4, fixing the unit of welfare makes the measure
of absolute intertemporal risk aversion (or risk aversion on welfare) unique, while fixing
the ‘zero welfare level’ makes the measure of relative intertemporal risk aversion unique.
Precisely, the following assertions hold.
Lemma 5: Let there be given a sequence of preference relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T}
satisfying axioms A1-A3, A4’ and A5’. In addition, choose
i) a time t∗ ∈ {1, ..., T} and number w∗ ∈ IR++,
ii) outcomes xzerot for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} or
iii) numbers wt ∈ IR for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Then, for representations (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 4 with twice
differentiable functions ft ◦ g
−1
t that
a) satisfy ∆Gt∗ = w
∗, the risk measures AIRAt
b) satisfy gt ◦ ut(x
zero
t ) = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, the risk measures RIRAt
c) satisfy ∆Gt∗ = w
∗ and gt ◦ ut(x
zero
t ) = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T},
the risk measures AIRAt and RIRAt
d) satisfy ∆Gt∗ = w
∗ and Gt = wt for all t ∈ {1, ..., T},
the risk measures AIRAt and RIRAt
are determined uniquely and independent of the choice of the Bernoulli utility
functions for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
As all gauges of the representation correspond to particular choices of Bernoulli utility,
lemma 5 can be restated as the fact that, once the corresponding welfare information
has been fixed, the measures RIRAt and AIRAt are gauge invariant. In assertion a) the
externally given information specifies the unit of welfare measurement, by prescribing
a numerical value to the difference in welfare between the best and the worst outcome,
i.e. uwelft (x
max
t ) − u
welf
t (x
min
t ) = gt ◦ ut(x
max
t ) − gt ◦ ut(x
min
t ) = Gt − Gt = w
∗. Note
that it is enough to fix the unit for some period, in order to determine the welfare
unit for all periods.11 Such a partial specification of the measure scale for welfare
makes the measures of absolute intertemporal risk aversion unique. Assertion b) fixes
the ‘zero welfare level’ for all periods, by prescribing outcomes in every period that
shall correspond to a zero welfare. Note that such a specification of welfare leaves the
11The freedom in the choice of welfare unit for the different representations of the same preferences
corresponds to the multiplicative constant ag in the allowed transformations for gt in the representation
of theorem 4. As ag is common to all periods, specifying ag determines the unit of welfare measurement
for all periods.
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unit of welfare undetermined. The information is enough to render the measures of
relative intertemporal risk aversion unique. Assertion c) fixes the welfare unit and the
zero welfare level together. This step eliminates the freedom in the measure scale of
welfare, going along with different representations, completely. In consequence, both
measures of intertemporal risk aversion are determined uniquely. Assertion d) offers
an alternative way to eliminate the indeterminacy of the measure scale for welfare.
Here I fix the unit of welfare as in a), and prescribe numerical values to the worst
outcomes in every period. Similarly, one could prescribe numerical values to any other
arbitrary outcome in every period. The necessity to fix the ‘zero welfare level’, or specify
some alternative information, in every period, is due to the allowed non-stationarity of
preferences, which allows the functions ft ◦ g
−1
t to vary arbitrarily over time. The next
chapter gives conditions under which the functions gt and ft for different periods are
directly related.
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Chapter 9
Stationarity
9.1 Certainty Stationarity
The representation developed in the preceding chapter allows time and uncertainty ag-
gregation to vary arbitrarily from period to period. This chapter introduces different
stationarity assumptions for preferences and elaborates their implications for the repre-
sentation. First, the current section develops an axiom restricting choice under certainty
that renders intertemporal aggregation and Bernoulli utility stationary. On certain con-
sumption paths, it gives rise to the common discount utility representation. Due to the
finite planning horizon in my analysis, the corresponding axiom slightly differs from its
usual formulation. It can be interpreted as a combination of the assumption that the
mere passage of time does not change preference, and an assumption that the rank-
ing of two lotteries does not depend on a common certain outcome in the last period.
Subsequently, in section 9.2, I introduce an axiom that additionally makes uncertainty
aggregation invariant over time. In particular, the resulting representation contains the
model of generalized isoelastic preferences, usually employed to disentangle (atemporal)
risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability. Section 9.3 works out an alternative
stationarity assumption for the evaluation of uncertainty. Analogously to the axiom for
certain consumption paths derived in the current section, it builds on the assumption
that the ranking of two lotteries does not depend on a common certain outcome in the
last period. An attractive feature of the resulting representation is that it condenses
information on intertemporal risk aversion into a single parameter. The latter insight
is worked out in section 9.4. There, I characterize intertemporal risk aversion in the
different representation theorems given in this chapter. In addition, I state a simplified
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axiom characterizing intertemporal risk aversion of preferences in a stationary setting.
Stationarity, in the sense of the standard discount utility model is a ubiquitous as-
sumption in economic modeling, and in particular in environmental economics. However,
to the best of my knowledge, the assumption is expressed in terms of the underlying
preference relations only for models featuring an infinite time horizon. In these models,
the axiomatic characterization of stationarity requires that a decision maker prefers a
consumption path x over another consumption path x′ in the present, if and only if,
he prefers a consumption path (x0, x) over a consumption path (x0, x′) in the present
(Koopmans 1960).1 Such an axiomatization makes use of the fact that for an infinite
time horizon, adding an additional outcome does not change the length of a consump-
tion path. Precisely, both paths x and (x0, x), are elements of X∞ and can be compared
by the same preference relation. On the contrary, for a finite time horizon, the paths
x and (x0, x) differ in length and, thus, cannot be compared by means of the same
preference relation . The reason, why I keep my model in the finite time horizon is
threefold. First, the common techniques for analyzing an infinite time horizon setting
(contraction and fix point theorems) have to assume from the outset a positive rate of
pure time preference. However, as mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, such a
positive discount rate is not without controversy.2 Second, the reasoning on stationar-
ity carried out in this chapter together with the reasoning on attitude with respect to
the timing of uncertainty resolution carried out in chapter 10, make a strong point for
choosing a zero rate of time preference for a time consistent approach to choice under
uncertainty. Third, for most planning processes and scenario evaluations there exists
a reasonable upper bound for the planning horizon.3 Considering the assumption of a
finite horizon a competitive alternative to the assumption of an infinite planning horizon
that is accompanied by a positive discount rate, I give a slightly different axiomatization
of stationarity. In the discussion later on, I provide several comments with respect to
the limit of an infinite time horizon. The following axiom is applicable in a finite time
horizon setting and, there, yields the standard discount utility model for the evaluation
of certain consumption paths.
1See page 130 for details.
2Compare the citation of Ramsey (1928, 543), who states that a positive rate of pure time preference
is “ethically indefensible”. I come back to this issue in chapter 10.4.
3While such an upper bound can be in the magnitude of several decades, note that taking as upper
bound a point of time by which our sun has burned out or turned into a red giant still provides a finite
upper bound (Sackmann, Boothroyd & Kraemer 1993).
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A7 (certainty stationarity) For all x2, x′2 ∈ X2 and all x0 ∈ X holds
(x2, x0) 1 (x
′2, x0) ⇔ x2 2 x
′2 .
On the right hand side of the equivalence, the decision maker faces a comparison between
x2 and x′2 as consumption paths starting in period 2. Note that, by time consistency
A5’, the comparison on the right is equivalent to (x0, x2) 1 (x
0, x′2). On the left
hand side of the equivalence, the decision maker faces a comparison between x2 and
x′
2 as consumption paths starting in period 1. The additional outcome x0, which is
commonly added to the paths x2 and x′2, makes (x2, x0) and (x′2, x0) choice objects
of the appropriate length, so that they can be compared in period 1 by the preference
relation 1. The important property of the axiom is that the decision maker’s preference
over the (certain) consumption paths is independent of their starting point.4
I want to give an interpretation of axiom 7 by separating the underlying idea into
two steps. Assume that a decision maker in period 1, planning with time horizon T ,
prefers consumption plan (x2, x0) over plan (x′2, x0). Now, let him contemplate about
his choice in period 2. Assume that he is confronted in period 2 with the exact same
consumption paths (x2, x0) and (x′2, x0) (not with their continuation). Furthermore, let
him anticipate that in period 2 he will plan ahead the same amount of periods as he
does in period one, implying a time horizon T +1. Formally, I denote these preferences
of the decision maker in period 2 with time horizon T + 1 by 2|T+1. Then, given that
nothing else changes between period 1 and period 2, I demand that the decision maker
ranks (or rather plans to rank) the projects in both choice situations the same way.
Requiring the latter for all consumption paths yields the condition
(x2, x0) 1|T (x
′2, x0) ⇔ (x2, x0) 2|T+1 (x
′2, x0) (9.1)
for all x2, x′2 ∈ X2 and x0 ∈ X. Condition (9.1) most clearly captures the intuition of
stationarity, in the sense that the mere passage of time should not change the evaluation.
However, up to now the preference relations ·|T and ·|T+1 are completely unrelated.
In consequence, equation (9.1) on its own does not restrict the decision maker’s prefer-
ence relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} = (t|T )t∈{1,...,T} in any way. Thus, the second step in the
reasoning has to relate the preference relation 2|T+1 to the relation 2=2|T . Both
preference relations specify how the decision maker anticipates to evaluate choice objects
in period 2. The relation 2|T specifies his ranking when planning T − 2 periods ahead
(until period T ), and the relation 2|T+1 states his ranking when he plans T − 1 periods
4Note the difference to time consistency. The latter is a condition on consumption paths starting in
the same period that yield a common outcome in the first period. Then, the continuation of the paths
in the next period should be ranked the same way as the complete paths in the earlier period.
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ahead (until period T +1). Accepting stationarity in the sense of equation (9.1), axiom
A7 requires the following relation between ·|T and ·|T+1:
x2 2|T x
′2 ⇔ (x2, x0) 2|T+1 (x
′2, x0) (9.2)
for all x2, x′2 ∈ X2 and x0 ∈ X. In words, if two scenarios or projects are evaluated with
a time horizon of T +1, and yield the same outcome in period T +1, then, an evaluation
based only on a time horizon T shall yield the same ranking of the scenarios.
Let me point out the analogous reasoning to yield stationarity from the assumption
expressed in equation (9.1) for the case of an infinite planning horizon. Denote the
consumption paths corresponding to (x2, x0) and (x′2, x0) by x, x′ ∈ X∞. Then, by
time consistency the right hand side of equation (9.1) is equivalent to (x0, x) 1|T+1
(x0, x′) for all x, x′ ∈ X∞ and x0 ∈ X. Moreover, in the infinite horizon setting, it
holds 1|T+1=1|∞=1|T , a relation which makes equation (9.2) dispensable. That
way, I arrive at the standard axiom of stationarity for the infinite planning horizon:
x 1|∞ x
′ ⇔ (x, x) 1|∞ (x, x
′) for all x ∈ X and all x∞, x′∞ ∈ X∞, dating back to
Koopmans (1960)[294]5. Hence, at first sight, the second assumption, corresponding to
equation (9.1), seems to come for free with an infinite time horizon. However, this is
not the case. It is a necessary assumption in the standard framework with an infinite
planning horizon that the decision maker applies a positive rate of pure time prefer-
ence. Therefore, the weight given to future consumption converges to zero. Thus, the
assumption that coinciding outcomes in the ‘last’ period of the planning horizon do not
matter for the ranking of consumption paths is implicit in the infinite horizon setting.
It is the combined result of the decision maker’s intrinsic devaluation of the future and
his infinite planning horizon.
As in the simplified setting analyzed in chapter 6.3, also in the general stationary
setting the sets of Bernoulli utility functions coincide for different periods. Therefore,
define u ∈ B ≡ B1 . Preference stationarity on certain consumption paths as formu-
lated in axiom A7, together with the assumptions of the previous chapter, yields the
following representation.
Theorem 7: Let there be given a sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B with range U . The sequence
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
5Koopmans (1960) actually formulates his postulates in terms of utility functionals. However the
translation of his postulate 4 into the preference setup is immediate. His general axiomatic setting is
translated into preferences in Koopmans (1972), again with stationarity corresponding to postulate 4.
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ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A7 (certainty stationarity)
if and only if, there exist strictly increasing and continuous functions ft : U → IR
for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} and g : U → IR as well as a discount factor β ∈ IR++, such
that with defining
v) the normalized discount weights
βt = β
1−βT−t
1−βT−t+1
for β 6= 1 and
βt =
T−t
T−t+1
for β = 1 and
vi) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by u˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and
recursively
u˜t−1 = g
−1
[
(1− βt−1) g ◦ u(xt−1) + βt−1 g ◦M
ft(pt, u˜t)
]
(9.3)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ft(pt, u˜t) ≥M
ft(p′t, u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
Moreover the functions g and ft are unique up to nondegenerate positive affine
transformations.
Certainty stationarity implies that the same Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B can be
used in the representation for all periods. Moreover, it makes the functions gt, char-
acterizing intertemporal aggregation, coincide for adjacent periods up to a (common)
multiplicative constant. This constant corresponds to the discount factor β. As shown
in the proof, a representation (u, ft, g)t∈{1,...,T} for (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 7
corresponds to a representation (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} = (u, ft, β
tg)t∈{1,...,T} for (t)t∈{1,...,T}
in the sense of the general non-stationary representation of theorem 4. Expressing this
relation in words, the information characterizing intertemporal aggregation, which in
the general setting is contained in the functions gt for t ∈ {1, ..., T}, can be captured in
the stationary setting by two quantities. The first piece of information is taken up by
the function g, which now is common to all periods. In the one commodity Epstein Zin
gauge, it comprises the information on intertemporal substitutability. The second piece
of information characterizes the change of the functions gt between different periods.
This change is captured in a single parameter, the discount factor β, which describes
the reduction in weight given to future outcomes.
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For the limit of an infinite time horizon under the assumption β < 1, the normalized
discount weights βt used in the representation converge to the discount factor itself:
limT→∞ βt = β for all t. Then, the weight given to the present as opposed to the
future is constant. However, for a decision maker who plans with a finite time horizon,
the weights βt have to accommodate not only discounting, but also the weight that an
individual period receives as opposed to the remaining future. The shorter the time
horizon, or the closer the end of the time horizon, the higher must be the weight that
the present period obtains as opposed to the remaining future.6 On certain consumption
paths the evaluation is ordinally equivalent to the representation
xt t x
′t ⇔
T∑
τ=t
βtg ◦ u(xtτ ) ≥
T∑
τ=t
βtg ◦ u(x′tτ ).
Moreover, in the g = id gauge, the recursive construction of aggregate utility in equa-
tion (9.3) becomes
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = (1− βt−1)u(xt−1) + βt−1M
ft(pt, u˜t)
and yields for certain consumption paths a representation ordinally equivalent to the
widely applied evaluation
xt t x
′t ⇔
T∑
τ=t
βtu(xtτ ) ≥
T∑
τ=t
βtu(x′tτ ).
In difference to the intertemporal aggregation rules, the uncertainty aggregation rules
are allowed to vary arbitrarily over time. The next two sections elaborate two different
assumptions rendering the uncertainty aggregation rules stationary as well.
9.2 Risk Stationarity I
In the preference framework of the preceding section, I assume stationarity in the eval-
uation of certain consumption paths. The assumption implies a close relation between
intertemporal aggregation rules in different periods. In contrast, in the representation
of theorem 7 uncertainty evaluation is allowed to vary arbitrarily over time.7 It stands
6In particular, at the end of the time horizon, the weight given to the future has to be zero. Note,
that this reasoning is necessary because the weights given to the present and to the future have to add up
to one in the time aggregator g−1 [(1− βt−1) g(·) + βt−1(·)]. Otherwise the symmetric characterization
of intertemporal aggregation and uncertainty aggregation by functions gt and ft would fail.
7Precisely, uncertainty evaluation is allowed to vary arbitrarily between different periods t and t′.
By the requirement of time consistency, uncertainty aggregation has to be fixed for a given period t
and, thus, independent of whether period t is τ or τ ′ periods into the future.
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to reason that a decision maker who relates his evaluation of certain consumption paths
between different periods, is also willing to relate his evaluation of uncertain consump-
tion plans for different periods. An example of a preference representation which relates
uncertainty evaluation between different periods is the generalized isoelastic model. It
has been discussed in chapter 7.1 as the common framework to disentangle (atemporal)
risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability. In the multiperiod framework, the
generalized isoelastic model features uncertainty aggregation rules that are commonly
characterized by ft = z
α ,∀ t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
In order to state an axiom that implies time constant uncertainty aggregation rules,
it proves useful to introduce a special notation for constant consumption paths. Let
x¯t = (x¯, x¯, ..., x¯) denote the certain constant consumption path that gives consumption
x¯ from t until T . Then 1
2
x¯t + 1
2
x¯′t ∈ Pt is the lottery in period t that randomizes
with probability 1
2
between the constant consumption streams giving x¯ and x¯′. The
following axiom demands that these randomized consumption streams relate to certain
consumption streams the same way in different periods.
A8 (risk stationarity I) For all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} holds
1
2
x¯ t + 1
2
x¯′ t t x¯
′′ t ⇔ 1
2
x¯ t+1 + 1
2
x¯′ t+1 t+1 x¯
′′ t+1 ∀ x¯, x¯′, x¯′′ ∈ X .
The axiom can be conceived as an indifference requirement to the start, and thus, the
duration of a taken risk. In particular, for a decision maker who is indifferent between
the lottery 1
2
x¯ + 1
2
x¯′ and a certain outcome x¯′′ in period T , axiom A8 requires that he
is indifferent between the lottery 1
2
(x¯, x¯) + 1
2
(x¯′, x¯′) and the certain consumption path
(x¯′′, x¯′′) in period T −1 as well. Be aware that in the lotteries of axiom A8 the outcomes
in the different periods are perfectly correlated. In particular in the above example,
lottery 1
2
(x¯, x¯) + 1
2
(x¯′, x¯′) is not the same as the lottery 1
2
(x¯, 1
2
x¯+ 1
2
x¯′) + 1
2
(x¯′, 1
2
x¯+ 1
2
x¯′),
which would correspond to independent coin tosses in both periods. Adding axiom A8
to the assumptions of theorem 7 yields the following representation.
Theorem 8: Let there be given a sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B with range U . The sequence
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A7-A8 (stationarity)
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if and only if, there exist strictly increasing8 and continuous functions f : U → IR
and g : U → IR as well as a discount factor β ∈ IR++, such that with defining
v) the normalized discount weights
βt = β
1−βT−t
1−βT−t+1
for β 6= 1 and
βt =
T−t
T−t+1
for β = 1 and
vi) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by u˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and
recursively
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
−1
[
(1− βt−1) g ◦ u(xt−1) + βt−1 g ◦M
f (pt, u˜t)
]
(9.4)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
f (pt, u˜t) ≥M
f (p′t, u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
Moreover g and f are unique up to nondegenerate positive affine transformations.
In this representation a common function f characterizes risk attitude in all periods. Re-
lating the representation to the general non-stationary setting, a representation (u, f, g)
in the sense of theorem 8 corresponds to the representation (u, f, βtg) in the sense of
theorem 4. Due to the fact that both functions, g and f , apply to all periods, gauging
can be carried out as already discussed in chapter 6.4.
Lemma 6: Gauge lemma 1, corollary 2 (f-gauge) and corollary 3 (g-gauge) of sec-
tion 6.4 also hold for the multiperiod representation of theorem 8.
Precisely, replace in the respective statements ‘theorem 2’ by ‘theorem 8’ and
‘i− iii)’ by ‘i− iv)’. Moreover, either replace the word ‘monotonic’ by ‘increasing’
in corollaries 2 and 3, or replace the word ‘increasing’ by ‘monotonic’ in theorem 8.
In the one-commodity Epstein Zin gauge (u = id), the representation yields a multi-
period extension of the generalized isoelastic model discussed in chapter 7.1. ForX ⊂ IR,
the Epstein Zin gauge for the isoelastic setting, where f = zα and g(z) = zρ, brings
about the following recursive construction of aggregate utility u˜t.
Equation (9.4) in the Epstein Zin gauge (u = id) with isoelastic preferences:
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) =
{
(1− βt−1)x
ρ + βt−1
[∫
X˜t
u˜t(x˜t)
α dpt
] ρ
α
} 1
ρ
(9.5)
8Alternatively, the theorem can be stated with ‘increasing’ replaced by ‘monotonic’ (see chapter 6.3).
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Analogous formulations have been used in many applications in order to disentangle
atemporal risk aversion, characterized by α, from intertemporal substitutability, char-
acterized by ρ. For details and an overview over the respective literature consult chapter
7.1. Recall that I have introduced the functions ut and u˜t as explicit arguments in the
uncertainty aggregation rules, in order to analyze and make use of the freedom in the
choice of Bernoulli utility. In the literature disentangling risk aversion from intertem-
poral substitutability, the uncertainty evaluation is usually stated in terms of the power
mean, which corresponds to Mα, but uses the probability measure p∗t induced by pt on
Ut through the function u˜t (see chapter 5.3, in particular footnote 29). Then, denoting
the elements of Ut ⊂ IR by ut, equation (9.5) writes as
u˜t−1(xt−1, p
∗
t ) =
{
(1− βt−1)x
ρ + βt−1
[∫
Ut
ut
α dp∗t
] ρ
α
} 1
ρ
.
The standard form of the aggregator is obtained for the limit of an infinite time horizon,
where limT→∞ βt = β for all t.
9.3 Risk Stationarity II
Stationarity of risk attitude in the preceding section was primarily motivated by the
objective to obtain constant uncertainty aggregation rules. In this section, I reconsider
stationarity of preference in a risky world. Departing from axiom A7 for certain con-
sumption paths, I derive an alternative requirement for stationarity of risk attitude,
yielding a preference representation distinct from that given in theorem 8.
In section 9.1 I have motivated the axiom of certainty stationarity by splitting it up
into two assumptions. The first requirement, corresponding to equation (9.1), expresses
that the mere passage of time shall not change preferences. The second assumption,
corresponding to equation (9.2), compares two scenarios yielding the same outcome in
period T+1. For such scenarios, it requires that adapting a time horizon of T+1 or of T
shall yield the same ranking of the two scenarios. In the following, I give an analogous
reasoning for risky scenarios. As already in axioms A6 and A8, it proves sufficient
to require risk stationarity only for ‘coin toss’ compositions of certain consumption
paths, i.e. probability a half mixtures of type 1
2
x + 1
2
x′. Moreover, it is enough to have
the decision maker rank these lotteries with respect to certain alternatives. Then, the
analogue requirement to equation (9.1) becomes
1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t|T (x
′′, x0) ⇔ 1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t+1|T+1 (x
′′, x0) (9.6)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ Xt+1, x0 ∈ X and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. In words, the mere passage of time
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shall not change the ranking between the different scenarios. As I want the decision
maker to evaluate lotteries where uncertainty resolves at any point in the future, I
require equation (9.6) to hold for all periods.9
The second step to arrive at the axiom of risk stationarity, is to relate the relations
·|T and ·|T+1. As in section 9.1, I require that scenarios whose outcomes coincide in
the last period of a finite planning horizon T + 1 shall be ranked the same way when
applying a planning horizon of T . This demand is formalized by the statement
1
2
x + 1
2
x′ t+1|T x
′′ ⇔ 1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t+1|T+1 (x
′′, x0) (9.7)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ Xt+1, x0 ∈ X and t ∈ {1, ..., T}. As the right hand side of the
requirements in equations (9.6) and (9.7) coincides, together, the equations bring about
the following axiom for stationarity of risk attitude in a setting with a finite planning
horizon.
A9 (risk stationarity II) For all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} and x0 ∈ X:
1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t (x
′′, x0) ⇔ 1
2
x + 1
2
x′ t+1 x
′′ ∀ x, x′, x′′ ∈ Xt+1.
In short, the decision maker ranks lotteries of the form 1
2
x + 1
2
x′ the same way when
they are faced in period t as when they are faced in period t+ 1. When facing them in
period t, the additional outcome x0 at the end of the planning horizon, which coincides
for all consumption paths, does not change his ranking.
Before I come to the representation, let me briefly point out the analogous reasoning
to yield risk stationarity from the assumption expressed in equation (9.6) in the case of
an infinite planning horizon. Denote the consumption paths corresponding to (x, x0) and
(x′, x0) simply by x, x′ ∈ X∞, yielding the notation 1
2
x+ 1
2
x′ for the lotteries considered in
the infinite horizon version of equation (9.6). Moreover, in the infinite horizon setting, it
is 1|T+1=1|∞=1|T . Then, by time consistency, equation (9.6) for t = 1 is equivalent
to
1
2
x + 1
2
x′ 1|∞ x
′′ ⇔ (x1,
1
2
x + 1
2
x′) 1|∞ (x1, x
′′)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ X∞ and x1 ∈ X. Similarly for t = 2 equation (9.6) is equivalent to
(x1,
1
2
x + 1
2
x′) 1|∞ (x1, x
′′) ⇔ (x1, x2,
1
2
x + 1
2
x′) 1|∞ (x1, x2, x
′′)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ X∞ and x1, x2 ∈ X. The latter statement for t = 2 can be transformed
9Alternatively, I could formulate the requirement analogously to equation (9.1) in section 9.1 by
only considering preference in periods 1 and 2. Such a reformulation is straight forward, once it is
recognized that time consistency A4’ allows to carry over all the requirements in equation (9.6) into
the first two periods, by adding common outcomes to the beginning of all consumption plans which
start in later periods.
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using the corresponding statement for t = 1 into the requirement:
1
2
x + 1
2
x′ 1|∞ x
′′ ⇔ (x1, x2,
1
2
x + 1
2
x′) 1|∞ (x1, x2, x
′′)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ X∞ and x1, x2 ∈ X. By induction I obtain the general requirement
1
2
x + 1
2
x′ 1|∞ x
′′ ⇔ (xt, 1
2
x + 1
2
x′) 1|∞ (x
t, x′′) (9.8)
for all x, x′, x′′ ∈ X∞, t ∈ IN and xt ∈ X t. A corresponding10 axiom for stationarity of
risk attitude is found in Chew & Epstein (1991, 356).
Preference stationarity for the evaluation of lotteries as formulated in axiom A9, to-
gether with the assumptions of the previous chapter, yields the following representation.
Theorem 9: Let there be given a sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a Bernoulli utility function u ∈ B with range U . The sequence
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A9 (risk stationarity II)
if and only if, there exists a strictly increasing and continuous function g : U → IR
and a discount factor β ∈ IR++ as well as a function h ∈
{
exp, id, 1
exp
}
, such that
with defining the functions w˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
v) w˜T (xT ) = g ◦ u(xT ) and recursively
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = g ◦ u(xt−1) + βM
h(pt, w˜t) or by (9.9)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
h(pt, w˜t) ≥M
h(p′t, w˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt. (9.10)
Moreover, if the representation employs h ∈
{
exp, 1
exp
}
, then two functions g and
g′ both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the above sense, if and only if, there exists b ∈ IR
such that g = g′+ b. In a representation employing h = id, two functions g and g′
both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the above sense, if and only if, there exist a ∈ IR++
and b ∈ IR such that g = ag′ + b.
10In difference to the above formulation, the authors require condition (9.8) for all lotteries, not just
for the probability a half (‘coin toss’) combinations that I have used and which prove sufficient in my
setting.
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The representation constructed in theorem 9 slightly differs from earlier representa-
tions. First, the functions employed for the recursive construction of the representation
in equations (9.9) and (9.10) are not complete analogues to those used in earlier rep-
resentations. Precisely, the functions w˜t used in equation (9.9) relate to the functions
u˜t used in the earlier theorems as w˜t =
1
1−βt
g ◦ u˜t. Second, instead of the functions ft,
a function h characterizes the uncertainty aggregation rule employed above. The func-
tion h closely connects to intertemporal risk aversion and, in particular, characterizes
whether intertemporal risk aversion, risk neutrality or risk seeking prevail. Note that
for h = 1
exp
the characterization of the uncertainty aggregation rule corresponds to the
function h(z) = 1
exp(z)
= exp(−z).11
This departure from earlier layouts of the representations is caused by axiom A9. The
latter implies a close relation between the function g characterizing intertemporal aggre-
gation, and the functions ft characterizing uncertainty aggregation. In order to exploit
this relation, the functions w˜t and h are introduced (confer part four of the proof to see
how this simplifies the representation). In difference to the requirements of intertempo-
rally additive expected utility, the relation implied by axiom A9 between ‘risk aversion’
and ‘intertemporal substitutability’12 leaves one degree of freedom.13 This freedom
breaks the representation up into the three classes, corresponding to h ∈
{
exp, id, 1
exp
}
.
In each of these classes, the functions ft, characterizing uncertainty aggregation in the
sense of the earlier representation theorems, are affine transformations of h ◦ g.14 How-
ever, the mentioned relation between ft and g, which is used to simplify the represen-
tation, only holds for particular choices of g ∈ gˆ. In consequence, in order to exploit
the relation, I have to give up part of the affine freedom for the choice of g. For this
reason, in the cases where h ∈
{
exp, 1
exp
}
, the function g is no longer free up to affine
transformations, but only up to a translational constant.
Another consequence of incorporating the function g, characterizing intertemporal ag-
gregation, into the function w˜t, is that equation (9.9) is time additive in g ◦u. Note that
g ◦ u corresponds, up to discounting, to the time additive Bernoulli utility function de-
fined as welfare in chapter 7.3. Thus, for the certainty additive gauge (g = id) equation
11I avoid the notation h = exp−1 because h−1 is used to denote the inverse.
12I put quotation marks, as it has been analyzed in chapter 7.1 that this interpretation of f and g is
meaningful only in a one commodity setting applying the Epstein Zin gauge.
13Recall that in the intertemporally additive expected utility model, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion is always fixed to the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
14This is why h in the above representation is closely related to the functions ft ◦ g
−1
t characterizing
intertemporal risk aversion in the earlier representations. However, note that the affine transformation
is negative for the case where h = 1exp . The next section works out the precise relation.
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(9.9) is linear in Bernoulli utility uwelf . In that case the recursive representation employ-
ing w˜t and the one using u˜t coincide up to the factor 1− βt.
15 In theorem 9, there seem
to be three disconnected classes of representations corresponding to h ∈
{
exp, id, 1
exp
}
.
The exploration of intertemporal risk aversion carried out in the next section naturally
gives rise to a continuous connection between these different representations.
9.4 Intertemporal Risk Aversion
The section analyzes how intertemporal risk aversion is characterized in the representa-
tions developed in this section. As the stationary setting is a special case of the general
multiperiod setup developed in chapter 8, the axiomatic definition of intertemporal risk
aversion given in chapter 8.2 applies. However, alternatively, a slightly less demanding
axiom can be used. In a stationary setting, it proves sufficient to compare lotteries to
constant consumption paths only. Such a definition states that a decision maker ex-
hibits weak intertemporal risk aversion in period t, if and only if, the following axiom is
satisfied:
A6wst (weak intertemporal risk aversion) For all x¯
t, xt ∈ Xt holds
x¯t ∼t x
t ⇒ x¯t t
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x¯t−i, x
t
i).
A decision maker is said to exhibit strict intertemporal risk aversion in period t, if and
only if, the following axiom is satisfied:
A6 sst (strict intertemporal risk aversion) For all x¯
t, xt ∈ Xt it holds
x¯t ∼t x
t ∧ ∃ τ ∈ {t, ..., T} s.th. [xtτ ]τ 6∼τ [x¯]τ
⇒ x¯t ≻t
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x¯t−i, x
t
i).
The interpretation of the axioms is analogous to that of axioms A6w and A6 s discussed
at length in chapter 7.2. The only difference is that, as x¯t is a constant consumption
path, the second part of the premise in the strict version simply requires the consumption
path x to exhibit some variation. Then, the second line of the axiom demands that the
constant consumption path delivering x¯ in every period, is preferred to a lottery whose
outcome paths differ in one period from x¯. In that respective period i, which is drawn
with equal probability from {t, ..., T}, the outcome x¯ is replaced by outcome xi. For
15The general g−gauge is obtained simply by eliminating the function g from equation (9.9) and
abandoning the freedom to pick the Bernoulli utility function u freely. The next section elaborates
more gauges.
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some i, the outcome xi is preferred, and for others it is judged inferior with respect to
the outcome x¯ prevailing in the other periods. The axiom requires the decision maker to
prefer the constant consumption path x¯t over the described lottery, which might yield a
better outcome than x¯ in some period, but might as well yield a worse outcome. Again,
the outcomes that are judged better than x¯ and those that are judged inferior with
respect to x¯ balance in the sense that receiving all (i.e. consumption path x), would
make the decision maker indifferent to the constant path. However, the lottery only
gives the decision maker one of the outcomes taken from x. Thus, the fear of receiving
an outcome which is judged inferior with respect to x¯ makes the intertemporally risk
averse decision maker prefer the certain and constant consumption path to the lottery.
If axiom A6 sst (A6
w
st) is satisfied with ≻t (t) replaced by ≺t (t), the decision maker
is called a strong (weak) intertemporal risk seeker. If a decision maker’s preferences
satisfy weak intertemporal risk aversion as well as weak intertemporal risk seeking, the
decision maker is called intertemporally risk neutral. The following theorem relates
intertemporal risk attitude to the functional representation of theorem 7. It is similar
to theorem 6 worked out in chapter 8, however, it uses the weaker axioms A6wst and A6
s
st
adapted to the stationary setting.
Theorem 10: Let the sequence of triples (u, ft, g)t∈{1,...,T} represent the set of prefer-
ences = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 7. Furthermore let t ∈ {1, ..., T−1}.
Then the following assertions hold:
a) A decision maker is strictly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in period t in
the sense of axiom A6 sst, if and only if, ft ◦ g
−1(z) is strictly concave [convex] in
z ∈ Γt.
b) A decision maker is weakly intertemporally risk averse [seeking] in period t in
the sense of axiom A6wst, if and only if, ft ◦ g
−1(z) is concave [convex] in z ∈ Γt.
c) A decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral in period t, if and only if,
ft ◦ g
−1(z) is linear in z ∈ Γt.
d) The above assertions hold as well, if axiom A6 sst is replaced by axioms A6
s or
A6 s*, and if axiom A6
w
st is replaced by axioms A6
w or A6w* .
Intertemporal risk attitude is described by the second order characteristics of the func-
tion ft ◦ g
−1(z). I refer to the latter as the stationary characterization of intertemporal
risk attitude. It excludes the discount rate β, which enters the general expression char-
acterizing intertemporal risk attitude ft◦g
−1
t (z) = ft◦g
−1(β−tz). Compare proposition 9
in section 7.2 to find that ft ◦ g
−1 is convex, if and only if ft ◦ g
−1
t is convex.
16 In the
16Of course this statement also follows immediately from a comparison of theorem 10 with its non-
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certainty stationary setting of representation theorem 7, the functions ft are allowed to
vary arbitrarily over time. Therefore, the decision maker’s intertemporal risk attitude
may also differ arbitrarily between different periods. This feature changes for the rep-
resentations worked out in sections 9.2 and 9.3, which assume stationarity of preference
also for risky choices. Concerning the representation of theorem 8, observe that it is
the special case of theorem 7, where uncertainty aggregation is constant over time, i.e.
ft = f ∀ t ∈ {1, ..., T}. In consequence, theorem 10 applies with ftg
−1 = fg−1 indepen-
dent of the period. Thus, the decision maker is either intertemporally risk averse, risk
neutral or risk seeking in all periods. The same is true for a decision maker deciding
in accordance with risk stationarity II as formulated in axiom A9. I have pointed out
that h in the representation of theorem 9 corresponds, for an adequate choice of g ∈ gˆ,
to an affine transformation of ft ◦ g
−1. Therefore, the decision maker is intertemporally
risk averse, risk neutral or risk seeking depending on whether h is respectively 1
exp
, id
or exp.17
For a quantitative characterization of risk attitude, the definitions of absolute and
relative intertemporal risk aversion given in chapter 8.2 apply. In order to render these
risk measures unique, I first have to specify the range or, alternatively, the unit and the
zero level of welfare uwelf = g◦u. Other than for the non-stationary setting worked out in
chapter 8, it will suffice to fix the measure scale of welfare for one period in order to deter-
mine it, and thus the coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion, for all periods. However,
in difference to the stationary analysis without discounting in chapter 7.4, I have to de-
cide for which period I fix the measure scale, e.g. the range of uwelft to some given interval
G∗. I adopt the convention to fix the measure scale of welfare in the stationary setting
always for the first period. In consequence, fixing range(uwelf1 ) = G
∗ implies that the
range of welfare for later periods is fixed to range(uwelft ) = β
t−1range(uwelf1 ) = β
t−1G∗.
The following adaption of lemma 5 to the stationary setting applies.
Lemma 7: Let there be given a sequence of preference relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T}
satisfying axioms A1-A3, A4’, A5’ and A7 or A9. In addition, choose
i) a number w∗ ∈ IR++,
ii) an outcome xzero ∈ X or
iii) a nondegenerate closed interval W ∗ ⊂ IR.
Then, for representations in the sense of theorems 7 or 8 with twice differentiable
stationary analogue, theorem 6.
17Note again that in the case where h = 1exp , h is a negative affine transformation of ft ◦ g
−1, making
the latter concave (compare footnote 14). Also note that intertemporal risk attitude going along with
preferences that satisfy axiom A9 can be observed better in corollary 8 following below.
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functions ft ◦ g
−1 and for representations in the sense of theorem 9, which
a) satisfy ∆G = w∗, the risk measures AIRAt
b) satisfy g ◦ u(xzero) = 0, the risk measures RIRAt
c) satisfy ∆G = w∗ and g ◦ u(xzero) = 0, the risk measures AIRAt and RIRAt
d) satisfy G = W ∗, the risk measures AIRAt and RIRAt
are determined uniquely and independent of the choice of the Bernoulli utility
function.
Again, independence of Bernoulli utility implies that, once the corresponding welfare in-
formation has been fixed, the measures RIRAt and AIRAt are determined independently
of the representation and its gauge. In assertion a) this welfare information corresponds
to fixing the unit of measurement, by prescribing a numerical value to the difference
in welfare between the best and the worst outcome, i.e. uwelf1 (x
max) − uwelf1 (x
min) =
g ◦u(xmax)−g ◦u(xmin) = G−G = w∗. Such a partial specification of the measure scale
for welfare makes the measures of absolute intertemporal risk aversion unique. Assertion
b) fixes the ‘zero welfare level’, by choosing an outcome that shall correspond to zero
welfare. The information is enough to render the measures of relative intertemporal risk
aversion unique. Assertion c) fixes the welfare unit and the zero welfare level together.
This step completely eliminates the freedom in the choice of measure scale for welfare.
In consequence, both measures of intertemporal risk aversion are determined uniquely.
Assertion d) offers an alternative way to eliminate the indeterminacy of the measure
scale for welfare, by specifying the range of the function g and, thus, the welfare levels
corresponding to the best and the worst outcomes. The latter approach is taken in the
subsequent corollaries.
For preferences satisfying risk stationarity II as formulated in axiom A7, it is worth-
while to take a closer look at the representations that fix the degree of freedom in
the measure scale for welfare. For this purpose define the uncertainty aggregation rule
Mexp
ξ
for the case ξ = 0 by limit, yielding18
Mexp
0
(pt, w˜t) ≡ lim
ξ→0
Mexp
ξ
(pt, w˜t) = lim
ξ→0
1
ξ
ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(ξw˜t)
]
= Eptw˜t .
The limit is a simple application of l’Hospital’s rule, as shown in the proof of corollary 8.
Gauging g to identity in the representation of theorem 9 and fixing the range of welfare,
which for g = id corresponds to the range of u, I obtain the following representation.
Corollary 8 (g = id+−gauge) : Choose a nondegenerate closed interval W ∗ ⊂ IR.
18Note that the characterization of the uncertainty aggregation rule by f = expξ is equivalent to
f(z) = exp(ξ z).
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A sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A9 (risk stationarity II)
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → W ∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining the functions
v) w˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by w˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and recursively
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = u(xt−1) + βM
expξ(pt, w˜t) (9.11)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(p′t, w˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′t, w˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt. (9.12)
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely. With the convention that g1 = g,
the uniquely defined measures of intertemporal risk aversion are calculated to
AIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
and RIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
id.
Fixing the welfare range eliminates the affine freedom of g, here corresponding to the
freedom of u (g = id−gauge). In the representation of theorem 9, part of this freedom
was employed to carry information over the relation between the functions g and ft.
Fixing g and its range exogenously, this information gives rise to the new parameter ξ.
It parametrizes intertemporal risk aversion and corresponds to a degree of freedom
between the function g, characterizing intertemporal aggregation, and the functions
ft, characterizing uncertainty aggregation. In the particular case where ξ = 0, the
coefficient of relative atemporal risk aversion (defined in a one commodity setting) is
confined to the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and intertemporal
risk neutrality prevails. In this case, equations (9.11) and (9.12) recursively define the
intertemporally additive expected utility framework.
In theorem 9 there appear three seemingly disconnected representations corresponding
to h ∈
{
1
exp
, id, exp
}
. Corollary 8 shows how the coefficient of absolute intertemporal
risk aversion, which is proportional to ξ, connects the three different classes continuously,
allowing for a wide range of intertemporal risk attitude. However, though being constant
in welfare, the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion is not constant over
time. In the discussion of theorem 10, it had already been observed that for risk station-
ary representations in the sense of axiom A8 only the expression ft◦g
−1, which I referred
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to as the stationary characterization of intertemporal risk aversion, stays constant over
time. The general characterization ft ◦ g
−1
t picks up the discount rate from gt = β
t−1g.
The same happens for risk stationarity II in the sense of axiom A9. The interpretation
is as follows. The function ft ◦ g
−1 characterizes intertemporal risk aversion in period t
with respect to a welfare scale that is fixed in period t to range(g) = range(u) = W ∗.
One could formulate this characterization as a measurement in terms of a ‘current
value measure scale for welfare’. With respect to such a constant ‘current value mea-
sure scale’, the characterizing functions of intertemporal risk aversion are constant over
time.19 In contrast, the measures AIRAt and RIRAt are defined with respect to the
characterizing functions ft ◦ g
−1
t . Fixing range(g1) = range(g) = range(u) = W
∗, im-
plies that range(gt) = β
t−1range(g) = βt−1W ∗. Thus, in these measures intertemporal
risk aversion is measured with respect to a ‘present value measure scale for welfare’ and
discounting shrinks the range of welfare that serves as basis for the measurement of in-
tertemporal risk aversion in period t. Then, as the range of the welfare measure scale (in
present value) becomes smaller and smaller over time due to discounting, the coefficient
of intertemporal risk aversion has to increase in order to keep up a stationary aversion to
risk. Therefore, the coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion AIRAt and RIRAt include
the factor βt in the denominator. In addition to the latter, risk stationarity II brings
another dependence on time into the characterization of intertemporal risk aversion.
In the denominator appears as well the time-dependent normalized discount factor βt.
Recall that the latter takes account of the relative weight given to a single period as
opposed to the remaining future, a weight changing over time when a finite planning
horizon is approached. For a representation satisfying risk stationarity in the sense of
axiom A9, this change of weight enters into the characterization of intertemporal risk
aversion. It implies that the stationary part of intertemporal risk aversion, characterized
by ft ◦ g
−1, slowly decreases over time as the term 1− βt increases to unity for the last
period. Leaving this term unconsidered, yields a representation in the sense of theorem
8, satisfying axiom A8. In other words, disregarding the adjustment of intertemporal
risk aversion by the change of weight that the remaining future obtains as opposed to
the present period, in a setting with a finite planning horizon, makes the corresponding
decision maker indifferent to the length of risk taking (axiom A8). For an infinite time
horizon this weight is obviously constant, precisely it holds (1−βt) = (1−β), and a rep-
resentation in the (limiting) sense of theorem 9 also is a representation in the (limiting)
19Except for the normalization factor 11−βt in the case of risk stationarity in the sense of axiom A9.
This term will be discussed further below.
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sense of theorem 8.20
Alternatively to corollary 8, the representation can also be stated in the Kreps and
Porteus gauge where the functions ft are set to identity.
Corollary 9 (f = id+-gauge) : Choose a nondegenerate closed interval U∗ ⊂ IR++.
A sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4 for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A9 (risk stationarity II)
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → U∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that defining the functions
v) u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by u˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and recursively
- for ξ > 0: u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = u(xt−1)
ξ
(
Ept u˜t
)β
and
- for ξ = 0: u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = lnu(xt−1) + β Ept u˜t and
- for ξ < 0: u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = −u(xt−1)
ξ
(
− Ept u˜t
)β
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ Ept u˜t ≥ Ep′t u˜t ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt .
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely. With the convention that g1 = g,
21
the uniquely defined measures of intertemporal risk aversion are calculated to
AIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
and RIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
id.
Here, the functions u˜t are the same as those used in representation theorem 4. The func-
tion u, however, is only a strictly monotonic transformation of the respective Bernoulli
utility function used in the latter theorem. It is chosen in such a way that fixing the
range of u also fixes the range of g,22 which is necessary to render the measures of risk
aversion unique. However, note that due to the multiplicative form of intertemporal
20Note that a constant term (1− β) can be absorbed into the parameter ξ and makes no difference
for the comparison between different classes of representations.
21This notation relates to the underlying representing triples in the sense of theorem 4. In corollary 9
the assumption implies that the measure scale of welfare is fixed for the first period to range(uwelf1 ) =
range(g ◦ u) = lnU∗. See also the discussion below and the first remark in the proof of corollary 9.
22This is possible because of the relation implied by axiom A9 between the functions ft and g.
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aggregation, the range of welfare uwelf1 in the certainty additive sense of chapter 7.3 is
fixed to the range W ∗ = lnU∗ rather than to the range U∗. This is also the reason,
why a logarithm appears in the representation for ξ = 0. Only with this definition, the
range of welfare is fixed independently of the parameter ξ. However, eliminating the
logarithm in the representation for ξ = 0 would not change the measures of intertem-
poral risk aversion, as they are zero in the case ξ = 0 and, thus, independent of the
particular measure scale adopted for welfare.
Observe the particular nonlinear form for intertemporal aggregation that arises when
uncertainty aggregation is required to be linear. For decision makers that are not in-
tertemporally risk neutral, it is ‘almost multiplicative’. But it depends on the exponent
ξ. Translating the exponent ξ back into the uncertainty aggregation rule and establish-
ing a purely multiplicative intertemporal aggregation yields the following representation.
Corollary 10 (isoelastic uncertainty evaluation): Choose a nondegenerate closed
interval U∗ ⊂ IR++. A sequence of binary relations= (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T}
satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A9 (risk stationarity II)
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → U∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that defining the functions
v) v˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by v˜T (xT ) = u(xT ) and recursively
v˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = u(xt−1)
(
Mα=ξ(pt, v˜t)
)β
(9.13)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
α=ξ(p′t, v˜t) ≥M
α=ξ(p′t, v˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely. With the convention that g1 = g,
23
the uniquely defined measures of intertemporal risk aversion are calculated to
AIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
and RIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
id.
23See footnote 21.
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Note, that the recursive construction (9.13) of the representation for ξ = 0 is equivalent
to the intertemporally additive expected utility setting. Again the range of welfare
in the sense of chapter 7.3 corresponds to W ∗ = lnU∗. The above representation is
particularly interesting, because it points out a special case that closely relates to the
generalized isoelastic framework analyzed in section 9.2. In the one commodity setting
and for u = id the following recursive characterization of the decision maker’s evaluation
is obtained:
v˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = xt−1
(
Mα=ξ(pt, v˜t)
)β
. (9.14)
It corresponds to an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of unity (ρ = 0) and uses
the isoelastic uncertainty aggregation ruleMα. Taking the interpretation of section 7.3,
the case ρ = 0, i.e. g = ln, corresponds to logarithmic welfare, which is a widespread
assumption in macroeconomics and popular also in environmental economic modeling.
It is the only specification for which risk stationarity II in the sense of axiom A9 allows
an isoelastic uncertainty aggregation.24 Observe that the setting (9.14) only coincides
with the (corresponding special case of the) isoelastic representation of section 9.2 for
an infinite planning horizon. As pointed out on page 144, the representations in the
sense of theorems 8 and 9 differ in the way they take account of the approaching end
of the planning horizon. More precisely, only the representation based on axiom A9
incorporates the change in weight that the present receives as opposed to the remaining
future ‘which shortens over time’. Let me summarize that only risk stationarity in the
sense of axiom A9 is a proper translation of the assumption that the mere passage of
time does not affect preferences. In contrast, axiom A8 characterizes what it needs to
make atemporal uncertainty aggregation constant in a setting with a finite time horizon.
This condition can be expressed as a form of indifference to the length of risk taking.
24In order to render ft a power function, intertemporal risk aversion has to be of the form
ft ◦ g
−1 =
(
g−1
)α
. This expression can only be proportional to expξ, characterizing up to propor-
tionality intertemporal risk aversion in the representation of theorem 9, if g−1 is proportional to exp.
But then g has to be proportional to ln which corresponds to the case ρ = 0.
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Chapter 10
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty
10.1 A Preference for the Timing of Uncertainty
Resolution
A particular feature of the recursive utility models employed in the preceding chapters,
is that they allow for an intrinsic preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty.
This preference is intrinsic in the sense that a decision maker can strictly prefer an
early resolution of uncertainty, even if the information obtained from the early reso-
lution is known not to affect his plans and, thus, his future outcomes. The current
section analyzes how a preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty is expressed
in the representations derived in the preceding chapters. The corresponding theorem
is a straight forward adaption of the result obtained by Kreps & Porteus (1978) to my
gaugeable setting. However, expressing the condition in terms of intertemporal risk
aversion, allows to examine the reason why a decision maker in the recursive utility
framework can exhibit a preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution. Section
10.2 discusses why such a form of intrinsic timing preference might not be desired in
a principled approach to choice under uncertainty. A consequence of eliminating the
intrinsic timing preference from the model is that, instead of recursive temporal lot-
teries, the more common description of uncertainty through probability measures that
are directly defined on consumption paths becomes sufficient for the evaluation of the
uncertain future. I elaborate, how the latter standard measures are derived from a given
temporal lottery by ‘integrating out’ temporal information. Subsequently, section 10.3
states the preference representation for a decision maker who is indifferent with respect
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to the timing of uncertainty resolution. Similarly to chapter 9.3, the resulting repre-
sentation captures intertemporal risk aversion in a single parameter. I work out that
the resulting model allows to disentangle (atemporal) risk aversion from intertemporal
substitutability without employing temporal lotteries. Furthermore, I show that a par-
ticularly suggestive ordering of two lotteries, which is used in the literature to motivate
a non-trivial preference with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution, can be sat-
isfied as well under indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution, if the decision
maker exhibits intertemporal risk aversion. Section 10.4 elaborates implications of the
axioms worked out in this and the preceding chapter for the pure rate of time preference
and, more generally, the weight given to future welfare.
Kreps & Porteus (1978) show that their recursive approach to describe choice under
uncertainty, which I have adopted so far, allows a decision maker’s preference to depend
on the time at which uncertainty resolves. Such a characteristic of preferences differs
from an instrumental preference for an early resolution of uncertainty, which is also
possible in the intertemporally additive expected utility model. In the latter case, early
resolution of uncertainty is preferred, whenever the information stemming from an earlier
resolution of uncertainty can be used to take action that improves outcomes (or their
probabilities). In contrast, the preference for early resolution of uncertainty that is
allowed in the setup of Kreps & Porteus (1978) and, thus, my setup in chapters 8
and 9, even holds when the decision maker cannot make any use of the information.
Chew & Epstein (1989) further analyze such a preference for the timing of uncertainty
resolution by introducing the concept of a timing premium for an early resolution. In
particular, they derive a representation for preferences going along with a constant
timing premium.1 In fact, the authors show that the assumption of a constant timing
premium can replace the independence axiom, which I adopt throughout my analysis
(Chew & Epstein 1989, 110). Note that any nontrivial2 application of the generalized
isoelastic model discussed in the preceding chapter implicitly features a preference for
the timing of uncertainty resolution. The explicit analysis of such a timing preference
is carried over to a time-continuous setting by Duffie, Schroder & Skiadis’s (1997),
who analyze how it influences asset pricing. Further generalizations of the modeling
1The timing premium relates the probabilities of two lotteries, in which uncertainty resolves at dif-
ferent points of time, and that yield the same outcomes with different probabilities. These probabilities
are picked in a way to make the decision maker indifferent between the lottery featuring early and the
lottery featuring late resolution of uncertainty.
2That is, any setting with non-zero consumption where the generalized model differs from intertem-
porally additive expected utility and the coefficient of relative risk aversion does not coincide with the
inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitutuion.
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framework are treated in Grant, Kajii & Polak (2000) and Skiadas (1998), who generalize
the concept of a comparable intrinsic preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution
beyond a recursive setup on temporal lotteries.
A standard motivation in the literature on non-indifference with respect to the timing
of uncertainty resolution is based on the comparison of the following two lotteries (e.g.
Duffie & Epstein 1992, Duffie et al. 1997, Skiadas 1998). In both lotteries, a decision
maker faces for some fixed number of periods either a high or a low consumption level,
depending on the toss of a coin. In lottery A, the coin is tossed at the beginning of every
period. If head comes up, the decision maker receives the high payoff in the respective
period and, if tail comes up, the decision maker faces the low payoff. In lottery B, a coin
is tossed once at the beginning of the first period. If head comes up, the agent receives
the high payoff in all periods, if tail comes up the agent receives the inferior payoff in
all periods. It is easily verified that a decision maker who employs the intertemporally
additive expected utility model, is indifferent between the lotteries A and B (see section
10.3). The intuition appealed to in the literature, which I personally share, is that people
would usually prefer lottery A over lottery B. Since the coin in lottery A is flipped in
every period, while in lottery B all uncertainty is resolved in the first period, such a
lottery evaluation can be interpreted as a preference for a late resolution of uncertainty.
However, the perfect serial correlation of outcomes in lottery B and the independence of
the outcomes in lottery A depicts another important difference between the two lotteries.
In fact, in section 10.3 I show that a strict preference for lottery A can also be derived in
a non-recursive model, where the decision maker is indifferent with respect to the timing
of uncertainty resolution, but intertemporally risk averse. The following extension of the
lottery example, found in the same papers cited above, concentrates on a pure timing
preference. For this purpose, a third lottery C is introduced. It coincides with lottery A,
except for the fact that for every period coins are (independently) tossed at the beginning
of period one. Therefore, the uncertainty resolves at the same point as in lottery B,
i.e. early. Again the authors point out that lotteries A and C conceptually differ, and
that a decision maker might not be indifferent between tossing the coins in the first
period (lottery C) or in the respective periods (lottery A) “based on the psychic costs
and benefits of early resolution” (Duffie & Epstein 1992). Other situations appealed to
in the literature, where people might exhibit intrinsic preference for either late or early
resolution of uncertainty, include anxious PhD students receiving information on exams
or jobmarket placements before or after a vacation (Chew & Epstein 1989, Grant, Kajii
& Polak 1998), or a person facing information on an incurable genetic disorder (Grant
et al. 1998).
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In the following I introduce the precise definition of an intrinsic3 preference for the
timing of uncertainty resolution. Let λ(xt, pt+1) + (1 − λ)(xt, p
′
t+1) denote a lottery in
period t that yields (xt, pt+1) with probability λ and (xt, p
′
t+1) otherwise. Both outcomes
of the ‘λ-lottery’ yield the same consumption xt in period t. Only the outcomes from
period t+1 on, described by pt+1 and p
′
t+1, are allowed to differ. An individual facing the
above lottery will know at the end of period t whether he confronts pt+1 at the beginning
of period t+1 or whether he faces p′t+1. Thus, uncertainty over pt+1 versus p
′
t+1 resolves
in period t. The definition of an intrinsic preference for the timing of uncertainty
resolution compares the lottery above to its degenerate counterpart (xt, λpt+1 + (1 −
λ)p′t+1). Analogous to the first lottery, the latter yields xt with certainty, pt+1 with
probability λ, and p′t+1 with probability 1 − λ. However, the uncertainty about facing
pt+1 or p
′
t+1 in period t + 1 is not resolved in period t, but only in period t + 1. The
following definition applies.
Definition: A decision maker prefers early [late] resolution of uncertainty in period t
for the fixed outcome xt, if for all pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1, λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that
λ(xt, pt+1) + (1− λ)(xt, p
′
t+1) t [t] (xt, λpt+1 + (1− λ)p
′
t+1). (10.1)
In words, a decision maker with a preference for early resolution of uncertainty, prefers
when the uncertainty about facing the future described by pt+1 or the future described
by p′t+1 resolves already in period t (lottery on the left), rather than in period t + 1
(lottery on the right). This uncertainty corresponds to the probability mixture λ and
1 − λ in equation (10.1). In contrast, if the decision maker exhibits a preference for
late resolution of uncertainty, he prefers to keep the uncertainty in period t, and have it
resolved only in period t+ 1. Note that a decision maker’s attitude with respect to the
timing of uncertainty resolution can generally depend on the period t, as well as on the
(certain) outcome xt, which he is facing in the respective period. A decision maker is
called indifferent to the timing of uncertainty resolution, if equation (10.1) holds with
indifference (∼t replacing t).
For a decision maker subscribing to the non-stationary multiperiod setting of chapter
8, his attitude with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution can be characterized
in terms of the representation of theorem 4 as follows.
3Note that the word ‘intrinsic’ is not standard in the corresponding literature. I introduce the word
to stress the conceptual difference to an instrumental preference for an early resolution of uncertainty,
which is implied by a possibility to use the early arrival of information in order to raise (expected)
welfare.
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Theorem 11: Let the sequence (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} represent the preferences ()t∈{1,...,T}
in the sense of theorem 4. Then a decision maker prefers early [late] resolution of
uncertainty in period t for outcome xt, if and only if,
ft ◦ g
−1
t
[
θt gt ◦ ut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1 ◦ f
−1
t+1(z) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
(10.2)
is convex [concave] in z ∈ ft(Ut).
4
The theorem adapts the result of Kreps & Porteus (1978) to the certainty separable
framework, and extends it in the sense of allowing for general gauges of intertemporal
and uncertainty aggregation. At the same time, my version relates the preference for
the timing of uncertainty resolution to the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. An
immediate consequence of theorem 11 is that only an intertemporally risk averse or
risk seeking decision maker can exhibit a (strict) preference for early or late resolution
of uncertainty. Otherwise, if ft ◦ g
−1
t and ft+1 ◦ g
−1
t+1 are linear, expression (10.2) is
linear as well. In such a situation the decision maker is indifferent with respect to the
timing of uncertainty resolution. As section 10.3 elaborates, the opposite is not true,
i.e. a decision maker who is indifferent to the timing of uncertainty resolution is not
necessarily intertemporally risk neutral. Note that, comparing my result to Kreps &
Porteus (1978, 197), doing without additive separability on certain consumption paths
implies replacing my expression in equation (10.2) by a general function u˜t(xt, z).
5
Theorem 11 answers a question raised by Epstein & Zin (1989, 952 et seq.) on the
interlacement of the preference for early resolution of uncertainty with risk aversion
and intertemporal substitutability. In their u = id-gauge, Epstein & Zin (1989) find
for the stationary isoelastic setting that early resolution of uncertainty is preferred, if
and only if α < ρ.6 The authors pose the question how these three characteristics of
4If theorem 4 is stated in terms of strictly monotonic functions (see chapter 8, footnote 2), then the
latter part changes to: ‘...if and only if (10.2) is convex [concave] in z ∈ f(U) for an increasing version
of f , or concave [convex] for a decreasing choice of f ’.
5Kreps & Porteus’s (1978) expression u˜t(xt, z) corresponds to the f = id gauge. Moreover, compar-
ing my theorem 11 to their theorem 3, note that my expression (10.2) is always increasing in z, which
has to be assured for a representation in the sense of Kreps & Porteus’s (1978) theorem 1.
6Using theorem 11, the result is verified easily for x > 0. For x = 0 the decision maker is always
indifferent with respect to the resolution of uncertainty in the respective period (see footnote 10). In
the generalized isoelastic setting expression (10.2) turns into
[
xρt + βt z
ρ
α
]α
ρ . Calculating the second
order derivative in z reproduces Epstein & Zin’s (1989, 952) result. Precisely, for α > 0 the second
order derivative is strictly positive, if and only if α < ρ. For the case α < 0 the function ft = z
α is
decreasing and, thus, the convexity condition for the attitude with respect to the timing of uncertainty
resolution reverses (see footnote 4). In that case, the second order derivative turns out strictly negative,
if and only if α < ρ. For the cases where α or ρ equal zero, set f respectively g to the logarithm.
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preference are related to each other in a more general setting.7 In a one commodity
setting with utility strictly increasing in the consumption level, expression (10.2) brings
an answer by gauging ut to identity. Then, the functions ft and gt characterize general
uncertainty attitude and intertemporal substitutability, and theorem 11 states their
exact relation to the preference for an early resolution of uncertainty. In particular, it
can be observed that the most important determinant of the preference for early or late
resolution of uncertainty is the difference ft ◦ g
−1
t between the functions characterizing
(atemporal) risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability in two adjacent periods.
Having elaborated the interpretation of the term ft◦g
−1
t as characterizing intertemporal
risk aversion, the latter concept should also foster understanding why a decision maker
in a Kreps & Porteus (1978) framework exhibits an intrinsic preference for early or late
resolution of uncertainty.
The following scenario should help to understand, why α < ρ in the isoelasitc setting
of Epstein & Zin (1989) and convexity of the expression (10.2) in the general setting,
describe a decision maker with a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty. In a
two period setup, a decision maker faces two different lotteries. Both lotteries yield with
equal probability either a high or a low outcome in the second period, and a common
certain outcome in the first. However, in lottery E (early), which is formally defined as
1
2
(x1, x2)+
1
2
(x1, x2), the uncertainty over the second period resolves already in period 1.
On the contrary, in lottery L (late), which is defined as (x1,
1
2
x2+
1
2
x2), the uncertainty
resolves in period 2. To simplify the notation, let p be the probability measure giving
weight p1 = p2 =
1
2
to outcomes x12 = x2 and x
2
2 = x2. Moreover, let i ∈ {1, 2} and, thus,
xi2 ∈ {x2, x2}. Assuming a certainty stationary decision maker who subscribes to the
axioms of representation theorem 7, the decision maker prefers lottery E over lottery L,
if and only if the following relation holds:
1
2
(x1, x2) +
1
2
(x1, x2) 1 (x1,
1
2
x2 +
1
2
x2)
⇔ f−11
{∑
i pif1 ◦ g
−1
[
(1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1 g ◦ u(x
i
2)
]}
≥ g−1
[
(1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1 g ◦ f2
{∑
i pif2 ◦ g
−1 ◦ g ◦ u(xi2)
}]
7Epstein & Zin (1989, 952): “For more general recursive utility functions, we have not found a
characterization in terms of [time and uncertainty aggregators] of the condition under which early or
late resolution is preferred” and they “suspect [...] inherent inseparability of these three aspects [...]
Further study of this issue is required” (Epstein & Zin 1989, 953).
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⇔ g ◦ f−11
{∑
i pif1 ◦ g
−1
[
(1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1 g ◦ u(x
i
2)
]}
≥ (1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1 g ◦ f
−1
2
{∑
i pif2 ◦ g
−1 ◦ g ◦ u(xi2)
}
⇔ Mf1◦g
−1
(
p, (1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1 g ◦ u
)
(10.3)
≥ (1− β1) g ◦ u(x1) + β1M
f2◦g−1
(
p, g ◦ u
)
. (10.4)
The simplest but very important insight is that the recursive framework evaluates the
risk in the period in which it resolves. Expression (10.3) can be interpreted as an
evaluation of lottery E, featuring an early resolution of uncertainty. The uncertainty is
evaluated with an uncertainty aggregation rule that is characterized by intertemporal
risk aversion in period 1.8 Expression (10.4) corresponds to the evaluation of lottery L,
featuring a late resolution of uncertainty. Here, intertemporal risk aversion in period 2 is
used to evaluate the corresponding risk. Thus, both lottery evaluations can be expressed
by means of an uncertainty aggregation rule which is characterized by intertemporal risk
aversion. However, the difference in the evaluation is twofold. First, to evaluate lottery
E the decision maker bases his evaluation of uncertainty on intertemporal risk aversion
in period 1, characterized by f1 ◦g
−1. For an evaluation of lottery L, however, he applies
the uncertainty aggregation rule Mf2◦g
−1
, which is characterized by intertemporal risk
aversion as it holds in period 2. Second, the fact that uncertainty resolves for lottery E
in the first period, makes the ‘whole’ consumption path from period 1 to period 2 an
argument of the uncertainty aggregation rule. This includes the certain consumption in
period 1, as well as the discount factor β1. In contrast, in the evaluation of lottery L,
the uncertainty aggregation rule is only applied to the outcomes of the second period.
Still striving for an intuition why a decision maker might intrinsically prefer an early
resolution of uncertainty, let me further simplify the scenario. Assume, as it is done
in Epstein & Zin (1989), that the functions f1 = f2 ≡ f coincide for both periods.
Moreover, assume that the first period outcome x1 corresponds to the decision maker’s
zero welfare level.9 Then the above inequality, corresponding to a preference for the
lottery with the early resolution of uncertainty, writes as
Mf◦g
−1
(
p, β1 g ◦ u
)
≥ β1M
f◦g−1
(
p, g ◦ u
)
. (10.5)
8To arrive at the evaluation in the last equivalence, only a strictly increasing transformation has been
applied to both sides of the inequality. Therefore, both sides still can be interpreted as an evaluation
of the respective lottery.
9This is a zero welfare level in the sense of chapter 7.3, i.e. uwelf = g ◦ u(x1) = 0. For the isoelastic
one commodity Epstein Zin setting it implies a zero consumption level x = 0.
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The only difference left between the two lottery evaluations, is that for the lottery with
an early resolution of uncertainty (left), the decision maker’s devaluation of the future
finds its place in the argument of the uncertainty aggregation rule. This position of β1 is
due to the fact that lottery E is conceived as a lottery over the whole consumption path,
and the weight given to the future is part of the evaluation of the path. On the other
hand, for lottery L, the uncertainty is related directly to the second period outcomes.
Only after the corresponding uncertainty is evaluated, the resulting certainty equivalent
is discounted. In such a scenario, the generalized isoelastic model yields a particular
evaluation as the uncertainty aggregation rules are linear homogeneous:
Mf◦g
−1
(p, β1 g ◦ u) =
[∑
i pi (β1x
i
2)
α
ρ
] ρ
α
= β1
[∑
i pi (x
i
2)
α
ρ
] ρ
α
= β1M
f◦g−1 (p, g ◦ u) .
In consequence, for a zero consumption level in the first period, the decision maker
is indifferent between the two lotteries.10 Observe, that this indifference whether or
not the normalized discount factor β1 is included in the lottery evaluation, only holds
for linear homogeneous uncertainty aggregation rules. In general, a devaluation of the
future makes a difference in the recursive evaluation of the two lotteries. For β1 < 1,
the inequality (10.5) is strict, if the uncertainty aggregation rule exhibits ‘decreasing
returns to scale’ in its second argument.11 Decreasing returns imply that discounting
the certainty equivalent of the undiscounted period 2 lottery, yields a lower evaluation,
than applying the uncertainty aggregation rule to the discounted outcomes. The first
procedure is taken to evaluate lottery L with a late resolution of uncertainty, the latter
to evaluate lottery E exhibiting an early resolution of uncertainty. Summarizing in one
sentence, if the decision maker’s uncertainty evaluation of discounted lottery outcomes is
higher than his discounted uncertainty evaluation of the undiscounted lottery outcomes,
he prefers an early resolution of uncertainty.
Now consider an evaluation of the above lotteries when the first period outcome does
not correspond to a zero welfare level. The uncertainty aggregation in the evaluation of
lottery L still yields the same result. The evaluation of the certain first period outcome is
added only after the evaluation of the uncertain second period. In contrast, uncertainty
10This special case has not been pointed out by Epstein & Zin (1989). To verify it, use theorem 11.
In the generalized isoelastic setting, expression (10.2) turns into
[
xρt + βt z
ρ
α
]α
ρ . It is immediate that
for xt = 0 the expression is linear in z.
11Note that the normalized discount factor b1 is smaller than one. Therefore, the inequality in the
definition of decreasing returns to scale is inverted compared to a definition of decreasing returns to
scale with the help of some λ > 1.
156
10.1. A PREFERENCE FOR THE TIMING OF UNCERTAINTY RESOLUTION
aggregation in lottery E is no longer concerned only with the second period outcomes xi2.
Also outcome x1 is conceived as part of the lottery entering the uncertainty evaluation.
Thus, introducing a positive first period welfare level raises the mean outcome of lottery
E, while keeping the variability in the lottery identical to the above setting with a zero
welfare level in the first period. In the Epstein-Zin setting with generalized isoelastic
preferences, the consequences are as follows. Recall, that in the isoelastic setting the
decision maker exhibits a constant coefficient of relative intertemporal risk aversion
(parametrized by α
ρ
). Thus, in absolute terms, the decision maker is less risk averse
when evaluating a lottery that implies a particular absolute variability of outcomes at
a higher welfare level, than he is when evaluation a lottery with the same variability
of outcomes at a lower welfare level. Therefore, he, effectively, is less risk averse when
evaluating the lottery with an early resolution of uncertainty, than he is when evaluating
the lottery with a late resolution of uncertainty (in the latter lottery evaluation the first
period consumption does not enter the uncertainty aggregation rule). In consequence, a
decision maker who is intertemporally risk averse and exhibits a constant coefficient of
relative intertemporal risk aversion, prefers an early resolution of uncertainty. On the
other hand, a decision maker who is intertemporally risk averse but exhibits a constant
coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion does not necessarily prefer an early
resolution of uncertainty. This will be derived formally in section 10.3. In general, this
second effect fostering a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty, is based on
the model feature that an earlier resolution of uncertainty makes the decision maker
evaluate the constant welfare spread between the uncertain outcomes at a higher welfare
level, whenever the foregoing certain period yields positive welfare.
A third effect causing a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty can set in
when the assumption that f1 = f2 is relaxed. Assume that the decision maker exhibits
a stronger intertemporal risk aversion in period 2, than he does in period 1. Then,
abstracting from the other effects worked out above, uncertainty reduces the welfare
stronger when the decision maker evaluates a lottery resolving in period 2, i.e. late.
This is, because in the latter case he applies the uncertainty aggregation rule Mf2◦g
−1
to evaluate the uncertain outcomes, while for the evaluation of the lottery with an early
resolution of uncertainty, the decision maker employs the less risk averse uncertainty
aggregation rule Mf1◦g
−1
.
The three possible driving forces for a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty
identified above, are merged in expression (10.2) of theorem 11. Starting with the one
treated last, it appears in terms of the functions ft ◦ g
−1
t and
[
ft+1 ◦ g
−1
t+1
]−1
. Consider
the case where ft ◦ g
−1
t is linear, while ft+1 ◦ g
−1
t+1 is concave. Then the decision maker
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exhibits a stronger intertemporal risk aversion in period t+1, than he does in period t.
For such a preference specification, gt+1 ◦ f
−1
t+1 turns out to be the only nonlinear term
in expression (10.2). Being a strictly increasing function, this inverse of ft+1 ◦ g
−1
t+1 is
convex. Thus, the decision maker prefers an early resolution of uncertainty. In general,
however, the other two effects discussed before play an important role as well. They
are ‘sandwiched’ between the terms gt ◦ f
−1
t and
[
gt+1 ◦ f
−1
t+1
]−1
, which characterize the
relative difference in intertemporal risk aversion between the two periods. The second
effect, depending on how uncertainty aggregation is influenced by first period welfare is
caught in general terms by θt gt ◦ ut(xt). The first effect, depending on how uncertainty
aggregation is influenced by the devaluation of the second period, is expressed in general
terms through the factor θtθ
−1
t+1.
12
Turning around the driving forces for an early resolution, the three effects above
work towards a preference for a late resolution of uncertainty. Straight forwardly, the
reasons can be summarized as follows. First, the decision maker’s discounted value of a
lottery over undiscounted outcomes is higher than his value for a lottery over discounted
outcomes. Second, the decision maker is more risk averse when evaluating a lottery with
coinciding gains and losses at a higher welfare level, than he is evaluating it at a lower
welfare level. Third, the decision maker is less intertemporally risk averse in the period
of late uncertainty resolution than he is in the period of early uncertainty resolution. The
next section discusses the question, whether a preference for early or late resolution of
uncertainty on the grounds discussed above is desirable or even reasonable, in particular
for a social decision maker.
10.2 Indifference to the Timing of Uncertainty Res-
olution & Reduction of Recursive Probabilites
In the preceding section I have elaborated that and how a decision maker, who applies
the general recursive framework employed in chapters 8 and 9, can exhibit an intrinsic
preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution. In particular, an intertemporally risk
averse decision maker who subscribes to the generalized isoelastic setup, i.e. the model
commonly applied to disentangle (atemporal) risk aversion from intertemporal substi-
12As theorem 5 has shown, the term θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt can be eliminated by an appropriate choice of the
functions gt. Therefore, the corresponding term in expression (10.2) does not introduce a driving force
for a preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution, that is conceptually different from the three
effects summarized above.
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tutability, has to prefer an early resolution of uncertainty. In this section I question
whether such an intrinsic preference for the timing of uncertainty resolution is reason-
able. I suggest that such a preference might not be desirable in a principled approach
to social decision making under uncertainty. In that case, the temporal information
that is embedded in the recursive description of uncertainty by temporal lotteries is
no longer needed for evaluation. I work out, how eliminating the timing information
from recursive temporal lotteries yields a common description of uncertainty in terms
of probability measures that are directly defined on consumption paths.
The most clear-cut motivation found in the literature for recursive utility with a non-
trivial attitude towards the timing of uncertainty resolution is the comparison between
lotteries A, B and C discussed on page 151 in the previous section. However, I have
already pointed out that the next section proves that a strict preference for lottery A
over lottery B can also be explained with a non-recursive representation under the as-
sumption of indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution. Therefore, to further
analyze why a decision maker might prefer an early or late resolution of uncertainty, I
concentrate on the comparison between lotteries A and C. Recall that in lottery A a
coin is tossed at the beginning of every period. If head comes up, the decision maker
receives the high payoff in the respective period and, if tail comes up, the decision maker
faces the low payoff in the respective period. Lottery C has been defined largely anal-
ogous to lottery A, with the only difference that in lottery C coins for the outcome of
every period are tossed already at the beginning of the first period. Therefore, lottery
C corresponds to a lottery with an early resolution of uncertainty, while lottery A cor-
responds to a lottery with a late resolution of uncertainty. The only motivation given in
the literature why one of these two lotteries might be preferred over the other is “based
on the psychic costs and benefits of early resolution” (Duffie & Epstein 1992). Such a
psychological explanation of a potential non-indifference between the two lotteries raises
the suspicion that it might not be a desirable feature of a decision support model for a
social decision maker. In the following, I argue that a social decision maker should be
indifferent between lotteries A and C. To sharpen the point, let me introduce a lottery
D. Lottery D is defined analogously to lottery C, only that the decision maker does not
observe the coin tosses. Only at the beginning of every period, the decision maker is
given the result of the coin toss that has decided over the outcome of the respective
period. Then13 lottery D is formally equivalent to lottery A. Now, a decision maker
13That is the case at least for the concepts of epistemic or subjective probabilities. For an objectivist’s
view on probability like in the case of the Popperian propensity, one might a well try to argue for
detaching the uncertainty resolution from the person who receives the information. See chapter 5.2 for
a brief overview of the different concepts of probability.
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with a (strict) preference for early resolution of uncertainty is willing to reduce welfare,
e.g. in period one, in order to exchange lottery D for lottery C. That is, he gives up
welfare in order to obtain an information earlier, of which he knows that it is of no use.
At least for a social decision maker, I do not think that such a behavior is desirable.
The lottery motivation for an intrinsic timing preference for uncertainty resolution
discussed above, is the most formal found in the respective literature. In the following, I
discuss two less formal motivations, which I regard the most elaborated and interesting
ones that I have encountered. Chew & Epstein (1989, 108) give the example of a Ph.D.
student who is about to spend a month of vacation in France. His comprehensive exams
have already been graded. Now, he has to decide whether he wants to be informed
about the result before or after his vacation (which he is committed to take). So far the
example of Chew & Epstein (1989). Certainly, there are individuals who would rather
be informed immediately, while others prefer not to possibly spoil their vacation with
bad news. The latter formulation already suggests my perception of the example. I do
not think that the reason why a student might prefer to receive the information before
or after the vacation is in fact due to an intrinsic preference for early or late resolution
of uncertainty, as it has been analyzed in the preceding section. I rather think that
the outcomes in the two lotteries are actually different. Receiving the news of having
failed the exam affects the welfare of the student beyond the future consequences of
repeating the exam, or changing his career. I suppose, the student will be unhappy if is
informed about having failed the exam. Moreover, the particular setting of the example
in which he receives the information before or after a vacation, suggests that there is
more to his ‘timing preference’ than the mere passage of time. I suggest that there is
an interaction between the unhappiness due to the bad news and the ability to enjoy
a vacation. For some people the bad news inhibits their ability to enjoy the vacation,
while for others, the vacation can help to better digest the bad news. In consequence,
the first type of people would prefer to receive the information after the vacation, while
the second type would like to be informed right away. Therefore, I would favor a more
explicit description of the welfare states at hand. If this is done, the preference for the
timing of uncertainty resolution might no longer be intrinsic, but rather instrumental
to avoid special types of information, which in some situations can affect welfare by
itself and interact with other characteristics of well-being. The above example involves
a personal information affecting a personal mood. For a principled approach to choice
under uncertainty, in particular for a social decision maker, I am convinced that the
timing should affect the decision only, if a welfare effect of the received information has
clearly been elaborated and made explicit. However, than it is not intrinsic anymore
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and not due to the effects discussed in the previous section.
Another interesting example of a preference for an early or late resolution of uncer-
tainty is given by Grant et al. (1998). The authors consider a situation where a person
has the opportunity to be tested for an uncurable genetic disorder. Grant et al. (1998)
cite a director of a genetic counseling program who states that “there are basically two
types of people. There are ‘want-to-knowers’ and there are ‘avoiders’. There are some
people who, even in the absence of being able to alter outcomes, find information of this
sort beneficial. The more they know, the more their anxiety level goes down. But there
are others who cope by avoiding, who would rather stay hopeful and optimistic and not
have the unanswered questions answered.” My interpretation of the situation is similar
to that of Chew & Epstein’s (1989) example. The ‘want-to-knowers’ are described as
people whose anxiety level goes down when they learn more about their potential dis-
orders or diseases. Again it seems to me that the information more directly affects the
welfare level than through any of the mechanisms discussed in the previous section, cor-
responding to an intrinsic preference for an early resolution of uncertainty as captured
in the Kreps & Porteus (1978) model. On the other hand, the avoiders are described
as hopeful and optimistic people who rather leave the question unanswered. Probably
there are many reasons, why someone prefers to abstain from undergoing the genetic
test. Let me explicitly work out the ‘explanation’ that an intrinsic preference for a late
resolution of uncertainty in the generalized isoelastic decision model would give for the
behavior of the ‘avoiders’. The (avoiding) decision maker is aware that he might suffer
at some point from an uncurable disease. The difference between being tested now or
never would be the following. When he takes the test today, he includes all of his welfare
experienced before he might fall ill into his lottery evaluation. Therefore, he evaluates
the risk of suffering from an incurable disease at a higher aggregate welfare level. More-
over, the decision maker has to be intertemporally risk seeking. Then, as he exhibits a
constant coefficient of relative intertemporal risk seekingness, he prefers to take the risk
at a lower welfare level. In his recursive evaluation this is achieved if he postpones the
resolution of the uncertainty as far as possible.14 Thus, the decision maker prefers not
to be tested at all. I doubt that such a mechanism underlying a preference for a late
resolution of uncertainty reflects the motives of the ‘avoiders’.
Finally, another argument, which is ubiquitous in the literature using or developing
general recursive models relying on a non-trivial attitude with respect to the timing of
uncertainty resolution, is that these models allow to disentangle between risk aversion
and intertemporal substitutability. Weil (1990, 32) even states that “attitudes toward
14Then, the welfare experienced before falling ill is excluded from the lottery evaluation.
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intertemporal substitution and risk aversion can be distinguished within the context
of KP15 preferences - precisely because these preferences do not impose indifference
toward the timing of resolution of uncertainty over temporal lotteries.” The next section,
however, shows that it is possible to distinguish between intertemporal substitution and
risk aversion in a non-recursive model satisfying indifference to the timing of uncertainty
resolution. Let me conclude the discussion. While there are situations in which people
exhibit preferences for an early or late resolution of uncertainty, I argue that these
preferences are not well described by an intrinsic preference for the timing of uncertainty
resolution as it has been analyzed in the previous section. Moreover, I believe that the
examples found in the literature to motivate an intrinsic preference for the timing of
uncertainty resolution are of interest for personal decision making rather than for a
social decision maker. If comparable situations can arise in social decision making, I
would advocate that the welfare effects of the information and its timing are stated
explicitly, making the preference for an early or late resolution of uncertainty in these
rather special situations instrumental. Finally, I believe that a principled approach to
choice under uncertainty should not depend on whether certain outcomes before a risky
period are considered part of the lottery or not, which is the essence of a corresponding
preference in the sense of the last section. In consequence, I consider the following
axiom as a desirable consistency requirement for a principled approach to choice under
uncertainty.
A10 (indifference to the timing of risk resolution)
For all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, xt ∈ X, pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1 and λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds
λ(xt, pt+1) + (1− λ)(xt, p
′
t+1) ∼t (xt, λpt+1 + (1− λ)p
′
t+1).
The axiom requires indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution as it has been
defined and discussed in the preceding section and above.
If axiom A10 is met, the information on temporal resolution of uncertainty contained
in the recursive probability measures pt,t∈{1,...,T} is no longer needed for evaluative pur-
poses.16 In consequence, I can use ‘common’ probability measures that are defined
directly on the space of future consumption paths Xt to describe the prevailing uncer-
tainty. In the remaining part of this section, I show how these ‘non-temporal’ probabil-
ity measures can be derived from its temporal counterparts. To this end, I inductively
strip away the information on the timing of uncertainty resolution. Given a lottery
15Weil (1990) abbreviates Kreps & Porteus (1978) with KP.
16This intuition finds its formal validation in theorem 12 in the next section.
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pt ∈ Pt, t ∈ {1, ..., T}, this is done by deriving for all τ ∈ {t, ..., T} reduced probability
distributions for the outcomes xτ that are only conditioned on the previous outcome
realizations xt, ..., xτ−1. These conditional probabilities together render a probability
measure on the set of consumption paths pxt ∈ ∆(X
t). The latter contains information
on how probable every outcome in a particular period is, but no information on the tim-
ing of uncertainty resolution. The following demonstration how to derive a ‘common’
or ‘non-temporal’ probability measure pxt ∈ ∆(X
t) from a corresponding ‘temporal’ lot-
tery pt ∈ Pt is not necessary to understand the representation and discussion in the
subsequent sections. The less technically minded reader may skip this rather formal
remainder of the section.
Pick any pt ∈ Pt with t ∈ {1, ..., T} and define for inductive purposes IP
Xt,Pt+1 = pt.
Moreover, denote with L(Y ) the Borel σ−field of a metric space Y . By a probability
distribution of y ∈ Y , I formally mean a probability measure defined on L(Y ). Then,
the marginal probability distribution of xt is defined as
IPXt(At) = IP
Xt,Pt+1(At, Pt) ∀At ∈ L(X) .
To arrive at the distribution of xt+1, I first define the conditional probability of pt+1
given xt. The latter is formally defined through the probability kernel IP
Pt+1|Xt : X ×
L(Pt+1)→ IR+ satisfying the requirement
IPXt,Pt+1(At, Bt+1) =
∫
At
IPPt+1|Xt(xt, Bt+1) dIP
Xt(xt)
for allAt+1 ∈ L(X) andBt+1 ∈ L(Pt+1). Then, for every xt ∈ X setting IP
Pt+1|xt(Bt+1) ≡
IPPt+1|Xt=xt(Bt+1) ≡ IP
Pt+1|Xt(xt, Bt+1) defines a probability measure on Pt+1. For every
xt ∈ X it gives a probability distribution over the temporal lotteries pt+1, i.e. a proba-
bility distribution over probability distributions on X˜t+1. This second order probability
distribution IPPt+1|xt contains the information on the uncertainty resolving in period t.17
In particular, if pt = (xt, pt+1) is degenerate, implying that no uncertainty resolves in
period t, then also IPPt+1|xt is degenerate: IPPt+1|xt(pt+1) = 1. To arrive at a reduced
probability measure on X˜t+1, I ‘integrate out’ the temporal information by summing
over all ‘positive weighted’ measures pt+1. This step yields for every xt ∈ X the reduced
probability measure IPXt+1,Pt+2|xt on X˜t+1 defined by
IPXt+1,Pt+2|xt(At+1, Bt+2) =
∫
Pt+1
pt+1(At+1, Bt+2) dIP
Pt+1|xt(pt+1)
for all At+1 ∈ L(X) and Bt+2 ∈ L(Pt+2). Then, the probability distribution of xt+1
17Precisely, only over the uncertainty resolving over period t+1 and later periods, given a particular
outcome xt in period t.
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given xt is obtained as the marginal of IP
Xt+1,Pt+2|xt defined as
IPXt+1|xt(At+1) = IP
Xt+1,Pt+2|xt(At+1, Pt+2)
for all At+1 ∈ L(X).
The same procedure to obtain conditional probabilities IPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt can be carried
out inductively for all τ ∈ {t + 1, ..., T − 1}. The induction step works as follows. Let
IPXτ ,Pτ+1|xτ−1,...,xt and its marginal IPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt be given for period τ . Then, define for
any given sequence xt, ..., xτ−1 the conditional probability of pτ+1 given xτ through the
probability kernel IPPτ+1|xτ−1,...,xt : X × L(Pτ+1)→ IR+ satisfying the requirement
IPXτ ,Pτ+1|xτ−1,...,xt(Aτ , Bτ+1) =
∫
Aτ
IPPτ+1|Xτ ,xτ−1,...,xt(xτ , Bτ+1) dIP
Xτ |xτ−1,...,xt(xτ )
for all Aτ ∈ L(X) and Bτ+1 ∈ L(Pτ+1). Then for every sequence xt, ..., xτ , setting
IPPτ+1|xτ ,...,xt(Bτ+1) ≡ IP
Pτ+1|Xτ=xτ ,...,xt(Bτ+1) ≡ IP
Pτ+1|Xτ ,xτ−1,...,xt(xτ , Bτ+1) defines a
probability measure on Pτ+1. Again, this measure is a probability distribution over
the probability distributions pτ+1 on X˜τ+1, containing information on the uncertainty
resolving in period τ . To arrive at the reduced probability measure on X˜τ+1, I ‘integrate
out’ the temporal information by summing over all weighted measures pτ+1. This step
yields for every sequence xt, ..., xτ the reduced probability measure IP
Xτ+1,Pτ+2|xτ ,...,xt
defined by
IPXτ+1,Pτ+2|xτ ,...,xt(Aτ+1, Bτ+2) =
∫
Pτ+1
pτ+1(Aτ+1, Bτ+2) dIP
Pτ+1|xτ ,...,xt(pτ+1)
for all Aτ+1 ∈ L(X), Bτ+2 ∈ L(Pτ+2). Finishing the induction step, I find the probability
of xτ+1 given xt, ..., xτ as the marginal
IPXτ+1|xτ ,...,xt(Aτ ) = IP
Xτ+1,Pτ+2|xτ ,...,xt(Aτ+1, Pτ+2)
for all Aτ+1 ∈ L(X).
That way, I arrive for τ = T − 1, and for any sequence xt, ..., xT−2, at the measure
IPXT−1,PT |xT−2,...,xt on X˜t−1, and its marginal IP
XT−1|xT−2,...,xt . In the final step, I obtain
as before IPPT |xT−1,...,xt as the conditional probability of pT given xt, ..., xT−1. However,
this time, the conditional probability of xT given xt, ..., xT−1 is obtained directly from
‘integration out’ pT :
IPXT |xT−1,...,xt(AT ) =
∫
PT
pT (AT ) dIP
PT |xT−1,...,xt(pT )
for all AT ∈ L(X). Having derived the conditional probability measures IP
Xτ |xτ−1,...,xt for
all periods τ ∈ {t, ..., T}, and all sequences xt, ..., xτ−1, I obtain the desired probability
measure on the set of certain consumption paths pxt , as the composition of the derived
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conditional probabilities. Formally, define pxt ∈ ∆(X
t) by the requirement
pxt (At, ..., AT ) =
T∏
τ=t
∫
Aτ
dIPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt(xτ )
=
∫
At×...×AT
dIPXT |xT−1,...,xt(xT ) .... dIP
Xt+1|xt(xt+1) dIP
Xt(xt)
for all At, ..., AT ∈ L(X). By construction, the measure p
x
t comprises the non-temporal
information of the lottery pt. For a representation of preferences respecting axiom A10,
only this information is needed to evaluate the uncertain future. The latter assertion is
verified as part of theorem 12, which is stated in the next section.
10.3 Intertemporal Risk Aversion and Non-Recursive
Uncertainty
The section works out preference representations for a decision maker who is indifferent
to the timing of uncertainty resolution in the sense discussed in the previous section
Adding axiom A10 to the assumptions of chapter 8 yields the following theorem.
Theorem 12: Let there be given a sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} and a sequence of Bernoulli utility functions (ut)t∈{1,...,T} with ut ∈ Bt .
The sequence of preference relations (t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A10 (timing indifference)
if and only if for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist strictly increasing continuous functions
gt : Ut → IR, as well as a function h ∈
{
exp, id, 1
exp
}
, such that with defining
v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ) (10.6)
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
h(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
h(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt, (10.7)
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Moreover, in a representation employing h ∈
{
exp, 1
exp
}
, two sequences (gt)t∈{1,...,T}
and (g′t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the above sense, if and only if,
there exists bt ∈ IR for every t ∈ {1, ..., T}, such that gt = g
′
t+ bt. In a representa-
tion employing h = id, two sequences (gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent
(t)t∈{1,...,T} in the above sense, if and only if, there exists a ∈ IR++, as well as
bt ∈ IR for every t ∈ {1, ..., T}, such that gt = ag
′
t + bt.
As anticipated in the previous section, the assumption of timing indifference implies
that the evaluation in equation (10.7) only employs aggregate utility u˜t and probability
measures pxt , p
′x
t ∈ ∆(X
t) that are defined non-recursively over consumption paths. The
measures pxt , p
′x
t ∈ ∆(X
t) are derived from their recursive counterparts pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt the
way explained in section 10.2. This relation, however, is only needed to axiomatize the
representation in the general setup. For an application of the theorem, it is sufficient
to describe the uncertain future directly with the measure pxt ∈ ∆(X
t). In view of the
axioms, note that in the above setting a result by Chew & Epstein (1989, 110) allows
to replace the independence axiom A3 by a collection of weaker assumptions.
To identify intertemporal risk aversion, I have to fix the measure scale for welfare in
the representation. Different possibilities for doing so in the non-stationary setting have
been explored in lemma 5. A full fixing of the measure scale corresponds to cases c)
and d) of the lemma and brings about the existence of ξ ∈ IR such that with the same
definition of u˜t as in equation (10.6), the representing equation (10.7) becomes
18
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt .
For such a u+−gauge, the measures of intertemporal risk aversion are defined uniquely
as AIRAt = −
ξ
θt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
θt
id. In the g+−gauge the corresponding result is
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 11 (g = id+−gauge, non-stationary) : Choose numbers wt ∈ IR for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T} (minimum welfare levels), as well as t∗ ∈ {1, ..., T} and a number
wt∗ ∈ IR satisfying wt∗ > wt∗ (maximum welfare level in period t
∗).
Then, a sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i)− iv) of theorem 12,
if and only if, there exist continuous functions ut : X → Ut with U t = wt for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T} and U t∗ = wt∗ , as wells as ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining
18See equation (C.46) in the proof of theorem 12.
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v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
uτ (x
t
τ )
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt . (10.8)
Moreover, the functions ut,t∈{1,...,T} are determined uniquely, as are the measures
of intertemporal risk aversion AIRAt = −
ξ
θt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
θt
id, where θt is the
time dependent normalization constant defined in theorem 4, here θt =
∆UtPT
τ=t∆Ut
.
Observe that uncertainty in the representing equation (10.8) is evaluated with intertem-
poral risk attitude. Let me relate the result to the discussion in section 10.1. There, I
have pointed out that in the case of an early resolution of uncertainty, certain outcomes
before the risky period are considered as part of the lottery. Thus, if the preceding
period yields a non-zero welfare, the uncertainty is evaluated at a different welfare level
than in the case of a late resolution of uncertainty. If (intertemporal) risk attitude
depends on the welfare level, this difference causes a preference for either of the two lot-
teries. Only if (absolute) intertemporal risk attitude is independent of the welfare level,
also the uncertainty evaluation is independent of whether certain outcomes in preceding
periods are conceived as part of the lottery or not. Only then, indifference to the timing
of uncertainty prevails. Therefore AIRAt is constant. Moreover, chapter 10.1 has elab-
orated that a difference in the attitude of intertemporal risk aversion between different
periods can imply a propensity to have uncertainty resolved in the period with the lower
intertemporal risk aversion. Therefore, the coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion in
the above representation only depend on the relative weight given to a particular period
as opposed to the remaining future, as characterized by the normalization constant θt,
but not otherwise on time. This difference to the representations derived under the
assumption of risk stationarity in chapter 9 will be discussed in the next section.
The following representation adds the assumption of certainty stationarity formulated
as axiom A7 in chapter 9.1. I state the representation directly in the g−gauge where it
implies the standard discount utility evaluation on certain consumption paths, and for
a fixed measure scale of welfare.
Theorem 13 (g = id+−gauge, certainty stationary) : Choose a nondegenerate
closed interval W ∗ ⊂ IR++.
A sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
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ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A7 & A10 (certainty stationarity & timing indifference)
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → W ∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining
v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
βτ−1u(xtτ )
it holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt .
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely, as are the measures of intertem-
poral risk aversion AIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
id.
In all periods outcomes are evaluated with a common certainty additive Bernoulli utility
function u, which describes welfare in the sense of chapter 7.3. Overall evaluation of a
particular consumption path is performed by taking the discounted sum of per period
welfare. To evaluate an uncertain future, the decision maker weights the aggregate wel-
fare of the possible consumption paths with their respective probabilities, and applies
the uncertainty aggregation rule Mexp
ξ
, which is parametrized (up to a normalization
factor) by the coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk seeking, i.e. the negative of
absolute intertemporal risk aversion. For the limit of an infinite time horizon, the nor-
malization constant that depicts the relative weight of an individual period as opposed
to the remaining future 1 − βt becomes constant over time. In consequence, so does
the coefficient of intertemporal risk aversion limT→∞AIRAt = −
ξ
1−β
. For a finite time
horizon, as the end of the planning horizon is approached, the decreasing length of the
welfare paths under consideration goes along with a coefficient of absolute intertemporal
risk aversion AIRAt that decreases over time to −ξ for the last period. Note that, in
accordance with the convention underlying lemma 7, the measure scale for welfare has
been fixed to W ∗ in period 1, implying ranges βt−1W ∗ for welfare measurement in later
periods.
In particular, theorem 13 shows that it is possible to disentangle atemporal risk aver-
sion from intertemporal substitutability without assuming an intrinsic preference for
early or late resolution of uncertainty. In addition, such a model is compatible with the
widespread discount utility model for the evaluation of individual consumption paths.
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The possibility to disentangle these two characteristics of preference, defined in a one
commodity setting, follows immediately from the fact that the coefficients of intertem-
poral risk aversion characterize a difference between intertemporal and atemporal un-
certainty aggregation. Before I state the Epstein Zin gauge, in which the coefficients of
relative (atemporal) risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability have been discussed
in chapter 7.1, I give some alternative formulations of general multiperiod representa-
tion.
Representing the same preferences described in theorem 13 in the Kreps Porteus gauge
yields the alternative form
Corollary 12 (f = id+−gauge, certainty stationary) : Choose a nondegenerate
closed interval U∗ ⊂ IR++. A sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on
(Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i)− iv) of theorem 13,
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → U∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining
v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T}
- for ξ > 0 by u˜t(x
t) =
∏T
τ=t u(x
t
τ )
ξβτ−1 and
- for ξ = 0 by u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t β
τ−1 lnu(xtτ ) and
- for ξ < 0 by u˜t(x
t) = −
∏T
τ=t u(x
t
τ )
ξβτ−1
the following equation holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}
pt t p
′
t ⇔ Epxt
u˜t(x
t) ≥ E
p′xt
u˜t(x
t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt,
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely, as are the measures of intertem-
poral risk aversion AIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
id.
Here, uncertainty is evaluated by the expected value operator. As observed in the earlier
models, this linearization of uncertainty aggregation comes at the price of introducing
a nonlinear aggregation of per period utility over time.19 Making the latter purely
19Also in corollary 12, the measure scale for welfare is fixed for period 1. However, note that due to
the multiplicative form of intertemporal aggregation, the range of welfare uwelf in the certainty additive
sense of chapter 7.3 is fixed to the range W ∗ = lnU∗ rather than to the range U∗. This is also the
reason, why a logarithm appears in the representation for ξ = 0. Only with this definition, the range of
welfare is fixed independently of the parameter ξ. However, eliminating the logarithm would not change
the measures of intertemporal risk aversion, as they are zero in the case ξ = 0 and, thus, independent
of the particular measure scale adopted for welfare.
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multiplicative over time brings about an isoelastic uncertainty aggregation rule, as stated
in the following variation of corollary 12.
Corollary 13 (isoelastic uncertainty evaluation, certainty stationary) :
Choose a nondegenerate closed interval U∗ ⊂ IR++. A sequence of binary re-
lations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i)− iv) of theorem 12,
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function u : X → U∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining
v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∏
τ=t
u(xtτ )
βτ−1
the following equation holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
ξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt,
Moreover, the function u is determined uniquely, as are the measures of intertem-
poral risk aversion AIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
id.
Note that for a one commodity setting, the assumption u = id in the above represen-
tation corresponds to the assumption of logarithmic welfare in the certainty additive
model. I want to close this collection of alternative representations for preferences
satisfying certainty stationarity and indifference to the timing uncertainty resolution
by moving more generally to the one commodity scenario and stating the Epstein-Zin
gauge. Here the (cardinal) consumption level is assumed to be a subset of IR, and
Bernoulli utility is assumed to be strictly increasing in x ∈ X ⊂ IR.
Corollary 14 (one commodity u = id+−gauge, certainty stationary) :
Choose a nondegenerate closed interval W ∗ ⊂ IR. A sequence of binary rela-
tions = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i)− iv) of theorem 13,
if and only if, there exists a continuous and surjective function g : IR → W ∗, a
discount factor β ∈ IR++ and ξ ∈ IR, such that with defining
v) the functions u˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
βτ−1g(xtτ ) (10.9)
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the following equation holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
ξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt,
Moreover, the function u id determined uniquely, as are the measures of intertem-
poral risk aversion AIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
and RIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
id.
Note that for the non-stationary representation, equation (10.9) would change to the form20
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
gt(x
t
τ ) .
It has been worked out in chapter 7.1 that in the Epstein-Zin gauge g characterizes
intertemporal substitutability, while f , here ft, characterizes (atemporal) risk attitude.
As ft is not observed directly in the representation it has to be inferred from the relation
characterizing intertemporal risk aversion (for ξ 6= 0) as21
ftg
−1
t (z) = at exp(
ξ
1− βt
z) + bt
⇒ ft(z) = at exp(
ξ
1− βt
gt) + bt = at exp(
ξ
1− βt
βtg) + bt
with at, bt ∈ IR and at ξ > 0. For the non-stationary setting analogously the relation
ft(z) = at exp(
ξ
θt
gt) + bt holds.
22 Noting that in the u = id gauge g and ft are defined
directly on X ⊂ IR, the coefficient of relative (atemporal) risk aversion calculates to
RRA(x) = −
f ′′ (x)
f ′ (x)
x = −
d2
dx2
kt exp
(
ξ
θt
gt(x)
)
+ dt
d
dx
kt exp
(
ξ
θt
gt(x)
)
+ dt
x
= −
(
ξ
θt
g′t(x)
)2
exp
(
ξ
θt
gt(x)
)
+ ξ
θt
g′′t (x) exp
(
ξ
θt
gt(x)
)
ξ
θt
g′t(x) exp
(
ξ
θt
gt(x)
) x
= −
[
ξ
θt
g′t(x) +
g′′t (x)
g′t(x)
]
x (10.10)
= −
[
ξ
βt
1− βt
g′(x) +
g′′(x)
g′(x)
]
x . (10.11)
Expression (10.10) holds for general non-stationary representations while for the cer-
20See equation (C.52) in the proof of corollary 14.
21This relation implying the stated coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion is derived in the proof
of theorem 13 as equation (C.48).
22See equation (C.43) in the proof of theorem 12.
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tainty stationary case given in corollary 14, where θt = 1− βt and gt = β
tg, expression
(10.11) applies. For example, the widespread assumption of logarithmic welfare, corre-
sponding to g = ln and an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of unity, yields the
particularly simple coefficient
RRA(x) = 1− ξ
βt
1− βt
.
A form that corresponds to the isoelastic (atemporal) uncertainty aggregation ruleMα
with the time dependent coefficient αt = ξ
βt
1−βt
.23 For an interpretation of the time
dependence, I refer again to the subsequent section. Before, I want to keep a promise
given in the preceding section.
In chapter 10.1 I have introduced two lotteries which are used in the literature to
motivate a non-trivial (intrinsic) preference to the timing of uncertainty resolution.
These lotteries have been defined as follows. In lottery A a coin is tossed at the beginning
of every period. If head comes up, the decision maker receives the high payoff in the
respective period and, if tail comes up, the decision maker faces the low payoff in the
respective period. In contrast, in lottery B a coin is tossed once at the beginning of
the first period. If head comes up, the agent receives the high payoff in all periods, if
tail comes up the agents receives the low payoff in all periods. The intuition appealed
to in the literature is that people would usually prefer lottery A over lottery B. In
section 10.2 I have claimed that a preference for a late resolution of uncertainty is by no
means necessary in order to explain the ranking. In the following I show that lottery A is
preferred over lottery B also by a timing indifferent decision maker, if (and only if) he is
intertemporally risk averse. It is easily recognized that the essence of such a preference
is captured already in a two period model. Denote the high lottery outcome by x and
the low lottery outcome by x. Then, lottery A writes as 1
2
(x, 1
2
x+ 1
2
x) + 1
2
(x, 1
2
x+ 1
2
x).
Lottery B is formally represented by 1
2
(x , x) + 1
2
(x , x). First, observe that in the
intertemporally additive expected utility model indifference between the two lotteries
prevails. Here, lottery A is evaluated by the expression
1
4
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
+ 1
4
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
+ 1
4
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
+ 1
4
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
which is equivalent to
1
2
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
+ 1
2
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)
,
representing an intertemporally additive expected utility representation of lottery B.
In contrast, for an intertemporally risk averse decision maker (ξ < 0) applying the
23Note that this case corresponds to the mentioned representation obtained from corollary 13 by
assuming u = id.
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evaluation characterized in theorem 13, the following relation holds:
1
2
(x, 1
2
x+ 1
2
x) + 1
2
(x, 1
2
x+ 1
2
x) ≻ 1
2
(x, x) + 1
2
(x, x)
⇔ 1
ξ
ln
[
1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]]
> 1
ξ
ln
[
1
2
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
2
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]]
⇔ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
< 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
+ 1
4
exp
[
ξ
(
u(x) + βu(x)
)]
⇔ exp
(
ξu(x)
) [
exp
(
ξβu(x)
)
− exp
(
ξβu(x)
)]
< exp
(
ξu(x)
) [
exp
(
ξβu(x)
)
− exp
(
ξβu(x)
)]
⇔ 0 <
[
exp
(
ξu(x)
)
− exp
(
ξu(x)
)] [
exp
(
ξβu(x)
)
− exp
(
ξβu(x)
)]
If the decision maker is not indifferent between outcomes x and x, i.e. if u(x) 6= u(x),
the relation in the last line is always satisfied, as either both terms in the product are
strictly positive, or both terms are strictly negative. In consequence, an intertemporally
risk averse decision maker always prefers lottery A over lottery B. For an intertemporally
risk seeking decision maker (ξ > 0), the inequality sign does not flip around in the step
from the second to the third equivalence. Therefore, the opposite preference holds true
and such a decision maker always prefers lottery B over lottery A. Only an intertempo-
rally risk neutral decision maker, characterized by the intertemporally additive expected
utility model, is indifferent between the two lotteries described above.
10.4 Implications for Discounting
In the preceding section I have shown that the requirement of indifference to the timing
of uncertainty resolution is compatible with strict intertemporal risk aversion and a
discount utility evaluation of certain consumption paths. This section analyzes the
consequences of merging the assumption of indifference to the timing of uncertainty
resolution with that of risk stationarity formulated in chapter 9.3 (risk stationarity II).
In theorem 13, I have described how certainty stationarity determines the time devel-
opment of intertemporal risk aversion for a decision maker who has no intrinsic prefer-
ence for early or late resolution of uncertainty. The coefficient of absolute intertemporal
risk aversion was seen to be constant in welfare and to adapt to the length of the plan-
173
CHAPTER 10. TEMPORAL RESOLUTION OF UNCERTAINTY
ning horizon lying ahead of the decision maker. It was calculated to AIRAt = −
ξ
1−βt
.
Similarly, the assumption of risk stationarity formulated in axiom A9 gives rise to a
coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion that is constant in welfare. Moreover,
the respective representation stated in corollary 8 exhibits the same adaption of the co-
efficients of intertemporal risk aversion to the length of the remaining planning horizon
through the factor 1
1−βt
. However, in contrast to the representation of the preceding
section, for a decision maker who complies with risk stationarity, the coefficient of ab-
solute intertemporal risk aversion also depends on the discount factor βt. As worked
out in chapter 9.3, under the assumption of axiom A9 only the functions ft ◦ g
−1 stay
constant over time (up to the normalization by 1
1−βt
). These functions, to which I have
referred as the stationary characterization of intertemporal risk attitude, measure in-
tertemporal risk aversion with respect to a ‘current value measure scale for welfare’.
In contrast, the coefficient AIRAt expresses intertemporal risk aversion with respect to
the ‘present value measure scale for welfare’. That is, if the measure scale for period
1 is fixed to range(uwelf1 ) = W
∗, then the measure scale of welfare in period t shrinks
down to the range(uwelft ) = β
t−1W ∗. But then, as the range of welfare measurement (in
present value) becomes smaller and smaller over time due to discounting, the coefficient
of intertemporal risk aversion has to increase in order to keep up a stationary aversion
to risk. However, this is not allowed by axiom A10. If indifference to the timing of
uncertainty resolution should prevail, the latter requires intertemporal risk aversion to
be constant over time (up to the normalization by 1
1−βt
). Otherwise, a decision maker
would be willing to give up welfare in order to have uncertainty resolved in the period
with the lowest intertemporal risk aversion, even if the information obtained is known
to be of no use.
In consequence, risk stationary devaluation of the future, which implies by axiom
A9 a decreasing coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion, is not compatible
with the demand of axiom A10, i.e. the lack of an intrinsic preference of uncertainty
resolution. Precisely, there is only one situation where such a devaluation of the future is
compatible with both axioms. For a decision maker who is intertemporally risk neutral,
the assumption of risk stationarity has no more bite than the assumption of certainty
stationarity. Here, the coefficient AIRAt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} is constant over
time and, thus, the intertemporally additive expected utility model trivially satisfies the
requirements implied by both axioms. However, for a nontrivial model of intertemporally
risk averse decision making, the following result obtains.
Theorem 14: A sequence of binary relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} on (Pt)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies
i) A1-A3 for all t, t ∈ {1, ..., T} (vNM setting)
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ii) A4’ for 1|XT (certainty additivity)
iii) A5’ (time consistency)
iv) A6 sst (strict intertemporal risk aversion)
v) A9 (risk stationarity II)
vi) A10 (timing indifference)
if and only if, there exists a representation in the sense of theorem 13 and its
corollaries with ξ < 0 and β = 1.
In words, a decision maker who accepts the above axioms does not discount the future
due to an intrinsic timing preference. However, he does devaluate uncertain welfare24.
In consequence, if uncertainty increases over time, future welfare gains less weight than
current welfare. The remainder of this paragraph renders the latter intuition precise.
For this purpose let px1 ∈ ∆(X
1) be a product measure px1 = IP
x1
1 ⊗ ... ⊗ IP
xT
T , so that
the outcomes in different periods are independently distributed. Assume that expected
welfare is the same in all periods, i.e. EIPxtt
uwelf(xt) = u
∗ ∈ U = W ∗ ∀ t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
To define what it means that uncertainty over welfare is increasing over time, I employ
Rothschild & Stiglitz’s (1970) definition of increasing risk. The authors define a random
variable to be riskier than another, if the corresponding probability distribution has
more weight on the tails.25 In particular, this condition is satisfied for a mean preserving
spread. Now, consider the probability distributions IPut over U that are induced by the
measures IPxtt through the certainty additive Bernoulli utility function u
welf . Then,
uncertainty of welfare increases over time, if IPut has more weight in the tails than IP
u
t′
for all t, t′ ∈ {1, ..., T} satisfying t > t′.26 For such an uncertainty specification it follows
from theorem 2 in Rothschild & Stiglitz (1970, 237) that the certainty equivalent of
welfare in period t is lower than the certainty equivalent of welfare in period t′. As
the expected welfare is the same in both periods, the difference in weights exhibits
some resemblance to discounting. Note, in particular, that the intertemporally additive
expected utility model does not allow for intertemporal risk aversion and, thus, not
for risk aversion on welfare and the reasoning I carried out above. Therefore, the only
24I still adhere to the notion of welfare discussed in chapter 7.3 as certainty additive Bernoulli utility.
25An equivalent characterization is that the riskier random variable can be obtained from the less
risky random variable by adding some noise. For a formal definition compare footnote 26.
26Formally let Pt denote the cumulative distribution function characterizing the measure IP
u
t for t ∈
{1, ..., T}. Pt is said to have more weight in the tales than Pt′ , if
∫u
U
Pt(y)−Pt′(y) dy ≥ 0 ∀u ∈ [U,U ].
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possibility it permits to capture a difference in the weighting of expected welfare is by
introducing a positive rate of pure time preference.
To my knowledge, the only consideration in the literature which is concerned with a
relation between discounting and stationarity that is somewhat comparable to the one
derived in theorem 14, is once more due to Epstein (1992, 16). Motivating models of
recursive utility, he points out a contradiction between a disentanglement of risk aver-
sion and intertemporal substitutability in a non-recursive model on the one hand, and
the positiveness of the discount rate on the other. He concludes that a disentanglement
is not possible, at least in a stationary setting. The preceding section has elaborated
how such a disentanglement is possible in a non-stationary and in a certainty stationary
setting. Theorem 14 confirms Epstein’s (1992, 16) assertion, but with a very different
interpretation. Having analyzed the reasons and consequences of an intrinsic timing
preference, I suggest that a non-recursive evaluation is desirable (axiom A10). In con-
sequence, a risk stationary decision maker in the sense of axiom A9 has to accept that
he does not have the freedom to devaluate the future for sheer impatience, without
violating any of the other axioms. Furthermore, theorem 14 together with theorem 13
show that, for a decision maker with a finite planning horizon, it is well possible to dis-
entangle atemporal risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability, without violating
any of the axioms. Moreover, also in the limit of an infinite planning horizon, a factor
β = 1 does not necessarily imply that aggregate welfare diverges. Due to intertemporal
risk aversion, an increase in uncertainty over time can still yield a finite evaluation of
scenarios.27 Of course, instead of accepting the consequences of theorem 14, the under-
lying axioms can be dropped. Since Chew & Epstein (1989, 110) have shown that under
the assumption of axiom A10 the independence axiom can be replaced by a collection
of much weaker axioms, it is not a promising candidate to give up in order to avoid the
implication of a zero rate of pure time preference. If I had to drop an assumption, I
would probably first abandon risk stationarity. In consequence, I had to allow for an
anticipated change of preference over time.
Let me close the chapter by revisiting the important problem of global warming that
has been discussed exemplarily in the introduction, as a motivation for my theoretical
analysis in this dissertation. As Plambeck et al. (1997, 85) have pointed out, a reduction
of the pure rate of time preference from 3%, as assumed in Nordhaus (1993), to 0% cor-
responding to β = 1, would result in an optimal abatement path that cuts emissions by
27Note however, that increasing uncertainty can also make the evaluation functional converge to
zero. Preliminary analysis shows that convergence to finite non-zero evaluation are knife-edge in the
assumptions on the probability distributions and their evolvement over time.
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50% from the baseline to the year 2100, as opposed to 10% in the assessment of Nord-
haus (1993). To the best of my knowledge, so far a zero rate of pure time preference has
only been argued for in terms of moral consideration. Theorem 14 states formal axioms
dealing with consistency aspects of evaluation under uncertainty, and shows that these
alone suffice to call for a zero rate of pure time preference. In difference to the evalua-
tions used in current climate models, however, the representation implied by theorem 14
goes along with an intertemporally risk averse decision maker. Therefore, uncertainty
has a higher cost than in the above climate models, which apply the intertemporally
risk neutral standard model when they consider uncertainty at all.28 In consequence,
an evaluation of global climate change under the assumptions of theorem 14, implies an
additional preference for scenarios that give rise to a less uncertain future. Since un-
certainty is likely to increase in the perturbation of the climate system, which increases
with the amount of greenhouse gas emissions, a first conjecture is that the additional
effect caused by intertemporal risk aversion in an evaluation in the sense of theorem 14,
yields an even higher abatement recommendation than the one pointed out by Plambeck
et al. (1997, 85). A closer analysis of this aspect constitutes an interesting area of future
research.
10.5 Summary
I have extended the concept of intertemporal risk aversion to the non-stationary mul-
tiperiod setting. The general recursive and gaugable representation for preferences that
are additive over time on certain consumption paths, and satisfy the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms, has been developed. The axiomatic characterization, as well as
the measures of intertemporal risk aversion, have been adapted to this framework. Dif-
ferent stationarity assumptions have been imposed on the general framework. These
axioms offer an alternative to the standard stationarity axioms that rely on an infinite
time horizon and a positive rate of pure time preference. First, certainty stationarity
has been characterized and shown to imply the standard discount utility model on cer-
tain consumption paths. Then, aiming at a stationarity assumption that includes the
generalized isoelastic model, I have worked out an axiom that implies constancy of the
functions characterizing (atemporal) uncertainty aggregation. However, this axiom does
not express the idea that the mere passage of time should not affect preference order-
28With the exception of the stylized simulation by Ha-Duong & Treich (2004) that features two
possible damage states in a generalized isoelastic framework.
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ings. A careful translation of the latter assumption to the evaluation of risky outcomes,
implies that constancy of atemporal risk attitude is only supported for an infinite time
horizon. Moreover, under a finite time horizon the corresponding axiom no longer ad-
mits for the whole class of generalized isoelastic evaluation rules. For risk stationary
preferences, the measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion is characterized by a
single parameter, is constant in welfare, and increases over time.
I have explained that a decision maker using a recursive evaluation over temporal
lotteries generally exhibits an intrinsic preference for an early or late resolution of un-
certainty. The relation between such a preference for the timing of uncertainty resolu-
tion, and the characterizing functions of intertemporal substitutability and atemporal
as well as intertemporal risk aversion has been given. I have analyzed the reasons for
a non-trivial attitude with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution in the recur-
sive model, and have compared it to respective motivations found in the literature. As
a result, I have suggested that indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution is a
desirable feature for a principled approach to choice under uncertainty. The correspond-
ing preference representation has been stated, and I have worked out how the model
allows to disentangle atemporal risk aversion from intertemporal substitutability in a
non-recursive setting. Moreover, I have shown that timing indifference is compatible
with the discount utility model on certain consumption paths. However, when adding
stationarity of choice over risky outcomes to the assumptions, a devaluation of the fu-
ture for reasons of sheer impatience is no longer allowed. Precisely, such a devaluation,
corresponding to a strictly positive rate of pure time preference is only possible for in-
tertemporally risk neutral decision makers, where the axiom of risk stationarity has no
additional bite. However, when uncertainty is increasing over time, also an intertem-
porally risk averse decision maker values (expected) future welfare less than current
welfare.
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Conclusions
11.1 Summary of Conceptual Contributions
This section summarizes the conceptual contributions of my dissertation. For a more
detailed summary of the analysis carried out in each of the three parts, the reader
is referred to the respective sections at the end of chapters 4, 7, and 10. Further
implications and possible applications of the derived concepts and modeling frameworks
are pointed out in section 11.2. Finally, I suggest different extensions of the study in
section 11.3.
Structuring the contributions by parts, I start out with the exploration of the re-
lation between the weight given to future consumption and service streams, and the
substitutability between environmental and produced service and consumption streams
in welfare. Under the assumption that produced consumption grows at a higher rate
than environmental service and amenity streams, I show that a lower substitutability
between the different classes of goods can imply a reduction of the weight given to future
consumption and services. The result has two implications for the sustainability debate.
First, the characterization of weak versus strong sustainability, resting upon a weak or
strong limitedness in the substitutability between the two classes of goods, is directly
connected to the weight given to future consumption and service streams. Second, a
strength in sustainability in the above sense, can counteract a strength of sustainability
in the sense of a higher weight given to consumption of future generations. Another
contribution of the analysis in part I is, to point out that not only the value of the
discount rate depends on the numeraire, but also the form of discounting. In particular,
I derive that time consistent behavior in a growing world with limited substitutability
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in consumption can imply hyperbolic discount rates.
Part II of the dissertation introduces the concept of intertemporal risk aversion. On
the one hand, the concept is designed to capture an important concern of the precau-
tionary principle. In particular, an intertemporally risk averse decision maker exhibits
a higher willingness to undergo preventive action in order to avoid a threat of harm,
than does a decision maker employing the intertemporally additive expected utility
model. On the other hand, the concept of intertemporal risk aversion sheds new light
on the disentanglement of atemporal risk aversion and intertemporal substitutability.
Such a disentanglement has been recognized in the literature to help in explaining sev-
eral observed phenomena. The concept of intertemporal risk aversion elaborates that
a specific difference between the characterizing functions of (atemporal) risk aversion
and intertemporal substitutability has itself an interpretation of risk aversion. Quanti-
tative measures of absolute and relative intertertemporal risk aversion are introduced.
The corresponding concept of risk aversion extends naturally to the multi-commodity
setting.
Part III extends the model framework for intertemporally risk averse decision making,
and relates the concept to two other important aspects of decision making under uncer-
tainty. Avoiding the assumption of a positive rate of pure time preference at the outset
of the model, I derive an axiomatization of stationary preferences in a framework with
a finite planning horizon. The standard interpretation of stationarity is that the mere
passage of time does not influence preferences. I point out that for a finite planning
horizon, an additional assumption is needed, in order to derive a stationary preference
representation. This assumption is also implicit in the infinite horizon setting, but gains
more bite under a finite planning horizon. In consequence, stationarity of risk attitude in
the latter framework only allows for constant coefficients of absolute intertemporal risk
aversion. In particular, the axiom excludes all specifications of the generalized isoelastic
model, except for the case of logarithmic welfare.1
Moreover, part III analyzes the concept of an intrinsic preference for the timing of
uncertainty resolution. I relate such a preference to the functions characterizing risk
attitude and intertemporal substitutability in my representations. Connecting the con-
cept to that of intertemporal risk aversion, I discuss the underlying intuition and draw
the conclusion that an intrinsic preference for early or late resolution of uncertainty is
likely to be undesired in a principled approach to decision making under uncertainty.
1Here, I refer to the axiom of risk stationarity II, capturing the idea that the mere passage of time
should not change preferences. The word ‘welfare’ is used in the sense of the certainty additive Bernoulli
utility function.
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Eliminating the intrinsic timing preference from the model allows to depict intertempo-
ral risk aversion and, thus, to disentangle atemporal risk aversion from intertemporal
substitutability, in a non-recursive decision model. Such a non-recursive description of
uncertainty constitutes a technical and conceptual simplification for the analysis of time
and risk attitude. Two further insights are obtained by relating the concept of timing
indifference to that of stationarity. First, I show that indifference to the timing of uncer-
tainty resolution is compatible with the assumption of certainty stationarity and, thus,
the standard discount utility approach to the evaluation of certain consumption paths.
Second, for an intertemporally risk averse decision maker, accepting the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms and time consistency, such an indifference is only compatible with
a stationary risk attitude, if the pure rate of time preference is zero. Thus, accepting
risk stationarity and the absence of an intrinsic preference for early or late resolution of
uncertainty, the decision maker will not devaluate the future for reasons of pure time
preference. However, he does so for reasons of increasing uncertainty over time.
11.2 Implications and Applications
The furthest reaching implications of this study are conveyed by the concept of
intertemporal risk aversion. First, the concept mediates between the advocates and the
opponents of the precautionary principle. On the one hand, the concept takes up the
important concern of the principle’s advocates regarding a higher willingness to undergo
preventive action than that implied by a standard cost benefit assessment. On the other
hand, it meets the requirements of the opponents by formalizing and, thus, sharpening
this concern and reconciling it with standard assumptions underlying economic eval-
uation. This step allows to evaluate clearly and precisely in a more exhaustive way
future threats to human welfare. In doing so, it also enables a more consistent and,
thus, less disputable application of the precautionary principle, which gains increasing
importance in international contracts and conventions, in particular in the field of the
environment-economy interaction.
Second, the concept of intertemporal risk aversion implies a higher welfare cost of
volatility. Since Lucas (1987), it is well known that the standard model in macroeco-
nomics implies a strong ‘bias’ in favor of policy measures that foster additional growth
at the expense of higher welfare volatility. If welfare volatility is caused by a stochas-
tic process, the concept of intertemporal risk aversion explains that the above ‘bias’
is caused by the implicit assumption of intertemporal risk neutrality. Acknowledging
intertemporal risk aversion implies an increased emphasis on considerations of welfare
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volatility in macroeconomic policy recommendations.
The third implication is a consequence of the fact that the concept of intertemporal
risk aversion holds naturally in a multi-commodity setting. Currently, most studies on
risk aversion only consider a single aggregate consumption good. This is partly due to
the somewhat complicated and less satisfactory theory of multi-commodity risk aversion
laid out by Kihlstrom & Mirman (1974). Intertemporal risk aversion characterizes risk
attitude in a way that is independent of the amount of goods under observation. In
consequence, an implication of the concept for economic modeling is to promote the ex-
plicit analysis of risk attitude in multi-commodity settings, including also more abstract
situations where an a priori measure scale of the goods in terms of real numbers is not
given.
My analysis on indifference with respect to the timing of uncertainty resolution has
two immediate implications for decision makers in public policy. First, if a decision
maker’s willingness to substitute consumption into risky states is different from his
propensity to substitute consumption into the certain future, I offer him a model where
he no longer has to use an evaluation scheme that forces him to give up welfare for
information that is of no use in the planning process. Second, if a decision maker accepts
the axioms implying a zero rate of pure time preference, the long-term is gaining much
more importance in model-based policy evaluations. While the certain future is treated
equal to the present, the uncertain future gains the more importance, the more the
decision maker can know about it. For a particular application of this reasoning, see
the last paragraph of this section.
The insight that a strong sustainability preference can imply a lower weight for future
consumption streams than a weak sustainability preference, mainly has implications for
the question how to depict different concepts of sustainability in economic modeling.
Policy implication rather emerge in more specific applications. For example, the insight
that limited substitutability in consumption can influence the effective discount rate, is
relevant for climate change evaluation. The corresponding models generally depict an
aggregate of consumption and employ a corresponding real discount rate. Yet, global
climate change is predicted to affect future flows of environmental services and produced
consumption significantly. Therefore, a non-constant time behavior of discount rates as
pointed out in the study, can be of particular importance. For a quantification of this
effect, however, an extension of the model is suggested in the next section. Apart
from evaluation studies, the insight that limited substitutability in consumption can
affect the form of discounting, is as well of interest for experimental economics. Here,
the topic of hyperbolic discounting is an active field of research. Applying the model to
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experimental settings, it is a promising exercise to examine to what extent the reasoning
on limited substitutability can contribute to an understanding of non-constant discount
rates observed in the laboratory.
Applications for the concept of intertemporal risk aversion and the respective modeling
frameworks derived in parts II and III are numerous. The concept can be applied to any
field of economic evaluation, decision making or modeling, where time and uncertainty
play an essential role, reaching from classical resource extraction problems to asset
pricing in stock markets. As an application of particular conceptual interest, I consider
a closer analysis of the paradox discovered by Rabin (2000) on the relation between risk
aversion in the small and in the large at different welfare levels. The latter has recently
been extended to non-expected utility theory by Safra & Segal (2005). As the concept
of intertemporal risk aversion allows to detach the description of risk aversion from the
curvature of welfare, it constitutes a natural candidate to reanalyze the paradox.
The modeling frameworks in this dissertation have been motivated from the viewpoint
of a principled and, thus, prescriptive approach to choice under uncertainty. I consider
it an important challenge to test how the derived representations perform in describing
observed phenomena. Of particular interest is the question, whether the developed
framework that allows to disentangle intertemporal substitutability from risk aversion
under indifference to the timing of uncertainty resolution, can quantitatively outperform
the generalized isoelastic model, which is the current work horse for this task. For
reasons of data availability and the amount of research already performed in the field,
the stock market is a good place to start such a comparison. The model’s ability to
explain the equity premium puzzle constitutes an interesting topic to investigate.
Another important application of the derived representational framework for intertem-
poral risk aversion is to take up once more the problem of climate change that has been
discussed in the introduction as a motivation for my theoretical analysis. I have pointed
out that a zero rate of pure time preference in climate change evaluation models sig-
nificantly modifies the recommendations for an optimal greenhouse gas abatement path
(Toth 1995, Plambeck et al. 1997). Founding such a zero rate of pure time preference on
my analysis of intertemporal risk aversion, rather than on moral considerations, adds a
new aspect to the evaluation. In contrast to the modeling approach of the above authors,
an evaluation featuring intertemporal risk aversion implies discounting for reasons of un-
certainty. In general, increasing uncertainty over time brings about a decreasing weight
given to future welfare and, thus, future consumption and service streams. However, if
the amount of uncertainty differs for the different abatement scenarios, those that render
future consumption less uncertain obtain a higher weight. Since uncertainty is likely
183
CHAPTER 11. CONCLUSIONS
to increase in the perturbation of the climate system, which increases with the amount
of greenhouse gas emissions, a first conjecture is that the additional effect caused by
intertemporal risk aversion yields an even higher abatement recommendation than the
one pointed out by the above studies. I plan to carry out a quantitative assessment of
the effect in the future.
11.3 Extensions
Apart from these direct applications pointed out in the preceding section, several ex-
tensions of the models and concepts discussed in this study seem worthwhile. I suggest
some of the standard extensions and others that appear conceptually most interesting.
Starting with the model employed in part I of this dissertation, two extensions that ‘de-
stylize’ the model stand to reason when the model is to be applied quantitatively.2 The
first extension would be to drop the assumption of a constant elasticity of substitution
between the two classes of goods.3 The second would be to model and estimate precisely
the supply side of the model, which so far is pressed into the simple assumption of differ-
ing growth rates in consumption. Furthermore, an integration of the models in parts I
and II stands to reason. In such a model, the combined effect of substitutability between
goods, between periods and between risk states on the discount rate can be analyzed. A
final extension which I want to point out, is based on the insight that the marginal util-
ity propagators used in the model can also be defined for more general non-conservative
preference fields, which do not possess a closed form representation in terms of utility.
Then, ‘value’ development over time can still be described in terms of their generators,
i.e. the individual discount rates can replace the concept of utility. Thus, a comparable
analysis to that in part I can be carried out in a much more general setting.
Turning to extensions of the modeling frameworks for the concept of intertemporal
risk aversion, I first want to mention those which I consider primarily technical. One
is to drop the assumption of additive separability over time. While the same axiomatic
characterization of intertemporal risk aversion holds, it is interesting to work out the
functional representation in the generalized recursive framework and to compare it to the
one derived in my setting. Another extension is to translate the model into a continuous
2See section 11.2. While an application to long-term evaluation studies would make both extensions
necessary, an application to the analysis of laboratory experiments allows to control for the ‘supply’
side.
3Of course, at the same time the assumption that there are only two different classes could be
dropped.
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time setting. While this step is immediate for the non-recursive representation, the
extension for the general setting can work along the lines of Duffie & Epstein (1992).
Finally, a comparable, but slightly more conceptual extension is to allow for history
dependence of preferences. While this step complicates the representations in terms
of Bernoulli utility functions, it should not limit the definition and representation of
intertemporal risk aversion.
A conceptually very promising extension is to combine the reasoning on intertempo-
ral risk aversion with concepts of ambiguity. In particular, a combination of my time
and uncertainty structure with Ghirardato et al.’s (2004) axiomatization of ambiguity
attitude can bring about an attractive model for choice under uncertainty, and a con-
cept of ‘intertemporal ambiguity’. Another possible extension picks up a point that has
been judged an application for the specific problem of global warming and suggests to
analyze it from a more general perspective. The object of investigation is the relation
between the form of discounting and the specifications of intertemporal risk aversion,
the probability distribution over uncertain outcomes, and its evolution over time. In
particular the question arises, under what assumptions on intertemporal risk aversion
and uncertainty evolvement, a welfare representation with a zero rate of pure time pref-
erence converges in an infinite time horizon. Finally, a useful extension of my setting is
to analyze the interpersonal aggregation of welfare for intertemporally risk averse deci-
sion makers. To this end, a comprising axiomatic framework that develops assumptions
on the interpersonal comparability of risk attitude and welfare has to be elaborated.
Summing up, I have suggested a principled approach to long-term evaluation and
decision making. Several related insights have been derived, which shall provoke and
support a discussion on how to treat the, mostly uncertain, long run in environmental
evaluation and economic modeling. The study has opened up several alleys of future
research, and I hope that these lead a way to future answers.
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Proofs and Calculations for Part I
A.1 Calculations for Chapter 2
Derivation of the finite time propagator, of marginal utility:
Using the multiplicative structure of the propagator the derivation of Dxi (t, t0) from
Dxi (t+ dt, t) is straightforward:
Dxi (t+ dt, t0) =
∂U
∂xi
(t+ dt)
∂U
∂xi
(t0)
=
∂U
∂xi
(t+ dt)
∂U
∂xi
(t)
∂U
∂xi
(t)
∂U
∂xi
(t0)
= Dxi (t+ dt, t)D
x
i (t, t0)
⇒ Dxi (t+ dt, t0)−D
x
i (t, t0) = (D
x
i (t+ dt, t)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
‖
Dxi (t, t0)
=
︷ ︸︸ ︷
−δi(x(t), x˙(t), t) dt D
x
i (t, t0)
⇒
Dxi (t+ dt, t0)−D
x
i (t, t0)
dt
= −δi(x(t), x˙(t), t)D
x
i (t, t0)
⇒
d
dt
Dxi (t, t0) = −δi(x(t), x˙(t), t)D
x
i (t, t0)
⇒
d
dt
lnDxi (t, t0) = −δi(x(t), x˙(t), t)
⇒ Dxi (t, t0) = a e
R t
t0
−δi(x(t
′),x˙(t′),t′) dt′
.
Because of Dxi (t, t) = 1 the integration constant a must be equal to 1.
Calculation of the social discount rate for
U(x1, x2, t)=[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s]
1
s e−ρt :
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The derivatives needed for the computation of δ1 are for s 6∈ {0, 1}:
∂U
∂x1
= a1u1(x1)
s−1u′1(x1)
[
a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s
] 1
s
−1
e−ρt ,
∂2U
∂x21
=
(
a1u1(x1)
s−1u′′1(x1)− (1− s)a1u1(x1)
s−2u′1(x1)
2
)
·
[
a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s
] 1
s
−1
· e−ρt
+(1− s)
(
a1u1(x1)
s−1
)2
u′1(x1)
2
[
a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s
] 1
s
−2
e−ρt and
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
= (1− s)
(
a1u1(x1)a2u2(x2)
)s−1
u′1(x1)u
′
2(x2)
·
[
a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s
] 1
s
−2
e−ρt .
Inserting these into equation (3.1) yields:
δ1(t) = ρ−
(a1u1(x1)
s−1u′′1(x1)−(1−s)a1u1(x1)
s−2u′1(x1)
2) [a1u1(x1)
s+a2u2(x2)
s]
1−s
s
a1u1(x1)s−1u′1(x1)[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)s]
1
s
−1
· x˙1 −
(1− s)(a1u1(x1)
s−1)2u′1(x1)
2[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s]
1
s
−2
a1u1(x1)s−1u′1(x1)[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)s]
1
s
−1
x˙1
−
(1− s) (a1u1(x1)a2u2(x2))
s−1 u′1(x1)u
′
2(x2)[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s]
1
s
−2
a1u1(x1)s−1u′1(x1)[a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)s]
1
s
−1
x˙2
= ρ−
u′′1(x1)
u′1(x1)
x˙1 + (1− s)u1(x1)
−1u′1(x1) x˙1
−(1− s)
a1u1(x1)
s−1u′1(x1)
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
x˙1 − (1− s)
a2u2(x2)
s−1u′2(x2)
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
x˙2
= ρ−
u′′1(x1)
u′1(x1)
x˙1
+(1− s)
u1(x1)
−1u′1(x1)(a1u1(x1)
s + a2u2(x2)
s)− a1u1(x1)
s−1u′1(x1)
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
x˙1
−(1− s)
a2u2(x2)
s−1u′2(x2)
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
x˙2
= ρ−
u′′1(x1)
u′1(x1)
x˙1 + (1− s)
a2u2(x2)
s
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
u′1(x1)
u1(x1)
x˙1
−(1− s)
a2u2(x2)
s
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
u′2(x2)
u2(x2)
x˙2 .
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Which brings about equation (3.2):
δ1(t) = ρ−
u′′1(x1)
u′1(x1)
x˙1 − (1−s)
a2u2(x2)
s
a1u1(x1)s + a2u2(x2)s
(
u′2(x2)
u2(x2)
x˙2 −
u′1(x1)
u1(x1)
x˙1
)
.
For s = 1 with ∂
2U
∂x1∂x2
= 0 and 1− s = 0 it is easily observed that the same equation has
to hold. For the case s = 1 it is u(x1, x2) = [a1x
s
1+ a2x
s
2]
1/s (see footnote 6 on page 27).
The derivatives needed for the computation of δ1 are
∂U
∂x1
= a1u1(x1)
a1−1u′1(x1)u2(x2)
a2e−ρt ,
∂2U
∂x21
= a1(a1 − 1)u1(x1)
a1−2u′1(x1)
2
u2(x2)
a2e−ρt
+a1u1(x1)
a1−1u′′1(x1)u2(x2)
a2e−ρt and
∂2U
∂x1∂x2
= a1u1(x1)
a1−2u′1(x1)a2u2(x2)
a2−1u′2(x2)e
−ρt .
These derivatives deliver the social discount rate
δ1(t) = ρ−
u′′1(x1)
u′1(x1)
x˙1 − a2
(
u′2(x2)
a2u2(x2)
x˙2 −
u′1(x1)
a1u1(x1)
x˙1
)
which coincides with equation (3.2) for s = 0 as a1 + a2 = 1.
A.2 Calculations and Proofs for Chapter 3
Some of the proofs make use of the following
Transformation of Vsp s and Vse s:
First note that the following relation holds:
d ln xi(t)
dt
=
x˙i(t)
xi(t)
⇒ d lnxi(t) dt = xˆi(t) dt
⇒ lnxi(t) =
∫ t
0
xˆi(t
′) dt′ + c
⇒ xi(t) = xi(0)e
R t
0 xˆi(t
′) dt′
⇒ xi(t)
s = xi(0)
ses
R t
0 xˆi(t
′) dt′ .
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Therefore the term Vsp s can be transformed as follows:
Vsp s(x1, x2) =
a2x2(t)
s
a1x1(t)s + a2x2(t)s
=
a2x2(0)
ses
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′) dt′
a1x1(0)se
s
R t
0 xˆ1(t
′) dt′ + a2x2(0)se
s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′) dt′
=
1
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
es
R t
0 xˆ1(t
′) dt′
es
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′) dt′
+ 1
=
1
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ + 1
. (A.1)
By switching the indices in equation (A.1) one finds the corresponding expression for
the value share of the environmental good:
Vse s(x1, x2) =
a1x1(t)
s
a1x1(t)s + a2x2(t)s
=
1
a2x2(0)s
a1x1(0)s
es
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ + 1
.
Proof of Proposition 1: The proposition is derived in the text. 2
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that all terms in equations (3.3) and (3.6) are positive.
First I show that Vsp s is strictly increasing. As derived above equation (A.1) holds:
Vsp s =
a2x2(t)
s
a1x1(t)s + a2x2(t)s
=
1
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ + 1
.
From xˆ2(t)−xˆ1(t) > 0∀ t and s > 0 it follows that the expression
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′
is strictly falling in time. Therefore the value share of the produced consumption stream
Vsp s is strictly increasing over time.
Second, such an increasing Vsp s implies that the second term in the social discount rate
for the environmental amenity stream (1− s)Vsp s (x1(t), x2(t)) (xˆ2 − xˆ1) is increasing in
a steady state. As this term is subtracted from the constant rate of pure time preference,
the social discount rate for the first commodity class δ1(t) declines in a steady state.
Third, a strictly increasing term Vsp s implies a strictly decreasing value share of the
environmental amenity stream Vse s = 1 − Vsp s. Such a strictly decreasing term Vse s
implies that the the expression (1− s)Vse s (x1(t), x2(t)) (xˆ2 − xˆ1) strictly decreases in a
steady state. As this expression is added to the constant rate of pure time preference to
yield the social discount rate for the produced consumption stream, the social discount
rate δ2(t) declines as well in a steady state.
Finally, if there exist ǫ > 0 and t∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t)− ǫ for all t ≥ t
∗,
which under assumption 1 is in particular satisfied in a steady state, the expression
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ falls to zero and the value share Vsp s grows to unity. Therefore
in a steady state the discount rate δ1 monotonously falls to δ1 = ρ − (1 − s)(xˆ2 − xˆ1)
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for t→∞. At the same time the value share of the environmental amenity stream Vse s
falls to zero implying that the social discount rate for the produced consumption stream
falls to δ2 = ρ. 2
Proof of Proposition 3: First I show that Vsp s is strictly decreasing. As derived
above equation (A.1) holds:
Vsp s =
a2x2(t)
s
a1x1(t)s + a2x2(t)s
=
1
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ + 1
.
But then from xˆ2(t) − xˆ1(t) > 0∀ t and s < 0 it follows that the expression
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ is strictly increasing in time. Therefore that value share of
the produced consumption stream Vsp s is strictly decreasing over time.
Second, such a decreasing Vsp s implies that the second term in the social discount rate
for the environmental amenity stream (1−s)Vsp s (x1(t), x2(t)) (xˆ2 − xˆ1) is decreasing in
a steady state. As this term is subtracted from the constant rate of pure time preference,
the social discount rate for the first commodity class δ1(t) grows in a steady state.
Third, a strictly decreasing term Vsp s implies a strictly increasing value share of the
environmental service stream Vse s = 1 − Vsp s. Such a strictly increasing term Vse s
implies that the the expression (1− s)Vsp s (x1(t), x2(t)) (xˆ2 − xˆ1) strictly increases in a
steady state. As this expression is added to the constant rate of pure time preference to
yield the social discount rate for the produced consumption stream, the social discount
rate δ2(t) grows as well in a steady state.
Finally if there exist ǫ > 0 and t∗ ∈ [0,∞) such that xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t) − ǫ for all t ≥ t
∗,
which in particular is satisfied under assumption 1 in a steady state, the expression
a1x1(0)s
a2x2(0)s
e−s
R t
0 xˆ2(t
′)−xˆ1(t′) dt′ grows without bounds and the value share Vsp s falls to zero.
Therefore in a steady state the discount rate δ1 monotonously grows to δ1 = ρ for
t → ∞. At the same time the value share of the environmental amenity stream Vse s
grows to one, implying that the discount rate for the produced consumption stream
grows to δ2 = ρ+ (1− s)(xˆ2 − xˆ1). 2
Proof of Proposition 4: The result for the steady state follows immediately from
propositions 2 and 3. For the social discount rate of the environmental amenity stream
the propositions establish the relation lim
t→∞
δ0<s<11 (t) = δ1 = ρ − (1 − s)(xˆ2 − xˆ1) <
ρ = lim
t→∞
δs<01 (t). For the social discount rate of the produced consumption stream the
propositions establish the relation lim
t→∞
δ0<s<12 (t) = ρ < ρ+(1−s)(xˆ2−xˆ1) = lim
t→∞
δs<02 (t).
The proof for the statement assuming only the existence of ǫ > 0 and t∗ ∈ [0,∞)
with xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t)− ǫ for all t ≥ t
∗ is as follows. Consider the long run social discount
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rate for the environmental amenity stream. In the proof of proposition 2 I have shown
that, if there exist ǫ > 0 and t∗ ∈ [0,∞) with xˆ1(t) < xˆ2(t)− ǫ, then the term Vsp
0<s<1
monotonously grows to unity as t → ∞. In particular there has to exist t1 ∈ [0,∞)
such that Vsp 0<s<1 > 2
3
∀ t > t1, implying
(1− s) Vsp 0<s<1 (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t)) > (1− s)
2
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
⇒ δ0<s<11 (t) = ρ− (1− s) Vsp
0<s<1(t) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
< ρ− (1− s)
2
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
for all t > t1. Similarly the fact that for s < 0 the proof of proposition 3 has shown
that Vsp s<0 monotonously falls to zero as t → ∞ implies the existence of t2 such that
Vsp s<0 < 1
3
. Then for the social discount rate of the in the strong sustainability scenario
it follows
(1− s) Vsp s<0 (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t)) < (1− s)
1
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
⇒ δs<01 (t) = ρ− (1− s) Vsp
s<0(t) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> ρ− (1− s)
1
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
for all t > t2. Setting t3 = max{t1, t2} I find
δs<01 (t) > ρ− (1− s)
1
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> ρ− (1− s)
2
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> δ0<s<11 (t)
for all t > t3. Analogously one derives for the social discount rate of the produced
consumption stream the existence of t′1 ∈ [0,∞) such that for 0 < s < 1 it holds
δ0<s<12 (t) = ρ+ (1− s) Vse
0<s<1(t) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
< ρ+ (1− s)
1
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
for all t > t′1 (as Vse
s goes to zero), and the existence of t′2 ∈ [0,∞) such that for s < 0
it holds
δs<02 (t) = ρ+ (1− s) Vse
s<0(t) (xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> ρ+ (1− s)
2
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
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for all t > t′2 (as Vse
s grows to unity). Then setting t′3 = max{t
′
1, t
′
2} delivers the relation
δs<01 (t) > ρ+ (1− s)
2
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> ρ+ (1− s)
1
3
(xˆ2(t)− xˆ1(t))
> δ0<s<11 (t)
for all t > t′3. Setting t¯ = max{t3, t
′
3} yields the statement of the proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of proposition 4 brings about the existence of t¯ ′
and ǫ > 0 such that
δs<0i (t)− δ
0<s<1
i (t) > ǫ for all t > t¯
′
⇔ exp
(∫ t
t¯ ′
δs<0i (t)− δ
0<s<1
i (t) dt
′
)
> exp
(∫ t
t¯ ′
ǫ dt′
)
for all t > t¯ ′
⇔
Dxi
0<s<1
(t, tt¯ ′)
Dxi
s<0
(t, tt¯ ′)
> exp
(∫ t
t¯ ′
ǫ dt′
)
for all t > t¯ ′ .
Therefore, for any t0 ∈ [0,∞) the following relation has to hold for some constant
C ∈ IR++:
Dxi
0<s<1
(t, t0)
Dxi
s<0
(t, t0)
=
Dxi
0<s<1
(tt¯ ′ , t0)
Dxi
s<0
(tt¯ ′ , t0)
Dxi
0<s<1
(t, tt¯ ′)
Dxi
s<0
(t, tt¯ ′)
> C exp
(∫ t
t¯ ′
ǫ dt′
)
. (A.2)
As the right hand side of equation (A.2) grows to infinity for t→∞ the left hand side
in particular grows bigger than one. Hence it exists t¯ such that
Dxi
0<s<1
(t, t0) > D
x
i
s<0
(t, t0) for all t > t¯ .
2
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Appendix B
Proofs for Part II
B.1 Notation and lemma
For convenience I denote the group of nondegenerate affine transformations by
A = {a : IR→ IR : a(z) = a z + b , a, b ∈ IR, a 6= 0} with elements a ∈ A and similarly
the group of positive affine transformations with elements a+ by
A+ = {a+ : IR → IR : a+(z) = a z + b , a, b ∈ IR, a > 0}. This notation will also
be introduced at a later point (page 74) in the main text.
Note: For a ∈ A it holds that Maf (u, p) = f−1a−1
∫
X
afu dp = f−1a−1a
∫
X
fu dp =
f−1
[∫
X
fu dp
]
=Mf (u, p) (the composition sign ◦ has been supressed).
Some proofs in appendix B.3 will make use of the following lemma.
Lemma 0: If the tuple (u, f) represents  in the sense of proposition 7, then so does
the tuple (s ◦ u, f ◦ s−1) for any s : U → IR strictly increasing and continuous.
Proof of lemma 0: The second tuple stands for the representation
sf−1
[∫
X
(fs−1)(su) dp
]
= sf−1
[∫
X
fu dp
]
. The latter is a strictly increasing trans-
formation of the representation Mf (p, u) for  and hence a representation for  itself.
Moreover s ◦ u and f ◦ s−1 are continuous and the latter is strictly monotonic.1 2
1Continuity of s−1 follows from the fact that the inverse of a strictly monotonic function on an
interval is continuous (Heuser 1988, 231).
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B.2 Proofs for Chapter 5
Proof of proposition 6: “⇒”: Let Mf satisfy equation (5.4). Then for some given
function u it is
Mf (p, u) < E(p, u) ∀ p ∈ P thu
⇒ f−1 [p(x¯)f [u(x¯)] + p(x)f [u(x)]] < p(x¯)u(x¯) + p(x)u(x) (B.1)
for all p ∈ P s such p(x¯), p(x) > 0 and p(x¯) + p(x) = 1. Moreover equation (B.1) has to
hold for all elements x, x¯ ∈ X that satisfy the condition u(x¯) > u(x). Define p = p(x)
and p¯ = p(x¯). Then the requirement p(x¯), p(x) > 0 and p(x¯) + p(x) = 1 translates into
p¯,p ∈ (0, 1), p¯ + p = 1. Similarly define u = u(x) and u¯ = u(x¯). Then u(x¯) > u(x)
translates into u¯ > u. With these definitions (B.1) can be written as
⇔ f−1
[
p¯ f [ u¯ ] + pf [u ]
]
< p¯u¯ + pu (B.2)
and has to hold for all p¯,p ∈ (0, 1) with p¯ + p = 1 and for all u¯,u ∈ U with u¯ > u.
Note that the symmetry in (B.2) implies that the condition u¯ > u can be replaced by
the condition u¯ 6= u. But for an increasing function f equation (B.2) is equivalen to
⇔ p¯ f [ u¯ ] + pf [u ] < f [ p¯u¯ + pu ]
and has to hold for all p¯,p ∈ (0, 1), p¯ + p = 1 and for all u¯,u ∈ U with u¯ 6= u. But
this is just the definition of concavity of f on U . Similarly for a decreasing function f
the relation
⇔ p¯ f [ u¯ ] + pf [u ] > f [ p¯u¯ + pu ]
has to hold and defines convexity of f on U . As a strictly monotonic function is either
strictly increasing or strictly decreasing the first assertion in the proposition follows. The
second part for the uncertainty aggregation rule Mα follows immediately from Hardy
et al. (1964, 26) as has already been mentioned in the text. Alternatively verify that
f(z) = zα is strictly decreasing and convex for α < 0 and strictly increasing and concave
for α ∈ (0, 1) but strictly increasing and convex for α > 1. The case α = 0 was defined
by limit. As it holds that limα→0M
f(z)=zα =Mln and the natural logarithm is strictly
increasing and concave the uncertainty aggregation rule corresponding to the geometric
mean and α = 0 is precautionary as well.
“⇐”: Take any p ∈ P thu . Going backwards the steps in in the first part of the proof
immediately gives that strict concavity for an increasing function f and strict convexity
for a decreasing f yield equations (B.1) and (B.2). Thus the evaluation of any threat of
harm lottery by means of the uncertainty aggregation ruleMf renders a lower evaluation
than does expected value. 2
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B.3 Proofs for Chapter 6
Proof of theorem 1: As X is a compact metric space it is Polish and, thus, separable.
Therefore the theorem follows immediately from theorem 3 in Grandmont (1972). 2
Proof of proposition 7: “⇒”: By axioms A1-A3 theorem 1 gives the existence of
the representation (u0, id) with u0 as in theorem 1. Because u of proposition 7 and u0
of theorem 1 are in B it is u
0(x1) ≥ u0(x2) ⇔ δx1  δx2 ⇔ u(x
1) ≥ u(x2) for all
x1, x2 ∈ X. Therefore a strictly increasing transformation s exists such that u = s ◦ u0.
Let U0 ≡ range(u0) and U ≡ range(u). To see that continuity of u and u0 bring about
continuity of s : U0 → U it is enough to find that the preimage of any closed subset
A ⊂ U under s is closed. As u is continuous the preimage of A under u, B = u−1(A),
is closed. Moreover a closed subset of a compact space B is compact and the image of
a compact set under the continuous function u0 is compact (Schofield 2003, 111). In
consequence the resulting image u0(B), which is the sought for preimage of A under s,2
is closed. Hence, s is continuous. Therefore by lemma 0 the tuple (s◦u0, s−1) represents
. Let f+ ≡ s−1, then f+ is strictly increasing and continuous and (u, f+) represent 
in the sense of proposition 7.
“⇐”: First let f be strictly increasing and (u, f) represent  in the sense of proposition
7. Applying lemma 0 with s = f−1 strictly increasing and continuous (see footnote 1)
shows that (f−1 ◦u, id) also represents  in this sense. But than u0 ≡ f−1 ◦u represents
 in the sense of theorem 1. Therefore the latter assures that A1-A3 are satisfied. For f
strictly decreasing note thatMf =M−f and hence the above reasoning can be applied
to the representing tuple (u,−f) with −f strictly increasing.
Moreover part: “⇒”: The statement will be proven in the respective moreover part
of proposition 8. Replace g by f , T by N , (x∗, ..., x∗) by x∗ and (x1, x2, ..., x2) by
1
N
xi +
N−1
N
x2 to read the respective proof in terms of proposition 7. Note that the
constructive proof for uniqueness up to affine transformations in an expected utility
representation as given e.g. in Fishburn (1970, 114 et seq.) or Rubinstein (2006, 93 et
seq.), which could be adapted here, would not carry over to the uniqueness of g in the
intertemporal aggregation rule in proposition 8 because the latter applies fixed weights
to every period.
“⇐”: Follows immediately from Mf = Maf with af being a nondegenerate affine
transformation of f (see beginning of Appendix B.1). 2
2To see that u0(B) is indeed the preimage of A under s note that s ◦ u0(B) = s ◦ u0(u−1(A)) =
u(u−1(A)) = A.
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Proof of corollary 1: “⇒”: By axioms A1-A3 and theorem 1 there exists a repre-
sentation (u0, id) of  in the sense of proposition 7 where id is the identity (defined
on U0 ≡ range(u0)). Then by lemma 0 also (f−1u0, f) represents  in the sense of
proposition 7 (and equation 6.2). Due to continuity of f−1 (see footnote 1) and u0, the
function u ≡ f−1u0 is continuous and constitutes a Bernoulli utility function for which
Mf represents .
Remark with respect to footnote 5 on page 75: In the above construction equation (6.2)
applies f only on the domain f |U : U → U
0. One can define f right away on a given,
nondegenerate interval U = [U,U ] ⊂ IR and require the representing Bernoulli utility
function u : X → U to be surjective. For this case define the affine transformation a+
by a = f(U)−f(U)
U0−U
0 and b =
f(U)U0−f(U)U
0
U0−U
0 . Then u ≡ f−1a0u0 renders the unique Bernoulli
utility function satisfying equation (6.2) together with the above properties.
“⇐”: As u in equation (6.2) is a Bernoulli utility function, this part of the proof is
implied by the “⇐” part of proposition 7.
Moreover part: “⇒”: Equation (6.2) implies for degenerate lotteries that there exists
a strictly increasing function s such that u′ = s ◦ u. As in the proof of proposition 7
it follows that s is continuous. If (u′, f) = (s ◦ u, f) is a representation of  then so
is (s−1 ◦ s ◦ u, f ◦ s) = (u, f ◦ s) by lemma 0. Comparing the latter with the represen-
tation (u, f) the moreover part of proposition 7 brings about the existence of a ∈ A
such that f = afs. From the fact that s is strictly increasing it can be inferred that
a is strictly increasing as well and can be replaced by a+ ∈ A+. But then it follows
fu = a+fsu⇒ fu = a+fu′ ⇒ u = f−1a+fu′.
“⇐”: First let f be increasing. If (u, f) is a representation of  then by proposition 7
also (u,a+f) is a representation. By lemma 0 it follows that also ([a+f ]u,a+f [a+f ]−1)
is a representation. Applying lemma 0 once again yields the result that (f−1a+fu, f) is
a representation of . For f decreasing by proposition 7 (u,−a+f) is a representation
of  and by a similar reasoning as above so are ([−a+f ]u, id), (f−1{−[−a+f ]u},−f),
(f−1a+fu,−f) and (f−1a+fu, f). 2
Proof of proposition 8: “⇒”: By axiom A4 it exists u0 such that
∑T
i=1 u
0(xi) repre-
sents . Furthermore as u ∈ B find that
u(x) ≥ u(x′)
⇔ [x]1  [x
′]1
⇔ (x, x0, ..., x0)  (x′, x0, ..., x0)
⇔ u0(x1) +
T∑
i=2
u0(x0) ≥ u0(x2) +
T∑
i=2
u0(x0)
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⇔ u0(x) ≥ u0(x′).
Hence there exists a strictly increasing and continuous3 transformation function g : U →
IR such that u0 = g ◦ u. But then it is
T∑
t=1
u0(xt) ≥
T∑
t=1
u0(x′t)
⇔
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(xt) ≥
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(x′t)
⇔ 1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(xt) ≥
1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(x′t)
⇔ g−1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(xt)
]
≥ g−1
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
g ◦ u(x′t)
]
yielding the representation stated in equation (6.4).
“⇐”: For g increasing u0 ≡ g ◦ u and for g decreasing u0 ≡ −g ◦ u satisfy axiom A4.
Moreover part: “⇒”: Given the Bernoulli utility function of proposition 8 I define
U = maxx∈X u(x) and U = minx∈X u(X) (the extrema are attained by continuity of
u and compactness of X). Let g′ : U → IR be another strictly monotonic, continuous
function satisfying equation (6.4). If indifference between all outcomes holds (i.e. U =
U), both functions g and g′ have a degenerate codomain and they are trivially affine
transformations of each other. Hence in the following it is assumed that U > U .
Define g˜ = ag′ + b as the affine transformation of g′ that coincides with g on the
best and the worst outcome, i.e. g˜(U)
!
= g(U) and g˜(U)
!
= g(U) (corresponding to
a = g(U)−g(U)
g′(U)−g′(U)
and b = g
′(U)g(U)−g′(U)g(U)
g′(U)−g′(U)
). In the following I will show by contradiction
that g and g˜ have to coincide everywhere. The latter will imply that g′ is in fact an
affine transformation of g.
Assume that g˜(u) and g(u) do not coincide for all u ∈ U .4 Then by continuity and
connectedness there exist x1 and x2 with
u1 ≡ u(x1) < u2 ≡ u(x2) (B.3)
such that g˜(u1) = g(u1), g˜(u2) = g(u2) and
g˜(u) 6= g(u) ∀u ∈ (u1, u2). (B.4)
Let (qi)i∈{1,...,T} denote a sequence of weights with 0 < qi < 1 ∀i and
∑T
i=1 qi = 1.
3Compare continuity of s in the proof of proposition 7.
4For the rest of this proof u also specifies particular values that the utility function u takes on. It
should be obvious where u specifies a function and where it specifies a value.
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The particular case of proposition 8 is qi =
1
T
∀i. By construction it is q1g˜(u1) +∑T
i=2 qig˜(u2) = q1g(u1) +
∑T
i=2 qig(u2). Now equation (B.3) and continuity imply the
existence of x∗ with u∗ ≡ u(x∗) such that
u1 < u
∗ < u2 (B.5)
and (x∗, x∗, . . . , x∗) ∼ (x1, x2, . . . , x2). Therefore the following equivalence holds:
g˜(u∗) = q1g˜(u
∗) +
T∑
i=2
qig˜(u
∗) = q1g˜(u1) +
T∑
i=2
qig˜(u2)
= q1g(u1) +
T∑
i=2
qig(u2) = q1g(u
∗) +
T∑
i=2
qig(u
∗) = g(u∗).
But g˜(u∗) = g(u∗) contradicts equations (B.4) and (B.5). Hence g˜ and g have to coincide
and g′ is an affine transformation of g.
“⇐” is a special case of “⇐” in the moreover part of proposition 7. 2
Proof of theorem 2: “⇒”: First I show that by certainty additivity A4 and time
consistency A5 it is u ∈ BF if and only if u ∈ BT . Hereto note that by certainty
additivity it exists u0 : X → R such that
(x0, x) F (x
0, x′)
⇔ u0(x0) + u0(x) ≥ u0(x0) + u0(x′)
⇔ u0(x) + u0(x0) ≥ u0(x′) + u0(x0)
⇔ (x, x0) F (x
′, x0).
The statement u ∈ BT is equivalent to u(x) ≥ u(x
′)⇔ x T x
′ which by time consis-
tency and the above is equivalent to u(x) ≥ u(x′) ⇔ (x0, x) F (x
0, x′) ⇔ (x, x0) F
(x′, x0). But the latter is the definition of u ∈ BF .
Second by A1-A3 proposition 7 gives the existence of f as in the proposition such
that Mf represents T . For any p ∈ P define x
p to be an arbitrary element of the
set of certainty equivalents {x ∈ X : u(xp) = Mf (p, u)} for p. In the rest of this
paragraph I show that these sets are not empty. As X is connected compact and u
is continuous the range is a closed interval u(X) = [U ,U ]. Moreover max
p
Mf (p, u) =
max
x
Mf (δx, u) = max
x
u(x) = U and min
p
Mf (p, u) = min
x
Mf (δx, u) = min
x
u(x) = U .
Hence u−1
(
Mf (p, u)
)
is nonempty for all p ∈ P .
Third by definition and time consistency A5 it holds that xp ∼T p ⇔ (x, x
p) ∼F
(x, p) ∀x ∈ X, p ∈ P . From certainty additivity A4 and u ∈ B proposition 8
brings about the existence of g as in the proposition such that (x, xp) F (x
′, xp
′
) ⇔
g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x) + 1
2
g ◦ u(xp)
]
≥ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x′) + 1
2
g ◦ u(xp
′
)]
]
.
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Forth combining the above statements I find for any two pairs (x, p), (x′, p′) ∈ X ×P
that the following relation holds:
(x, p) F (x
′, p′)
⇔ (x, xp) F (x
′, xp
′
)
⇔ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x) + 1
2
g ◦ u(xp)
]
≥ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x′) + 1
2
g ◦ u(xp
′
)]
]
⇔ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x) + 1
2
g ◦Mf (p, u)
]
≥ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x′) + 1
2
g ◦Mf (p′, u)
]
.
This implies representation v).
“⇐”: i) follows immediately from proposition 7. The same is true for ii) noting that
Mf (δx, u) = u(x) and using proposition 8. To show iii) first replace a decreasing g by−g
yielding the same representation v) with an increasing g. Then iii) can be seen to hold by
(x, p) F (x, p
′)⇔ g−1
[
1
2
g ◦ u(x) + 1
2
g ◦Mf (p, u)
]
≥ g−1[1
2
g ◦ u(x) + 1
2
g ◦Mf (p′, u)]⇔
g ◦ u(x) + g ◦Mf (p, u) ≥ g ◦ u(x) + g ◦Mf (p′, u)⇔Mf (p, u) ≥Mf (p′, u)⇔ p T p
′.
Moreover part: For g the moreover part is immediate from proposition 8. For f note
that affine transformations of f leaveMf unchanged, so that the affine transformations
allowed for f in vi) by proposition 7 also leave the representative character of v) un-
touched. 2
Proof of lemma 1: The triple (s ◦ u, f ◦ s−1, g ◦ s−1) stands for the representation
sg−1
[
1
2
gs−1su(x) + 1
2
gs−1sf−1
[∫
X
(fs−1)(su) dp
]]
= sg−1
[
1
2
gu(x) + 1
2
gf−1
[∫
X
(fu) dp
]]
.
The latter is a strictly increasing transformation of the representation of F correspond-
ing to the triple (u, f, g). Moreover s◦u, f ◦ s−1 and g ◦ s−1 are continuous (see footnote
1) and f ◦ s−1 and g ◦ s−1 are strictly monotonic. Hence (s ◦ u, f ◦ s−1, g ◦ s−1) is a
representation for F itself. The same reasoning obviously holds for T . 2
Proof of corollary 2: “⇒”: By certainty additivity A4 the set of Bernoulli utility
functions B = BT is not empty. Hence by theorem 2 there exists a representing tuple
(u0, f 0, g0) for some u0 ∈ B. Wlog let f
0 be increasing if and only if f given in the
corollary is increasing (if this is not the case just take −f 0 rendering a representation for
the same preference). Then s = f−1f 0 is strictly increasing and continuous (see footnote
1). Lemma 1 zields that ([f−1f 0]u0, f 0[f−1f 0]−1, g0[f−1f 0]−1) = (f−1f 0u0, f, g0f 0
−1
f)
is a representation of  that uses f to characterize the the uncertainty aggregation rule.
“⇐”: Implied by “⇐” in theorem 2.
Moreover part: “⇒”: Let (u, f, g) and (u′, f, g′) be representations for  in the sense
of v) and vi). Then looking at degenerate lotteries vi) implies that there exists a strictly
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increasing continuous transformation such that u′ = s ◦ u. If (u′, f, g′) = (s u, f, g′) is a
representation of  then by lemma 1 so is the triple (u, fs, g′s). Comparing the latter
to the representation (u, f, g) the moreover part of theorem 2 implies that there have to
exist affine transformations a+ ∈ A+ and a ∈ A such that
f = a+f s ⇔ s−1 = f−1a+f and
g = ag′s.
That a+ has to be positive affine can be inferred from the fact that s is strictly increasing.
Substituting the result for s into the equations for g and u renders
g = ag′f−1a+
−1
f and
u = s−1u′ = f−1a+f u′.
“⇐”: First let f be increasing. If (u, f, g) is a representation of  then by theorem 2
for a+ ∈ A+ and a ∈ A also (u,a+f,ag) is a representation. By lemma 1 it follows
that also ([a+f ]u,a+f [a+f ]−1,ag[a+f ]−1) = (a+fu, id,agf−1a+
−1
) is a representation.
Applying lemma 1 once again yields the result that (f−1a+fu, f,agf−1a+
−1
f) is a
representation of . For f decreasing find that by theorem 2 (u,−a+f,ag) is a repre-
sentation of  and by a similar reasoning as above so are ([−a+f ]u, id,agf−1(−a+)−1),
(f−1{−[−a+f ]u},−f,agf−1(−a+)−1(−f)) and (f−1a+fu,−f,agf−1(a+)−1f) as well
as (f−1a+fu, f,agf−1a+
−1
f). 2
Proof of corollary 3: Imitates the proof of corollary 2. 2
B.4 Proofs for Chapter 7
Proof of lemma 2: Let u ∈ B be an arbitrary Bernoulli utility function for the set
of preference relations . By theorem 2 there exist f and g as in the theorem, unique
up to nondegenerate affine transformations, such that the triple (u, f, g) represents .
Let u˜ ∈ B be any other Bernoulli utility function for  and let the triple (u˜, f˜ , g˜) be
a corresponding representation in the sense of theorem 2.
Compare proof of proposition 7 to see that there exists a strictly increasing continuous
transformation s such that u˜ = s ◦ u. Lemma 1 implies that with (u, f, g) as well
(s ◦ u, f ◦ s−1, g ◦ s−1) = (u˜, f ◦ s−1, g ◦ s−1) is a representation for . Comparing the
latter to the representation (u˜, f˜ , g˜) the moreover part of theorem 2 implies the existence
of affine transformations a, a˜ ∈ A such that f˜ = af ◦ s−1 and g˜ = a˜g ◦ s−1. But then
find that f˜ ◦ g˜−1 = af ◦ s−1 ◦ s ◦ g−1a˜−1 = af ◦ g−1a˜−1 ∈ fˆ ◦ gˆ−1. 2
202
B.4. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 7
Proof of theorem 3: a) “⇒”: The first part of the premise in axiom A6 snd translates
into the representation of theorem 2 as
(x¯, x¯) ∼F (x1, x2)
⇔ g−1
(
1
2
g ◦ u(x¯) + 1
2
g ◦ u(x¯)
)
= g−1
(
1
2
g ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
g ◦ u(x2)
)
⇔ u(x¯) = g−1
(
1
2
g ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
g ◦ u(x2)
)
(B.6)
and for the second part of the premise renders
x1 6∼T x2
⇔ u(x1) 6= u(x2) . (B.7)
Writing the implication of axiom A6 snd in the representation of theorem 2 yields
x¯ ≻T
1
2
x1 +
1
2
x2
⇔ u(x¯) > f−1
(
1
2
f ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
f ◦ u(x2)
)
. (B.8)
Combining equations (B.6) and (B.8) renders
g−1
(
1
2
g ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
g ◦ u(x2)
)
> f−1
(
1
2
f ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
f ◦ u(x2)
)
(B.9)
which for an increasing [decreasing] version of f is equivalent to
⇔ f ◦ g−1
(
1
2
g ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
g ◦ u(x2)
)
> [<] 1
2
f ◦ u(x1) +
1
2
f ◦ u(x2) .
Defining zi = g ◦ u(xi) the equation becomes
⇔ f ◦ g−1
(
1
2
z1 +
1
2
z2
)
> [<] 1
2
f ◦ g−1(z1) +
1
2
f ◦ g−1(z2) . (B.10)
Noting that for all x1, x2 ∈ X there exists a certainty equivalent x¯ to the lottery
1
2
x1+
1
2
x2
(compare proof of theorem 2) so that the first part of the premise is satisfied and that
the second part of the premise implies (by equation B.7) that z1 6= z2, one finds that
equation (B.10) has to hold for all z1, z2 ∈ Γ with z1 6= z2. Therefore f ◦ g
−1 has to be
strictly concave [convex] on Γ (Hardy et al. 1964, 75).
a) “⇐”: The necessity of axiom A6 snd is seen to hold by mainly going backwards through
the proof of sufficiency given above. Strict concavity [convexity] of f ◦ g−1 with f
increasing [decreasing] implies that equation (B.10) and thus equation (B.9) have to hold
for z1, z2 ∈ Γ with z1 6= z2. The latter corresponds to the second part of the premise of
axiom A6 snd (see equation B.7). The second part of the premise corresponding to (B.6)
guarantees that equation (B.9) implies equation (B.8) which yields the implication of
axiom A6 snd.
b): Replace in the proof of part a) ‘strict’ by ‘weak’, ‘≻T ’ by ‘T ’ and ‘>’ by ‘≥’ and
the proof is valid for part b).
c)“⇒”: Replacing in the reasoning of “a ⇒” the symbols ‘≻T ’ by ‘∼T ’ and ‘>’ by ‘=’
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yields the following alteration of equation (B.10)
f ◦ g−1
(
1
2
z1 +
1
2
z2
)
= 1
2
f ◦ g−1(z1) +
1
2
f ◦ g−1(z2)
which has to hold for all z1, z2 ∈ Γ with z1 6= z2. By Acze´l (1966, 46) this condition
implies linearity of f ◦ g−1 on Γ. Hence f ◦ g−1 = a for some a ∈ A. Then gauging
f = id yields g = a−1. But as g is only determined up to affine transformations I can
represent the same preference with choosing g = id as well. However with f = g = id the
representation of theorem 2 represents F as intertemporally additive expected utility.
c)“⇐”: If the preference relation  is representable by intertemporal expected utility,
then the premise of axiom A6wnd, respectively the first part of the premise of axiom A6
s
nd,
translates into
(x¯, x¯) ∼F (x1, x2)
⇔ u(x¯) + u(x¯) = u(x1) + u(x2)
⇔ u(x¯) = 1
2
(u(x1) + u(x2))
⇔ x¯ ∼F
1
2
x1 +
1
2
x2
and thus implies intertemporal risk neutrality. 2
Proof of proposition 9: Let h be some function in fˆ ◦ gˆ−1. Then any other function
h˜ in fˆ ◦ gˆ−1 can be expressed as h˜ = aha˜−1 for some a, a˜ ∈ A. Strict concavity of h is
equivalent to
h
(
1
2
z1 +
1
2
z2
)
> 1
2
h (z1) +
1
2
h (z2)
for all z1, z2 ∈ Γ with z1 6= z2 (Hardy et al. 1964, 75). Furthermore with introducing
z˜i = a˜zi, i ∈ 1, 2, the following manipulations hold
⇔ ah
(
1
2
z1 + a
1
2
z2
)
> 1
2
ah (z1) +
1
2
ah (z2)
⇔ ah
(
1
2
a˜−1z˜1 +
1
2
a˜−1z˜2
)
> 1
2
ah
(
a˜−1z1
)
+ 1
2
ah
(
a˜−1z2
)
⇔ aha˜−1
(
1
2
z˜1 +
1
2
z˜2
)
> 1
2
aha˜−1 (z1) +
1
2
aha˜−1 (z2)
⇔ h˜
(
1
2
z˜1 +
1
2
z˜2
)
> 1
2
h˜ (z˜1) +
1
2
h˜ (z˜2)
for all z˜1, z˜2 ∈ Γ˜ = a˜Γ with z˜1 6= z˜2. But the last equation characterizes strict concavity
of h˜. The same reasoning holds true for weak concavity replacing > for ≥ and for
convexity reversing the inequalities. 2
Proof of corollary 4: By corollary 3 there exists a Bernoulli utility function u and a
function f such that in a g = g¯-gauge the triple (u, f, g¯) represents the set of preference
relations . The allowed transformations for u and f without fixing the range of u
are (u, f) → (u˜, f˜) = (g−1a+−1g u,a f g−1a+g) with a ∈ A and a+ ∈ A+. Now
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write the closed interval W ∗ as [U,U ] and require that some representing Bernoulli
utility function u˜ satisfies u˜(xmin) = U and u˜(xmax) = U , where xmin and xmax are
elements of the set of worst respectively best outcomes in X (which is non-empty due to
compactness and continuity). Starting from the arbitrary Bernoulli utility function u an
appropriate u˜ is obtained as u˜ = g¯−1a+
−1
g¯ u by means of the affine transformation a+
satisfying the conditions a+ (g¯ ◦ u(xmin))
!
= g¯(U) and a+ (g¯ ◦ u(xmax))
!
= g¯(U). Being
an affine function, a+ is determined uniquely by fixing two of its points. Thus, u˜ is
determined uniquely and the freedom remaining for the representing function f reduces
to f → f˜ = af with a ∈ A. Therefore, the expression for intertemporal risk aversion
f ◦ g¯−1 is determined up to transformations f ◦ g¯−1 → f˜ g¯−1 = afg¯−1, rendering the
according measures unique. 2
Proof of corollary 5: This is a trivial consequence of theorem 2. Everything but the
uniqueness of g has been established there. But fixing two points of a function g that
is determined already up to affine transformations obviously removes the indeterminacy
completely. 2
Proof of lemma 3: Let the triples (u, f, g) and (u˜, f˜ , g˜) be arbitrary representations
for the set of preference relations = (F ,T ). As in the proof of lemma 2 it follows
that there exists a strictly increasing continuous function s and affine transformations
a, a˜ ∈ A such that u˜ = s ◦ u, f˜ = af ◦ s−1 and g˜ = a˜g ◦ s−1. Let xmin and xmax
be (members of the set of) worst respectively best outcomes in X with respect to .
Writing the closed interval G as G = [G,G] the additional assumption in lemma 3
requires for the function g that G = g ◦ u(xmin) and G = g ◦ u(xmax). Similarly for g˜ it
has to hold that G = g˜ ◦ u˜(xmin) and G = g˜ ◦ u˜(xmax). Together with the implication of
lemma 2 these requirements bring about the relations
G = g˜ ◦ u˜(xmin) = a˜g ◦ s−1 ◦ u˜(xmin) = a˜g ◦ u(xmin) = a˜G and
G = g˜ ◦ u˜(xmax) = a˜g ◦ s−1 ◦ u˜(xmax) = a˜g ◦ u(xmax) = a˜G .
Therefore a˜ has to be the identity and it is f˜ ◦ g˜−1 = af ◦ s−1 ◦ s ◦ g−1a˜−1 = af ◦ g−1.
But by construction the measures of intertemporal risk aversion RIRA and AIRA are
independent of the remaining indeterminacy corresponding to the transformation a. 2
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Appendix C
Proofs for Part III
C.1 Proofs for Chapter 8
Proof of theorem 4: The proof is divided into four parts. The first part gives a
representation for certain consumption paths which is a generalization of proposition 8
for non-stationary utility. In part two I derive a corresponding recursive formulation,
still only for certain consumption paths. Finally, part three works out the general
representation for temporal lotteries as given in the theorem. Part four verifies that the
derived representation implies all axioms.
Part I (“⇒”): First, note that certainty additivity A4 for 1 carries over to t for all
t with coinciding Bernoulli utility functions uoτ ,τ≥t . The argument works inductively.
Given that t |X1 has a certainty additive representation with Bernoulli utility functions
uoτ ,τ≥t , it follows from time consistency A5 that for all x
t+1, x′t+1 ∈ Xt+1 and any xt ∈ Xt:
xt+1 t+1 x
′t+1
⇔ (xt, x
t+1) t (xt, x
′t+1)
⇔ uot (xt) +
∑T
τ=t+1 u
o
τ (x
t+1
τ ) ≥ u
o
t (xt) +
∑T
τ=t+1 u
o
τ (x
′t+1
τ )
⇔
∑T
τ=t+1 u
o
τ (x
t+1
τ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t+1 u
o
τ (x
′t+1
τ ).
Therefore t+1 has a certainty additive representation which uses the same Bernoulli
utility functions uoτ for τ ≥ t+1 as does the above representation for t. In the following
uot continues to denote the above utility index derived from certainty additivity, while
ut denotes the period t (Bernoulli-) utility function given in the theorem.
Second, I show that for every pair of utility functions uot and ut there exists a strictly
207
APPENDIX C. PROOFS FOR PART III
increasing, continuous transformation gt such that ut = gt ◦ u
o
t . By uτ ∈ Bt I have:
ut(xt) ≥ ut(x
′
t)
⇔ [xt]t t [x
′
t]t
⇔ (xt, x
o, ..., xo) t (x
′
t, x
o, ..., xo)
⇔ uot (xt) +
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (xτ ) ≥ u
o
t (x
′
t) +
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (xτ )
⇔ uot (xt) ≥ u
o
t (x
′
t)
Hence ut is a monotonic transformation of u
o
t and it exists a strictly increasing function
gt : Ut → IR such that u
o
t = gt ◦ ut. For the fact that continuity of u
o
t and ut imply
continuity of gt consult the proof of proposition 7.
Third, I give a representation over certain consumption paths in terms of the Bernoulli
utility functions ut, t ∈ {1, ..., T}, given in the theorem. This is merely a task of com-
bining the two results derived above which yield for all t and all xt, x′t ∈ Xt:
xt t x
′t
⇔
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (x
t
τ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (x
′t
τ )
⇔
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
′t
τ ).
Part II (“⇒”): In this part, I construct the recursive analogue to the above represen-
tation for certain consumption paths. Let me first define for every t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} the
intertemporal aggregation rule
N gt,gt+1 : Ut × Ut+1 → IR
N gt,gt+1(·, ·) = g−1t
[
θtgt(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
with normalization constants
θt =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
and ϑt =
Gt+1Gt−Gt+1Gt
∆Gt
.
The normalization constants ensure that the domain of g−1t in the intertemporal aggre-
gation rule is in fact [Gt, Gt]. This will be verified in the rest of this paragraph. To this
purpose, note that
Gt+1 + ϑt =
Gt+1(Gt−Gt)+Gt+1Gt−Gt+1Gt
∆Gt
= ∆Gt+1
∆Gt
Gt and
Gt+1 + ϑt =
Gt+1(Gt−Gt)+Gt+1Gt−Gt+1Gt
∆Gt
= ∆Gt+1
∆Gt
Gt .
The maximal value of the argument of g−1t [ · ] in N
gt,gt+1 is taken on for Gt = gt(U t)
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and Gt+1 = gt+1(U t+1) which yields
θt
[
gt(·) + θ
−1
t+1 {gt+1(·) + ϑt}
]max
= ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
[
Gt +
PT
τ=t+1 ∆Gτ
∆Gt+1
{
Gt+1 + ϑt
}]
= ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
[
Gt +
PT
τ=t+1 ∆Gτ
∆Gt+1
{
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
Gt
}]
= ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
[
Gt∆Gt+Gt
PT
τ=t+1 ∆Gτ
∆Gt
]
= Gt.
The minimal value of the argument of g−1t [ · ] in N
gt,gt+1 is taken on for Gt = gt(U t) and
Gt+1 = gt+1(U t+1). In this case exactly the same equation holds true with Gt replaced
by Gt. Hence the expression defining the intertemporal aggregation rule N
gt,gt+1 is well
defined.
For the second step, I introduce the notation txt−1 to denote the continuation of the
consumption path xt−1 ∈ Xt−1 from period t on, i.e. xt−1 = (xt−1t−1,
t xt−1). Then, define
the aggregate intertemporal utility functions for certain consumptions paths by setting
u˜T = uT and for 1 < t ≤ T recursively:
u˜t−1(x
t−1) ≡ u˜t−1(x
t−1
t−1 ,
txt−1) = N gt−1,gt∗
(
ut−1(x
t−1
t−1), u˜t(
txt−1)
)
= g−1t−1
[
θt−1 gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
t−1
t−1) + θt−1θ
−1
t gt ◦ u˜t(
txt−1) + θt−1θ
−1
t ϑt−1
]
.
From the first step in this part it follows that range(u˜t) = [U t, U t].
Third, I show that there exist constants ξt, such that the following equation holds for
all t ∈ {1, .., T}:
θ−1t gt ◦ u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt . (C.1)
As θT = 1 this relation obviously holds for t = T (with ξT = 0). The following
manipulation shows that the equation holds by (backwards) induction for all t:
θ−1t−1 gt−1 ◦ u˜t−1(x
t−1)
= θ−1t−1 gt−1 ◦ g
−1
t−1
[
θt−1 gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
t−1
t−1) + θt−1θ
−1
t gt ◦ u˜t(
txt−1) + θt−1θ
−1
t ϑt−1
]
= gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
t−1
t−1) + θ
−1
t gt ◦ u˜t(
txt−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸ + θ−1t ϑt−1
= gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
t−1
t−1) +
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
t−1
τ ) + ξt + θ
−1
t ϑt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=
∑T
τ=t−1 gτ ◦ uτ (x
t−1
τ ) + ξt−1 .
But (C.1) states that on certain consumption paths u˜t is a (strictly) increasing trans-
formation of
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ and hence a representation of t |Xt .
Note: The following equality holds:
θtθ
−1
t+1 =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
PT
τ=t+1 ∆Gτ
∆Gt+1
= ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
PT
τ=t∆Gτ
∆Gt+1
− ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
= (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
. (C.2)
Part III (“⇒”): The extension of the representation to uncertainty employs backward
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induction. The induction hypothesis I have to proof is the following. For every t ∈
{1, ..., T} and u˜t defined as in the theorem, it holds
H1 ∃ft : Ut → IR s.th. pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
ft(pt, u˜t) ≥M
ft(p′t, u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
The proof uses recursively the following additional hypothesis claiming that for every
lottery there exists a certainty equivalent that is a certain consumption path:
H2 For all pt ∈ Pt there exists x
pt ∈ Xt such that xpt ∼ pt.
Let me first verify that induction hypothesis H1 and H2 are satisfied for t = T . For
H1 this is an immediate consequence of proposition 7. Observing that for t = T it is
xt = x
t, also H2 is an immediate consequence of the existence of a certainty equivalent
for every pT ∈ PT which has been shown in the proof of proposition 7.
Given H1 and H2 for t I proceed to show that the induction hypotheses also hold for
t − 1. To this end, note that Mft(pt, u˜t) = M
ft(xpt , u˜t) = u˜t(x
pt) and find that the
following equivalence holds:
(xt−1, pt) t−1 (x
′
t−1, p
′
t)
⇔ (xt−1, x
pt) t−1 (x
′
t−1, x
p′t)
⇔ u˜t−1(xt−1, x
pt) ≥ u˜t−1(x
′
t−1, x
p′t)
⇔ N gt−1,gt (ut−1(xt−1), u˜t(x
pt)) ≥ N gt−1,gt
(
ut−1(x
′
t−1), u˜t(x
p′t)
)
⇔ N gt−1,gt
(
ut−1(xt−1),M
ft(pt, u˜t)
)
≥ N gt−1,gt
(
ut−1(x
′
t−1),M
ft(p′t, u˜t)
)
⇔ u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) ≥ u˜t−1(x
′
t−1, p
′
t) ,
where u˜t−1 is the aggregate intertemporal utility function for degenerate period t−1 lot-
teries as given in the theorem. u˜t−1 ∈ C
0(Xt−1×Pt) satisfies (xt−1, pt) t−1 (x
′
t−1, p
′
t)⇔
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) ≥ u˜t−1(x
′
t−1, p
′
t) for all (xt−1, pt), (x
′
t−1, p
′
t) ∈ Xt−1 × Pt. Therefore, by
proposition 7 with the compact metric space Xt−1 × Pt, it exists ft−1 : Ut−1 → IR such
that:
pt−1 t−1 p
′
t−1 ⇔ M
ft−1(pt−1, u˜t−1) ≥M
ft−1(p′t−1, u˜t−1) ∀ pt−1, p
′
t−1 ∈ Pt−1.
Hence H1 also holds for t−1. Moreover as shown in the proof of proposition 7 for every
lottery pt−1 ∈ Pt−1 there exists a certainty equivalent x˜
pt−1 = (x
pt−1
t−1 , p
pt−1
t ) ∈ Xt−1 × Pt
such that pt−1 ∼t−1 x˜
pt−1 . Given that induction hypothesis H2 holds for t, there exists
a certain consumption path xp
pt−1
t with xp
pt−1
t ∼t p
pt−1
t . Therefore by time consistency
xpt−1 ≡ (xpt−1t−1 , x
p
pt−1
t ) is a certain consumption path which satisfies xpt−1 ∼t−1 pt−1.
Hence, the second induction hypothesis H2 is satisfied for t − 1 as well, and recursion
gives that H1 and thus the theorem is satisfied for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Part IV (“⇐”):
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A1 (weak order): Transitivity and completeness are trivial.
A2 (independence): Let pt ∼t p
′
t. Then for any p
′′
t ∈ Pt, a ∈ [0, 1] it follows:
pt ∼t p
′
t
⇔ f−1t
∫
ftu˜t dpt = f
−1
t
∫
ftu˜t dp
′
t
⇔
∫
ftu˜t dpt =
∫
ftu˜t dp
′
t
⇔ a
∫
ftu˜t dpt + (1− a)
∫
ftu˜t dp
′′
t = a
∫
ftu˜t dp
′
t + (1− a)
∫
ftu˜t dp
′′
t
⇔ f−1t
∫
ftu˜t d(a pt + (1− a) p
′′
t ) = f
−1
t
∫
ftu˜t d(a p
′
t + (1− a) p
′′
t )
⇔ a pt + (1− a) p
′′
t ∼t a p
′
t + (1− a) p
′′
t .
A3 (continuity): Using the topology of weak convergence on Pt, the functional
Mft(·, u˜t) : Pt → IR is continuous. For all pt ∈ Pt define the numbers U
pt ∈ IR by
Upt = Mft(pt, u˜t). Then, the sets {p
′
t ∈ Pt : p
′
t t pt} and {p
′
t ∈ Pt : pt t p
′
t} are the
inverse image of the closed intervals [Upt , U ] and [U,Upt ] under Mft(·, u˜t) and as such
they are closed.
A4 (certainty additivity): Defining uoτ = gτ ◦ uτ for all τ ∈ {1, ..., T} find that for all
x, x′ ∈ XT :
x  x′
⇔ u˜t(x) ≥ u˜t(x
′)
⇔
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (xτ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
′
τ )
⇔
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (xτ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t u
o
τ (x
′
τ ).
A5 (time consistency): For all t ∈ {1, ..., T} find for all xt ∈ Xt and pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1:
(xt, pt+1) t (xt, p
′
t+1)
⇔ g−1t
[
θt gt ◦ ut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1 ◦M
ft+1(pt+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
≥ g−1t
[
θt gt ◦ ut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1 ◦M
ft+1(p′t+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
⇔ M ft+1(pt+1, u˜t+1) ≥ M
ft+1(p′t+1, u˜t+1)
⇔ pt+1 t+1 p
′
t+1.
Moreover Part: Uniqueness of (ft)t∈{1...T} up to affine transformations follows for each
ft as in the proof of theorem 2.
1 In the following I give the proof for the uniqueness
result for (gt)t∈{1...T} which is slightly more involved.
“⇐”: It has to be proven that if the triple (uτ , fτ , gτ )τ∈{t,...,T} represents t as in the
theorem, then so does the tuple (uτ , fτ , g
′
τ )τ∈{t,...,T} with (g
′
τ )τ∈{t,...,T} = (agτ+bτ )τ∈{t,...,T}
for any a, b ∈ IR, a > 0. For the g′τ -scenario the normalization constants change as
1As seen in theorem 2 the allowed transformations for f and g are independent.
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follows.
θ′t =
∆G′tPT
τ=t∆G
′
τ
= a∆GtPT
τ=t a∆Gτ
= ∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
= θt and (C.3)
ϑ′t =
G′t+1G′t−G
′
t+1G
′
t
∆G′t
=
(aGt+1+bt+1)(aGt+bt)−(aGt+1+bt+1)(aGt+bt)
a∆Gt
= aϑt +
bt+ta(Gt−Gt)+bta(Gt+1−Gt+1)
a∆Gt
+ bt+1bt−bt+1bt
a∆Gt
= aϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
(C.4)
for t ∈ {1, ..., T}.2 Hence, noting that g′−1t (·) = g
−1
t
[
a−1t {(·)− bt}
]
, the intertemporal
aggregation rule transforms as
N g
′
t,g
′
t+1(·, ·) = g′−1t
[
θ′tg
′
t(·) + θ
′
tθ
′−1
t+1g
′
t+1(·) + θ
′
tθ
′−1
t+1ϑ
′
t
]
= g−1t
[
a−1
{
θt(agt(·) + bt) + θtθ
−1
t+1(agt+1(·) + bt+1)
+θtθ
−1
t+1(aϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
)− bt
}]
= g−1t
[
θtgt(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt + a
−1{
θtbt + θtθ
−1
t+1bt+1 + θtθ
−1
t+1(−bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
)− bt
}]
= g−1t
[
θtgt(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= N gt,gt+1(·, ·) .
To arrive at the last line I have used equation (C.2). It results that (uτ , fτ , g
′
τ )τ∈{t,...,T}
is a representation of t.
“⇒”: From the proof of the main part (in particular from equation C.1) it is known
that if the sequences (fτ )τ∈{t,...,T} and (gτ )τ∈{t,...,T} represent t as in the theorem, then∑T
τ=t gτ ◦uτ (xτ ) represents t on the set of certain outcome paths. In particular assume
that (uτ , fτ , gτ )τ∈{1,...,T} and (uτ , f
′
τ , g
′
τ )τ∈{1,...,T} both represent 1. Then
∑T
τ=1 gτ ◦
uτ (xτ ) and
∑T
τ=1 g
′
τ ◦ uτ (xτ ) both represent 1 |X1 . Pick any r ∈ {1, ..., T}. Define
g˜τ =
∆Gr
∆G′r
g′τ + gτ (uτ )− g
′
τ (uτ )
∆Gr
∆G′r
for all τ ∈ {1, ..., T} which yields
g˜τ (uτ ) = gτ (uτ ) ∀τ ∈ {1, ..., T} and
g˜r(ur) = gr(ur).
As (g˜τ )τ∈{1,...,T} = (ag
′
τ+bτ )τ∈{1,...,T} with a > 0 it follows from “⇐” that
∑T
τ=t g˜τ ◦uτ (xτ )
represents 1 |X1 . In the following, I will show that in fact (g˜τ ),τ∈{1,...,T}= (gτ )τ∈{1,...,T}
completing the proof.
The proof that (g˜τ )τ∈{1,...,T} has to be equal to (gτ )τ∈{1,...,T} distinguishes two cases.
In the first case, I assume that for all τ ∈ {1, ..., T} it is g˜τ 6= gτ . In the second case, I
assume that for at least one τ ∈ {1, ..., T} it is g˜τ = gτ and for some other it is g˜τ ′ 6= gτ ′ .
Both assumptions will lead to a contradiction. For the rest of this proof I will slightly
modify notation letting Uτ ∈ IR denote utility levels in period τ (and not the range of
2Where bT+1 and ∆GT+1 are treated as zero to render ϑ
′
T = 0.
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uτ ).
Case 1: Assume that for all τ ∈ {1, ..., T} it is g˜τ 6= gτ .
First, observe that due to continuity, connectedness, g˜(U r) = g(U r) and g˜(U r) =
g(U r), there have to exist U
1
r and U
2
r such that g˜(U
1
r ) = g(U
1
r ), g˜(U
2
r ) = g(U
2
r ) and
g˜(Ur) 6= g(Ur) ∀Ur ∈ (U
1
r , U
2
r ). Furthermore pick any s ∈ {1, ..., T} with s 6= r. Then,
again by continuity, connectedness and g˜(U s) = g(U s) there exist U
1
s and ǫ > 0 such that
g˜(Us) = g(Us) ∀Us ≤ U
1
s and g˜(Us) 6= g(Us) ∀Us ∈ (U
1
s , U
1
s + ǫ). For all τ /∈ {s, r} fix
xτ = x
o
τ arbitrarily for the rest of this proof. To simplify notation let (Us, Ur)  (U
′
s, U
′
r)
be shorthand for (xo1, ..., xs, ..., xr, ..., x
o
T ) 1 (x
o
1, ..., x
′
s, ..., x
′
r, ..., x
o
T ), where Us = us(xs)
and Ur = ur(xr).
3
Second, for U∗s ∈ (U
1
s , U
1
s + ǫ) define U
∗
r by the requirement (U
∗
s , U
1
r ) ∼ (U
1
s , U
∗
r ).
4
Pick a U∗s for which U
∗
r ∈ (U
1
r , U
2
r ). Restating this indifference in the
∑T
τ=1 g˜τ ◦ uτ (xτ )
and
∑T
τ=1 gτ ◦ uτ (xτ ) repesentations for 1 |X1 yields respectively
g˜s(U
∗
s ) + g˜r(U
1
r ) = g˜s(U
1
s ) + g˜r(U
∗
r )
gs(U
∗
s ) + gr(U
1
r ) = gs(U
1
s ) + gr(U
∗
r ) .
The terms stemming from periods τ /∈ {r, s} cancel because they are the same on both
sides of the equation. Moreover by construction it is g˜r(U
1
r ) = gr(U
1
r ) and g˜s(U
1
s ) =
gs(U
1
s ). Therefore taking the difference of the two equation above brings about
g˜s(U
∗
s )− gs(U
∗
s ) = g˜r(U
∗
r )− gr(U
∗
r ) . (C.5)
Third define U∗∗r by (U
∗
s , U
∗∗
r ) ∼ (U
1
s , U
2
r ). Such U
∗∗
r exists and lies in (U
1
r , U
2
r )
due to continuity, connectedness and (U∗s , U
1
r ) ∼ (U
1
s , U
∗
r ) ≺ (U
1
s , U
2
r ) ∼ (U
∗
s , U
∗
r ∗) and
(U∗s , U
2
r ) ≻ (U
1
s , U
2
r ) ∼ (Us∗, U
∗
r ∗). Stating the indifference condition in the
∑T
τ=1 g˜τ ◦
uτ (xτ ) and
∑T
τ=1 gτ ◦ uτ (xτ ) representations for 1 |X1 yields respectively
g˜s(U
∗
s ) + g˜r(U
∗∗
r ) = g˜s(U
1
s ) + g˜r(U
2
r )
gs(U
∗
s ) + gr(U
∗∗
r ) = gs(U
1
s ) + gr(U
2
r ) .
Due to g˜s(U
1
s ) = gs(U
1
s ) and g˜r(U
2
r ) = gr(U
2
r ) taking the difference between these two
equations renders
g˜s(U
∗
s )− gs(U
∗
s ) = − [g˜r(U
∗∗
r )− gr(U
∗∗
r )] . (C.6)
3For r < s nothing but the order in this notation would change.
4It can happen that for some U∗s there is no U
∗
r high enough within the domain of ur such that the
indifference holds (i.e. no xr ∈ Xr is good enough to make up for getting outcome x1s instead of x
∗
s in
period s). However continuity, connectedness and U1r < Ur make sure that for small enough U
∗
s > U
1
s
there exist U∗r satisfying the condition. In particular for any U
∗
s satisfying the condition given in the
next line there obviously exists U∗r .
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The fourth step derives a contradiction from combining equations (C.5) and (C.6).
Together these two equations yield the following statement:
g˜r(U
∗
r )− gr(U
∗
r ) = − [g˜r(U
∗∗
r )− gr(U
∗∗
r )] . (C.7)
Recollect that U∗r , U
∗∗
r ∈ (U
1
r , U
2
r ) where by construction it has to hold that g˜r(Ur) 6=
gr(Ur). Together with equation (C.7) it follows that either g˜r(U
∗
r ) > gr(U
∗
r ) and
g˜r(U
∗∗
r ) < gr(U
∗∗
r ) or vice versa. In any case continuity together with connectedness
implies that there exists U0r between U
∗
r and U
∗∗
r for which g˜r(U
0
r ) = gr(U
0
r ). But this
contradicts g˜(Ur) 6= g(Ur) ∀Ur ∈ (U
1
r , U
2
r ) and hence the “case 1 assumption” that for
all τ ∈ {1, ..., T} it is g˜τ 6= gτ .
Case 2: Assume that there exist i, j ∈ {1, ..., T} such that g˜i 6= gi and g˜j = gj.
Then, in analogy to case 1 there exist U1i and ǫ > 0 such that g˜(Ui) = g(Ui) ∀Ui ≤ U
1
i
and g˜(Ui) 6= g(Ui) ∀Ui ∈ (U
1
i , U
1
i + ǫ). Furthermore fix some U
1
j < U j. As in case 1 fix
τ /∈ {s, r} to some arbitrary xoτ and use the shorthand notation (Ui, Uj)  (U
′
i , U
′
j) for
(xo1, ..., xi, ..., xj, ..., x
o
T ) 1 (x
o
1, ..., x
′
i, ..., x
′
j, ..., x
o
T ).
Pick some U∗i ∈ (U
1
i , U
1
i + ǫ) such that there exists U
∗
j < U j satisfying (U
∗
i , U
1
j ) ∼
(U1i , U
∗
j ).
5 Stating this indifference condition in the
∑T
τ=1 g˜τ ◦uτ (xτ ) and
∑T
τ=1 gτ ◦uτ (xτ )
repesentations for 1 |X1 yields respectively
g˜i(U
∗
i ) + g˜j(U
1
j ) = g˜i(U
1
i ) + g˜j(U
∗
j )
gi(U
∗
i ) + gj(U
1
j ) = gi(U
1
i ) + gj(U
∗
j ) .
Again the terms stemming from periods τ /∈ {i, j} cancel. Moreover it is g˜j(U
1
j ) =
gj(U
1
j ), g˜i(U
1
i ) = gi(U
1
i ) and g˜j(U
∗
j ) = gj(U
∗
j ). But this implies g˜i(U
∗
i ) = gi(U
∗
i ) in
contradiction to g˜(Ui) 6= g(Ui) ∀Ui ∈ (U
1
i , U
1
i + ǫ). 2
Proof of theorem 5: The moreover part of theorem 4 shows that the functions
gt for t ∈ {1, ..., T} exhibit an affine freedom with translational constants b
g
t that are
independent between the different periods. In the following I show that this freedom can
be used to eliminate the normalization constants ϑt in the representation of theorem 4.
“⇒”: Take an arbitrary representation (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} for the preferences (t)t∈{1,...,T}
in the sense of theorem 4. I construct a transformation gt → g˜t = gt + bt, such that
the particular representation going along with (ut, ft, g˜t)t∈{1,...,T} satisfies ϑ˜t = 0 for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Let the translation parameter b1, g1 → g˜1 = g1 + b1, be arbitrary but
5Again the existence of an appropriate U1j is just a question of picking U
∗
i ∈ (U
1
i , U
1
i + ǫ) close
enough to U0i .
214
C.1. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 8
fixed. Equation (C.4) shows that the condition for ϑ˜t = 0 is equivalent to
ϑ˜t = aϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
!
= 0
⇔ bt+1 = aϑt + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
. (C.8)
Fixing inductively the constants bt for t > 1 by equation (C.8) eliminates the normal-
ization constants ϑ˜t and renders the new intertemporal aggregation rule
N gt,gt+1∗ : Ut × Ut+1 → IR
N gt,gt+1∗ (·, ·) = g˜
−1
t
[
θtg˜t(·) + θtθ
−1
t+1g˜t+1(·)
]
,
which is used in the representation of theorem 5.
“⇐”: Observe that the condition Gt+1
Gt+1
= Gt
Gt
implies ϑt = 0:
Gt+1
Gt+1
= Gt
Gt
⇔ Gt+1Gt = GtGt+1
⇔ Gt+1Gt −GtGt+1 = 0
⇔ ϑt = 0 .
But then, the necessity part of the proof is a special case of theorem 4.
Moreover part: “⇒”: Let (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (ut, f
′
t , g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} be representations
in the sense of theorem 5. By theorem 4, I know that the functions gt and g
′
t can at
most differ by an affine translation of type gt → g
′
t = a gt + bt. In addition equation
(C.8) has to be satisfied with ϑt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}. Given b1 and defining
b = b1
∆G1
, the latter equation determines all translation parameters bt as
bt = bt−1
∆Gt
∆Gt−1
= bt−2
∆Gt−1
∆Gt−2
∆Gt
∆Gt−1
= bt−2
∆Gt
∆Gt−2
= bt−3
∆Gt
∆Gt−3
= ...
= b1
∆Gt
∆G1
= b∆G1
∆Gt
∆G1
= ∆Gt b .
Therefore, the remaining freedom of a representation (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of
theorem 5 is given by the simultaneous transformations gt → g
′
t = a gt + ∆Gt b for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T} with a ∈ IR++ and b ∈ IR and, as before, the independent transformations
ft → f
′
t = a
f
t ft + b
f
t for t ∈ {1, ..., T} with a
f
t ∈ IR++ and b
f
t ∈ IR.
“⇐”: Wlog let (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} be a representation of (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of
theorem 5. Recalling from the main part of the proof that Gt+1
Gt+1
= Gt
Gt
implies ϑt = 0,
it is know that (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} is also a representation in the sense of theorem 4.
Thus, by the moreover part theorem 4, (ut, f
′
t , agt + ∆Gtb)t∈{1,...,T} is a representation
in the sense of theorem 4 as well, whenever f ′t is a positive affine transformation of ft.
Moreover, because of ϑt = 0 equation (C.4) implies
ϑ′t = aϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
= −∆Gt+1 b+∆Gt b
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
= 0 .
Therefore, the sequence of triples (ut, f
′
t , agt +∆Gtb)t∈{1,...,T} also is a representation in
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the sense of theorem 5.
Remark: On certain consumption paths the representation simplifies to the form
u˜t(x
t) = g−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ )
]
. (C.9)
This is an immediate consequence of equation (C.1) in the proof of theorem 4.
Recognizing that ϑt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} implies ξt = 0 in all periods, the referenced
equation becomes θ−1t gt◦u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦uτ (x
t
τ ) which is equivalent to equation (C.9).
2
Proof of lemma 4: Due to backwards recursion in the construction of the aggregate
utility functions u˜t, the representing functions for t > τ stay unaltered by the change
(uτ , fτ , gτ )→ (u
′
τ , f
′
τ , g
′
τ ). For aggregate intertemporal utility in period τ find:
u˜′τ (xτ , pτ+1)= sτg
−1
τ
[
θτ gτs
−1
τ sτuτ (xτ ) +θτθ
−1
τ+1 gτ+1M
fτ+1(pτ+1, u˜τ+1) +θτθ
−1
τ+1ϑτ
]
= sτ ◦ u˜τ (xτ , pτ+1) .
Note that the normalization constants do not change as the range of gτ and g
′
τ are the
same. Then, the new representing functional in period τ becomes
Mf
′
τ (pτ , u˜
′
τ ) = M
f ′τ (pτ , sτ ◦ u˜τ )
= sτ ◦ f
−1
τ
[ ∫
fτ ◦ s
−1
τ ◦ sτ ◦ u˜τ dpτ
]
= sτ ◦M
fτ (pτ , u˜τ ).
As it corresponds to a strictly increasing transformation of Mfτ (pτ , u˜τ ), it represents
τ . For period τ − 1 the new aggregate intertemporal utility function becomes:
u˜′τ−1(xτ−1, pτ ) = g
−1
τ−1
[
θτ−1 gτ−1uτ−1(xτ−1) +
θτ−1
θτ
gτs
−1
τ M
f ′τ (pτ , u˜′τ ) +
θτ−1
θτ
ϑτ−1
]
= g−1τ−1
[
θτ−1 gτ−1uτ−1(xτ−1) +
θτ−1
θτ
gτs
−1
τ sτM
fτ (pτ , u˜τ ) +
θτ−1
θτ
ϑτ−1
]
= u˜τ−1(xτ−1, pτ ).
Therefore, again due to backwards recursion in the construction of the functions u˜t, the
representing functions in periods t < τ stay unchanged. In consequence, (ut, ft, gt)
′
t∈{1,...,T}
is a representation of (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 4, whenever
(ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} is a representation of (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 4. 2
Proof of corollary 6: The main part of the proof imitates that of corollary 2. Instead
of applying lemma 1, gauge lemma 4 is used for every period.
Moreover part: “⇒”: Also the moreover part works along the lines of corollary 2.
Let (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (u
′
t, ft, g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} be representations in the sense of the corol-
lary. Then it exists for every t a strictly increasing, continuous function st such that
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u′t = st ◦ ut. Lemma 4 implies that with (u
′
t, ft, g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} = (st ut, ft, g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} being
a representation of , so is the sequence of triples (u,ftst, g
′
tst)t∈{1,...,T}. Comparing the
latter to the representation (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} it can be deduced from the moreover part
of theorem 4 that there have to exist a ∈ IR++ as well as affine transformations a
+
t ∈ A
+
and aat ∈ A
a for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, such that
ft = a
+
t ft st ⇔ s
−1
t = f
−1
t a
+
t ft and (C.10)
gt = a
a
t g
′
tst. (C.11)
Substituting the result for the functions st into the equations for gt and ut renders
gt = a
a
t g
′
tf
−1
t a
+
t
−1
ft and
ut = s
−1
t u
′
t = f
−1
t a
+
t ft u
′
t.
“⇐”: Let the sequence of triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} be a representation of the pref-
erences described by = (t)t∈{1,...,T}. Then by theorem 4, with a
+
t ∈ A
+ for t ∈
{1, ..., T}, and aat ∈ A
a, also the sequence (ut,a
+
t ft,a
a
t gt)t∈{1,...,T} is a representation
of . By lemma 4 it follows that also ([a+t f ]ut,a
+
t ft[a
+
t ft]
−1,aat gt[a
+
t ft]
−1)t∈{1,...,T} =
(a+t ftut, id,a
a
t gtf
−1
t a
+
t
−1
)t∈{1,...,T} is a representation of . Applying lemma 4 once again
yields the result that the sequence (f−1t a
+
t ftut, ft,a
a
t gtf
−1
t a
+
t
−1
ft)t∈{1,...,T} is a represen-
tation of . 2
Proof of corollary 7: Imitates the proof of corollary 6. In the moreover part instead
of equations (C.10) and (C.11) find
ft = a
+
t f
′
t st and
gt = a
a
t gtst ⇔ s
−1
t = g
−1
t a
a
t gt .
Substituting the result for the functions st into the equations for ft and ut renders
ft = a
+
t f
′
t g
−1
t a
a
t
−1gt and
ut = s
−1
t u
′
t = g
−1
t a
a
t gt u
′
t .
2
Proof of theorem 6: The proof is divided into five parts. In the first, I translate
axiom A6 s into the representation of theorem 4. In the second part, I show that the
equation derived in the first part locally implies strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t . Part three
extends this result to strict concavity on the entire set Γt. Part four proofs the necessity
of axiom A6 s for the strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t . Together, parts one through four proof
assertion a) of the theorem for the case of strict intertemporal risk aversion. For the
case of strict intertemporal risk seeking just change the signs in the inequalities and
replace concave by convex. Part five lays out how assertions b-d) follow from the proof
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of assertion a). Part I (“⇒”): In part one I translate axiom A6 s into the representation
of theorem 4. I start with the first line, i.e the premise, and use equation (C.1) to find:
xt ∼t x
′t
⇒ g−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
= g−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
gτuτ (x
′t
τ ) + ξt
]
. (C.12)
The existence of τ ∈ {t, ..., T} such that [xtτ ]τ 6∼τ [x
′t
τ ]τ , translates into
gτuτ (x
t
τ ) 6= gτu(x
′t
τ ) for some τ ∈ {t, ..., T}. (C.13)
The second line of axiom A6 s becomes
xt ≻T
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(xt−ix
′t
i ).
⇒ g−1t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
>
f−1t
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]]
⇒ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
.
Using equation (C.12) the left hand side can be transformed as follows:
ftg
−1
t
[
T−t
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
+ 1
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
′t
τ ) + ξt
]]
>∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
⇒ ftg
−1
t
[
1
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
i=t
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]]
>∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
⇒ ftg
−1
t
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]]
> (C.14)∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
.
Let me define the function z˜ : Xt → Γt by z˜(x
t) = θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt. Compare
part two of the proof of theorem 4 to see that, when restricting the domain to those
consumption paths satisfying equation (C.13),6 the function z˜ is onto Γt =
(
Gτ , Gτ
)
=(
θt
∑T
τ=tGτ+ξt , θt
∑T
τ=tGτ+ξt
)
. In particular define zi = z˜
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )
)
. In this notation
equation (C.14) becomes
ftg
−1
t
(∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
zi
)
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t (zi). (C.15)
If equation (C.15) had to hold for all zi ∈ Γt it would be a straight forward condition
for strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t . However, axiom A6
s does not immediately imply that
the equation has to be met for every choice (zi)i∈{t,...,T}, zi ∈ Γt. Equation (C.15) has to
6It is for the latter restriction that the theorem is considering the open set Γt.
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hold only for sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} that are stemming from consumption paths (x
t
−ix
′t
i )
for which x′t ∈ Xt and xtτ ∈ X
t satisfy the premise of axiom A6 s. In what follows, I
proceed to show that this restricted demand is enough to imply strict concavity of ft ◦g
−1
t
on Γt.
Part II (“⇒”): Let zo ∈ Γt. In this part I show that for every such z
o there exists
an open neighborhood Nzo ⊂ Γt such that equation (C.15) implies strict concavity of
ft ◦ g
−1
t on Nzo .
In the first step I define a certain consumption path xot ∈ Xt with z˜(xot) = zo. It
will satisfy the additional characteristic that none of its outcomes is extremal. Define
(Goτ )τ∈{t,...,T} to be a sequence with Gτ < G
o
τ < Gτ∀τ and θt
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ + ξt = z
o. Such a
sequence has to exist as zo ∈ Γt implies θt
∑T
τ=tGτ+ξt < z
o < θt
∑T
τ=tGτ+ξt. Moreover
by connectedness of X and continuity of gτ ◦ uτ there exists for every τ ∈ {t, ..., T} an
outcome xoτ ∈ u
−1
τ [g
−1
τ (G
o
τ )] such that G
o
τ = uτgτ (x
o
τ ). Define x
ot
τ = (x
o
t , ..., x
o
T ).
In the second step I define deviation paths xµt around xot. Set ǫτ = min{G
o
τ −
Gτ , Gτ − G
o
τ} for τ ∈ {t, ..., T} and let ǫ = minτ∈{t,...,T} ǫτ . By construction of x
ot it is
ǫ > 0. For any sequence µ = (µτ )τ∈{t,...,T} with µτ ∈ (−ǫ, ǫ) define G
µ
τ = G
o
τ + µτ for all
τ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Then each Gµτ is element of (G
o
τ − ǫ, G
o
τ + ǫ) ⊂ (Gτ , Gτ ) and hence there
exists xµτ
t ∈ u−1t
[
g−1t (G
µ
τ )
]
. Define xµt = (xµt , ..., x
µ
T ).
Third, I calculate the zµi ∈ Γt corresponding to the consumption paths (x
ot
−ix
µt
i) and
restate the condition xot ∼t x
µt in terms of zo and (zµi )i∈{t,...,T}. It is
zµi = z˜
(
(xot−ix
µt
i)
)
= θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xot−ix
µt
i)τ
)
+ ξt
= θt
(
(
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ )−G
o
i +G
µ
i
)
+ ξt
= zo + θt(G
µ
i −G
o
i ).
Hence zµi = z˜
(
(xot−ix
µt
i)
)
as a fuction of µi is onto (G
o
τ − θtǫ , G
o
τ + θtǫ). The equation
also implies that the condition [xotτ ] 6∼τ [x
µt
τ ] ⇔ gτuτ (x
η
τ ) 6= gτu(x
µ
τ ) ⇔ G
o
τ 6= G
µ
τ for
some τ ∈ {t, ..., T} is equivalent zµi 6= z
o for some τ . Using equation (C.12) I further
find that xot ∼t x
µt translates into
θt
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ + ξt = θt
∑T
τ=tG
µ
τ + ξt
⇒ θt
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ + ξt =
T−t
T−t+1
(
θt
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ + ξt
)
+ 1
T−t+1
(
θt
∑T
τ=tG
µ
τ + ξt
)
⇒ θt
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ + ξt =
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t
(
θt
(
(
∑T
τ=tG
o
τ )−G
o
i +G
µ
i
)
+ ξt
)
⇒ zo = 1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t z
µ
i .
Summarizing steps one to three I have shown that equation (C.15) has to hold for all
sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ (z
o−θtǫ, z
o+θtǫ) satisfying
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t zi = z
o (and not
all zi = z
o). However, due to the restriction that the weighted average has to equal zo
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this requirement is not enough to guarantee concavity of ftg
−1
t on zi ∈ (z
o−θtǫ, z
o+θtǫ).
Define Nzo = (z
o − θtǫ
2
, zo + θtǫ
2
). In the following I proceed to show that (C.15) has
to hold for all non-constant sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ Nzo . The latter will be
sufficient to guarantee strict concavity of ftg
−1
t on the open set Nzo .
In step four, take any z∗ ∈ Nzo . I construct a corresponding consumption path x
∗t
with z∗ = z˜(x∗t) as well as a perturbation xηt around it. Define
G∗τ = G
o
τ +
z∗−zo
θt(T−t+1)
∈
(
Goτ −
−θtǫ
2θt(T−t+1)
, Goτ +
−θtǫ
2θt(T−t+1)
)
⊂ (Goτ − ǫ, G
o
τ + ǫ) .
Then there exists x∗τ ∈ u
−1
t
[
g−1t (G
∗
τ )
]
. Define the consumption path x∗t = (x∗t , ..., x
∗
T )
and find that indeed
z˜(x∗t) = θt
T∑
τ=t
G∗τ + ξt = θt
(
T∑
τ=t
Goτ +
z∗−zo
θt(T−t+1)
)
+ ξt
= zo + z∗ − zo
(
T∑
τ=t
1
(T−t+1)
)
= z∗
Aim of the following construction is to make sure that the perturbations xηt around
x∗t account for all sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ Nzo that satisfy
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t zi = z
∗.
Define ǫ∗− = ǫ−(G
o
i−G
∗
i ) and ǫ
∗
+ = ǫ+(G
o
i−G
∗
i ). For any sequence η = (ητ )τ∈{t,...,T} with
ητ ∈ (−ǫ
∗
−, ǫ
∗
+) letG
η
τ = G
o
τ+ητ for all τ ∈ {t, ..., T}. Then eachG
η
τ is in (G
o
τ−ǫ, G
o
τ+ǫ) ⊂
(Gτ , Gτ ) and hence there exists x
η
τ
t ∈ u−1t
[
g−1t (G
η
τ )
]
. Let xηt = (xηt , ..., x
η
T ).
In step five, I calculate the zηi = z˜
(
(x∗t−ix
ηt
i)
)
corresponding to the consumption paths
(x∗t−ix
ηt
i) and restate the condition x
∗t ∼t x
ηt in terms of z∗ and (zηi )i∈{t,...,T}. It is
zηi = z˜
(
(x∗t−ix
ηt
i)
)
= θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(x∗t−ix
ηt
i)τ
)
+ ξt
= θt
(
(
∑T
τ=tG
∗
τ )−G
∗
i +G
η
i
)
+ ξt
= z∗ + θt(G
η
i −G
∗
i ). (C.16)
As before with xot and xµt the condition [x∗tτ ] 6∼τ [x
ηt
τ ] for some τ ∈ {t, ..., T} is
equivalent to zµi 6= z
o for some i and equations (C.12) and (C.16) translate x∗t ∼t x
ηt
into
z∗ = 1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t z
η
i .
In step six it is shown that the zηi calculated in the previous step can generate any
sequence (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with elements zi ∈ Nzo that satisfies
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t z
η
i = z
∗. To verify
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this fact find that each zηi = z
∗ + θt(G
η
i −G
∗
i ) can take any
7 of the values in(
z∗ + θt(−ǫ
∗
−) , z
∗ + θtǫ
∗
−
)
=
(
zo + (z∗ − zo)− θt
(
ǫ− (Goi −G
∗
i )
)
, zo + (z∗ − zo) + θt
(
ǫ+ (Goi −G
∗
i )
))
=
(
zo + (z∗ − zo)− θtǫ− θt
z∗−zo
θt(T−t+1)
, zo + (z∗ − zo) + θtǫ− θt
z∗−zo
θt(T−t+1)
)
=
(
zo − θtǫ+ (z
∗ − zo)
(
1− 1
T−t+1
)
, zo + θtǫ+ (z
∗ − zo)
(
1− 1
T−t+1
) )
which due to z∗ ∈ Nzo = (z
o − θtǫ
2
, zo + θtǫ
2
) is a superset of
⊇
(
zo − θtǫ+
θtǫ
2
(
1− 1
T−t+1
)
, zo + θtǫ−
θtǫ
2
(
1− 1
T−t+1
) )
⊇
(
zo − θtǫ
2
, zo + θtǫ
2
)
.
Therefore the zηi can take on any value in Nzo as long as the sequence satisfies z
∗ =
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t z
η
i . Hence equation (C.15) also has to hold for all non-constant sequences
(zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ Nzo and
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t zi = z
∗.
Finally, I show that ftg
−1
t has to be strictly concave on Nzo . Equation (C.15) has to
hold for all non-constant sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ Nzo and
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t zi = z
∗.
But z∗ was an arbitrary element of Nzo and steps four to six hold for any z
∗ ∈ Nzo .
Therefore equation (C.15) has to hold for all sequences (zi)i∈{t,...,T} with zi ∈ Nzo except
for the constant sequences with zi = zj ∀ i, j ∈ {t, ..., T}).
8 Now pick any l ∈ {t, ..., T−1}
and define λ = l−t+1
T−t+1
> 0. Furthermore for any pair za, zb ∈ Nzo select zt = ... = zl = za
and zl+1 = ... = zT = zb. Then equation (C.15) becomes
ftg
−1
t
(
λza + (1− λ)zb
)
> λftg
−1
t (za) + (1− λ)ftg
−1
t (zb)
and has to hold for all za, zb ∈ Nzo , za 6= zb. But due to the continuity of ft ◦ g
−1
t this
implies strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t on Nzo (Hardy et al. 1964, 74,75).
Part III (“⇒”): In this part I show that the local strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t on Nzo
for all zo ∈ Nzo as derived in the second part implies strict concavity on Γt.
9 I will
first demonstrate that weak concavity extends to Γt and then that local strict concavity
together with global weak concavity imply strict concavity of ft ◦ g
−1
t on all of Γt.
First, note that a concave function ht = ft ◦ g
−1
t on Nzo has non-increasing right-
continuous right-derivatives h′t+ as well as non-increasing left-continuous left-derivatives
7Of course all zi together have to sum up to (T − t+ 1)z
∗ and not all zi can be equal to z
∗. These
however are the only restrictions.
8Any such sequence yields a weighted arithmetic mean that lies within Nzo .
9I have to show that concavity does not only hold for convex combinations within a particular set
Nzo but for all convex combinations within Γt.
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h′t− at every point in Nzo (van Tiel 1984, 4,5). Moreover there are at most countably
many points in Nzo where ht is not differentiable (van Tiel 1984, 5). Take any closed
interval [zl, zu] ⊂ Γt. Then already a finite number of open sets Nzo with z
o ∈ I ⊆ Γt, I
finite, cover [zl, zu] (Heine-Borel-theorem). Hence there are just countably many points
where ht is not differentiable on [z
l, zu]. Denote the countable set where ht is not differ-
entiable by A. Then on [zl, zu]\A it is h′t− = h
′
t+ and due to the left-continuity of the
left-derivative and right-continuity of the right-derivative ht
′ is continuous on [zl, zu]\A.
Moreover for all points in A the left- and right-derivative exist. But for such an almost
everywhere continuously differentiable function the fundamental theorem of calculus
applies (Ko¨nigsberger 1995, 217). Therefore the relation ht(z) = ht(c) +
∫ z
c
h′t+(z
′) dz,
c, z ∈ [zl, zu] holds. By van Tiel (1984, 9) such an integral representation with a right-
continuous non-increasing integrand is a sufficient condition for weak concavity of ht on
[zl, zu]. Moreover any open set Γt ⊂ IR is exhaustible by compact sets, i.e there exists
an isotone sequence of closed intervals [zln, z
u
n],n∈IN such that Γt =
⋃
n∈IN[z
l
n, z
u
n]. Hence
ht has to be weakly concave on Γt.
Second, I show that local strict concavity together with global weak concavity implies
strict concavity on Γt. Take any pair of points za, zb ∈ Γt, za < zb. Let zc ∈ Nzb be a
point satisfying za < zc < zb. Moreover define λ ∈ (0, 1) by zc = λza + (1 − λ)zb and
let µ = 1
2λ
. Then the following inequality holds for any pair za 6= zb in Γt (as za < zb is
wlog):
ftg
−1
t
(
1
2
za +
1
2
zb
)
= ftg
−1
t
(
µλ za + (1− µλ) zb
)
= ftg
−1
t
(
µλ za +
(
µ (1− λ) + (1− µ)
)
zb
)
= ftg
−1
t
(
µ (λ za + (1− λ) zb)︸ ︷︷ ︸
zc
+(1− µ) zb
)
> µ ftg
−1
t
(
λza + (1− λ) zb
)
+ (1− µ) ftg
−1
t (zb)
≥ µ
(
λ ftg
−1
t (za) + (1− λ) ftg
−1
t (zb)
)
+ (1− µ) ftg
−1
t (zb)
= µλ ftg
−1
t (za) +
(
µ (1− λ) + (1− µ)
)
ftg
−1
t (zb)
= µλ ftg
−1
t (za) + (1− µλ) ftg
−1
t (zb)
= 1
2
ftg
−1
t (za) +
1
2
ftg
−1
t (zb) .
Therefore ftg
−1
t is strictly concave on Γt (Hardy et al. 1964, 75).
Part IV (“⇐”): It is left to proof that strict concavity on Γt implies axiom A6
s. As
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in part one of this proof the prerequisite of A6 s becomes
xt ∼t x
′t
⇒ g−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
= g−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
gτuτ (x
′t
τ ) + ξt
]
. (C.17)
The existence of i ∈ {t, ..., T} such that [xti]i 6∼i [x
′t
i ]i translates into
gτuτ (x
t
i) 6= gτu(x
′t
i )
⇔ θt
T∑
τ=t
τ 6=i
gτu(x
t
τ ) + θtgiuτ (x
t
i) + ξt 6=
T∑
τ=t
τ 6=i
gτu(x
t
τ ) + θtgτu(x
′t
i ) + ξt
⇔ z˜(xt) 6= z˜
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )
)
(C.18)
for some i ∈ {t, ...T}. But then due to strict concavity of ft◦g
−1
t , the fact that z˜
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )
)
cannot be the same for all i,10 and using equation (C.17) it has to hold that
ftg
−1
t
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]]
>∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
⇒ ftg
−1
t
[
T−t
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
+ 1
T−t+1
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
′t
τ ) + ξt
]]
>∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]
⇒ g−1t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (x
t
τ ) + ξt
]
>
f−1t
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
t
[
θt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )τ
)
+ ξt
]]
⇒ xt ≻T
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(xt−ix
′t
i ) .
Note that the flow of manipulations is laid out in more detail (going backwards) in part
two of the proof.
Part V: Assertion b) is obtained by replacing A6 s by A6wand the strict inequaties
by their weak counterparts.11 A decision maker is intertemporally risk neutral if his
preferences satisfy weak risk seeking as well as weak risk aversion. Therefore, assertion
b) implies that the function ft ◦ g
−1
t has to be concave and convex at the same time
and, thus, linear. On the other hand, a representation featuring a linear composition
ft ◦ g
−1
t yields indifference between the certain consumption path and the lottery and,
therefore, satisfies weak risk seeking as well as weak risk aversion (compare part four of
the proof). In consequence, assertion c) holds. The proof of assertion d) is completely
10This is implied by equation (C.18) as again z˜(xt) equals the weighted average
1
T−t+1
∑T
i=t z˜
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )
)
.
11In this case the second step in part three becomes redundant.
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analogous to that of assertion a). Equation (C.15) becomes
ftg
−1
t
(
1
2
zhigh + 1
2
zlow
)
> 1
2
ftg
−1
t (z
high) + 1
2
ftg
−1
t (z
low) ,
implying that the last step (“Finally...”) in part three of the proof can be omitted. 2
Proof of lemma 5: Let the triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (u˜t, f˜t, g˜t)t∈{1,...,T} be arbi-
trary representations for the set of preference relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of
theorem 4. For every t ∈ {1, ..., T} there exist, as in the proof of lemma 3, strictly in-
creasing continuous function st and affine transformations a
+
t ∈ A
+, as well as a ∈ R++
and affine transformations aat ∈ A
a, such that u˜t = st ◦ ut, f˜t = a
+
t ft ◦ s
−1
t and
g˜t = a
a
t gt ◦ s
−1
t .
a) The requirement that for some t∗ both representations satisfy the condition ∆Gt∗ =
Gt∗ −Gt∗ = gt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
max)− gt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
min)
!
= w∗ implies
w∗ = G˜t∗ − G˜t∗ = g˜t∗ ◦ u˜t∗(x
max)− g˜t∗ ◦ u˜t∗(x
min)
= aat∗ gt∗ ◦ s
−1
t∗ ◦ u˜t∗(x
max)− aat∗ gt∗ ◦ s
−1
t∗ ◦ u˜t∗(x
min)
= aat∗ gt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
max)− aat∗ gt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
min)
= agt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
max) + bt∗ − agt∗ ◦ ut∗(x
min)− bt∗
= a
(
Gt∗ −Gt∗
)
= aw∗ .
Therefore, a = 1 and, as the multiplicative constant is the same for all periods, the
remaining freedom of the expression ft ◦ g
−1
t corresponds to transformations ft ◦ g
−1
t →
f˜t ◦ g˜
−1
t = a
+
t ft ◦ g
−1
t a
1
t
−1
, where a1t
−1
denotes the inverse of aa=1t , i.e. a
1
t
−1
(z) = z − bt.
To compare the functions ft◦g
−1
t and f˜t◦g˜
−1
t characterizing intertemporal risk aversion
in the different representations, I first have to work out how the argument
z = θtgt ◦ ut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1gt+1
(
Mf (pt+1, ut+1
)
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
= θtgtut(xt) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + ϑt
)
scales under the above transformations. This step is necessary in order to compare both
measures for the same consumption plans. To this end, first note that a = 1 implies
∆G˜t = ∆Gt. Therefore it is θ˜t = θt. Moreover, simultaneous transformations (ut, gt)→
(u˜, g˜t) = (stut, gts
−1
t ) leave the normalization constant ϑt unchanged, because Gt =
gt ◦ ut(x
max
t ) = gts
−1
t stgt(x
max
t ) = g˜t ◦ u˜t(x
max
t ) = G˜t and similarly Gt = G˜t. Therefore,
by equation (C.4) it follows that general transformations (ut, ft, gt) → (u˜t, f˜t, g˜t) =
224
C.1. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 8
(stut,a
+
t fts
−1
t , gts
−1
t + bt) yield ϑ˜t = ϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
. With these results, I find
z˜ = θ˜tg˜tu˜t(xt) + (1− θ˜t)
∆G˜t
∆G˜t+1
(
g˜t+1M
f (pt+1, u˜t+1) + ϑ˜t
)
= θt
(
gts
−1
t stut(xt) + bt
)
+
(1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1s
−1
t+1st+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + bt+1 + ϑt − bt+1 + bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
)
= θtgtut(xt) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + ϑt
)
+
+θtbt + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
bt
∆Gt+1
∆Gt
)
= θtgtut(xt) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + ϑt
)
+ bt
= z + bt.
In consequence, for twice differentiable functions ft ◦gt, it follows by equation (7.8) that
˜AIRAt(z˜)
∣∣∣
z˜=z+bt
= −
(
f˜t◦g˜
−1
t
)
′′
(z˜)(
f˜t◦g˜
−1
t
)
′
(z˜)
∣∣∣∣
z˜=z+bt
= −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
= AIRAt(z) .
Thus, the measures of absolute intertemporal risk aversion AIRAt are independent of the
particular choice of the triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} representing the underlying preferences
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} .
b) The requirement that gt ◦ ut(x
zero
t ) = g˜t ◦ u˜t(x
zero
t ) = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} yields
0 = g˜t ◦ u˜t(x
zero
t )
= agt ◦ s
−1
t stut(x
zero
t ) + bt
= agt ◦ ut(x
zero
t ) + bt
= a · 0 + bt = bt .
Therefore it is f˜t ◦ g˜
−1
t = a
+ftg
−1
t a
−1. To compare the functions ft ◦ g
−1
t and f˜t ◦
g˜−1t , characterizing intertemporal risk aversion, I have to relate the arguments z and z˜
corresponding to the same consumption plan. As in the proof of assertion a), it holds
that the transformations st leave Gt, Gt, and ∆Gt unchanged. Therefore, I know for the
general transformations (ut, ft, gt) → (u˜t, f˜t, g˜t) = (stut,a
+
t fts
−1
t , agts
−1
t ) by equation
(C.3) that θ˜t = θt and by equation (C.4) that ϑ˜ = aϑt. With these results, I find
z˜ = θ˜tg˜tu˜t(xt) + (1− θ˜t)
∆G˜t
∆G˜t+1
(
g˜t+1M
f (pt+1, u˜t+1) + ϑ˜t
)
= θtagts
−1
t stut(xt) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
agt+1s
−1
t+1st+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + aϑt
)
= a
(
θtgtut(xt) + (1− θt)
∆Gt
∆Gt+1
(
gt+1M
f (pt+1, ut+1) + ϑt
))
= az.
In consequence, for twice differentiable functions ft ◦gt, it follows by equation (7.6) that
˜RIRAt(z˜)
∣∣∣
z˜=az
= −
(
f˜t◦g˜
−1
t
)
′′
(z˜)(
f˜t◦g˜
−1
t
)
′
(z˜)
z˜
∣∣∣∣
z˜=az
= −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
z = RIRAt(z) .
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Thus, the measures of relative intertemporal risk aversion RIRAt are independent of the
particular choice of the triples (ut, ft, gt)t∈{1,...,T} representing the underlying preferences
= (t)t∈{1,...,T} .
c) Simply combine statements a) and b), acknowledging that the requirements are dis-
joint in the sense that a) fixes the multiplicative parameter a, while b) fixes the trans-
lational parameters bt.
d) As in the proof of asserion a), it follows that a = 1. Therefore, the requirement
Gt = G˜t = wt for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} implies
wt = G˜t = g˜tu˜t(x
min)
= gts
−1
t stut(x
min) + bt = gtut(x
min) + bt
= wt + bt,
and thus bt = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. But then, the rest of the proof is equivalent to
that of assertions a) and b). 2
C.2 Proofs for Chapter 9
Proof of theorem 7: The proof is divided into four parts. Axioms A1-A3, A4’ and
A5’ assure the existence of a representation in the sense of theorem 4. In the first part
I show that axiom A7 allows to pick the same Bernoulli utility for all periods. In the
second part I work out a relation between the functions gt in different periods that has
to hold in such a representation by axiomA7. Part three calculates the corresponding
normalization constants and brings about the representation stated in the theorem.
Finally, part four proves the necessity of the axioms.
Part I (“⇒”): I show that axiom A7 implies that there exists a strictly monotonic
and continuous transformation st such ut−1 = st ◦ ut for any t ∈ {1, .., T}. To this end,
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translate axiom A7 into the representation of theorem 4 using equation (C.1).
(x2, x0) 1 (x
′2, x0) ⇔ x2 2 x
′2
; u˜1
(
(x2, x0)
)
≥ u˜1
(
(x′
2
, x0)
)
⇔ u˜1(x
2) ≥ u˜1(x
′2)
; g−11
(
θ1
T∑
τ=2
gτ−1 ◦ uτ−1(x
2
τ ) + gT ◦ uT (x
0) + ξ1
)
≥ g−11
(
θ1
T∑
τ=2
gτ−1 ◦ uτ−1(x
′2
τ−1) + gT ◦ uT (x
0) + ξ1
)
⇔ g−12
(
θ2
T∑
τ=2
gτ ◦ uτ (x
2
τ ) + ξ2
)
≥ g−12
(
θ2
T∑
τ=2
gτ ◦ uτ (x
′2
τ ) + ξ2
)
Considering in particular the consumption paths x2, x′2 satisfying x2τ = x
′2
τ ∀ τ 6= t yields
; gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
2
t ) ≥ gt−1 ◦ ut−1(x
′2
t ) ⇔ gt ◦ ut(x
2
t ) ≥ gt ◦ ut(x
′2
t )
; ut−1(x
2
t ) ≥ ut−1(x
′2
t ) ⇔ ut(x
2
t ) ≥ ut(x
′2
t )
for all x2t = x
′2
t ∈ X. Therefore, as in the proof of proposition 7, it has to exist a strictly
monotonic and continuous transformation st such that ut−1 = st ◦ ut. But then, by
induction it is B1 = B2 = ... = BT ≡ B and I can pick a common Bernoulli utility
function u ∈ B for all periods.
Part II (“⇒”): In this part, I derive an affine relation between the functions gt in
different periods. To this end, I translate axiom A7 into the particular representation
in the sense of theorem 4, which applies the same Bernoulli utility function u for all
periods. Using again equation (C.1) I obtain the condition
T∑
τ=2
gτ−1 ◦ uτ−1(x
2
τ ) +
gT ◦ uT (x
0) ≥
T∑
τ=2
gτ−1 ◦ uτ−1(x
′2
τ−1) +
gT ◦ uT (x
0)
⇔
T∑
τ=2
gτ ◦ uτ (x
2
τ ) ≥
T∑
τ=2
gτ ◦ uτ (x
′2
τ )
for all x2, x′2 ∈ X2. The above equivalence implies that both,
∑T
τ=2 gτ ◦ uτ (x
2
τ ) and∑T
τ=2 gτ−1 ◦ uτ−1(x
2
τ ), are representations for 2 |X2 . In consequence, by the more-
over part of theorem 4 there exist a ∈ IR++ and bt ∈ IR, t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, such that
gt = agt+1 + bt for all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}.
12 Use the freedom in the uniqueness of
(gt)t∈{1,...,T} to define g˜t = gt−
∑T−1
τ=t a
τ−tbτ for t ∈ {1, ...T − 1} without loosing the rep-
12Here it is g′t = gt+1. Note that it is immediate from the proof of the moreover part in theorem
4 that coincidence of the representations (only) on the certain outcome paths is enough to assure the
uniqueness result for (gt)t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
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resentative character of the sequence (u, ft, g˜t)t∈{1,...,T} for (t)t∈{1,...,T}. Observe that
g˜t = gt−
∑T−1
τ=t a
τ−tbτ = agt+1+bt−bt−a
∑T−1
τ=t+1 a
τ−tbτ = ag˜t+1. Set g = a
T−1g˜T . More-
over let β = a−1. Then the sequence of triples (u, ft, a
T−tg˜T ) = (u, ft, β
t−TβT−1g) =
(u, ft, β
t−1g) for t ∈ {1, ..., T} represents (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 4.
Note 1: Expressing the triples with respect to g˜τ instead of g yields the equivalent rep-
resentation triples (u, ft, β
t−τ g˜τ )t∈{1,...,T} and in particular for τ = T the representation
(u, ft, β
t−T g˜T )t∈{1,...,T}.
Part III (“⇒”): Calculating the corresponding normalization constants for the repre-
senting tuples derived in the previous step, yields the representation stated in the theo-
rem. In the usual convention denote ∆Gt = Gt−Gt and G = [G,G] = [g(minx∈X u(x)),
g(maxx∈X u(x))] and find
θt =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
= β
t∆GPT
τ=t β
τ∆G
= 1
1+β+β2+...+βT−t
= 1−β
1−βT−t+1
for β 6= 1,
θt =
∆GtPT
τ=t∆Gτ
= ∆GPT
τ=t∆G
= ∆G
(T−t+1)∆G
= 1
T−t+1
for β = 1 and
ϑt =
Gt+1Gt−Gt+1Gt
∆Gt
= β
t+1GβtG−βt+1GβtG
βt∆G
= 0.
Using equation (C.2) it is straight forward to calculate the aggregate intertemporal
utility functions. In the case β 6= 1 they are
u˜t(·, ·) = g˜
−1
t
[
θtg˜t ◦ u(·) + (1− θt)
∆G˜t
∆G˜t+1
(
g˜t+1 ◦M
ft+1(·, u˜t+1) + 0
)}]
= g−1
[
β−t+1
{
θtβ
t−1g ◦ u(·) + (1− θt)β
−1
(
βtg ◦Mft+1(·, u˜t+1)
)}]
= g−1
[
θtg ◦ u(·) + (1− θt)g ◦M
ft+1(·, u˜t+1)
]
.
Defining βt = 1−θt = 1−
1−β
1−βT−t+1
= 1−β
T−t+1−1+β
1−βT−t+1
= β 1−β
T−t
1−βT−t+1
gives the representation
stated in the theorem. For β = 1 find
u˜t(·, ·) = g
−1
[
1
T−t+1
g ◦ u(·) + (1− 1
T−t+1
)g ◦Mft+1(·, u˜t+1)
]
and define βt = 1− θt = 1−
1
T−t+1
= T−t+1−1
T−t+1
= T−t
T−t+1
to get the stated representation.
Note 2: For the evaluation of certain consumption paths equation (C.1) together with
ϑt = 0 and hence ξt = 0 yields:
u˜t(x
t) = g˜−1t
[
θt
T∑
τ=t
g˜τ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ )
]
= g−1
[
(1− βt)
T∑
τ=t
βτ−tg ◦ u(xtτ )
]
. (C.19)
Part IV (“⇐”): Axioms A1-A5 follow immediately from “⇐” of theorem 4. To see
that axiom A7 holds, take a look at equation (C.19) and note that g−1 and the x0 term
cancel in the representation of A7 (for any x0).
Moreover part: The moreover part is an immediate consequence of the moreover part
of theorem 4. 2
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Proof of theorem 8: “⇒”: Axioms A1-A7 assure the existence of a representation in
the sense of theorem 7. Axiom A8 implies furthermore that the uncertainty aggregation
rules in different periods can be characterized by the same function. Using equation
(C.19) to translate axiom A8 into the representation of theorem 7 yields for the first
expression
1
2
x¯ t + 1
2
x¯′ t t x¯
′′ t
⇔ f−1t
[
1
2
ft ◦ u˜t(x¯
t) + 1
2
ft ◦ u˜t(x¯
′ t)
]
≥ u˜t(x¯
′′ t)
⇔ f−1t
[
1
2
ft ◦ g
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(x¯)
]
+ 1
2
ft ◦ g
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(x¯′)
]]
≥ g−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(x¯′′)
]
⇔ f−1t
[
1
2
ft ◦ g
−1
[
1−β
1−βT−t+1
1−βT−t+1
1−β
g ◦ u(x¯)
]
+ 1
2
ft ◦ g
−1
[
1−β
1−βT−t+1
1−βT−t+1
1−β
g ◦ u(x¯′)
]]
≥ g−1
[
1−β
1−βT−t+1
1−βT−t+1
1−β
g ◦ u(x¯′′)
]
⇔ f−1t
[
1
2
ft ◦ u(x¯) +
1
2
ft ◦ u(x¯
′)
]
≥ u(x¯′′) ,
and analogously for the second expression
1
2
x¯ t+1 + 1
2
x¯′ t+1 t+1 x¯
′′ t+1
⇔ f−1t+1
[
1
2
ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1(x¯
t+1) + 1
2
ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1(x¯
′ t+1)
]
≥ u˜t+1(x¯
′′ t+1)
⇔ f−1t+1
[
1
2
ft+1 ◦ u(x¯) +
1
2
ft+1 ◦ u(x¯
′)
]
≥ u(x¯′′) .
For all x¯, x¯′ ∈ X there is an outcome x¯′′ ∈ X such that the above relations hold with
equality (compare proof of theorem 2). This fact implies that the following equality has
to hold for all x¯, x¯′ ∈ X:
f−1t
[
1
2
ft ◦ u(x¯) +
1
2
ft ◦ u(x¯
′)
]
= f−1t+1
[
1
2
ft+1 ◦ u(x¯) +
1
2
ft+1 ◦ u(x¯
′)
]
⇔ ft+1f
−1
t
[
1
2
ftu(x¯) +
1
2
ftu(x¯
′)
]
= 1
2
ft+1 f
−1
t ft u(x¯) +
1
2
ft+1 f
−1
t ft u(x¯
′) .
Defining ht = ft+1 ◦ f
−1
t and the interval Ft = ft(U), this condition translates into the
equation
ht
(
1
2
y + 1
2
y′
)
= 1
2
ht (y) +
1
2
ht (y
′) ∀y, y′ ∈ Ft .
Therefore ht has to be linear on Ft (Hardy et al. 1964, refinement of theorem 83 on p.74).
Hence the expression ft+1 ◦f
−1
t is linear on ft(U) implying that there exists at ∈ A such
that with z = f−1t (y) ∈ U it is
ft+1f
−1
t (y) = a
−1
t y
⇔ f−1t (y) = f
−1
t+1a
−1
t y
⇔ ft(z) = atft+1(z) .
By the fact that ft and ft+1 are both increasing it follows that at has to be positive
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affine, i.e. at ∈ A
+. But as each ft in the representation is determined only up to
positive affine transformations, setting ft = ft+1 = f still yields a representation of
t∈{1,...,T}.
“⇐”: Axioms A1-A5 follow immediately from “⇐” of theorem 4. As seen in the first
part of the proof, for constant consumption paths it is u˜t(x¯
t) = u(x¯)∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Therefore axiom A8 is seen to hold by observing that for all x¯, x¯′, x¯′′ ∈ X:
1
2
x¯ t + 1
2
x¯′ t t x¯
′′ t
⇔ f−1
[
1
2
f ◦ u˜t(x¯
t) + 1
2
f ◦ u˜t(x¯
′ t)
]
≥ u˜t(x¯
′′ t)
⇔ f−1
[
1
2
f ◦ u˜t+1(x¯
t+1) + 1
2
f ◦ u˜t+1(x¯
′ t+1)
]
≥ u˜t+1(x¯
′′ t+1)
⇔ 1
2
x¯ t+1 + 1
2
x¯′ t+1 t+1 x¯
′′ t+1 .
Moreover part: The moreover part is an immediate consequence of the moreover part
of theorem 4. 2
Proof of lemma 6: Except for admitting decreasing functions f and g, when changing
“increasing” into “monotonic” in theorem 8, the statements are special cases of lemma
4, corollary 6 and corollary 7. The decreasing functions come in the same way as in the
proofs for chapter 6.4, by noting that Maf = Mf and analogously Nag = N g for all
a ∈ A. Therefore, if the triple (u, f, g) represents t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 8,
then so do the triples (u,−f, g) and (u, f,−g), if f and g are admitted to be decreasing
in the representation. 2
Proof of theorem 9: The proof is divided into five parts. First, I translate axiom
A9 into the representation of theorem 7. This step yields a requirement for the rep-
resenting functions ft and g that is solved in the second part under the assumption
of differentiability of ft ◦ g
−1. The third part shows that the derived solution has to
hold as well without assuming differentiability. Part four translates the solution into
the representation stated in the theorem. Finally, part five proofs the necessity of the
axioms for the representation.
Part I (“⇒”): First note that axiom A9 implies axiom A7 by choosing x = x′. There-
fore a representation in terms of theorem 7 has to exist. In order to translate A9 for
t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} into the latter representation, note that by definition of x as an ele-
ment of Xt+1, the period τ entry of the consumption path (x, x0) ∈ Xt corresponds to
(x, x0)τ = xτ+1 for τ ∈ {t, ..., T − 1}. Then, using equation (C.19), the left hand side of
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the equivalence in axiom A9 translates into
1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t (x
′′, x0)
⇔ f−1t
{
1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tgu(xτ+1) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]
+1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tgu(x′τ+1) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]}
≥ g−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tgu(x′′τ+1) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]
⇔ gf−1t
{
1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(xτ ) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]
+1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(x′τ ) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]}
≥
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(x′′τ ) + (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0)
]
.
Define the sum S =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(xτ ) and similarly S
′ =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(x′τ )
and S ′′ =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)gu(x′′τ ) as well as A = (1− βt)β
T−tgu(x0). Then, varying the
consumption paths x, x′ and x′′ in Xt+1, goes along with varying S, S ′ and S ′′ in the
interval [1−β
T−t
1−β
G, 1−β
T−t
1−β
G]. Similarly, as x0 is varied in X, the value A takes on any
number in the interval [(1 − βt)β
T−tG, (1 − βt)β
T−tG] . In the introduced notation,
the above inequality corresponding to the left hand side of the equivalence in axiom A9
writes as
gf−1t
{
1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]}
−A ≥(1− βt)S
′′. (C.20)
In the same notation the right hand side of the equivalence in axiom A9 translates into
gf−1t+1
{
1
2
ft+1g
−1
[
(1− βt+1)S
]
+ 1
2
ft+1g
−1
[
(1− βt+1)S
′
]}
≥(1− βt+1)S
′′. (C.21)
As derived in the proof of theorem 4 (induction hypothesis H2), for every lottery pt+1 ∈
Pt+1 there exists a certain consumption path as certainty equivalent. In consequence,
for any x, x′ ∈ Xt+1, there exists a certainty equivalent x′′ ∈ Xt+1 for the lottery 1
2
x +
1
2
x′ ∈ Pt+1, such that equation (C.21) holds with equality. Then, by axiom A9 also
equation (C.20) has to hold with equality. Equating the two equations by S ′′ yields the
requirement
gf−1t
{
1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]}
− A (C.22)
= (1−βt)
(1−βt+1)
gf−1t+1
{
1
2
ft+1g
−1
[
(1− βt+1)S
]
+ 1
2
ft+1g
−1
[
(1− βt+1)S
′
]}
for all S, S ′ ∈ [1−β
T−t
1−β
G, 1−β
T−t
1−β
G] and A ∈ [(1− βt)β
T−tG, (1− βt)β
T−tG].
Part II (“⇒”): In this part, I establish the general solution to equation (C.22), under
the assumption that ht = ft ◦ g
−1 is differentiable for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. First, observe
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that the right hand side of equation (C.22) is independent of A.13 Thus, the left hand
side has to be constant in A. Taking the first derivative with respect to A, the latter
requirement yields
∂
∂A
h−1t
{
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S + A] +
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S
′ + A]
}
− A = 0
⇔ h−1t
′
{
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S + A] +
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S
′ + A]
}
·{
1
2
h′t [ (1− βt)S + A] +
1
2
h′t [ (1− βt)S
′ + A]
}
= 1
⇔ 1
2
h′t [ (1− βt)S + A] +
1
2
h′t [ (1− βt)S
′ + A]
= h′t
{
h−1
[
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S + A] +
1
2
ht [ (1− βt)S
′ + A]
]}
,
where the prime at the function ht (and only the one at the function ht) denotes a
derivative. Defining y = ht [(1− βt)S + A] and y
′ = ht [(1− βt)S
′ + A], both in Ft =(
ft(U), ft(U)
)
, the latter equation becomes
1
2
h′th
−1
t (y) +
1
2
h′th
−1
t (y
′) = h′th
−1
t
(
1
2
y + 1
2
y′
)
.
By Hardy et al. (1964, refinement of theorem 83 on p.74) it follows that the composition
h′th
−1 has to be linear. Therefore, I obtain the following differential equation for ht,
where at, bt ∈ IR and z = h
−1
t (y) ∈ Γt = (G,G):
h′th
−1
t (y) = aty + bt ∀y ∈ Ft
⇔ h′t(z) = atht(z) + bt ∀z ∈ Γt. (C.23)
For at = 0 the solution to h
′
t(z) = bt is obviously ht(z) = bt z + kt with kt ∈ IR. I
will come back to this solution below (case 2). In the meanwhile (case 1), assume
at 6= 0∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Case 1, at 6= 0∀t ∈ {1, ..., T}:
First the differential equation (C.23) is solved using variation of the constant. Solving
the homogeneous differential equation for period t yields∫
1
ht
dht =
∫
at dz
⇔ lnht = atz + c˜t with c˜t ∈ IR
⇔ ht(z) = ct exp(atz) with ct = exp(c˜t) ∈ IR++.
Taking the integration constant ct as a function of z renders the ansatz
13Note that a functional equation that corresponds to the requirement that the left hand side of
equation (C.22) is independent of A is solved in a different way by Acze´l (1966, 153) by relating it to
a Cauchy equation.
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ht(z) = ct(z) exp(atz) for the inhomogeneous equation:
h′t(z) = atht(z) + bt
⇒ c′t(z) exp(atz) + ct(z) at exp(atz) = at ct(z) exp(atz) + bt
⇒ c′t(z) exp(atz) = bt
⇒
∫
dct =
∫
bt exp(−atz)dz
⇒ ct(z) = −
bt
at
exp(−atz) + kt with kt ∈ IR.
Therefore ht(z) = [−
bt
at
exp(−atz) + k] exp(atz) = −
bt
at
+ kt exp(atz) with kt ∈ IR is the
general solution to equation (C.23) with at, bt ∈ IR, at 6= 0. Note, however, that it is also
known by theorem 7 that ht has to be strictly increasing. Thus, whenever for at > 0
it has to hold as well kt > 0 and for at < 0 it has to hold as well kt < 0. Furthermore
denote dt = −
bt
at
∈ IR, and determine the inverse of ht to be h
−1
t (y) =
1
at
ln
[
−dt+y
kt
]
.14
Second, I substitute the solution for ht and ht+1 back into equation (C.22) to find for
the left hand side
h−1t
{
1
2
ht
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
ht
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]}
− A
= 1
at
ln
[
1
kt
{
− dt+
1
2
dt +
1
2
kt exp
[
at{ (1− βt)S + A}
]
+1
2
dt +
1
2
kt exp
[
at{ (1− βt)S
′ + A}
]}]
− A
= 1
at
ln
[
1
2
exp
[
at{ (1− βt)S + A}
]
+ 1
2
exp
[
at{ (1− βt)S
′ + A}
]]
− A
= 1
at
ln
[
1
2
exp
[
at (1− βt)S
]
+ 1
2
exp
[
at (1− βt)S
′
]]
,
= ln
[
1
2
exp(S)at (1−βt) + 1
2
exp(S ′)at (1−βt)
] 1
at ,
and analogously for the right hand side
(1−βt)
(1−βt+1)
h−1t+1
{
1
2
ht+1
[
(1− βt+1)S
]
+ 1
2
ht+1
[
(1− βt+1)S
′
]}
= (1−βt)
(1−βt+1)
1
at+1
ln
[
1
2
exp
[
at+1 (1− βt+1)S
]
+ 1
2
exp
[
at+1 (1− βt+1)S
′
]]
= ln
[
1
2
exp(S)at+1 (1−βt+1) + 1
2
exp(S ′)at+1 (1−βt+1)
] (1−βt)
at+1(1−βt+1) . (C.24)
Therefore, equation (C.22) requires that for a continuum of values S and S ′ it has to
14Note that the relation holds also holds kt < 0. Then the nominator inside the logarithm −dt+ y =
kt exp(atz) is negative as well.
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hold [
1
2
exp(S)at (1−βt) + 1
2
exp(S ′)at (1−βt)
] 1
at(1−βt)
=
[
1
2
exp(S)at+1 (1−βt+1) + 1
2
exp(S ′)at+1 (1−βt+1)
] 1
at+1(1−βt+1) .
Necessary and sufficient for this equality is the condition at(1−βt) = at+1(1−βt+1) ≡ ξ.
15
As at ∈ IR\{0} and 1− βt 6= 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, there exists a solution if and only if
ξ ∈ IR\{0}. Summarizing, in the case that at 6= 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, equation (C.22)
implies that there exists ξ ∈ IR\{0} such that for every t it is ht(z) = ft ◦ g
−1(z) =
dt+kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
z) with dt, kt ∈ IR, kt 6= 0. In addition for ξ > 0 it has to hold kt > 0 and
for ξ < 0 it has to hold kt < 0.
Case 2, ∃ t ∈ {1, ..., T} with at = 0:
The solution to equation (C.23) for at = 0 is ht(z) = bt z+kt with kt ∈ IR. By theorem 7
it is known that ht has to be strictly increasing. Thus, the constant bt has to be strictly
positive. But then, the constants bt and kt correspond to positive affine transformations
of ft, which are known not to affect the representation. Therefore, wlog I can set bt = 1
and kt = 0. Then ht is the identity and the left hand side of equation (C.22) becomes
gf−1t
{
1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]}
− A
= 1
2
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]
− A = 1
2
(1− βt)
[
S + S ′
]
. (C.25)
Let me first consider the case where at+1 6= 0. Then, equation (C.24) gives the right
hand side of equation (C.22). Define s = exp(S) and s′ = exp(S ′) and find that equation
(C.22) yields the following condition:

(1− βt)
[
1
2
S+ 1
2
S ′
]
= ln
[
1
2
exp(S)at+1 (1−βt+1)+ 1
2
exp(S ′)at+1 (1−βt+1)
] (1−βt)
at+1(1−βt+1)
⇔
[
1
2
ln s+ 1
2
ln s′
]
= ln
[
1
2
sat+1 (1−βt+1) + 1
2
sat+1 (1−βt+1)
] 1
at+1(1−βt+1)
⇔ s
1
2 s′
1
2 =
[
1
2
sat+1 (1−βt+1) + 1
2
sat+1 (1−βt+1)
] 1
at+1(1−βt+1)
for a continuum of s and s′. However, the above equality does not hold for at+1(1 −
βt+1) 6= 0 (Hardy et al. 1964, 15,26). As it is 1−βt 6= 0, this fact implies a contradiction
to the assumption that at+1 6= 0. Evaluating equation (C.22) for period t− 1 the same
reasoning brings about a contradiction to the assumption at−1 6= 0. Therefore, if at = 0
for some t it necessarily follows that at = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ...T}.
In the case at = 0 for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} use (C.25) to see that equation (C.22) simplifies
15For the necessity see for example Hardy et al. (1964, 26).
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to the tautology
1
2
[
(1− βt)S+A
]
+ 1
2
[
(1− βt)S
′+A
]
−A = (1−βt)
(1−βt+1)
1
2
[
(1− βt+1)S + (1− βt+1)S
′
]
⇔ 1
2
(1− βt)
[
S + S ′
]
= 1
2
(1− βt)
[
S + S ′
]
,
which implies no further restrictions on the functional form of ht.
Part III (“⇒”): In this part I show that the solution to equation (C.22) derived in
part two has to hold as well if only continuity of ht = ft ◦ g
−1 is assumed.16 Other
than differentiability, the latter is assured by theorem 7. Assume that some continuous
function ht satisfies equation (C.22). Expecting that the general solution will be of
the form derived in part two, I define for all t ∈ {t, ..., T} the continuous functions
rt : IR→ IR by rt(y) = ht [(1− βt) ln(y)] ⇔ ht(z) = rt ◦ exp(
1
1−βt
z). Then the left hand
side of equation (C.22) becomes
h−1t
{
1
2
ht
[
(1− βt)S + A
]
+ 1
2
ht
[
(1− βt)S
′ + A
]}
− A
= (1− βt) ln ◦ r
−1
t
{
1
2
rt ◦ exp
[
1
1−βt
{ (1− βt)S + A}
]
+1
2
rt ◦ exp
[
1
1−βt
{ (1− βt)S
′ + A}
]}
− A
= (1− βt) ln ◦ r
−1
t
{
1
2
rt ◦ exp
[
S + A
1−βt
]
+ 1
2
rt ◦ exp
[
S ′ + A
1−βt
]}
− A
and with defining s = exp [S], s′ = exp [S ′] and a = exp
[
A
1−βt
]
the relation writes as
= (1− βt) ln ◦ r
−1
t
{
1
2
rt (s a) +
1
2
rt (s
′ a)
}
− (1− βt) ln a
= (1− βt) ln
[
1
a
r−1t
{
1
2
rt (s a) +
1
2
rt (s
′ a)
}]
.
Analogously, the right hand side of equation (C.22) becomes
(1−βt)
(1−βt+1)
· (1− βt+1) ln
[
r−1t+1
{
1
2
rt+1 (s) +
1
2
rt+1 (s
′)
}]
.
Using these expressions equation (C.22) translates into the requirement
1
a
r−1t
{
1
2
rt (s a) +
1
2
rt (s
′ a)
}
= r−1t+1
{
1
2
rt+1 (s) +
1
2
rt+1 (s
′)
}
for a continuum of values s, s′ and a. First of all, this relation implies that the left
hand side has to be constant in a for all values of s and s′. By Hardy et al. (1964,
66,68) it follows that rt has to be either an affine transformation of rt(z) = z
ξt for some
ξt ∈ IR\{0} or an affine transformation of ln. I will associate the latter case with ξ = 0.
In the first case equation (C.22) becomes
1
a
{
1
2
(sa)
ξt + 1
2
(s′a)
ξt
} 1
ξt =
{
1
2
(s)ξt+1 + 1
2
(s′)
ξt+1
} 1
ξt+1 (C.26)
16I.e. there are no further continuous solutions to equation (C.23).
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which implies ξt = ξt+1 ≡ ξ for all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} (Hardy et al. 1964, 26). The case
where rt = ln corresponds to taking the limit ξt → 0 in (C.26), and the same reasoning
on ξt and ξt+1 holds true, i.e if some rt is an affine transformation of ln then all have to
be an affine transformation of ln.
In consequence, the following solutions of equation (C.22) for ht are possible. In the
case ξ ∈ IR\{0} I find for all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}
h∗t (z) = kt
(
exp( 1
1−βt
z)
)ξ
+ dt = kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
z) + dt , (C.27)
with dt, kt ∈ IR and, in order to assure strict increasingness of h
∗
t (z), kt ξ > 0. In the
case ξ = 0 I find for all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}
h∗t (z) = b˜t ln
(
exp( 1
1−βt
z)
)
+ dt = b˜t
1
1−βt
z + dt ,
with b˜t, dt ∈ IR and, in order to assure strict increasingness of h
∗
t (z), b˜t ξ > 0. With
b˜t =
bt
1−βt
this solution is seen to correspond to case two in part two. Thus, giving up
the differentiability assumption for ftg
−1 yields no further solutions to equation (C.22),
than those already found in part two.
Part IV (“⇒”): In part four I substitute the relations found in parts two and three for
ht = ft ◦ g
−1 back into the representation of = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 7.
I start with the case ft ◦g
−1(y) = dt+kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
y) with dt, kt ∈ IR and kt ξ > 0. Taking
g as given, the function ft follow as
ft ◦ g
−1(y) = dt + kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
y)
⇔ ft(·) = dt + kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
g(·)) .
Then the functions u˜t in the representation of theorem 7 become
u˜t(xt, pt+1)= g
−1
{
(1− βt) g ◦ u(xt) + βt g ◦ f
−1
t+1
[∫
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1
]}
= g−1
{
(1− βt) g ◦ u(xt) + βt
1−βt+1
ξ
ln
[
1
kt+1
{
−dt+1 +
∫
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1
}]}
.
Define the functions w˜t =
1
1−βt
g ◦ u˜t. Due to the relation between g and ft, imposed by
axiom A9, a recursive formulation employing these strictly monotonic transformation of
the functions u˜t, largely simplifies the representation.
w˜T (xT ) = gu(xT ) and
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) =
1
1−βt−1
g ◦ u˜t−1(xt−1, pt)
= gu(xt−1) +
βt−1
ξ
1−βt
(1−βt−1)
ln
[
1
kt
{
− dt +
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftu˜t
}]
.
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Using the relation 1−βt+1
1−βt
= 1−β
T−t+1
1−βT−(t+1)+1
= ββ−1t further yields
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = gu(xt−1) +
β
ξ
ln
[
1
kt
{
− dt +
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftg
−1 gu˜t
}]
= gu(xt−1) +
β
ξ
ln
[
1
kt
{
− dt +
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t dt + kt exp
(
ξ
1−βt
·
(1− βt)w˜t
)}]
= gu(xt−1) +
β
ξ
ln
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
ξw˜t
)]
(C.28)
= gu(xt−1) + βM
expξ(pt, w˜t) , (C.29)
where the uncertainty aggregation rule is characterized by the function r(z) = exp(ξz) =
exp(z)ξ. Expression (C.29) will be used for the g+ − gauge of the representation in
corollary 8, where the range of g has been fixed. Here however, the parameter ξ can be
absorbed into the function g. To this end, define w˜∗t = |ξ| w˜t, g
∗ = |ξ| g and sgn(ξ) as
the sign of ξ. Then line (C.28) yields
w˜∗t−1(xt−1, pt) = |ξ| gu(xt−1) +
|ξ|
ξ
β ln
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
ξw˜t
)]
= g∗u(xt−1) + sgn(ξ) β ln
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
sgn(ξ) w˜∗t
)]
= g∗u(xt−1) + βM
expsgn(ξ)(pt, w˜
∗
t ) . (C.30)
Expression (C.30) yields equation (9.9) for the cases f ∈ {exp, 1
exp
}. To obtain the
representing equation (9.10) first observe that
Mft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ft ◦ u˜t
]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftg
−1
(
(1− βt) w˜t
)]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t dt + kt exp
(
ξ
1−βt
(1− βt) w˜t
)]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t dt + kt exp
(
sgn(ξ) w˜∗t
)]
.
Then, recalling that sgn(kt) = sgn(ξ), find that the strictly increasing transformation
Mf (pt, w˜
∗
t ) = ln
[
sgn(ξ)
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
sgn(ξ) w˜∗t
)]
=Mexp
sgn(ξ)
(
pt, w˜
∗
t
)
.
yields the expression representing the preferences in equation (9.10).
In the remaining case it is ft ◦ g
−1(y) = bt z + kt with bt, kt ∈ IR and bt > 0. Taking g
as and, thus, ft = bt z + kt an analogous reasoning to the one carried out above yields
u˜t(xt, pt+1)= g
−1
{
(1− βt) g ◦ u(xt) + βt g ◦ f
−1
t+1
[∫
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1
]}
= g−1
{
(1− βt)g ◦ u(xt)+βt
[
1
bt+1
{
−kt+1+
∫
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 ft+1 ◦ u˜t+1
}]}
.
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And defining the functions
w˜T (xT ) = gu(xT ) and
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) =
1
1−βt−1
g ◦ u˜t−1(xt−1, pt)
= gu(xt−1) +
βt−1
(1−βt−1)
[
1
bt
{
− kt +
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftu˜t
}]
= gu(xt−1) +
βt−1
(1−βt−1)
[
1
bt
{
− kt +
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t bt(1− βt)w˜t + kt
}]
= gu(xt−1) + β
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t w˜t
]
,
where the latter expression corresponds to the recursion (9.9) stated in the theorem for
the cases f = id. The representing equation (9.10) follows from
Mft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ft ◦ u˜t
]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftg
−1
(
(1− βt) w˜t
)]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t kt + bt(1− βt) w˜t
]
which is a strictly increasing transformation of
Mf (pt, w˜t) = Eptw˜t =M
id(pt, w˜t) .
Part V (“⇐”): As shown above, the representation is a special case of theorem 7.
Therefore axioms A1-A5 follow immediately from “⇐” of theorem 7. The following
calculation shows that axiom A9 is satisfied as well. Hereto note that for certain con-
sumption paths x ∈ Xt it is w˜t(x) =
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(xτ ). For the case h = exp define
k = 1 and for the case h = 1
exp
define k = −1. Then, for h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
} and for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, x0 ∈ X and x, x′, x′′ ∈ Xt+1 it holds
1
2
(x, x0) + 1
2
(x′, x0) t (x
′′, x0)
⇔ k ln
(
1
2
exp
[
k
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(xτ+1)
]
exp
[
k βTg ◦ u(x0)
]
+1
2
exp
[
k
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(x′τ+1)
]
exp
[
k βTg ◦ u(x0)
])
≥
∑T−1
τ=t β
τ−tg ◦ u(x′′τ+1) + β
Tg ◦ u(x0)
⇔ k ln
(
1
2
exp
[
k
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)g ◦ u(xτ )
]
+ 1
2
exp
[
k
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)g ◦ u(x′τ )
])
≥
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−(t+1)g ◦ u(x′′τ )
⇔ 1
2
v˜t+1(x) +
1
2
v˜t+1(x
′) ≥ v˜t+1(x
′′)
⇔ 1
2
x + 1
2
x′ t+1 x
′′ .
The case h = id makes both sides of the above inequalities linear in the term βTg◦u(x0),
so that it cancels as well and A9 is satisfied.
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Moreover part: “⇒”: Assume that g and g′ both represent the sequence of preference
relations = (t)t∈{1,...,T} (the prime in g
′ does not indicate a derivative!). By the
representation of= (t)t∈{1,...,T} on certain paths, the freedom of g is limited to positive
affine transformations as in theorem 7, i.e. it have to exist a, b ∈ IR, a > 0 such that
g = ag′ + b. However, the dependence of ft on g destroys part of this freedom when
considering choice over lotteries.17 Precisely, find that the function w˜′T corresponding
to the choice g′ is
w˜′T (xT ) = g
′ ◦ u(xT ) = a g ◦ u(xT ) + b
Define again k = 1 for the case h = exp and k = −1 for the case h = 1
exp
. Then, for the
case h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
}, the fact that w˜T (xT ) as well as w˜
′
T (xT ) are to represent the same
preferences over period T lotteries implies
k
∫
dpT exp(k w˜T ) ≥ k
∫
dpT exp(k w˜T )
⇔ k ln
[ ∫
dpT exp(k w˜T )
]
≥ k ln
[ ∫
dpT exp(k w˜T )
]
⇔ Mh(pT , w˜T ) ≥ M
h(p′T , w˜T )
⇔ pT t p
′
T
⇔ Mh(pT , w˜
′
T ) ≥ M
h(p′T , w˜
′
T )
⇔ k ln
[ ∫
dpT exp(k w˜
′
T )
]
≥ k ln
[ ∫
dpT exp(k w˜
′
T )
]
⇔ k
∫
dpT exp(k w˜
′
T ) ≥ k
∫
dpT exp(k w˜
′
T )
for all pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt. In consequence there have to exist constants c, d ∈ IR, c > 0 such that
exp(k w˜T ) = c exp(k w˜
′
T ) + d
= c exp(k a w˜′T + kb) + d
= c exp(kb) exp(k w˜′T )
a + d .
Thus, defining the constant c˜ = c exp(kb) and the variable z = exp(k w˜′T (xt)) the relation
z = c˜za + d
has to hold for all z ∈ [exp(G), exp(G)]. The relation can only be satisfied if the right
hand side is linear and, thus, a = 1. In consequence, if g and g′ both represent the
preferences = (t)t∈{1,...,T}, it has to exist b ∈ IR such that g = g
′ + b.
For the case h = id, corresponding to a maximizer of intertemporally additive ex-
pected utility, the above reasoning yields no further restrictions on the constants a or b.
17Without the dependence of f on g an affine transformation a of g cancels out. However, when f
depends on g as in the representation of theorem 9, at the same time f−1 → af−1, corresponding to
an affine transformation of the inverse of f . Such a transformation is, in general, not compatible with
the freedom in the choice of the representing functions.
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In that case, if g and g′ both represent the preferences = (t)t∈{1,...,T} all that can be
claimed is the existence a, b ∈ IR, a > 0, such that g = ag′ + b.
“⇐”: For the case h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
}, let g = g′ + b and g be part of a representation of
= (t)t∈{1,...,T}. Define as before k = 1 for the case h = exp and k = −1 for the case
h = 1
exp
. I claim that for every t ∈ {1, ..., T} it exists γt ∈ IR such that w˜
′
t = w˜t + γt.
The proof is by backwards induction. For t = T it holds
w˜′T (xT ) = g
′ ◦ u(xT ) = g ◦ u(xT ) + b = w˜T (xT ) + γT
with γT = b. The induction step from t to t− 1 works as follows:
w˜′t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
′u(xt−1) + βM
expk(pt, w˜
′
t)
= gu(xt−1) + b+ k β ln
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
kw˜t + kγt
)]
= gu(xt−1) + b+ k β ln
[
exp(kγt)
∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
kγtw˜t
)]
= gu(xt−1) + k β ln
[∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
kγtw˜t
)]
+ b+ βγt
= w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) + γt−1,+βγt
with γt−1 = b + βγt. Next I show, that such an additive constant in w˜t cancels out in
the representing equation (9.10):
Mh(pt, w˜
′
t) ≥ M
h(p′t, w˜
′
t)
⇔ Mh(pt, w˜t + γt) ≥ M
h(p′t, w˜t + γt)
⇔ k ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(k w˜t + γt)
]
≥ k ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(k w˜t + γt)
]
⇔ k ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(k w˜t)
]
≥ k ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(k w˜t)
]
⇔ Mh(pt, w˜t) ≥ M
h(p′t, w˜t) .
Thus, if g represents preferences = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense of theorem 9 with h ∈
{exp, 1
exp
}, then so does g′ = g + b.
In the case h = id, let g = ag′+b and g be part of a representation of = (t)t∈{1,...,T}
in the sense of theorem 9. I claim that for every t ∈ {1, ..., T} it exists γt ∈ IR such that
w˜′t = aw˜t + γt. Proof is by backwards induction. For t = T it holds
w˜′T (xT ) = g
′ ◦ u(xT ) = ag ◦ u(xT ) + b = av˜T (xT ) + γT ,
with γT = b. The induction step from t to t− 1 is as follows:
w˜′t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
′ ◦ u(xt−1) + βEptw˜
′
t(xt, pt+1)
= a g ◦ u(xt−1) + b+ βEpt a w˜t(xt, pt+1) + β γt
= a w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) + b+ β γt .
Setting γt−1 = b+γt closes the induction step. But then, the representation in equation
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(9.10) stays unchanged:
Ept w˜
′
t ≥ Ep′t w˜
′
t ⇔ Ept a w˜t + γt ≥ Ep′t a w˜t + γt ⇔ Ept w˜t ≥ Ep′t w˜t .
2
Proof of theorem 10: The proof resembles that of theorem 6. Part one translates
axiom A6 sst into the representation of theorem 7. Then I show in the second part that
the equation derived in the first locally implies concavity of ft ◦ g
−1. Part three extends
this result to concavity on the entire set Γt. The necessity of axiom A6
s
st is implied by
theorem 6. The difference to the proof of theorem 6, i.e. the stronger prerequisite in
axiom A6 sst, mainly affects the first step in part two. Subsequently the proof follows
that of theorem 6 and the reader is referred to the latter.
Part I (“⇒”): In this part I translate axiom A6 sst into the representation of theorem
7. I start with the first line, i.e the premise, and use equation (C.19) to find
x¯t ∼t x
t
⇒ g−1
[
(1− βt)
T∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(x¯)
]
= g−1
[
(1− βt)
T∑
τ=t
βτ−tu(xtτ )
]
. (C.31)
The existence of τ ∈ {t, ..., T} such that [xtτ ] 6∼τ [x¯] translates into
u(xtτ ) 6= u(x¯) for some τ ∈ {t, ..., T}. (C.32)
The second line of axiom A6 sst becomes
x¯t ≻T
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
(x¯t−i, x
t
i).
⇒ g−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu(x¯)
]
> f−1t
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
) ]]
⇒ ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu(x¯)
]
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
) ]
.
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Using equation (C.31) the left hand side can be transformed as follows:
ftg
−1
[
T−t
T−t+1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu(x¯)
]
+ 1
T−t+1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu(xtτ )
]]
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
) ]
⇒ ftg
−1
[
1
T−t+1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
i=t
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
)]]
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
) ]
⇒ ftg
−1
[∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
)]]
(C.33)
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1
[
(1− βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu
(
(x¯t−i, x
t
i)τ
) ]
.
Define the function z˜ : Xt → Γt by z˜(x
t) = (1 − βt)
∑T
τ=t β
τ−tu (xtτ ). Restricting the
domain to those consumption paths that satisfy condition (C.32) the function is onto(
(1−βt)
∑T
τ=tG , (1−βt)
∑T
τ=tG
)
=
(
G , G
)
= Γt. In particular define zi = z˜
(
(xt−ix
′t
i )
)
.
In this notation equation (C.33) becomes
ftg
−1
(∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
zi
)
>
∑T
i=t
1
T−t+1
ftg
−1(zi). (C.34)
If equation (C.34) had to hold for all zi ∈ Γt it would be a straight forward condition
for strict convexity of ft ◦ g
−1. However axiom A6 sst does not immediately imply that
the equation has to be met for every choice (zi)i∈{t,...,T}, zi ∈ Γt. Only for combination
(zi)i∈{t,...,T} stemming from consumption paths (x¯
t
−i, x
t
i) for which x
t ∈ Xt and x¯ ∈ X
satisfy the premise of axiom A6 sst. In what follows I proceed to show that this restricted
demand is enough to imply strict convexity of of ft ◦ g
−1 on Γt.
Part II (“⇒”): Let zo ∈ Γt. In this part I show that for every such z
o there exists
an open neighborhood Nzo ⊂ Γt such that equation (C.34) implies strict concavity of
ft ◦ g
−1 on Nzo .
In the first step I define a certain consumption path x¯t with x¯ ∈ X such that z˜(x¯t) =
zo. The fact zo ∈ Γt is equivalent to G < z
o < G. By connectedness of X and continuity
of g ◦ u there exists an outcome xo ∈ u−1 [g−1 (zo)] such that zo = u ◦ g(xo). Define
xot = x¯ot = (xo, ..., xo) and find that z˜(xot) = z0. Note that the difference between
the stationary and the non-stationary setting is that only in the stationary setting it
is guaranteed that any zo ∈ Γt can be attained by evaluating a constant consumption
path.
From step two on the proof (including Part III) follows exactly the one laid out for
theorem 6 on page 219 with Goτ = z
o for all τ ∈ {t, ..., T} and ǫ = min{zo −G,G− zo}.
Part IV (“⇐”): “⇐” is implied by theorem 6 for xt = x¯t. 2
Proof of lemma 7: The lemma is an immediate consequence of lemma 5 with the
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convention g1 ◦ u1 = g ◦ u. Then, the representing triples (u, ft, g)t∈{1,...,T} in the sense
of theorems 7 correspond to the representing triples (ut = u, ft, gt = β
t−1g)t∈{1,...,T} in
the sense of theorem 4. Therefore, imposing the unit, the zero level or the range of
g ◦u determines the according values for gt ◦ut in the sense of theorem 4 for all periods.
Thus, the statements in a), b), c) and d) in lemma 5 imply the assertions a), b), c) and
d) in lemma 7. As theorems 8 and 9 are special cases of theorem 7, the reasoning holds
true as well for representations in the sense of theorems 8 and 9. 2
Proof of corollary 8: To the most part, the g+−gauge of the representation in
theorem 9 has already been derived in the proof of the latter theorem.
“⇒”: Before absorbing the parameter ξ into the function g in the proof of theorem 9,
the recursive construction of w˜t for the case corresponding to h ∈
{
exp, 1
exp
}
was given
by equation (C.29), which states
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = gu(xt−1) + βM
expξ(pt, w˜t) .
Simply defining the new utility function u∗ = g ◦ u yields the g = id-gauge. Once the
range of u∗, i.e. g, is fixed, a transformation absorbing the free parameter ξ into the
function g, i.e. u∗, as carried out to arrive at the final representation stated in theorem 9,
is no longer possible.
The representing equation (9.12) is obtained as follows. The representation that is
known to hold by theorem 4 for the specifications of theorem 9 is
Mft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ft ◦ u˜t
]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ftg
−1
(
(1− βt) w˜t
)]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t dt + kt exp
(
ξ w˜t
)]
.
But, recalling that kt ξ > 0, the latter expression is easily recognized as a strictly
increasing transformation of
Mexp
ξ
(pt, w˜t) =
1
ξ
ln
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp
(
ξ w˜t
)]
.
Therefore, also Mexp
ξ
(pt, w˜t) represents the preferences = (t)t∈{1,...,T}.
For the case corresponding to h = id in the representation of theorem 9, the proof of
the latter theorem has derived the following representation
w˜T (xT ) = gu(xT ) and
w˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = gu(xt−1) + βEptw˜t ,
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with
pt t p
′
t ⇔ Eptw˜t ≥ Ep′tw˜t .
Thus, with the definition Mexp
0
(pt, w˜t) = Eptw˜t, the claimed representation also holds
for ξ = 0.
Finally, observe that, as stated in the text, the above definition ofMexp
0
corresponds
to the limit ξ → 0. To see this, simply apply l’Hospital’s rule:
Mexp
0
(pt, w˜t) ≡ lim
ξ→0
Mexp
ξ
(pt, w˜t)
= lim
ξ→0
ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(ξw˜t)
]
ξ
= lim
ξ→0
∂
∂ξ
ln
[ ∫
dpt exp(ξw˜t)
]
∂
∂ξ
ξ
= lim
ξ→0
∫
dptw˜t exp(ξw˜t)∫
dpt exp(ξw˜t)
=
∫
dptw˜t
1 = Eptw˜t .
“⇐”: Implied by theorem 9.
Moreover part: By lemma 7 the function g ◦ u in theorem 9 is uniquely determined,
once its range has been fixed. As seen above, the representing utility function in the
corollary corresponds to the function u∗ = g ◦ u. Thus, fixing its range determines the
function uniquely. Moreover lemma 7 implies that the measures of intertemporal risk
aversion are determined uniquely.
Equation (8.7) defines the measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion in period t
as the function
AIRAt(z) = −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
.
As derived in the proof of theorem 9, the case ξ 6= 0 corresponds to ft ◦ g
−1 =
kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
z) + dt, with dt, kt ∈ IR and kt ξ > 0 (compare C.27). Then, with g1 = g and
gt = β
t−1g, the measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion is calculated to
AIRAt(z) = −
d2
dz2
ft◦g−1(β−t+1z)
d
dz
ft◦g−1(β−t+1z)
= −
d2
dz2
kt exp
„
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1z
«
+dt
d
dz
kt exp
„
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1z
«
+dt
= −
„
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1
«2
exp
„
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1z
«
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1 exp
„
ξ
1−βt
β−t+1z
« = − ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
,
yielding the constant coefficient of absolute intertemporal risk aversion −ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
. In the
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case ξ = 0 it as
AIRAt(z) = −
d2
dz2
ft◦g−1(β−t+1z)
d
dz
ft◦g−1(β−t+1z)
= −
d2
dz2
bt z+kt
d
dz
bt z+kt
= 0 ,
coinciding with the general expression AIRAt(z) = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
.
The measure of relative intertemporal risk aversion in period t is defined in equa-
tion (8.6) as the function
RIRAt(z) = −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
z .
In consequence it holds RIRAt(z) = AIRAt(z) · z, yielding RIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
id. 2
Proof of corollary 9: The proof is divided into two parts. The first part derives a
representation triple in the sense of theorem 4, in which the functions ft correspond to
the identity, and which satisfies the requirements of corollary 9. The second part works
out the corresponding representation as stated in the corollary. The necessity of the
axioms is immediate by theorem 9.
Part I: First, observe that corollary 8 with Bernoulli utility u∗ implies, with the def-
inition u = exp(u∗) ⇔ u∗ = lnu, the representation for the case ξ = 0 (h = id in
theorem 9). The logarithm is introduced because the representation for the case ξ 6= 0
fixes the measure scale for welfare to lnu∗, as it will be observed in the remark at the
end of this part of the proof. In the following, I work out the proof for the case where
ht(z) = ft ◦ g
−1(z) = kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
z) + dt ,
with dt, kt ∈ IR and kt ξ > 0, corresponding to equation (C.27) and case two of the
proof of theorem 9. As I want to gauge the functions ft to identity, I have to allow the
functions gt to vary over time. Therefore, I express the preferences = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in
a representation in the sense of theorem 4. Recall, that a certainty stationary repre-
sentation, as the one above, corresponds to a representation (u, ft, β
t−1g) in the sense
of theorem 4. I take the functions ft as given. Then, the requirement (C.27) for ftg
−1
restated above implies
gt = β
t−1g = βt−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
(ft − dt)
)
.
In consequence, the sequence of triples(
u , ft , gt = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
(ft − dt)
))
t∈{1,...,T}
represents the preferences described in theorem 9, in the sense of the non-stationary
representation theorem 4. By gauge lemma 4 it is known that the same preferences are
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represented by the sequence of triples(
u′t = ft ◦ u , f
′
t = ft ◦ f
−1
t , g
′
t = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
(ft ◦ f
−1
t − dt)
))
t∈{1,...,T}
=
(
u′t = ft ◦ u , f
′
t = id , g
′
t = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
( id− dt)
))
t∈{1,...,T}
. (C.35)
As desired, uncertainty aggregation corresponding to the above representation is linear.
However, observe that
u′t = ft ◦ u = kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
g ◦ u) + dt .
The relation implies that it is impossible to fix u′t to a given range independent of ξ.
18
Therefore, define the functions
u∗t =
(
1
kt
(u′t − dt)
)1−βt
ξ
= exp( ξ
1−βt
g ◦ u)
1−βt
ξ = exp(g ◦ u) (C.36)
Then u∗ = u∗t is independent of ξ and moreover constant in time. Note also, that u
∗
t is
always positive. Using this definition, the representing triples (C.35) write as(
ktu
∗
ξ
1−βt + dt , id , β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
( id− dt)
))
t∈{1,...,T}
.
Finally, the moreover part of corollary 6 allows to eliminate the constants kt and dt from
the above triples, up to the sign of kt (choose a
+
t =
1
kt
( id− dt) and note that ft = id).
I obtain the representing sequence of triples(
u′′t = sgn(ξ) u
∗
ξ
1−βt , f ′′t = id , g
′′
t = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) id
))
t∈{1,...,T}
. (C.37)
The function u∗ in expression (C.37) corresponds to the utility function u stated in
corollary 9. For preference representations in theorem 9, Bernoulli utility lies in the
class u : X → IR. By equation (C.36), the latter class for u corresponds to functions
u∗ lying in the class of continuous functions from X into the positive real numbers, i.e.
u∗ ∈ {u∗ : X → IR++}.
Remark: The requirement of corollary 9 that u, i.e. u∗ in the representing triples above,
is onto the interval U∗ corresponds to setting the range for the measurement of welfare
in period t to the range of
g′′t ◦ u
′′
t = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
u∗
ξ
1−βt
)
= βt−1 ln (u∗) (C.38)
and, thus, g1 ◦ u1 = lnu
∗.
Part II: In the following I calculate the representation expressed by the sequence of
18Or from a different perspective, g′t ◦ u
′
t = β
t−1 1−βt
ξ ln
(
1
kt
(u′t − dt)
)
depends on ξ. Thus fixing the
range of u′t as is, would not allow for a common measure scale for welfare.
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triples in (C.37). Let U∗ =
[
U∗, U
∗
]
. Then, observe that ∆G′′t = β
t ln U
∗
U∗
and ϑ′t = 0.
Thus, with the same definition for βt = 1 − θ
′′
t as in theorem 7 (compare page 228), it
holds
u˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = g
′′−1
t−1
[
θ′′t−1 g
′′
t−1 ◦ u
′′
t−1(xt−1) + (1− θ
′′
t−1)
∆G′′t−1
∆G′′t
g′′t ◦M
f ′′t (pt, u˜t)
]
= g′′
−1
t−1
[
(1− βt−1) g
′′
t−1 ◦ u
′′
t−1(xt−1) + βt−1 β
−1 g′′t ◦M
f ′′t (pt, u˜t)
]
= sgn(ξ) exp
(
ξ
βt−2(1−βt−1)
[
(1− βt−1) β
t−2 1−βt−1
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) ·
sgn(ξ) u∗(xt−1)
ξ
1−βt−1
)
+ βt−1 β
t−2 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) Ept u˜t
)])
= sgn(ξ) exp
(
ln
(
u∗(xt−1)
ξ)) exp(βt−1 1−βt1−βt−1 ln ( sgn(ξ) Ept u˜t))
= sgn(ξ) u∗(xt−1)
ξ
(
sgn(ξ) Ept u˜t
)β
. (C.39)
Where I have used the relation 1−βt
1−βt−1
= ββ−1t−1 to arrive at the last line. Distinguishing
the two cases where sgn(ξ) > 0 and sgn(ξ) < 0, equation (C.39) corresponds to the
representation stated in the theorem.
Moreover part: Equation (C.38) in the remark shows that the demand of u∗, corre-
sponding to u in the corollary, being onto the given interval U∗ fixes also the range for
the measurement of welfare g′′ ◦ u′′t . Therefore, the moreover part follows as in corol-
lary 8. 2
Proof of corollary 10: The representation is a simple transformation of corollary 9.
“⇒”: For ξ 6= 0 define v˜t : X˜t → IR for t ∈ {1, ..., T} by v˜t = (sgn(ξ) u˜t)
1
ξ , where u˜t
defines the recursive construction of the representation in corollary 9. Then it is
v˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = u(xt−1)
(
Ept sgn(ξ) u˜t
)β
ξ
= u(xt−1)
(
Ept v˜
ξ
t
)β
ξ
= u(xt−1)
(
Mα=ξ(pt, v˜t)
)β
,
yielding the stated construction of v˜t. Then the representation of corollary 9 translates
into
pt t p
′
t
⇔ Ept u˜t ≥ Ep′t u˜t
⇔ sgn(ξ) Ept sgn(ξ) u˜t ≥ sgn(ξ) Ep′t sgn(ξ) u˜t
⇔ sgn(ξ) Ept v˜
ξ
t ≥ sgn(ξ) Ep′t v˜
ξ
t
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⇔
(
Ept v˜
ξ
t
)ξ
≥
(
Ep′t v˜
ξ
t
)ξ
⇔ Mα=ξ(p′t, v˜t) ≥ M
α=ξ(p′t, v˜t)
for all pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
For the case ξ = 0 the stated representation corresponds to
M0(pt, v˜t) = exp
( ∫
dpt ln v˜t
)
= exp
( ∫
dpt ln
[
u(xt)
(
exp
[
Ept ln(v˜t+1)
])β])
= exp
( ∫
dpt lnu(xt) + β
[
Ept ln(v˜t+1)
])
Define u∗ = lnu and v˜∗t = ln v˜t. Then the representation is ordinally equivalent to∫
dptu
∗(xt) + β
[
Ept ln(v˜t+1)
]
For the case ξ = 0 the stated representation corresponds to
v˜t−1(xt−1, pt) = u(xt−1)
(
exp
[
Ept ln(v˜t)
])β
= u(xt−1) exp
[
Ept β ln(v˜t)
]
.
Defining v˜∗t = ln v˜t and u
∗ = lnu⇔ u = expu∗ yields the representation
v˜∗t−1(xt−1, pt) = ln
(
exp[u∗(xt−1)] exp
[
Ept βv˜
∗
t
])
= u∗(xt−1) + Ept β v˜
∗
t .
But the latter construction of aggregate welfare, corresponds to that of corollary 8 for
preferences corresponding to ξ = 0 (intertemporally additive expected utility). More-
over, the uncertainty evaluation
M0(pt, v˜t) = exp
( ∫
dpt ln v˜t
)
= exp
( ∫
dpt v˜
∗
t
)
is a strictly increasing transformation of Ept v˜
∗
t . Therefore, the representation for the
case ξ = 0 is equivalent to the formulation in corollary 8.
“⇐”: Immediate consequence of corollary 9.
Moreover part: Is implied by the moreover part of corollary 9. Again, the measure
scale for welfare is fixed for the first period to the range lnU∗. 2
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C.3 Proofs for Chapter 10
Proof of theorem 11: “⇒”: Translating the condition (10.2) for a preference for an
early resolution of uncertainty into the representation of theorem 4 yields the inequality
λ(xt, pt+1) + (1− λ)(xt, p
′
t+1) t (xt, λpt+1 + (1− λ)p
′
t+1)
⇔ λftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1M
ft+1(pt+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
+(1− λ)ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1M
ft+1(p′t+1, u˜t+1) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
≥ ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1
[
λ
∫
dpt+1ft+1u˜t+1
+(1− λ)
∫
dpt+1ft+1u˜t+1
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
Defining γ =
∫
dpt+1ft+1u˜t+1 ∈ ft+1(Ut+1) and γ
′ =
∫
dp′t+1ft+1u˜t+1 ∈ ft+1(Ut+1) yields
⇔ λftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
+(1− λ)ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ
′) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
≥ ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1
[
λγ + (1− λ)γ′
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
. (C.40)
Condition (10.2) in the definition of a preference for an early resolution of uncertainty
has to hold for all lotteries pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1 and λ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, inequality (C.40)
has to hold for all γ, γ′ ∈ ft+1(Ut+1), implying that the expression
ft ◦ g
−1
t
[
θt gt ◦ ut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1 ◦ f
−1
t+1(γ) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
(C.41)
has to be convex in γ ∈ ft+1(Ut+1). Similarly, replacing t by t and ≥ by ≤ for the case
of a preference for a late resolution of uncertainty implies concavity of expression (C.41).
“⇐”: All steps showing the necessity of the convexity condition of expression (C.41)
can be carried out backwards, implying sufficiency. 2
Proof of theorem 12: The proof is divided into three parts. First, I translate
axiom A9 into the representation theorem 7 and derive a functional equation with known
solution. In the second part I work out the corresponding representation and translate it
from recursive lotteries into probabilities defined directly on consumption paths. Finally,
part three shows that the functional representation implies the axioms.
Part I (“⇒”): By axioms A1-A3, A4’ and A5’ a representation for = (t)t∈{1,...,T} in
the sense theorem 4 has to exist. Indifference with respect to the timing of uncertainty
resolution in the sense of axiom A9, formally corresponds to a weak preference for
early and late resolution of uncertainty. Therefore, relation (C.40), worked out in the
proof of theorem 11, has to hold with equality. Defining ht = gt ◦ f
−1
t ∀ t ∈ {1, ..., T},
y = θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt, z = θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ) and z
′ = θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ
′) yields the
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following equality
λftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
+(1− λ)ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1(γ
′) + θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= ftg
−1
t
[
θt gtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1 gt+1f
−1
t+1
[
λγ + (1− λ)γ′
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
⇔ λht
[
y + z
]
+ (1− λ)ht
[
y + z′
]
= ht
[
y + θtθ
−1
t+1h
−1
t+1
[
λht+1(θt+1θ
−1
t z) + (1− λ)ht+1(θt+1θ
−1
t z
′)
]]
⇔ h−1t
[
λht
[
y + z
]
+ (1− λ)ht
[
y + z′
]]
− y
= θtθ
−1
t+1h
−1
t+1
[
λht+1(θt+1θ
−1
t z) + (1− λ)ht+1(θt+1θ
−1
t z
′)
]
. (C.42)
As the right hand side of equation (C.42) does not depend on y, the left hand side has
to be constant in y. By part two and part three of the proof of theorem 9, or by Acze´l
(1966, 153), the only solutions for ht satisfying this condition are
ht(z) = at exp(ξtz) + bt and
ht(z) = atz + bt
with at, ξt 6= 0.
Case 1, h1(z) = a1 exp(ξ1z) + b1:
In the case h1(z) = a1 exp(ξ1z)+ b1 note that either a1 and ξ1 have to be both negative,
or they have to be both positive, in order to yield an increasing function ht (as required
in theorem 4). In both cases, the inverse calculates to h−11 (z) =
1
ξ1
ln( z−b1
a1
). Then the
left hand side of equation (C.42) translates for t = 1 into
1
ξ1
ln
[
1
a1
{
λ
(
a1 exp(ξ1y) exp(ξ1z) + b1
)
+(1− λ)
(
a1 exp(ξ1y) exp(ξ1z
′) + b1
)
− b1
}]
− y
= 1
ξ1
ln
[
λ
(
exp(ξ1z)
)
+ (1− λ)
(
exp(ξ1z
′)
)]
.
Define the functions r(z) = exp(ξ1 z) and s(z) = h2(θ2θ
−1
1 z). Then equation (C.42) for
t = 1 turns into the relation
r−1
[
λr(z) + (1− λ)r(z′)
]
= s−1
[
λs(z) + (1− λ)s(z′)
]
.
By Hardy et al. (1964, 66) it follows that S is a nondegenerate affine transformation
of r. Therefore, it must hold that s(z) = h2(θ2θ
−1
1 z) = a2 exp(ξ1 z) + b2. Then,
h2(z) = a2 exp(
ξ1 θ1
θ2
z) + b2 .
250
C.3. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 10
Defining ξ2 =
ξ1 θ1
θ2
, the same reasoning for t = 2 yields h3(θ3θ
−1
2 z) = a3 exp(ξ2 z) + b3
h3(z) = a3 exp(
ξ2 θ2
θ3
z) + b3 .
Defining inductively ξt+1 =
ξtθt
θt+1
and recognizing that the definition implies that θt ξt ≡ ξ
is constant over time, find inductively that for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}:
ht(z) = at exp(
ξ
θt
z) + bt (C.43)
with at ξ > 0.
Case 2, h1(z) = a1z + b1:
For h1 linear, the same reasoning as in case 1 implies that ht has to be linear for all
periods. Thus, the solution in case 2 is
ht(z) = atz + bt
for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Moreover, the constants at have to be strictly positive in order to
yield an increasing function ht as required by theorem 4.
Part II (“⇒”): In part two I derive the representations corresponding to the functions
ht = ft ◦ g
−1
t derived in part one. Starting with case 1, I have ht = at exp(
ξ
θt
z) + bt for
all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Defining the affine function at(z) = at z+ bt simplifies the notation to
ht(z) = at exp(
ξ
θt
z) and h−1t (z) =
θt
ξ
ln(a−1t z) for the inverse. To explore this relation
it proves helpful to employ a strictly monotonic transformation of the functions u˜t for
the recursive construction of the representation. Defining these as v˜t = ft ◦ u˜t for all
{1, ..., T}, find find
v˜t(xt, pt+1) = ft ◦ u˜t(xt, pt+1)
= ht
[
θtgtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1h
−1
t+1
[∫
dpt+1ft+1u˜t+1
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= at exp
(
ξ
θt
[
θtgtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1
θt+1
ξ
ln
[
a−1t+1
∫
dpt+1v˜t+1
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
])
= at exp
(
ξgtut(xt) + ln
[
a−1t+1
∫
dpt+1v˜t+1
]
+ ξθ−1t+1ϑt
)
= at exp(ξgtut(xt))
[
a−1t+1
∫
dpt+1v˜t+1
]
exp(ξθ−1t+1ϑt) .
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Recursively this relation yields
v˜t(xt, pt+1) = ft ◦ u˜t(xt, pt+1)
= at exp(ξgtut(xt))
[
a−1t+1
∫
dpt+1at+1 exp(ξgt+1ut+1(xt+1))[
a−1t+2
∫
dpt+2v˜t+2
]
exp(ξθ−1t+2ϑt+1)
]
exp(ξθ−1t+1ϑt)
= at exp(ξgtut(xt))
[∫
dpt+1 exp(ξgt+1ut+1(xt+1))∫
dpt+2a
−1
t+2v˜t+2
]
exp(ξθ−1t+2ϑt+1) exp(ξθ
−1
t+1ϑt)
= at exp(ξgtut(xt))
[∏T
τ=t+1
∫
dpτ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
]
∏T−1
τ=t exp(ξθ
−1
τ+1ϑτ ) .
Observe that the brackets delimit the argument of the product, not of the integrals. The
integral
∫
dp
(xτ ,pτ+1)
τ is not only over the argument xτ of the expression exp(ξgτuτ (xτ )),
but also over the measure pτ+1 determining the integration in the subsequent period.
Then, preferences in period t are represented by the uncertainty aggregation rule
Mft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ft ◦ u˜t
]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t v˜t
]
.
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t at exp(ξgtut(xt))
[∏T
τ=t+1
∫
dpτ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
]
∏T−1
τ=t exp(ξθ
−1
τ+1ϑτ )
]
= f−1t
[
at
[∏T
τ=t
∫
dpτ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
]∏T−1
τ=t exp(ξθ
−1
τ+1ϑτ )
]
WithMft(pt, u˜t) being a representation, so is any strictly increasing transformation. In
particular, note that f−1t is strictly increasing and that
∏T−1
τ=t exp(ξθ
−1
τ+1ϑτ ) is a positive
constant. Furthermore, let k = 1 for at, ξ > 0, and k = −1 for at, ξ < 0. Then, the
following expression represents preferences over uncertain period t lotteries expressed in
terms of the recursive lotteries pt
k
∏T
τ=t
∫
dp
(xτ ,pτ+1)
τ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ )) , (C.44)
in the sense that
pt t p
′
t ⇔ k
∏T
τ=t
∫
dpτ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ )) ≥ k
∏T
τ=t
∫
dp′τ exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
for all pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
Finally, I translate the representation (C.44) into the representation stated in the
theorem applying the reduced probability measures pxt defined on the set of consumption
paths. In chapter 10.2 I have shown how to infer such a probability measure pxt ∈ ∆(Xt)
from any given temporal lottery pt ∈ Pt, t ∈ {1, ..., T}. The probability measures defined
in that section will now be used to rearrange the expression (C.44) into the representation
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stated in the theorem. To start with, I demonstrate the according transformation of
the first two measures pt and pt+1 in expression (C.44). To this purpose, I suppress the
terms that that go beyond period τ = t+ 2.∫
Xt×Pt+1
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t exp(ξgtut(xt))
∫
Xt+1×Pt+2
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 exp(ξgt+1ut(xt+1))
=
∫
Xt
dIPXt(xt)
∫
Pt+1
dIPPt+1|xt(pt+1)
∫
Xt+1×Pt+2
dp
(xt+1,pt+2)
t+1 (xt+1, pt+2)
exp(ξgtut(xt)) exp(ξgt+1ut(xt+1)) .
Observe that IPPt+1|xt(pt+1) is a function of xt. Moreover, no term in the expression
directly depends on the measure pt+1 in the third integral (only on its arguments).
‘Integrating out’ pt+1 eliminates the temporal information on what uncertainty resolves
in period t, and yields the following expression (see chapter 10.2):
=
∫
Xt
dIPXt(xt)
∫
Xt+1×Pt+2
dIPXt+1,Pt+2|xt(xt+1, pt+2)
exp(ξgtut(xt)) exp(ξgt+1ut(xt+1)) .
Inductively this manipulation can be carried on for all periods τ ∈ {t+1, ...T} as follows:∫
Xτ×Pτ+1
dIPXτ ,Pτ+1|xτ−1,...,xt(xτ , pτ+1)
∫
Xτ+1×Pτ+2
dp
(xτ+1,pτ+2)
τ+1
=
∫
Xτ×Pτ+1
dIPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt(xτ ) dIP
Pτ+1|xτ ,...,xt(pτ+1)
∫
Xτ+1×Pτ+2
dp
(xτ+1,pτ+2)
τ+1
=
∫
Xτ
dIPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt(xτ )
∫
Xτ+1×Pτ+2
dIPXτ+1,Pτ+2|xτ ,...,xt(xτ+1, pτ+2) ,
where, in general, the measure IPXτ+1,Pτ+2|xτ ,...,xt depends on the integration variables
xτ , ..., xt of the preceding integrations. See chapter 10.2 for details. Applying this
manipulation to all periods transforms the representation (C.44) into
k
∏T
τ=t
∫
Xτ
dIPXτ |xτ−1,...,xt(xτ ) exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
= k
∫
X
t dpxt
∏T
τ=t exp(ξgτuτ (xτ ))
= k
∫
X
t dpxt exp
(∑T
τ=t ξgτuτ (xτ )
)
, (C.45)
with k < 0 for ξ < 0 and k > 0 for ξ > 0. Define, as in equation (10.6) stated
in the theorem, the aggregate utility function u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ). Replacing
the variable k in expression (C.45) with the function 1
ξ
ln, corresponding to a strictly
increasing transformation, yields the representation
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt . (C.46)
It would correspond to a u+−gauge, when the range of the functions gt had been fixed
exogeneously. However, as the latter is not the case in theorem 12, I can redefine the
function gt as g
∗
t = |ξ| gt to absorb the constant ξ up to its sign. Then, For ξ > 0
define h = exp to obtain the representation stated in equation (10.7). For ξ < 0,
defining h = exp−1 = 1
exp
takes up the sign of ξ and, thus, also yields the preference
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representation stated in equation (10.7).
In case 2, it was found that ht = at z + bt for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Again, the definition
of the affine functions at(z) = at z + bt, simplifies the notation to ht(z) = at z and
h−1t (z) = a
−1
t z. Then, I find
v˜t(xt, pt+1) = ft ◦ u˜t(xt, pt+1)
= ht
[
θtgtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1h
−1
t+1
[∫
dpt+1ft+1u˜t+1
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= at
[
θtgtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1
[∫
dpt+1a
−1
t+1v˜t+1
]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
,
which recursively yields
v˜t(xt, pt+1) = at
[
θtgtut(xt) + θtθ
−1
t+1
[ ∫
dpt+1a
−1
t+1at+1
[
θt+1gt+1ut+1(xt+1) +
θt+1θ
−1
t+2
[ ∫
dpt+2a
−1
t+2v˜t+2
]
+ θt+1θ
−1
t+2ϑt+1
]]
+ θtθ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= atθt
[
gtut(xt) +
[ ∫
dpt+1
[
gt+1ut+1(xt+1) +[ ∫
dpt+2θ
−1
t+2a
−1
t+2v˜t+2
]
+ θ−1t+2ϑt+1
]]
+ θ−1t+1ϑt
]
= atθt
[
gtut(xt) +
∫
dpt+1gt+1ut+1(xt+1) +
∫
dpt+2θ
−1
t+2a
−1
t+2v˜t+2
+θ−1t+2ϑt+1 + θ
−1
t+1ϑt
]
= atθt
[
gtut(xt) +
∑T
τ=t+1
∫
dpτgτuτ (xτ )
]
+ atθt
∑T−1
τ=t θ
−1
τ+1ϑτ .
Again, the integral
∫
dp
(xτ ,pτ+1)
τ is not only over xτ , but also over the measure pτ+1, deter-
mining the integration in the subsequent period. Preferences in period t are represented
by the uncertainty aggregation rule
Mft(pt, u˜t) = f
−1
t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t ft ◦ u˜t
]
= f−1t
[ ∫
dp
(xt,pt+1)
t v˜t
]
.
= f−1t
[
atθt
[∑T
τ=t
∫
dpτgτuτ (xτ )
]
+ atθt
∑T−1
τ=t θ
−1
τ+1ϑτ
]
.
WithMft(pt, u˜t), also any strictly increasing transformation represents period t prefer-
ences. In particular, the following expression constitutes a preference representation∑T
τ=t
∫
dpτgτuτ (xτ ) ,
so that
pt t p
′
t ⇔
∑T
τ=t
∫
dpτgτuτ (xτ ) ≥
∑T
τ=t
∫
dp′τgτuτ (xτ ) ,
for all pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt.
254
C.3. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 10
The translation into the non-recursive representation works similar to case 1,∑T
τ=t
∫
dpτgτuτ (xτ )
=
∫
dp
xt,pt+1
t
[
gtut(xt) +
∫
dp
xt+1,pt+2
t+1
[
gt+1ut+1(xt+1) +
[
...+
∫
dpxTT gTuT (xT )
]]]
=
∫
dp
xt,pt+1
t
∫
dp
xt+1,pt+2
t+1 ...
∫
dpxTT gTut(xT )
gtut(xt) + gt+1ut+1(xt+1) + ...+ gTuT (xT )
=
∫
dIPXt(xt)dIP
Xt+1|xt(xt+1) .... dIP
XT |xT−1,...,xt(xT )
gtut(xt) + gt+1ut+1(xt+1) + ...+ gTuT (xT )
=
∫
dpxt
∑T
τ=t gτuτ (xτ )
=
∫
dpxt u˜t(x
t) ,
yielding the representation stated in equation (10.7) for h = id.
Part III (“⇐”): As shown above, the representation is a special case of theorem 4.
Therefore axioms A1-A5’ follow immediately from “⇐” of theorem 4. The following
calculation shows that axiom A10 is satisfied as well. For the case h = exp define k = 1
and for the case h = 1
exp
define k = −1. Moreover, let pet = λ(xt, pt+1)+ (1−λ)(xt, p
′
t+1)
denote the lottery with early resolution of uncertainty and let plt = (xt, λpt+1+(1−λ)p
′
t+1)
denote the lottery with late resolution of uncertainty. Then, for h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
} and for
all t ∈ {1, ..., T − 1}, xt ∈ X, pt+1, p
′
t+1 ∈ Pt+1 and λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds
Mh
(
pet
x, u˜t
)
= k ln
[ ∫
dpet
x exp
(∑T
τ=t kgτuτ (xτ )
) ]
= k ln
[
λ exp
(
kgtut(xt)
) ∫
dpxt+1 exp
(∑T
τ=t+1 kgτuτ (xτ )
)
+(1− λ) exp
(
kgtut(xt)
) ∫
dp′xt+1 exp
(∑T
τ=t+1 kgτuτ (xτ )
) ]
= k ln
[
exp
(
kgtut(xt)
)(
λ
∫
dpxt+1 + (1− λ)
∫
dp′xt+1
exp
(∑T
τ=t+1 kgτuτ (xτ )
) ]
= k ln
[ ∫
dplt
x
exp
(∑T
τ=t kgτuτ (xτ )
) ]
=Mh
(
plt
x
, u˜t
)
Thus indifference between early and late resolution of uncertainty prevails. In the case
h = id the uncertainty aggregation rules are linear and the same equality in the repre-
sentation holds.
Moreover part: “⇒”: That two different sequences (gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} rep-
resenting (t)t∈{1,...,T} at most differ up to positive affine transformations follows from
the representation on certain consumption path and the moreover part in theorem 4.
The proof that the common multiplicative factor a in g′t = agt+bt has to equal unity for
the cases h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
} is the same as in the proof of the moreover part of theorem 9.
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“⇐”: Let g′t = gt + bt with bt ∈ IR for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Define as before k = 1 for the
case h = exp and k = −1 for the case h = 1
exp
. Then, for the case h ∈ {exp, 1
exp
}, the
following equality holds for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}.
Mh
(
pt
x, u˜′t
)
= k ln
[ ∫
dpt
x exp
(∑T
τ=t kgτuτ (xτ ) + kbτ
) ]
= k ln
[ ∫
dpt
x exp
(∑T
τ=t kgτuτ (xτ )
) ]
+
∑T
τ=t bτ
=Mh
(
pt
x, u˜t
)
+
∑T
τ=t bτ
Thus, if one of the sequences (gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} represents (t)t∈{1,...,T}, so
does the other:
Mh
(
pt
x, u˜′t
)
≥ Mh
(
p′t
x
, u˜′t
)
⇔ Mh
(
pt
x, u˜t
)
+
∑T
τ=t bτ ≥ M
h
(
p′t
x
, u˜t
)
+
∑T
τ=t bτ
⇔ Mh
(
pt
x, u˜t
)
≥ Mh
(
p′t
x
, u˜t
)
.
For the case where h = id, intertemporal and uncertainty aggregation are linear and the
equivalence
E
pxt
u˜′t(x
t) ≥ E
p′xt
u˜′t(x
t)
⇔ E
pxt
a u˜t(x
t) +
∑T
τ=t bτ ≥ Ep′xt
a u˜t (x
t) +
∑T
τ=t bτ
⇔ E
pxt
u˜′t(x
t) ≥ E
p′xt
u˜′t(x
t)
implies that (gt)t∈{1,...,T} and (g
′
t)t∈{1,...,T} both represent (t)t∈{1,...,T} if the relation
g′t = agt + bt holds with a ∈ IR++ and bτ ∈ IR for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. 2
Proof of corollary 11: Using the representation of corollary 7 instead of theorem 4,
when calculating the representation in the proof of theorem 12, allows to trade in the
freedom to pick the functions ut in order to set the functions gt to identity. In con-
sequence, the aggregate utility function is defined as u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t uτ (x
t
τ ). Moreover,
with gt = id for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}, fixing ut also fixes gt ◦ ut. Therefore, lemma 5 assures
that the risk measure AIRAt and RIRAt are unique. Precisely, fixing welfare for the
worst outcomes in all periods in the best outcome in one period is an immediate alter-
native to cases c) and d) in lemma 5 to eliminate the freedom in the choice of gt for all
t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Then, the representation (C.46) derived in the proof of theorem 4 holds:
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt ,
with u˜t(x
t) =
∑T
τ=t uτ (x
t
τ ) and without the freedom to absorb ξ into the functions
gt ◦ ut = ut, as done in the proof of theorem 4. The proof that the case where h = id
256
C.3. PROOFS FOR CHAPTER 10
corresponds to the (limiting) definition of Mexp
0
(pxt , u˜t) = Epxt
u˜t is found in the proof
of corollary 8.
Moreover part: As noted above, lemma 7 implies the uniqueness of the risk measures
AIRAt and RIRAt. Equation (8.7) defines the measure of absolute intertemporal risk
aversion in period t as the function
AIRAt(z) = −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
.
As derived in the proof of theorem 12, the case ξ 6= 0 corresponds to
ht(z) = gt ◦ f
−1
t (z) = at exp(
ξ
θt
z) + bt
Therefore, the measure of absolute intertemporal risk aversion calculates to
AIRAt(z) = −
d2
dz2
ft◦g
−1
t (z)
d
dz
ft◦g
−1
t (z)
= −
d2
dz2
kt exp
„
ξ
θt
z
«
+dt
d
dz
kt exp
„
ξ
θt
z
«
+dt
= −
„
ξ
θt
«2
exp
„
ξ
θt
z
«
ξ
θt
exp
„
ξ
θt
z
« = − ξ
θt
,
for ξ 6= 0. The same relation is easily seen to hold as well for ξ = 0 where ft ◦ gt is
linear in z. The measure of relative intertemporal risk aversion in period t is defined in
equation (8.6) as the function
RIRAt(z) = −
(ft◦g−1t )
′′
(z)
(ft◦g−1t )
′
(z)
z .
In consequence it holds RIRAt(z) = AIRAt(z) · z, yielding RIRAt = −
ξ
θt
id. 2
Proof of theorem 13: “⇒”: Adding certainty stationarity to the assumptions of
theorem 12 implies, as shown in the proof of theorem 7, that Bernoulli utility can be
picked identical in all periods. Moreover, in that case it exist β ∈ IR++ and g : X → IR
such that the functions gt can be chosen as gt = β
t−1g. Then, in the representation of
theorem 12, the construction of aggregate utility simplifies to the form
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ) =
T∑
τ=t
βτ−1g ◦ u(xtτ ) ≡
T∑
τ=t
βτ−1u∗(xtτ ) , (C.47)
where the simple redefinition of Bernoulli utility as u∗(xtτ ) = g ◦ u(x
t
τ ) yields the
g = id−gauge. Moreover, in the formulation of the theorem, the range of welfare
u∗(xtτ ) = g ◦u(x
t
τ ), i.e. u in the notation of the theorem, is fixed exogenously. Therefore,
as in corollary 11, the parameter ξ in equation (C.46) stemming from the relation
ht(z) = gt ◦ f
−1
t (z) = at exp(
ξ
1−βt
z) + bt (C.48)
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cannot be absorbed by the function u∗. In consequence, for the case ξ 6= 0, the represen-
tation (C.46) prevails, just as for the g+−gauge in corollary 11. Also as in the previous
g+− corollaries 8 and 11, it is found that the case ξ = 0 is covered by the representation
using the uncertainty aggregation rule Mexp
0
(pxt , u˜t) = Epxt
u˜t.
“⇐”: Implied by theorems 7 and 12.
Moreover part: By lemma 7, the choice of the range of u = u1 = g1 ◦ u1 as W
∗ fixes
the measure scale of welfare for all periods. Therefore, corollary 11 covers the moreover
part with θt = 1− βt (see proof of theorem 7). 2
Proof of corollary 12: “⇒”: First, gauge lemma 4 is applied to translate the
sequence of representing triples from the general representation into the Kreps Porteus
gauge. Then, the (per period) utility function employed in corollary 12 is chosen in order
to be time invariant and fix the measure scale for welfare. Finally, instead of working
out the representation from the beginning, the new functions u and gt are substituted
for the old ones into the reduced non-recursive representation.
The preferences in the general certainty stationary representation corresponding to
the form given in equation (C.47) for the case ξ 6= 0 correspond to the sequence of
representing triples(
u , kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
gt) + dt , gt
)
t∈{1,...,T}
. (C.49)
An application of gauge lemma 5 with s = kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
gt) + dt renders uncertainty ag-
gregation linear. It transforms the representation to(
kt exp(
ξ
1−βt
gt ◦ u) + dt , id ,
1−βt
ξ
ln
(
1
kt
(id− dt)
))
t∈{1,...,T}
The moreover part of corollary 6 allows to eliminate the constants kt and dt from the
above triples, up to the sign of kt (choose a
+
t =
1
kt
( id − dt) and note that ft = id).
Furthermore, it is gt = β
t−1g, implying the representation(
u′ = sgn(ξ) exp
(
ξ
1−βt
βt−1g ◦ u
)
, f ′t = id , g
′
t =
1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) id
))
t∈{1,...,T}
.
In the representation of corollary 12, I use a particular utility function u, henceforth u∗,
whose range can be fixed independent of the period, and which determines the ranges
of welfare g′ ◦ u′ independent of ξ. Define
u∗ =
(
sgn(ξ) u′
) 1−βt
ξ βt−1=
(
sgn(ξ) sgn(ξ) exp
(
ξ
1−βt
βt−1g ◦ u
)) 1−βtξ βt−1
= exp
(
g ◦ u
)
.
Then, the function u∗ is independent of t (as g and u are so), it is always positive (being
an image of the exponential function) and, moreover, it fixes welfare independent of the
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parameter ξ, as can be inferred from the following equation:
g′ ◦ u′ = 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) u′
)
= 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) sgn(ξ) u∗
ξ βt−1
1−βt
)
= βt−1 ln u∗ .
To obtain the corresponding representation observe that gt = β
t−1g in the represen-
tation corresponding to the triples (C.49) has to be transformed with the inverse of
s = exp( ξ
1−βt
βt−1g) to 1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) id
)
while f becomes the identity and u is replaced
with u′ = sgn(ξ)
(
u∗
) ξ βt−1
1−βt . Applying these changes to the representation (C.45) yields
k
∫
dpxt exp
(∑T
τ=t ξgτuτ (xτ )
)
= sgn(ξ)
∫
dpxt exp
(∑T
τ=t ξβ
τ−1gu(xτ )
)
= sgn(ξ)
∫
dpxt exp
(∑T
τ=t ξ
1−βt
ξ
ln
(
sgn(ξ) sgn(ξ)
(
u∗(xτ )
) ξ βt−1
1−βt
))
= sgn(ξ)
∫
dpxt exp
(∑T
τ=t ln
(
u∗(xτ )
)ξ βt−1)
= sgn(ξ)
∫
dpxt
∏T
τ=t
(
u∗(xτ )
)ξ βt−1
. (C.50)
Defining u˜ = sgn(ξ)
∏T
τ=t
(
u′(xτ )
)ξ βt−1
brings about the representation stated in corol-
lary 12 for the case ξ 6= 0. For the case ξ = 0 the representation equals that of theorem
13 as Mexp
0
(pxt , u˜t) = Epxt
u˜t (see corollary 8).
“⇐”: Since the representation is shown to be equivalent to that of theorem 13, necessity
of the axioms follows from the proof of the latter theorem.
Moreover part: As the the coefficients of intertemporal risk aversion are gague invari-
ant, the result is covered by corollary 8. 2
Proof of corollary 13: “⇒”: The corollary is an immediate consequence of the
representation established in equation (C.50) in the proof of corollary 12, which, with
u ≡ u∗, is a strictly increasing transformation of the expression
sgn(ξ)
(∫
dpxt
∏T
τ=t
(
u(xτ )
)ξ βt−1) 1|ξ|
.
The latter is again ordinally equivalent to(∫
dpxt
∏T
τ=t
(
u(xτ )
)ξ βt−1)1ξ
.
Defining u˜ =
∏T
τ=t
(
u′(xτ )
)βt−1
yields the representation stated in corollary 13 for the
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case ξ 6= 0. For the case ξ = 0 the stated representation is
Mξ=0(pxt , u˜t) = exp
(∫
dpxt ln
(∏T
τ=t
(
u(xτ )
)βt−1))
= exp
(∫
dpxt
∑T
τ=t ln
(
u(xτ )
)βt−1)
= exp
(∫
dpxt
∑T
τ=t β
t−1 ln
(
u(xτ )
))
. (C.51)
Thus, Bernoulli utility used in the above representation is a logarithmic transformation
of the certainty additive Bernoulli utility function (welfare) employed in the representa-
tion of theorem 13. The class of preferences represented by the evaluation corresponding
to expression (C.51) is obviously the same as those represented for ξ = 0 in theorem 13
or corollary 12.
“⇐”: Implied by corollary 12.
Moreover part: Implied by corollary 12. 2
Proof of corollary 14: “⇒”: I give the reasoning as well for the stationary as
for the non-stationary setting, as the latter is referred to in the text. For the non-
stationary setting equation (C.46) in the proof of theorem 12 has already pointed out
the representation for the general u+ gauge as
pt t p
′
t ⇔ M
expξ(pxt , u˜t) ≥M
expξ(p′xt , u˜t) ∀ pt, p
′
t ∈ Pt ,
where aggregate welfare has been defined through the recursion
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
gτ ◦ uτ (x
t
τ ) .
For the Epstein-Zin gauge, the outcome space is assumed to be a subset of IR. Moreover
Bernoulli utility (in every period) is assumed to be strictly increasing in the consumption
level. Thus the identity can be chosen as the representing Bernoulli utility function.
Then, with u = ut = id, in the non-stationary case aggregate utility is characterized by
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
gτ (x
t
τ ) , (C.52)
and the form of the evaluation of uncertain scenarios, characterized by intertemporal
risk aversion, stays unchanged. For the certainty stationary setting it is gt = β
t−1g and
thus
u˜t(x
t) =
T∑
τ=t
βt−1g(xtτ ) .
“⇐”: Implied by theorem 13.
Moreover part: See corollary 11 (non-stationary setting) and theorem 13 (certainty
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stationary setting).
2
Proof of theorem 14: The assertion follows immediately from comparing the func-
tions characterizing intertemporal risk aversion in the representations of theorem 9 and
theorem 13. These imply that the two representations can only coincide for the case
where β = 1.
“⇒”: Preferences satisfying the stated axioms have to be representable in the sense
of theorems 9 and 13.19 Choose a nondegenerate closed interval W ∗ ⊂ IR++ and re-
quire that u = uwelf is onto W ∗. Then, due to risk stationarity, by corollary 8 there
have to exist ξ and β such that the functions ft ◦ gt characterizing intertemporal risk
aversion are specified by the coefficients AIRAt = −
ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
. Analogously, due to
timing indifference, by theorem 13 there have to exist ξ′ and β′ such that the func-
tions ft ◦ gt characterizing intertemporal risk aversion are specified by the coefficients
AIRAt = −
ξ′
1−β′t
.
Both representations, that of corollary 8 and that of theorem 13, are special cases of
the certainty stationary representation in theorem 7. For given preferences 
= (t)t∈{1,...,T}, coincidence of the representations on certain consumption paths im-
plies that β = β′. In consequence, it also holds that βt = β
′
t. As the measure scale
for welfare is fixed to W ∗ in the first period, lemma 7 states that the characterizations
AIRAt of intertemporal risk aversion are unique for all t ∈ {1, ..., T}. Therefore, com-
parison of the measures of intertemporal risk aversion for period one implies that ξ = ξ′.
Then, the requirement that furthermore AIRAt
!
= − ξ
βt−1(1−βt)
!
= − ξ
(1−βt)
for all t > 1,
cannot be satisfied unless β = 1 or ξ = 0. However, the requirement of strict intertem-
poral risk aversion as formulated in axiom A6 sst implies implies ξ < 0. Therefore it has
to hold that β = 1.
“⇐”: Except for axiom A6 sst all of the stated axioms are implied by theorems 9 and 13.
Axiom A6 sst is implied by theorem 10, case a). 2
19Recall that axiom A9 implies certainty stationarity as described in axiom A7.
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